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A b st r a c t
This thesis empirically analyses the role that human rights and democracy have played 
in European Union foreign policy towards Ukraine and Egypt since the end of the Cold 
War. It departs from the dominant approach in international relations theory that 
conceptualises the pursuit of such aims as an illustration of the EU’s sui generis 
actomess, to trace empirically the sources of the rhetorical inclusion of human rights and 
democracy in foreign policy and their implementation.
The thesis argues that the ‘logic of diversity’ provides the most powerful means to 
understand the ‘push’ factors that led to the integration of human rights and democracy 
in EU foreign policy and the ‘brakes’ in their implementation. Whereas scholars have 
suggested numerous ways in which such ‘normative’ positions are overridden by other 
strategic concerns, my research findings conclude that the EU increased its ‘normative’ 
coordination in parallel to pursuing further engagement with third countries on key 
interests, making the dilemma between ‘principles and interests’ more acute. 
Notwithstanding the finding that EU action has been, mostly but not exclusively, limited 
to declaratory positions, the single most important factor jeopardising a stronger policy 
can be located in the intergovernmental politics within the Union.
Human rights and democracy have thus been pushed up the EU agenda thanks to the 
‘policy entrepreneurship’ of some member states, at times succeeding in persuading 
other more reluctant EU actors. Their ‘institutionalisation’ has also helped raise the 
costs of non action. The motivations can range from instrumentalist rationality to 
cognitive views about the legitimacy of such principles. However, these are trumped not 
just by conflicting ‘interests’, but also by different cognitive understandings of the 
opportunity to pursue human rights and democracy. Action is thus the result of 
bargaining between different ‘constituencies’ within the EU on the basis of both 
rationalist arguments as well as ideational views.
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C h a p t e r  1 
In t r o d u c t io n
1. Paradoxes ofEUpolicies for human rights and democracy
The European Union (EU) has spent much rhetoric to portray itself as a global promoter 
of human rights and democracy abroad. It has included these aims in its Treaty-based 
objectives in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), incorporated them in all 
its regional and country-directed external policies, and developed multilateral positions 
in international organisations. The EU has also devoted increasingly substantial funds to 
foster a culture of human rights and democracy in third countries, developed global 
policies and campaigns, pioneered ‘distinctive’ ways of institutionalising human rights 
and democracy in its external relations through contractual agreements that place these 
principles in a legalised context, and has sought to ensure that human rights and 
democracy are integrated into its security policies, such as the Conflict Prevention 
strategy or the European Security Strategy (ESS).
The ways in which the EU has committed itself to human rights and democracy has 
raised expectations of a ‘different’ kind of behaviour as an international actor, 
conceptualised in ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power models, or as an actor committed to an 
‘ethical foreign policy’. Theoretical elaborations drawing from the EU’s claims have 
emphasised that the sources of such ‘normative’ aims lie in the specific and sui generis 
nature of the EU as an actor.1 Conversely, empirical research has underlined that the 
EU’s actual performance is far below its rhetoric, making it an object of criticism when 
failing to live up to such commitments. The EU is accused of using ‘normative’ values 
to dress up its ideology,2 of inconsistent behaviour with respect to the principles it
1 To quote a few references, Mario Telo (2006), Europe: a Civilian Power? European Union, Global 
Governance, World Order, Basingstoke: Palgrave; Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: A 
Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235-58; Hazel Smith 
(2002), European Union foreign policy: what it is and what it does, London: Pluto. The literature on the 
topic will be reviewed in section 2 of this chapter and in chapter 3.
2 David Chandler (2002), From Kosovo to Kabul, London: Pluto Press.
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claims to promote because of other security3 or economic priorities4 that override human 
rights and democracy concerns.
What is argued here is that theoretical approaches have been insufficiently developed 
through empirical research, while empirical approaches have tended, with few 
exceptions, to focus on narrower policies (such as democratisation strategies), without 
reaching generalisations about EU foreign policy as a whole, and without questioning 
the nature of the EU as an international actor. Therefore, it is contended that, alongside 
the need for more empirically based research examining EU foreign policy on a case by 
case basis, this gap between rhetoric and performance requires further investigation and 
explanations.
To an extent, it should be expected of an international actor to develop a public 
discourse that it does not necessarily fulfil in practice. It is also to be expected that a 
collective actor with diverse and extensive global commitments, interests and diplomatic 
relations will not simply pursue an idealist-based foreign policy.
Yet a paradoxical element remains: why cultivate the image of the ‘good-doer’, raising 
internal and external expectations for performance, when the actual policies are an easy 
target for accusations of double standards, inconsistencies, or instrumentalism? Ukraine 
and Egypt are two examples in which the high rhetoric has not been matched by EU 
action in responding to human rights and democracy shortcomings. The EU’s image has 
been tarnished as a consequence. As will be amply illustrated, the European press has 
been consistently critical of EU performance in Ukraine, and its role has been negatively 
compared to that of the US: according to Timothy Garton Ash, ‘shamingly, Americans 
probably have done more to support the democratic opposition in Ukraine, and to shine 
a spotlight on electoral malpractices, than west Europeans have’.5 In Egypt, the EU has
3 Gorm Rye Olsen (2000), ‘Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of “Europe”: Limits 
to International Idealism’, Democratization, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 142-167; Karen E. Smith (2001), ‘The EU, 
human rights and relations with third countries: “foreign policy” with an ethical dimension?’ in Margot 
Light and Karen E. Smith (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
185-203, and Karen E. Smith (2003), European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge: 
Polity.
4 Angela Ward (1998), ‘Frameworks for Cooperation between the European Union and Third States: a 
Viable Matrix for Uniform Human Rights Standards?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 
pp. 505-536.
Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Freedom’s front line’, The Guardian, 25 November 2004.
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let down the high expectations of ‘normative’ behaviour regarding human rights abuses 
on part of the NGO community struggling to survive regime clampdowns.6
The main reasons for these failures have been attributed, in the academic literature, to 
the EU’s support of the governments in Kiev and Cairo. Former Ukrainian President 
Leonid Kuchma was considered the best hope to pursue market reform and as the most 
appropriate interlocutor to ensure that the country would be able to continue maintaining 
reasonable relations with Moscow and with the West without entering its sphere of 
interest.7 In Egypt, government cooperation in counter-terrorism and, to a lesser extent, 
in migration control have been highlighted as key issues that since September 11 have 
trumped the EU’s normative agenda regarding democracy and human rights in the 
Mediterranean.8
Yet in-depth research into the two cases reveals that the reasons for which the EU’s 
performance on human rights and democracy has been below expectations run deeper 
than the strategic considerations mentioned above. In many respects, the principles of 
human rights and democracy have acquired a certain ‘taken-for-grantedness’ in the post 
Cold War Western world. No democracy would admit to not subscribing to them. Yet 
beneath the surface of this acquired consensus, research will show quite different views 
on why and how the EU should include these in its foreign policy. The differences do 
not just regard the ways in which these principles should be promoted and how the EU 
reconciles its multiple interests and foreign policy objectives, but also whether human 
rights and democracy should be actively promoted in the first place.
This would open up more philosophical questions that revolve around the debate 
between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, addressed not just by theoreticians 
but also by practitioners. Questions regard the definition of rights, their (Western) origin
6 Soha Bayoumi (2007), ‘Egyptian Views of the EU: Pragmatic, Paternalistic and Partnership Concerns’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 331-347.
7 See in particular, Ted Piccone and Richard Youngs (2006), Strategies fo r  Democratic Change: 
Assessing the Global Response, Madrid: FRIDE and Democracy Coalition Project, chapter on Ukraine, 
pp. 97-121.
Annette Jiinemann (2003b) (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11. International, 
Regional, Domestic Dynamics, London: Frank Cass; Richard Youngs (2006a), Europe and the Middle 
East in the Shadow o f September 11, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers; George Joffe (2008), ‘The 
European Union, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in the Maghreb’, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 46. No. 1, pp. 147-171.
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and development, and whether they can be considered universal ‘givens’ or culturally 
determined perceptions. Can human rights and democracy be ‘exported’ in the name of 
a liberal notion of ‘expanding the democratic community’,9 or do they reflect ‘euro- 
centric imperialism’?10 Is it legitimate to interfere in the internal affairs of other states? 
From a more pragmatic point of view, promoting human rights and democracy world­
wide may be counterproductive with respect to its initial aims (for instance it might lead 
to retaliatory measures) or may even be harmful to the notion itself.11
The debate within the institutions and between the member states thus reveals that 
behind a consensus that it should be the EU, alongside individual member states, to take 
on the human rights and democracy agenda, when responses are actually demanded by 
‘policy entrepreneurial constituencies’ within the EU, the member states do not share a 
common understanding of whether and how the EU should respond. Competing 
strategic priorities also reveal cognitive differences on what are assumed to be common 
‘principled ideas’.12 The end result is that EU policy on human rights and democracy 
has tended to be limited to ‘integrating’ (or ‘mainstreaming’ in EU jargon) the principles 
into the statements, documents, some aid programmes and projects, and to declaratory 
diplomatic positions. The rhetoric and ‘institutionalisation’ of human rights and 
democracy makes it hard not to respond, but a ‘logic of diversity’ between the member 
states ensures that diplomacy reflects the lowest common denominator. Indeed, the logic 
of diversity is considered here as the main source of the problems that the EU 
encounters in pursuing its declared aims.
While it is undeniable that competing strategic considerations often trump the EU’s 
stated ‘normative’ objectives, these alone cannot be imputed as the key source of the 
gap between rhetoric and performance. While EU ‘normative’ rhetoric was at its peak in 
the 1990s, the two case studies show that it was in the 2000s that the EU produced 
greater political output and diplomatic activity with regard to human rights and
9 David P. Forsythe and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer (2000), ‘US foreign policy and Enlarging the Democratic 
Community’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 988-1010.
10 Helene Sjursen (2006), ‘What kind of power?’, Journal o f European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 169- 
181.
11 Chris Brown (1999), ‘Universal human rights: a critique’, in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler 
(eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 103-127.
12 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993a), ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy. An Analytical 
Framework’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, 
Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 3-30.
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democracy in Ukraine and Egypt, even if by and large limited to declaratory positions. 
This coincided with the two countries acquiring greater strategic importance in the EU’s 
foreign policy agenda, in the context of Eastern enlargement of the EU, and in the wake 
of September 11 and the fight against terrorism. In other words, the increase of strategic 
priorities competing with normative aims -  what is often referred to as the ‘values vs 
interests’ dilemma - alone cannot explain the inconsistencies and paradoxes of EU 
foreign policy and human rights and democracy.
2. The research agenda
The overall question the thesis is trying to address is does the EU include human rights 
and democracy objectives in its foreign policy? I f  so, why? And if  not, why? Given that 
the starting point of research is to explore all possible avenues that might point to 
relevant explanations, it is also necessary to question whether the rhetoric has any 
substance.
As will be argued in chapter 2, the main distinction in explanatory frameworks is 
between rationalist justifications and constructivist or cognitive approaches. 
Instrumental justifications derived from rationalism would see the inclusion of human 
rights and democracy as a means to achieve a set of objectives. These can range from 
viewing human rights as a Machiavellian mask to disguise other hegemonic priorities, 
such as imposing Western values on the developing world, or as rhetoric for domestic 
consumption in an era of globalised norms. In other words, these interpretations13 
question the degree to which the EU is genuine about its stated aims, claiming that 
human rights and democracy concerns do not really exist, or that they are trumped by 
other stronger priorities in the security or economic fields.
But human rights and democracy can also serve other external objectives, for instance as 
a means to promote stability and security in the EU’s neighbourhood. This would not 
only fit with many of the strategic arguments used by EU actors to justify their position 
in world politics, but also with explanations about EU enlargement, especially towards 
Eastern Europe. Still within a rationalist perspective, internal objectives could also serve
13 See chapters 2 and 3 for the appropriate referencing to the secondary literature available on the topic 
and for theoretical literature from which the hypotheses are derived.
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the purpose of building the EU’s human rights and democracy agenda, in order to 
promote some shared norms guiding foreign policy, as a means to strengthen the EU’s 
identity, or to manage relations between EU member states and institutions.
Institutionalist approaches focus on the role of EU institutions in shaping state 
preferences. The EU’s rhetorical commitment would generate, through 
institutionalisation, further commitments to respond to human rights and democracy 
problems through EU foreign policy. Policy networks and ‘ideational changes’ therein 
can act as a constituency influencing the human rights and democracy agenda.
Constructivist or cognitive approaches, conversely, would place the sources of human 
rights and democracy in EU foreign policy in the peculiar origins and history of the 
Union, making them two of the norms that characterise the EU’s internal identity. It 
would logically follow that the EU’s external projection reflects the features of the 
Union. Even if human rights and democracy are not consistently activated in practice, 
they would still constitute an inescapable and constitutive characteristic of the EU’s 
historical and institutional set up.
But how to ascertain the relevance and applicability of these various hypotheses? I have 
developed a sub-set of questions regarding EU foreign policy making to guide empirical 
research on a case by case basis. The aim is to uncover the reasons that drove EU action 
on human rights and democracy problems in Ukraine and Egypt by exploring the 
processes that led to such responses.
On the basis of an approach drawn from foreign policy analysis applied to the EU, 
hypotheses are developed in order to identify which EU actors stimulate the 
development o f a foreign policy with normative aims and, conversely, which actors 
inhibit it? Here, the search will be for the ‘constituencies’ that supported EU responses 
or not. With regard to the EU, the decision making processes and the relationship 
between supranational and intergovernmental dynamics also need to be explored: what 
dynamics lead to addressing human rights and democracy concerns in third countries? 
This too will help us understand the relative weight of member states and Community 
institutions in shaping policy and promoting certain kinds of responses, also pointing to
18
the degree to which the principles have actually been institutionalised in EU foreign 
policy making.
What are the EU’s priorities? Using a classic distinction between security or political 
aims, the search for economic advantages, and ideational motivations, the process of 
including human rights and democracy, the factors and actors determining such 
inclusion or creating obstacles to it, and the external environment in which the EU 
operates all need to be taken into account in order to gauge the relative weight of diverse 
interests and norms at play.
3. Human rights and democracy in Ukraine and Egypt: challenges to EU foreign 
policy
Geographical proximity alone makes Ukraine and Egypt important countries to the EU. 
They are both considered of strategic relevance from the points of view of regional 
cooperation and stability, security and, though less so, in trade terms. Ukraine, as a new 
neighbour of the EU, the role it plays in relations between the EU and Russia, as a 
transit country for Europe’s energy sources, and as a key actor in regional stability, has 
seen its importance increase over time since its independence in 1991, especially in the 
context of EU enlargement to Central Europe in the 2000s. Egypt has been of an 
unquestionable importance to the EU member states with regard to the role it plays the 
Middle East, in relations with the Arab and Islamic worlds, and as a lynchpin for 
relations with African countries, but also as a trade partner.
Indeed, both countries have been the object of EU foreign policy in a number of ways. 
They are party to broad contractual agreements that entail political, economic, financial 
and security cooperation: a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Ukraine 
and an Association Agreement (AA) with Egypt. Both countries participate in the EU’s 
more recent European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and Egypt has been a member of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) since its beginning in 1995. And they are 
both important aid recipients of the EU as well of as other actors, especially the US, for 
which they have been respectively third and second largest aid recipient after Israel. 
Thus, EU relations with them cut across both the European Community (EC) and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy pillars, as well as aspects of Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA).
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Finally, both countries present or have presented significant problems in the fields of 
human rights and democracy which have put pressure on the EU to respond, while at the 
same time challenging important strategic priorities in the EU regarding cooperation 
with Moscow and Cairo, stability in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and the fight 
against terrorism.
Ukraine, a country that had been demanding stronger relations with the EU and a 
prospect of accession, experienced the deterioration of its fragile democratic institutions 
and practices especially towards the end of the 1990s and in the 2000s, just as EU 
concern towards the country started to increase in the context of enlargement to Central 
Europe. Demands from Ukrainian domestic forces, from other actors such as the 
Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), as well as from some actors within the EU for a stronger action on human 
rights and democracy increasingly competed with the need to cooperate with Russia, 
while it was seeking to strengthen its ties with its former Soviet empire.
Egypt’s stable authoritarian regime, also based on the extraordinary powers of 
repression granted by the virtually permanent emergency law, has been justified by the 
needs of the fight against terrorism and by Cairo’s important role in regional and 
international politics. But Washington’s neo-conservative ‘regime change’ rhetoric 
under the George W. Bush administration and dissatisfaction within the EU with the 
framework of relations with Cairo also put pressure to respond on the many human 
rights and democracy deficits that exist within Egypt.
EU positions with regard to human rights and democracy in Ukraine will be examined 
between 1991, when the country was recognised as an independent state, and the close 
of 2004, when the Orange Revolution ended the decade of Kuchma’s presidency, which 
had increasingly turned towards authoritarian practices. Ukraine’s democratic deficit 
between 1991 and 2004 rests on many factors that go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Complex historical legacies left independent Ukraine with a very weak terrain for 
building a democratic independent state. Until the new Parliament (Verkhova Rada) was 
elected in 1994, the political elite showed more interest in plundering the liberalising
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economy than in defining the distribution of powers and approving a new Constitution.14 
The difficult evolution of relations with Russia over the spoils of the Soviet Union and 
the redefinition of regional security also ensured that Ukraine’s first president Leonid 
Kravchuk (1991-1994) concentrated more on building a sovereign state and the 
country’s position in the international system than on democracy.15
The fragility of political parties left the political centre a conquest ground by a variety of 
powerful groups, made up of ‘businessmen’, largely formed by people who had made 
money illegally, known as the ‘oligarchs’. Their major objective was to secure immunity 
from prosecution for their criminal activities,16 and thanks to their regional strongholds 
they occupied a prominent role in the Rada. The rise of the oligarchs was to become a 
structural feature blocking democratic transition in Ukraine. To a large extent the power 
of President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) was based on his ability to regulate, through 
dividi et impera tactics, oligarchic groups that depended on personal ties with the 
executive for their wealth and influence.17
The weakness of Parliament left Kuchma with ample space to push through a 
Constitution (by threatening to resort to a referendum) in June 1996, as the last of the 
post-Soviet states, which gave the President strong powers. The presidential- 
parliamentary system was clearly tilted towards presidentialism, and Kuchma tried to 
augment his powers through referenda (a tactic in which Belarusan president-dictator 
Aleksandr Lukashenko excelled). Though not as extensive as Kuchma had hoped, these 
powers often made relations between the executive and the legislative conflictual,18 and 
included: competence over foreign policy; the appointment of the prime minister and his 
or her unilateral dismissal together with the cabinet; the veto of parliamentary bills (that 
can be overruled by two thirds of the Rada)\ and the power of appointment in many
14 Kataryna Wolczuk (2001), ‘Ukraine: Tormented Constitution-Making’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.) 
Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Institutional Engineering, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 243-268.
15 Ilya Prizel (1997), ‘Ukraine between proto-democracy and “soft” authoritarianism’, in Karen Dawisha 
and Bruce Parrott (eds.), Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Moldova, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: pp. 330-365.
16 Rosaria Puglisi (2003), ‘The Rise of the Ukrainian Oligarchs’, Democratization, Vol. 10, No. 3, 
Autumn, pp. 99-123.
17 Freedom House (2003), Nations in Transit, chapter on Ukraine.
18 Oleh Protsyk (2003), ‘Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU 
enlargement’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 427-442, Charles R. Wise and 
Trevor L. Brown (1998), ‘The Consolidation of Democracy in Ukraine’, Democratization, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
pp. 116-137.
21
other key positions, such as the prosecutor general, the head of the security service and 
the secretary of the National Security Council. Kuchma’s powers were increasingly 
based on corrupt practices determined by the rising oligarchy that dominated business 
and political life through a web of clan and ally-based groups that controlled regional 
power bases and had spread their tentacles towards the capital in a bid to maintain 
impunity and determine political choices. The penetration of oligarchs in public life 
distorted significantly the foundations of democratic institutions. If the judiciary 
remained formally independent from political power throughout the period examined 
here, the erosion of the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers had the 
potential to undermine its independence.
In this context, the human rights and democracy situation in Ukraine deteriorated over 
the years rather than improve as it built its post-communist state institutions. In the early 
1990s Ukraine was of far less concern to international human rights watchdogs 
compared to other former Soviet Republics, such as Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, not to 
speak of the conflicts that emerged on the borders of the break-away republics. It was 
towards the end of the 1990s that the most significant human rights and democracy 
violations started to take place in Ukraine. On the bases of independent international 
reports,19 the major problems incurred in Ukraine over democracy and human rights 
regard the role of the President and his abuses of the system to increase his powers, the 
conduct of elections, media freedom, and the prison system.
This thesis focuses on two issues: press freedom and elections. These cases are 
considered the most relevant for the purposes of this thesis because of their recurrence 
over time, their magnitude, and their impact on political life in Ukraine and on its 
relations with the EU -  all of which will be illustrated in the course of chapters 5 and 6.
The Egyptian case study will be examined for the period 1995-2007, covering the birth 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership until the agreement on the European
19 The identification of the main human rights and democracy problems experienced in Ukraine is based 
on external reports by international watchdog organisations. See Human Rights Watch, World Report, 
chapters on Ukraine in the editions between 1991 and 2007; Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 
chapters on Ukraine in the editions from 1991 to 2007; Freedom House, Nations In Transit, chapters on 
Ukraine in the editions from 1997 to 2007; Amnesty International, State of the world’s human rights, 
sections on Ukraine in the editions from 1991 to 2007; US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, chapters on Ukraine in the 
editions between 1993 and 2007. The same sources have been used for the Egyptian case study.
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Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan. In general terms, Egypt shares with the other Arab 
states a number of key problems that lie behind their human rights and democracy 
deficits. These include the lack of three essentials: freedom, knowledge and the 
empowerment of women. The absence of free and fair elections, constraints on the 
media and society, a patriarchical social environment, organised civil society strangled 
by legal and administrative constraints are all common throughout the Arab world, 
compounded in Egypt by the suspension of basic fundamental rights under the 
emergency law.20 After a period of repression following Sadat’s assassination in 1981, 
President Hosni Mubarak continued Sadat’s process of political ‘opening’ (intifah) 
towards a degree of political pluralism through elections and economic liberalisation 
carefully controlled by the regime and the main party in power, the National Democratic 
Party (NDP), on the basis of the 1971 Constitution.21 Executive and legislative powers 
are heavily concentrated in the hands of the President, who can present legislation, 
shuffle the government (accountable to the President), and dissolve the People’s
Assembly. The Consultative Assembly {Majlis al-Shura), is firmly in the hands of the
22regime.
Conversely, since the mid 1980s the judiciary has enjoyed a degree of independence that 
has had an important impact on political life. The Supreme Constitutional Court, the 
‘boldest judicial actor’, has repeatedly criticised, for instance, the conduct of elections.23 
The majority of legal opposition parties owe their status to court decisions. This has 
given the Egyptian regime a veil of legitimacy that has led some analysts to view the 
country as one in transition, blocked in the 1990s, in the aftermath of September 11, and 
from 2006 onwards by the government’s fight against the Islamist opposition - which 
has implied a severe curtailment of political and civil rights - and justified internally and 
internationally by the fight against terrorism.24 But these oscillations between processes
20 United Nations Development Programme (2002), Arab Human Development Report, New York.
21 Daniela Pioppi (2004), ‘L’Egitto dtWintifah: quale liberalizzazione?’ in Federica Bicchi, Laura 
Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (eds.), La Questione della Democrazia nel Mondo Arabo. Stati societa e 
conflitti, Monza: Polimetrica, pp. 271-289.
22 Eberhard Kienle (2001), A Grand Delusion. Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, London and 
New York: I.B. Tauris, chapter 2.
23 Nathan J. Brown (1997), The Rule o f Law in the Arab World. Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, chapter 4, quote on p. 102.
24 The perception of Egypt as a country in transition blocked by the risk of fundamentalism and of 
terrorism is clearly reflected in the EU’s analysis of the country in the early 2000s. See Euro-Med 
Partnership (2002), Egypt Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & National Indicative Programme 2002- 
2004, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/egypt/csp/02 06 en.pdf.
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of opening the political arena and the crackdown on the opposition were also caused by
9Sdomestic dynamics relating to the maintenance of power. Indeed, there are a number 
of factors that suggest that the intifah was more about transforming the regime in order 
to preserve power rather than a transition towards a form of democracy: a
9  f\‘modernisation of authoritarianism’.
The major source of substantive infringements on human rights and on the partially 
democratic provisions offered by the Constitution stems from the persistence of the 
emergency law. Only Syria, Sudan and Egypt have used this type of law to suspend 
parts of their constitutional provisions. In Egypt it has been in place since 1967 
(continuously since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 by the radical 
Islamist group Jihad) and is renewed every three years. Under the justification of the 
fight against terrorism, the emergency law has given the government’s security forces 
ample room for manoeuvre in investigations, detention, arrest without charge and 
imprisonment of suspected opponents of the regime, as well as their families and 
acquaintances. The powers of security bodies were strengthened by the anti-terrorist law 
of 1992, which criminalised even suspected association with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Indeed, the UN Commission on Human Rights has called for its review.27
Justification for the state of emergency is linked to terrorism. Islamic terrorism has 
constituted the most serious threat to the domestic stability of a country whose post­
colonial history has otherwise seen a low level of conflict compared to the region. 
Terrorist groups acting in the name of Islam were an important feature of Egyptian 
politics during the 1990s. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and Jihad were the 
two main groups that conducted a ‘war of attrition’ against the government between 
1990 and 1997, causing 1,300 casualties and culminating in the Luxor attack of
9RNovember 1997. The crackdown on security by the government and the failure of 
these groups to gather popular support led to the defeat of al-Jama ’a and the apparent
25 Eberhard Kienle (1998b), ‘More than a Response to Islamism: the Political Deliberalisation of Egypt in 
the 1990s’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 219-235; Jason Brownlee (2002), ‘The Decline of 
Pluralism in Mubarak’s Egypt’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 6-14. For a critique of 
‘transitology’, see Kienle (2001), chapter 8.
26 Pioppi (2004), quotation on p. 289.
27 Amnesty International (2007), Egypt -  Systematic abuses in the name o f security, London: Amnesty 
International, AI Index: MDE 12/001/2007.
28 Fawaz A. Gerges (2000), ‘The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt? Cost and Prospects’, Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4: pp. 592-612, quote on p. 592.
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dispersal of Jihad. Some of its leaders, however, re-emerged with the terrorist attack 
against the United States in September 2001.29
Mubarak’s strategy to deal with the outbreak of terrorism had implications for the 
human rights and democracy standards in Egyptian political and social life: first of all he 
resorted to Islamist discourse in an attempt to undermine moderate and non moderate 
Islamic movements; secondly, the crackdown was not limited to terrorist groups but 
extended to the Muslim Brotherhood, many of whose leading figures have been arrested 
and tried in special military courts, professional syndicates controlled by the 
Brotherhood have been closed down, and the activities of human rights and non­
governmental organisations restricted.
Under the emergency law, arbitrary detention and torture are extremely common means 
for fighting any dissent. In the 1990s death penalties and executions for political reasons 
reached an unprecedented number in Egypt’s independent history, with the side effect of 
weakening the judiciary.30 Exact figures on sentences and executions are not available, 
but research indicates that 530 executions took place between 1991 and 2000, 28 in 
2001, 49 in 2002, and 36 in 2003.31
But even without the emergency law, the strict limitations on the formation of political 
parties have weakened the liberal opposition and prevented the largest and oldest 
political group, the Muslim Brotherhood, from standing in elections and forming a 
party. Indeed, the right to a free and fair vote has been a farcical affair. Until the 
presidential and parliamentary elections of 2005, Mubarak and the NDP ran virtually 
unopposed, thanks to the weakness of the opposition, the illegality of the Muslim
32Brotherhood, the legal harassment of its members, and widespread electoral fraud. 
Freedom of assembly, although at times tolerated, was illegal and for much of the 1990s 
strikes were banned and rules were used to take on politically active trade unions. 
Freedom of expression and of the media is curbed by restrictive laws against defamation
29 Diane Singerman (2002), The Politics of Emergency Rule in Egypt’, Current History, pp. 29-35. 
Mohammad Atta was one of the attackers on September 11; while two top leaders of the Egyptian Jihad, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef joined forces with Bin Laden and established the International 
Islamic Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.
30 Kienle (2001).
31 International Federation for Human Rights (2005), The Death Penalty in Egypt, Report of International 
Fact Finding Mission, No. 415/2005, April.
32 Dalacoura (2003).
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or in cases in which a published piece of information might threaten public order or 
damage the national economy and national interest. The Constitution forbids censorship 
except in special circumstances, such as under a state of emergency, which is de facto 
permanent. In addition, public ownership of the many press outlets limits press freedom, 
though it is more pluralist than in many other Arab countries. During 2007 several 
episodes suggested that press freedom was being further curtailed by the regime.
With regard to civil society, Egypt had a long tradition of associations until the 1952 
free officer coup, after which Nasser abolished free associationism. In 1964 the 
government established a restrictive law governing civil society associations. In the mid- 
2000s, despite extensive restrictions the country could count numerous NGOs, including 
ones dealing with human rights (restrictions, however, that hardly apply to the Islamist 
organisations carrying out social work through funding raised in mosques).33 
Nonetheless, NGOs have been repeatedly the object of government campaigns to curb 
them and their activities. In the late 1990s, the regime launched a campaign of 
denigration and harassment against human rights defenders in Egypt. In 1999 a new law 
restricted NGOs, by tightening rules on legal registration with the authorities, making 
external funding subject to government approval, severely curbing the type of activities 
they could carry out and instituting harsh criminal punishment for violations of the new 
law.34 This made NGOs dependent on foreign donors legally vulnerable. The legal case 
brought against the Ibn Khaldun Centre in 2001, which notoriously led to the 
imprisonment of Saad Eddin Ibrahim (a dual Egyptian-US citizen) and his colleagues, 
was an example of how external funding could be used to curb NGO activities. It has 
also led to splits within the NGO community, making it highly fragmented. Since 
September 11 the government has further sought to control the activities of the NGOs 
while at the same time realising their importance due to international donors’
33 Vickie Langhor (2004), T oo  Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics. Egypt and Liberalizing Arab 
Regimes’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 181-204.
34 Abdullahi A. An-Na’im (2001), ‘Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective’, Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 701-732; Human Rights Watch (1999), World Report 1999, section 
on Egypt, www.hrw.org/worldreport99/mideast/egypt.html.
35 Angela Griinert (2004), ‘Loss of Guiding Values and Support: September 11 and the Isolation of 
Human Rights Organizations in Egypt’, in Jiinemann (2003b), pp. 133-152.
36 Griinert (2004); Langhor (2004); James Drummond, ‘Activists despair of struggle’, Financial Times, 10 
May 2000; interviews, European Commission Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (1) and (2).
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requirement for the involvement of non-state actors to carry out projects in Egypt.37 
Recent events suggested a further campaign to curtail NGO activity.38
The Egyptian state has thus been defined as an ‘authoritarian’ regime, characterised by a 
strong centralisation of power through which the regime tries to exercise a monopoly 
over political activity and limited pluralism,39 or as a ‘hegemonic regime’.40 
Furthermore, in contrast with common transition paradigms upon which the Barcelona 
Process and EU policy towards Egypt were based,41 in Egypt periods of economic 
reform and liberalisation were not accompanied by political liberalisation.42
Torture and elections are the two themes that have been selected in order to focus the 
research here. Torture was widely considered the single largest human rights violation in 
Egypt, and electoral processes have been a risible affair, with only the very partial 
exception of the 2005 electoral rounds. Thus, as in the case of Ukraine, the two cases 
selected are thematic, where violations were repeated over time, rather than 
circumscribed episodes. Both case studies also allow for some evaluation of the ways in 
which EU policy evolved over time, in order to ascertain the degree to which human 
rights and democracy considerations in EU relations with Ukraine and Egypt, and to 
explain the role that they played in EU foreign policy.
4. The EU’s definition o f human rights and democracy
EU external polices treat human rights and democracy within the same ‘package’, as the 
analysis of their emergence and development in foreign policy conducted in chapter 3 
will show. It will also reconstruct how the EU progressively started to refer to these
37 Griinert (2004).
38 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2008), Limitations Imposed on the Right of Association in the 
Arab Region: Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society Organizations under Attack, written statement 
submitted to the UN Human Rights Council Seventh Session, 25 March.
39 Kienle (2001), Introduction.
40 Larry Diamond (2002), Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 
21-35.
41 See, for instance, Euro-Med Partnership (2002) Egypt Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & National 
Indicative Programme 2002-2004, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/egypt/csp/02 06 en.pdf.
42 Kienle (2001), Pioppi (2004). On democratisation theories and their application in the Arab world, see 
Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (2004), ‘Introduzione alia questione della democrazia nel mondo 
arabo’, in Bicchi, Guazzone and Pioppi (eds.), pp. 19-41.
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international norms in shaping its foreign policy. In 1991, a substantive articulation of 
how the EU views human rights and their relation to democracy was clarified:
The European Council recalls the indivisible character of human rights. The 
promotion of economic, social and cultural rights, as of civil and political 
rights, and of respect for religious freedom and freedom of worship, is of 
fundamental importance for the full realization of human dignity and of the 
legitimate aspirations of every individual. Democracy, pluralism, respect for 
human rights, institutions working within a constitutional framework, and 
responsible governments appointed following periodic fair elections, as well 
as the recognition of the legitimate importance of the individual in a society, 
are essential prerequisites of sustained social and economic development.43
However, their legitimacy, with respect both to the incorporation of such policies in the 
EU’s internal institutional and legal set up, and to their universality embedded in 
international law and norms, rests on different sources. The EU places the sources of 
legitimacy for pursuing human rights in international and regional treaties and 
agreements, explicitly referred to in all EC/EU declarations. Many of the rights that 
come under contention when used in foreign policy have actually found international 
normative consensus in the Universal Declaration and in the various covenants ratified 
from 1948 onwards,44 to which Ukraine and Egypt subscribed as well. Indeed, as 
chapter 3 will show, many of these principles are made explicit in the agreements 
between the EU and these two countries and in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) to which Egypt is party, and constitute the conditions that form the basis of the 
contractual agreements between the EU and third countries.
In the European context, reference to some key CSCE documents such as the Helsinki 
Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), give such principles 
a more political dressing tied to regional security, by including concepts such as the 
‘human dimension’ of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
process.45 The latter set of conventions represented the conceptualisation of link 
between individual human rights on the one hand, and security on the other, as strong in 
the new post Cold War Europe as the link between human rights and development had
43 European Council (1991), Declaration on Human Rights, Luxemburg: 28-29 June.
44 Jack Donnelly (1999), ‘The Social Construction of International Human Rights’, in Dunne and Wheeler 
(eds.), pp. 71-102.
45 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1990), ‘Document of the Copenhagen meeting of 
the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE’, available at www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-
1999/hd/cope90e.pdf.
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become in the 1980s in relations with the developing world. As the 1991 Declaration 
reads, ‘tensions and conflicts arising from flagrant and systematic violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in one country or in a specific region are often a threat 
to international peace and security’, providing a powerful rationale -  as will be argued -  
for an actual insistence on these principles, especially as far as post Cold War Europe 
was concerned.
In this context in particular, the EU also insisted on the protection of minority rights, for 
instance by requiring the ratification of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities as a condition for accession to the EU, 
Convention which not all the member states have ratified.
Indeed, the internal dimension of building a human rights regime has developed 
somewhat more slowly. In 1991 Article 6.2 of the Treaty on the European Union makes 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms part of the acquis. But it was only in 1997 that the enforcement dimension 
was added with Article 7 introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty that contemplates a set of 
negative measures, up to the suspension of membership, in the case of violation of the 
principles outlined in Article 6. In 2000 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, formally codified the rights enjoyed by the citizens of the EU member 
states, but will become legally binding only as a Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty (with opt- 
outs to sections of the Charter for Great Britain and Poland), which was supposed to 
enter into force in 2009. Only with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty will the EU 
acquire the legal personality necessary to accede to those international conventions 
whose principles it refers to in its foreign policy.
Conversely to human rights principles, while the EU claims a ‘moral’ legitimacy to 
pursue democratisation abroad due to its member states all sharing democratic 
principles,46 ‘democracy’ does not enjoy an international normative definition. In its 
external relations, the EU has not developed a one size for all conception of democracy, 
though it has spelt out its basic tenets, especially in the context of enlargement and of 
regional strategies. The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for accession entail the ‘stability of
46 European Commission (200le), The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and 
Democratisation in Third Countries, COM(2001) 252 final, Brussels: 8 May.
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institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities’.47 In Southeastern Europe, democratic principles (rather than 
democracy) included ‘representative government, accountable executive; government 
and public authorities to act in a manner consistent with the constitution and the law; 
separation of power (government, administration and law); free and fair elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot’ 48 Finally, in 1998, with respect to relations with 
the developing world, the EU defined democratic principles in terms of legitimacy 
(based on free elections through universal suffrage and the secret ballot), legality (in 
terms of rules for all citizens) and their effective application (through respect for 
fundamental freedoms, separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, political 
and institutional pluralism, participation in decision-making, and transparency of the 
institutions)49
The EU’s legitimacy in pursuing human rights and democracy in foreign policy is 
therefore partial. On the one hand, the EU seeks to legitimise the appropriateness of 
pursuing human rights in foreign policy in international law and norms, to which most 
EU member states have subscribed, but not the EU as such. On the other, it justifies its 
promotion of democracy by referring to its internal composition formed by democratic 
states. With regard to both principles, it nonetheless has sought for definitions to guide 
its action and responses to their violations in third countries, though it has been slower 
and less precise in finding consensus over the definitions of its own internal standards.
5. Outline o f  the thesis
The first task necessary to develop some potential explanations regarding the reasons 
behind the EU’s incorporation of human rights and democracy in its foreign policy is to 
identify a set of appropriate hypotheses. Chapter 2 is dedicated to this task. It draws 
upon international relations theoretical literature to identity five main hypotheses that 
derive from realist interpretations, institutionalism and constructivism. The first 
hypothesis considers the EU’s claim just a claim: human rights and democracy are not
47 European Council (1993), Council Conclusions, Copenhagen: 21-22 June.
48 European Council (1997), Council Conclusions, Annex to Annex III: Application of Conditionality 
with a view to developing a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with the Countries of the Region’, 
Luxemburg: 29-30 April
49 K. Smith (2003), pp. 132-133.
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amongst the EU’s foreign policy priorities but constitute an excuse or justification for 
the pursuit of other priorities that can range from establishing a hegemonic power over 
third countries, to seeking legitimacy vis-a-vis domestic electorates. Alternatively, 
human rights and democracy concerns are not activated precisely because they are 
secondary to EU foreign policy priorities. The second sees the pursuit of human rights 
and democracy as a means to increase security and stability for the EU. The third 
hypothesis too is instrumentalist, but is related to internal, rather than external, aims of 
building EU foreign policy capacity or identity. The fourth hypothesis focuses more 
strongly on the role of EU institutions, mitigating and shaping state preferences. The 
EU’s commitment would generate, through institutionalisation, a ‘habit of cooperation’ 
or a ‘logic of appropriateness’ to respond to human rights and democracy problems. The 
fifth sees human rights and democracy as part of the EU’s identity, whereby the EU’s 
nature itself would be the source of foreign policy output rooted in the principles that 
characterise it.
The second part of chapter 2 will address the theoretical framework necessary to guide 
the more empirical questions about the actors, factors and processes behind the EU’s 
responses to human rights and democracy problems in Ukraine and Egypt. It develops 
hypotheses about the relative weight of intergovernmental and institutional approaches 
to understand agency and decision making processes in the EU, about internal and 
external stimuli that push EU action, as well as introducing some concepts that allow for 
an understanding of ‘meso-level’ policy shaping processes. It seeks to identify 
‘constituencies’ that support EU action by using the concept of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
applied to member states as well as to the more common attribution to the Commission 
and the European Parliament. In doing so, I will support the need for flexible approaches 
to understanding EU foreign policy making, rather than single theoretical explanations.
Chapter 3 provides the historical framework of the thesis. It reconstructs the most 
important steps undertaken by the EU in the development of human rights and 
democracy policies, focusing on the post-Cold War period, and explaining the main 
developments in this field with regard to policies towards Ukraine and Egypt. It will 
then relate the research conducted for this thesis to existing literature in the field, whilst 
identifying the areas that require greater empirical knowledge and more adequate 
theoretical explanations. Throughout the chapter the core questions of the thesis are
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addressed in historical fashion: who were the most important actors within the EU 
determining these policy choices; what were the main reasons for doing so; were the 
stimuli for introducing such developments internally or externally induced; what range 
of tools were used; what European foreign policy priorities can be evinced? It does so 
by relating the history to the theory examined in Chapter 2 whilst preparing the ground 
for the analysis of the policy frameworks relevant to understand the case studies.
The following six chapters are dedicate to the two case studies: Ukraine and Egypt. The 
main hypotheses and research questions generated in chapter 2 will thus be tested on 
these two case studies. Chapters 4 and 7 will respectively review EU foreign policy 
towards Ukraine and Egypt in general terms, with the aim of ascertaining the processes, 
dynamics, actors and motivations guiding the EU and its member states. Chapters 5 and 
6 will address the two case studies in Ukraine regarding press freedom and elections; 
while chapter 8 and 9 will delve into EU policy on torture and on elections in Egypt.
The final chapter will draw conclusions. It will concentrate first on identifying some 
conclusions from the specific case studies: to what extent can it be claimed that human 
rights and democracy were included in foreign policy actions towards the two countries? 
What priorities emerged? The aim would be to identify sets of dynamics regarding 
actors, motivations, and priorities that characterise the EU foreign policy making 
process in action. The second part will aim to make some broader generalisations about 
EU foreign policy and the role of human rights and democracy, and relate these to the 
broader theoretical literature on the subject. Is the normative power model sustainable 
empirically? If not, what implications can be derived from empirical research that help 
understand the interplay between strategic foreign policy objectives and more 
‘normative’ or immaterial principles?
6. Conclusions
This research started off with the aim of providing empirical substantiation to 
constructivist-based views of the EU as a ‘different’ actor in the international arena. 
These conceptualisations appeared the most appropriate to fit the EU’s claim to pursue 
human rights and democracy in its foreign policy. Yet the empirical conclusions reached 
are by and large in contrast with these conceptualisations. In fact, the classical realism
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against which constructivist approaches departed provides more insights in 
understanding EU behaviour than EU-actor based interpretations. What is argued here is 
that ultimately both EU foreign policy and the role of human rights and democracy is 
still characterised by the lack of a common vision shared by the member states. The 
degree of institutionalisation of human rights and democracy in the EU’s external 
relations is such that not responding to their violation could have costs in terms of 
credibility and expectations. It also means that the policy entrepreneurs have reasonably 
powerful arguments (rhetorically subscribed to by the EU institutions) to persuade or 
shame more reluctant members to act. Yet the competing visions of human rights and 
democracy and the ‘logic of diversity’ in EU foreign policy significantly undermine 
actor-centric definitions.
Notwithstanding the idealist validity of constructivist approaches, it is hard to 
distinguish their analytical and prescriptive dimensions. The ‘constitutive’ features are 
factors that would construct the EU as a ‘force for good’. Analytically, it might be 
useful to explore whether other features compete, cognitively as well as materially, with 
those that would make the EU an actor that pursues ‘normative’ aims, which in turn 
would require an exploration of whether these competing features are materially or 
ideationally constructed.
Secondly, theoretical approaches to understanding EU foreign policy need to be 
problematised. In particular, explaining the EU’s international behaviour cannot be 
reconduced to single theoretical interpretations. An examination of the processes behind 
EU foreign policy choices reveals that different dynamics determine EU action, 
governed by a complex interplay between opportunities to exercise leverage, diverse 
concerns of the member states, inter-institutional dynamics, internal aims of maintaining 
unity in a context of a logic of diversity, and external objectives that can vary between 
expressing disapproval at the human rights and democracy abuses of a foreign 
government to more mundane concerns over access to energy, for example.
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Single interpretative frameworks are not sufficient to capture these complex dynamics. 
There is a risk of ‘dispersed eclecticism’,50 or pre-theoretical51 conclusions which in the 
past has led to insufficient theorisation about EU foreign policy. Yet it might be worth 
running this risk if it is necessary to understand the actual dynamics behind the Union’s 
political choices. Here, the use of broader theories of international relations can help 
understand ‘macro’ processes of EU foreign policy making.
Thirdly, EU foreign policy requires more empirical research on a case by case basis in 
order to understand patterns that can back theoretical generalisations. It was surprising 
to discover that two important partners of the EU, Ukraine and Egypt, have scarcely 
been covered by empirical research on EU policy towards them. While Ukraine has 
received some attention, largely through studies on the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Egypt is barely included in the literature on EU external relations.52 One of the aims of 
this thesis is to contribute to fill these empirical gaps. Single research agendas should 
also further explore the role of member states in reconciling national interests with 
European integration in the foreign policy domain.
50 Alfred E. Pijpers, (1991), ‘European Political Cooperation and the Realist Paradigm’, in Martin Holland 
(ed.), The Future o f Political Cooperation. Essays on Theory and Practice, Basingstoke and London, pp. 
8-35, quote on p. 14.
51 Roy H. Ginsberg (1989), Foreign Policy Actions o f the European Community: The Politics o f Scale, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
52 EU relations with two countries have been analysed in Phebe Marr, (1999) (ed.), Egypt at the 
crossroads: domestic stability and regional role, Washington, DC : National Defense University Press, 
and Ann Lewis (2002) (ed.), The EU and Ukraine, London : Kogan Page. A few studies of the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine have been published, including Adrian Karatnychky (2005), ‘Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 35-52; Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (2006)
(eds.), Revolution in Orange: The Origins o f Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough, Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Michael McFaul (2007), 'Ukraine Imports Democracy. 
External Influences on the Orange Revolution’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 45-83; Piccone 
and Youngs (2006); Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko (2006), ‘Western Influence’, in Aslund and 
McFaul (eds.), pp. 125-144. More specific studies on Egypt-EU are limited to Mohammed El-Sayed 
Selim, (1997), ‘Egypt and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Choice or Adaptive 
Mechanism?’, in Richard Gillespie, (ed.) (1997b), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and 
Economic Perspectives, London: Frank Cass, pp. 64-90, whereas the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has 
received considerable attention on part of the academic community, including human rights and 
democracy issues addressed (in a regional context) in Katerina Dalacoura (2003), Engagement or 
coercion? Weighing Western human rights policies towards Turkey, Iran and Egypt, London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs; Laura Feliu (2001), ‘Human Rights and the Barcelona Process’, in 
Fulvio Attina and Stelios Stavridis (eds.), The Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Issues from  
Stuttgart to Marseilles, Milan: Giuffre, pp. 67-92; Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (2002), ‘Themes 
in European Democracy Promotion’, European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case o f  North 
Africa. Special Issue of Democratization, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-16; Jiinemann (2003b); Youngs (2006a); 
Joffe (2008).
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Contrary to initial expectations when embarking on this research, the conclusions 
reached through empirical analysis contend that human rights and democracy in EU 
foreign policy are more strongly rooted in rhetoric than in reality. The examination of 
foreign policy processes towards Ukraine and Egypt will show that the logic of diversity 
is still dominant in EU foreign policy. This is not merely because the outcome of 
rational calculations on the costs and benefits of pursuing normative positions is usually 
against human rights and democracy concerns. These diverse views mean that it is not 
simply that human rights and democracy are considered secondary to other concerns and 
priorities, which may differ between the member states. It was an expected outcome that 
competing foreign policy priorities would not go to the benefit of the latter. But 
underlying these outcomes are competing cognitive and normative views of what EU 
foreign policy should be about, as well as of the role that human rights and democracy 
should play in relations with third countries.
This explains the degree of ‘ad hocery’ in responding to human rights and democracy 
violations in third countries and, when common positions are reached, the reasons for 
them developing overwhelmingly as declaratory positions that are not followed up by 
action. Despite nearly two decades of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
previous two decades of European Political Cooperation (EPC), there still is great 
divergence between EU member states on the priorities to be addressed, and human 
rights and democracy are not high up on the agenda.
The end result in terms of output is that the EU’s inclusion of human rights and 
democracy is, by and large, declaratory, a minimum common denominator reached as a 
result of compromise between the EU member states. There are exceptions: cases in 
which the EU does not even resort to declaratory positions, as well one case in which 
human rights and democracy became incorporated into a security logic, triggering EU 
action. The ‘brakes’ to the development of human rights and democracy concerns are, 
behind the logic of diversity, the prioritisation of other concerns - the most notable 
priority that emerges from the case studies is the understanding that maintaining 
cooperative relations with third partners is of paramount importance.
Yet human rights and democracy are high up in the rhetoric. Why have all the EU 
institutions placed such rhetorical importance, especially in the 1990s, on defining its
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foreign policy on characteristics that are not translated into actual performance? The 
rhetoric unmatched by substance can have detrimental effects on the development of the 
EU’s international reach, both in terms of internal domestic support and in terms of 
external capabilities. Secondly, the rhetoric can and has been taken seriously by partner 
governments, jeopardising the reasons for not pursuing action beyond declaratory 
positions. This has meant that the rhetoric, even if not followed by any action that might 
harm the third country, has driven wedges into the EU’s priority of seeking cooperation 
with foreign governments.
Policy entrepreneurs have been identified as raising the stakes for the EU to respond to 
human rights and democracy problems in third countries. In contrast to widespread 
expectations on the part of the academic community, the Commission does not emerge 
as a significant policy entrepreneur; rather some member states, often echoed or 
stimulated by the European Parliament, have pushed the human rights and democracy 
agenda within the EU. The debates between the member states that this research has 
uncovered are a further confirmation that within the EU there are quite diverse views 
about the role that human rights and democracy should play. Bilateral relations remain 
important especially with regard to those concerns that are most rooted in material 
interests in the capitals of the member states. And the ‘red lines’ put in place by the 
member states more often than not trump the development of normative positions.
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C h a p t e r  2
H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  D e m o c r a c y  in  E U  F o r e ig n  P o l ic y :
T h e  S e a r c h  f o r  an  A n a l y t ic a l  F r a m e w o r k
1. Introduction
It was only in the second half of the 1980s, and more significantly since the beginning 
of the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, that the EC/EU started to make human 
rights and democracy a part of its rhetoric and include them in its foreign relations 
objectives.53 The main turning points and the development of these policies will be 
examined in detail in Chapter 3. Suffice it to say at this point all the external policies of 
the European Union include the aims of promoting human rights and democracy, and 
that their pursuit has been enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union in 
its Common Foreign and Security provisions and later confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Human rights and democracy are thus included in the EU’s political, economic, cultural 
and security relations with a large part of the world.
The core puzzle of this thesis regards the gap between the rhetoric and commitment the 
EU has made in developing a self-portrait as a global promoter of human rights and 
democracy, and its actual performance in pursuing these aims through foreign policy.
The main question guiding this thesis therefore is: does the EU include human rights 
and democracy in its foreign policy? I f  so, why? And if  not, why? A set of hypotheses 
will be developed in this chapter, drawing largely from international relations theory, 
regarding the motivations that lead actors to pursue such foreign policy aims.
Applying these hypotheses to empirical research regarding the EU requires a further set 
of sub-questions necessary to guide analysis: what actors and factors stimulate the 
inclusion o f human rights and democracy in foreign policy and, conversely, what actors 
and factors inhibit it? And, secondly, what foreign policy processes drive EU responses 
to human rights and democracy problems in Ukraine and Egypt? These will be the core 
questions guiding the empirical research carried out in chapters 4 to 9; yet these
53 K. Smith (2001); and K. Smith (2003), chapters 5 and 6.
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questions too need to be set in a theoretical framework that can capture the complexities 
of EU foreign policy making.
While section 2 of this chapter will focus mainly on the core question of the thesis, 
section 3 will delve into the development of an analytical framework that will enable the 
use of a methodological approach capable of reaching some broader conclusions about 
EU foreign policy processes, addressing the two empirical questions about the processes 
and dynamics that govern the EU’s responses to human rights and democracy issues 
arising in its foreign policy. In other words, the reasons behind EU positions need to be 
accompanied by an understanding of those factors that are driving or hindering EU 
action.
Three broad schools of international relations will be drawn upon: realism, rationalist 
ideational approaches, and constructivism or cognitive approaches.54 With regard to 
understanding EU foreign policy processes, intergovemmentalism, institutionalism and 
identity-based interpretations will be considered. Despite the wide varieties within these 
schools, these will be simplified for the sake of clarity. Steve Smith warns against a 
‘pick and mix’ attitude,55 yet all single interpretations show strengths and weakness 
when applied to the study of human rights and democracy considerations in foreign 
policy, especially by a hybrid actor as the EU.
2. Instrumentalist, rationalist and cognitive approaches to understanding human
rights and democracy in EU foreign policy
I have placed explanations for why the EU would pursue human rights and democracy 
on a spectrum that ranges from instrumentalist to cognitive interpretations. 
Instrumentalist interpretations would exclude the possibility of human rights and
54 For a good definition of realist, liberal institutional and constructivist categories, see Sonia Lucarelli 
(2000), Europe and the Breakup o f Yugoslavia, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, chapter 6. Tonra 
prefers the use of the term ‘cognitive’ to ‘constructivist’. Ben Tonra (2003), ‘Constructing the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 41, No 4, pp. 731-56. Here, constructivism will be used when explicitly referring to the body of 
theory, while I will use the term ‘cognitive’ when exploring motivations for developing the EU’s 
normative agenda related to ideational factors. This is because the concept can be useful even without 
being set in the paradigms developed by theoreticians.
55 Steve Smith (1995), ‘The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Geneology of International Relations Theory’, 
in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, University Park, 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 1-37.
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democracy as playing any particular role in EU foreign policy, attributing them a role 
that is tied to rhetoric and ideology, possibly used as a Trojan horse for the pursuit of 
other objectives rooted in material gains, such as political hegemony, international 
stability, economic advantages, or to keep domestic public opinion and electorates 
happy. Alternatively, these other interests are considered more important and trump 
possible human rights and democracy concerns. The other end of the spectrum would 
consider human rights and democracy as part of a set of ideas that increasingly guide 
EU action, either because some actors have persuaded others of the appropriateness of a 
certain response to global human rights and democracy problems, or because they are a 
constitutive part of the identity of the EU.
These hypotheses will be developed further. First it is necessary to unpack some 
assumptions behind this spectrum. To a large extent, this dichotomy, which is implied in 
much of the literature,56 is false. Much of the literature on the subject appears to assume 
an inherent dichotomy between principles and interests, between idealism and 
pragmatism, an assumption that implies that principles reflect an ethical behaviour of 
the actor in question whereas interests are inherently ‘selfish’. In turn, these assumptions 
seem to be behind the rationalist-constructivist divide in much international relations 
literature.
Chris Brown has demonstrated the false theoretical premises of this dichotomy arguing 
that most foreign policies have a moral content: the challenge of policy making is the 
competition between a set of wider duties towards international society and towards the 
interest of one’s citizens.57 J0rgensen too affirms that ‘principles are completely 
agnostic along the dichotomies of benign/malign’.58
The task is not so much to uncover the degree to which the EU is ‘genuine’ about the 
principles it preaches; this would hide prescriptive views on how the EU should behave 
in the international arena. Rather, it is to explore the interaction between human rights
56 For a review of this assumption, see Richard Youngs (2004), ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic 
Interests in the EU’s External Identity’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 415-435.
57 Chris Brown (2001), ‘Ethics, interests and foreign policy’, in Light and K. Smith (eds.), pp. 15-32.
58 Knud Erik Jdrgensen (2006), ‘Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Values, Images and Principles in 
Foreign Policy’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles in EU Global Action, 
London: Routledge, pp. p. 42-58.
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and democracy and other foreign policy aims, together with the dynamics and processes 
between actors and within the EU institutions.
Nonetheless, the instrumentalist and cognitive spectrum is methodologically useful to 
understand the motivations guiding EU action. Testing the hypotheses empirically 
allows us to ascertain the degree to which human rights and democracy are present in 
foreign policy or whether they compete with other concerns, be these rooted in realist 
interests or in competing cognitive ideas.
The first hypothesis is that the aims of human rights and democracy in foreign policy do 
not exist, because they are secondary to other priorities. Alternatively, they merely hide 
interests and concerns instrumental to the achievement of other material objectives As 
E.H. Carr famously warned, morality is ‘a disguise for selfish vested interests’.59 The 
distortion of human rights and democracy principles during the Cold War60 as a 
‘camouflage’ of anti-communism was an example. If we rest our research on some of 
the fundamental tenets of realism, in both its classical and ‘neo’ versions,61 human rights 
as principles and objectives of foreign policy, can appear only sporadically, probably as 
a function of the power of hegemonic states, and would explain EU rhetoric in 
instrumental terms, to conceal other objectives, be they a means to ensure the states’ 
security or a way to expand their political hegemony and relative power.
Justifications based on human rights and democracy would thus be a form of rhetoric 
invented by powerful states, or could be used to justify military intervention or peace
59 Edward H. Carr (1981), The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of  
international relations, (reprint of the 2nd edition of 1946, first edition 1939), reissued in 2001 with an 
introduction by Micheal Cox, London: Palgrave), p. 80. It must be clarified that, in contrast with later 
neorealist interpretations, E. H. Carr did not view the ‘realist’ world as devoid of morality or of principles, 
although the latter were seen as far less influential than power.
60 Margot Light (2001), ‘Exporting Democracy’, in Margot Light and Karen E. Smith (eds.), Ethics and 
Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 75-92.
61 Classical realism should be distinguished from neorealism. The latter, influenced by scientific method, 
has developed abstract state-centric models o f power politics which, in its most extreme forms, excludes 
the possibility of norms or ideas playing a role. See John J. Mearsheimer (1994), ‘The False Promise of 
International Institutions’, International Security, Vol. XIX, No. 3, pp. 459-89. This approach is contested 
by classical realists themselves: ‘This theorizing is abstract in the extreme and totally unhistoric. It 
endeavours to reduce international relations to a system of abstract propositions with a predictive 
function’, Hans Morgenthau quoted in Richard K. Ashley (1984), ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, 
International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 225-86, quote on p. 279. For a critique of the ‘neorealist 
orrery’, see Ashley (1984).
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enforcement.62 Chandler argues that the ‘success of normative values’ in the post Cold 
War era is due to a population that is more aware about global human rights which puts 
pressure on ‘enlightened Western governments’ to respond. Human rights claims in 
foreign policy would thus be aimed more at internal electorates than for any external 
‘normative’ concern for the universality of the principles. But with regard to the EU, the 
internal dimension is not limited to the ‘two-level’ consideration between domestic 
positions and a state’s foreign policy. Relations between states within the EU need to be 
taken into account too. Here, inter-relational aims64 could play a part in developing 
human rights and democracy positions. I shall expand and explain further this 
hypothesis in the section regarding foreign policy processes.
On the other hand, few deny the existence of ‘normative’ concerns in foreign policy, and 
classical realism in particular can have something to say. According to Morgenthau, 
among the classical realists who did examine the role of ethics (if we understand human 
rights and democracy as ‘ethical’ objectives) in foreign policy,
morality, mores and law intervene in order to protect society against 
disruption and the individual against enslavement and extinction. When a 
society or certain of its members are unable to protect themselves with their 
own strength against the power drives of others [...] normative systems try 
to supplement power politics with their own rule of conduct.65
Otherwise, with the state as sovereign, citizens’ protection remains a state duty, whereas 
external human rights are ‘not the prime business of the state’.66 This would imply that 
norms can play a role in terms of filling a power vacuum, or that they can help justify 
international action when the instruments of power cannot be used. Pushing this 
argument further, one could hypothesise that the EU has developed rhetorical 
justifications of its action based on normative content precisely because of its inability 
to wield power behind its foreign policy.
62 Ken Booth (1993), ‘Human wrongs and international relations’, International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, 
pp. 103-126. On the hegemony of the powerful states manipulating human rights principles, see also 
Chandler (2002).
63 Chandler (2002), especially chapter 3. Quote on p. 58.
64 Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughton (2008), The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, chapter 1, p. 13.
65 Hans J. Morgenthau (1985), Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: 
Alfred A Knopf, (6th edition), p. 244.
66 Morgenthau (1985), p. 277.
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Carr’s dictum should warn us to look for the real motives behind a moral political 
assertion. As Morgenthau put it, ‘it is pertinent to ask whether [ethics] are mere
ideologies concealing the true motives of action or whether they express a genuine
(\1concern for the compliance of international policies with ethical standards’. 
Morgenthau’s question can be taken a step further: as Chris Brown underlined, there is 
no reason to see ‘interest’ as intrinsically a-moral or immoral. Indeed, one can 
hypothesise a convergence between so-called moral concerns, under which category 
human rights outside one’s state would fall, and interests. Brown supports his argument 
by referring to the 1997 British Foreign Office mission statement of the Labour 
government on bringing an ethical dimension to foreign policy, which ‘assumes that 
ethical principles are wholly consistent with the national interest’.69 As Donnelly puts it, 
‘moral interests are not crazier an idea than economic and security interests’.70
Thus, a further hypothesis sees human rights and democracy as merged with security 
interests. The case of EU enlargement to Central Europe has been considered a prime 
example in which promoting stability and security on the continent was backed by 
supporting political reforms that ensured transition to democracy and respect of human 
rights, reflecting ‘liberal’ ideas about the link between peace and democracy.71 This 
linkage has enjoyed much success in explaining EU integration and its expansion, based 
on Karl Deutsch’s transactionalist ‘security communities’ whereby the creation of 
mechanisms and institutions of mutual interdependence between states reduces the costs 
of security protection.72 Translating this hypothesis to the foreign policy domain, human 
rights and democracy can be explained as a means to promote stability and security in
67 Morgenthau (1985), p. 248.
68 Brown (2001).
69 Brown (2001), p. 17.
70 Jack Donnelly (2000), ‘An Overview’, in David P. Forsythe (ed.), Human Rights and Comparative 
Foreign Policy, Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, pp. 310-34, quote on p. 327.
71 Karen E. Smith (1999), The Making ofE U  Foreign Policy. The Case o f Eastern Europe, London, 
MacMillan Press, especially chapter 7.
72 Karl Deutsch (et al.) (1957), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. For more recent uses of this approach, see John Duffield (1994), ‘Explaining 
the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes’, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 369-88; Sonia Lucarelli (2002), Peace and Democracy: The Rediscovered 
Link. The EU, NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities, Final 
Report, NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Individual Research Fellowships 2000-2002 
Programme.
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third countries,73 of exporting the ‘democratic community’,74 or as a way to ensure a 
credibility of commitments on part of foreign states.75
The focus of the hypotheses developed so far has been on the reasons for which the EU 
member states may include human rights and democracy in its foreign policy, stemming 
largely from state based approaches of realist or liberal matrix. However, among the 
bodies of international relations literature that has examined the role of ‘norms’ in 
international affairs, those emphasising the role of institutions have provided a number 
of hypotheses that can be applied to the core question addressed here.
Studies in political and social institutions -  for the sake of simplicity labelled here 
institutionalism -  have focused on the way institutions and their rules, practices, and 
norms shape behaviour. These have shed light on the role of institutions and the ways 
they influence the preferences of the EU member states. Institutions could play a role 
in expanding knowledge and in shaping collective norms, in generating the EU 
commitment to including human rights and democracy in its foreign policy. Indeed, this 
approach has informed research into the opposite dynamic to state-centred approaches 
that see the member states as moulding EU institutions: the impact of institutions on 
states preferences and policies.77
Studies on the impact of ideas on policy choices argue that change in ‘principled ideas’ 
can bring about pressure for policy change, in favour of human rights protection, for 
example. According to Keohane and Goldstein, ‘normative ideas [...] specify criteria for 
distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust’, and mediate between ‘world 
views’ (which are ‘embedded in the symbolism of a culture and deeply affect modes of
73 K. Smith (2001).
74 Forsythe and Rieffer (2000).
75 Andrew Moravcsik (1999), The Choice fo r  Europe, London: UCL Press. This explanation is an 
adaptation of Moravcsik’s analysis which focuses on the reasons behind EU integration, rather than on 
foreign policy. His separate analysis explains why European states chose to submit to binding human 
rights obligations as way to enhance the credibility of the states and to ensure the commitment of future 
governments. Andrew Moravcsik (2000), ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe’, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 217-52.
76 Helen Wallace (2000), ‘Analysing and Explaining Policies’, in Helen Wallace and William Wallace 
(eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 65-81.
77 See, for instance, Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis Jr. (1996), ‘How Do International Institutions 
Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
40, No. 4, pp. 451-78.
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78thought and discourse’) and policy applications. The process of transformation from 
idea to policy outcome could follow three ‘causal pathways’: ‘ideas as roadmaps’, 
where they serve the purpose of guiding behaviour, especially under circumstances of 
uncertainty where decision-makers may not have had an available blue-print; 
‘coordination’, where they act as a ‘glue’ for policy-makers; and ‘institutionalisation’, 
which allow for changes in rules, norms and procedures.
The importance of the process of institutionalisation represents the final stage in the 
‘norm cycle’, where ideas become embedded in institutions and acquire a taken-for- 
granted status.79 According to Donnelly, it was the institutionalisation of human rights 
as a component of US foreign policy during the Carter administration, together with a 
degree of consolidation of the principles in other constituencies, such as among the 
Democrats and in public opinion, that prevented the Reagan administration from 
downgrading human rights as an element of US foreign policy altogether.80
Sikkink explicitly applied this approach to the study of the post Second World War 
history of human rights policies in the US and in Western Europe, excluding realism and 
constructivism as relevant explanations for these changes. Her argument constitutes an 
hypothesis that is worth testing, ‘policy makers adopted new policies because their 
ideas had changed’, which led them to attempted to articulate a new definition of long­
term US national interests that was concerned with respect for human rights, and used 
such respect as ‘the fundamental yard-stick with which to measure the value of an ally
Q 1
or the potential stability of a regime’. Furthermore, the stimuli for the development of 
a US human rights foreign policy did not come from the domestic level: in the US 
human rights concerns emerged within the decision-making structures, especially in the
78 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), quotes respectively on p. 9 and p. 8.
79 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization. Special issue: Exploration and Contestation in the Study o f World Politics, 
Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 887-917.
80 Jack Donnelly (1994), ‘Post-Cold War Reflections on the Study of International Human Rights’, Ethics 
and International Affairs, Vol. 8 (published annually), pp. 97-117. On the ‘socialisation’ of international 
norms and their incorporation into domestic practices, see also Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999), 
‘The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction’ in Thomas 
Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The power o f human rights: international norms and 
domestic change, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-38.
81 Kathryn Sikkink (1993), ‘The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States 
and Western Europe’, in Goldstein and Keohane (1993b), pp. 139-70, quote on p. 160, emphasis added.
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State Department. Only once the principles had gained ground, did Congressmen use 
human rights and democracy arguments in their rhetoric to rally public support.
One aspect of this approach that is worth underlining is the ‘institutionalisation’ of ideas 
which can lead to changes in rules and norms and their endurance even when the ideas 
have waned.82 And in the dynamics of this process of institutionalisation, policy-makers 
or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ play an important role: ‘agreement among a critical mass of 
actors on some emergent norm can create a tipping point after which agreement
01
becomes widespread in many empirical cases’. In short, this hypothesis attributes the 
main reason for including human rights and democracy in EU foreign policy to the 
communities involved in EU policy-making (which I will discuss in the following section 
regarding EU foreign policy processes), which undergo an ‘ideational shift’ and thus 
act as policy entrepreneurs pushing for the inclusion o f human rights and democracy 
concerns in the EU ’s external relations.
The final hypothesis sees the principles of human rights and democracy as constitutive 
features o f the EU ’s distinctive set up due to its own particular history of integration.84 
The EU would include human rights and democracy in its foreign policy both because 
they are among the key norms that have defined its own development and because in 
doing so it seeks to change the international environment in which it operates.
This hypothesis is derived largely from ‘constructivist’ approaches that build especially 
on Anthony Giddens’s work on structuration theory, according to which structures and
oc
agents reconstruct each other in a dynamic two-way process of iteration. This means 
that the relationship between institutions and actors is a continuous process of 
interaction, through which norms, identity and relative interests are formed, adapted, 
modified and changed. Viewed through this lens, concepts of the international system, 
the state, norms, international actors, interests are not givens, as rationalist accounts 
would have it, but social constructs: ‘international actors [...] inherently are socially
82 Goldstein and Keohane (1993a).
83 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), pp. 892-893.
84 Manners (2002); and Ian Manners (2006), ‘The Constitutive nature of values, images and principles in 
the European Union’, in Lucarelli and Manners (eds), pp. 19-41.
85 Anthony Giddens (1984), The Constitution o f Society: Outline o f the Theory o f Structuration, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, chapter 1.
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o/:
constructed’ and ‘prevailing norms [...] partly define their interest’. It postulated that 
international politics is a social phenomenon created by ideas, values and norms shared 
by a set of actors. This approach also challenges the rationality of actors assumed in all 
rationalist theories, whereby policy choices are expected to return specific benefits.
Constructivism’s central features can be summarised as follows: the building blocks of 
international relations are ideational as well as material; the ideational factors have both 
normative and instrumental dimensions; they express intentionality both of the 
individual and collectively; and the meaning of ideational factors is deeply embedded in 
history and thus vary according to time and place;87 identity, as a construct, also defines 
and guides action.
The significant differences of constructivism compared to rationalist interpretations are: 
a de-emphasis on the influence of domestic politics, constraints or stimuli in seeking the 
origins of change at the international level, and instead an emphasis on ideas as 
constitutive rather than as ‘theoretical fillers’88 that come to the aid of rationalist 
explanations. As Klotz puts it, ‘norms are constitutive components of both the 
international system and state’s interests’. They are not merely an ‘ethical alternative to 
or constraint on self-interest’, but they ‘play an explanatory role’.89 Thus, the 
constructivist framework manages to conflate explanatory and constitutive elements in 
one approach. The EU’s claim to include human rights and democracy in its foreign 
policy would constitute an identity-building exercise as much as the EU’s specific 
identity leads it to include these aims in foreign policy.
Conceptualisations of the EU in terms of its international identity,90 or as a ‘normative 
power’,91 single out its uniqueness, which derives from its ‘historical context, hybrid
86 Audie Klotz (1995), ‘Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and U.S. sanctions against 
South Africa’, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 451-478, quote on p. 460.
87 Alexander Wendt (1992), ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics’ , International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391-425; Alexander Wendt (1994), ‘Collective 
Identity Formation and the International State’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2., 
pp. 384-396; John Gerard Ruggie (1998), ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism 
and the Social Constructivist Challenge’, International Organization. Special issue: Exploration and 
Contestation in the Study of World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 855-85.
88 Ruggie (1998) uses a term coined by Mark Blyth, p. 868.
89 Klotz (1995), p. 460.onIan Manners and Richard Whitman (1998), ‘Towards Identifying the International Identity of the 
European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU’s Network of Relations’, Journal of European
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polity, and political-legal constitution’, and which predisposes the EU to act normatively 
on the global scene by diffusing its principles through ideational interaction.92 The 
sources of EU foreign policy (drivers, actors, motivations) and the distinctiveness of its 
output are thus inextricably tied by structuration processes: ‘the way in which the EU is 
constitutionally constructed is shaped by the way in which the EU’s international role is 
constructed which is, in turn, shaped by the way in which the EU is constitutionally 
constructed, ad infinitum’.93 It is the constitutive nature of the EU that determines its 
foreign policy outputs in terms of normative content: human rights and democracy 
represent one of the most important constitutive elements in defining the EU as a 
normative power.94 Identity-based hypotheses would expect human rights and 
democracy to feature high in EU foreign policy, even if not necessarily emerging as the 
prime concern.
The core difference in understanding the role that human rights and democracy can play 
in EU foreign policy between cognitive and rationalist approaches is therefore whether 
human rights and democracy are a feature of identity, and are thus activated on a taken 
for granted basis, or whether they are used because they serve a purpose. Such 
instrumentality is here not considered value-laden (in the sense of serving inherently 
‘good’ or ‘selfish’ purposes). The instrumental use can vary from seeking to consolidate 
hegemonic power over other parts of the world or to achieve market access in third 
countries, from conflict prevention to responding to domestic demands, from managing 
inter-institutional dynamics within the EU or inter-relational aims of bargaining between 
partners.
Integration, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 231-49; Richard Whitman (1998), From Civilian Power to Superpower? 
The International Identity o f the European Union, Basingstoke: MacMillan.
91 Manners (2002).
92 Manners (2002), p. 240.
Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (2003), ‘The “difference engine”: constructing and representing 




3. EU foreign policy making and human rights and democracy
Before examining how the validity of these hypotheses can be explored through 
empirical research, it is necessary to develop a framework explaining the scope of 
research and addressing the empirical questions regarding EU foreign policy making 
processes: what actors push for EU action on human rights and democracy? What 
factors trigger and influence an EU response? And conversely what actors and factors 
hinder the development of human rights and democracy positions?
First it is necessary to define and delimit the scope for investigation. As will be amply 
illustrated in chapter 3, the EU’s promotion of human rights and democracy involves the 
use of a broad range of civilian actions, positions, policies, and includes aid, trade, 
traditional diplomatic tools, as well as developing positions in multilateral organisations; 
and the spectrum of instruments can lead up to the use of military or civil-military tools 
often justified through humanitarian interventionism, and thus is subject to diverse 
decision-making processes. With the extraordinary growth of the EU’s foreign relations 
in the 1990s, the CFSP domain of intergovernmental relations is simply too limited an 
approach to understand the role of human rights and democracy in EU foreign policy.95
Through foreign policy analysis, broad frameworks have been developed that can 
provide a good starting point. Christopher Hill has developed an approach based on 
multilevel diplomacy which can take into account the interplay between national foreign 
policies, domestic influences, and a degree of common norms and interests that have 
been consolidated at the European level. He defines EU external activities as a ‘system 
of external relations’,96 which has multiple interests, objectives, policy making centres 
and decision making structures. It allows for the inclusion of the role of the member 
states, central not only to the EU’s CFSP but also in the definition of general foreign 
policy objectives, the activities that fall under the category of EC ‘external relations’, 
and the external dimension of all three pillars.
95 Keukeleire and MacNoughton (2008), chapter 12.
96 Christopher Hill (1993), ‘The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 
International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 305-328.
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Ginsberg has further developed this approach to conceptualise a ‘European Foreign 
Policy’ that includes the international and European contexts in which the EU operates, 
the variety of inputs into policy-making, from states to values, the hybrid institutional 
and decision-making structures of the three pillars, and the outputs in terms of foreign 
policy production.97 As White argues,
it is assumed that the elements of this framework - actors, processes, issues, 
instruments, context and outputs - are interrelated and constitute a foreign 
policy system in action. Thus, the nature of the policy process is affected by 
the identity of the actors involved, the issues being dealt with, the policy 
instruments available and, not least, the context within which policy is 
made. These interrelationships in turn generate the outputs from the
98system.
Enlargement policies, and the external impact of internal policies can also be included 
among the outputs of this broader approach.99 In other words, the most appropriate 
framework to understand EU foreign policy is complex and comprehensive and does not 
lend itself to a single theoretical interpretation. However, for the purposes of this thesis, 
the analysis will be focused on the decision-making process at EU level including the 
inputs of the member states, but will exclude national foreign policies as well as the 
opposite dynamic regarding the impact of EU policy on changing and shaping national 
preferences. Thus it will be more appropriate to speak of EU foreign policy rather than 
European foreign policy.
Addressing the question of agency in EU foreign policy, the key dichotomy has been 
between intergovemmentalists and institutionalists.100 Intergovemmentalists, be they of 
realist or liberal matrix, focus on the role of states, concentrating their research on the
97 Roy H Ginsberg (1999), ‘Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the 
Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 429- 
54; Roy H. Ginsberg, (2001), The European Union in international politics: baptism by fire, Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
98 Brian White (2001), Understanding European Foreign Policy, Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 
40.
99 Stephan Keukeleire (2002), ‘Reconceptualizing (European) Foreign Policy: Structural Foreign Policy’, 
paper presented at the 1st Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Bordeaux: 26-28 
September, available at www.wmin.ac.uk/csd/rw/TMP1005915395.htm.
100 Ben Soetendorp (1994), ‘The Evolution of the EC/EU as a Single Foreign Policy Actor’, in Walter 
Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy. The EC and Changing Perspectives in 
Europe, London: Sage, pp. 103-119; and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1996), ‘Exploring the Nature of the 
Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 53-80; Philip H. Gordon (1997-8), ‘Europe’s 
Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 74-100.
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developments leading from European Political Cooperation to the Maastricht Treaty 
creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy and later Treaty-based modifications, 
and/or on the role of national foreign policies in interaction with the other member states 
and with the EU level.101 The evolution of EU foreign policy is based on cost-benefit
109analyses of the member states, where the big countries set the rules of the game and
10^  •the smaller member states have to adapt or play on the margins. The incentives for 
cooperation would be represented by the enhancement of the member state’s power or 
influence (‘politics of scale’104) but cooperation would be severely limited by the ‘logic 
of diversity’.105
This approach does capture the key decision-making processes governing CFSP, 
especially with regard to the ‘history-making’106 decisions, such as including human 
rights and democracy in the aims of CFSP or those determining in which areas the EU 
should focus its foreign policy attention. Through these lens, rationality is often seen as
1 ( X Iinstrumentalist. The role human rights and democracy might play in EU foreign 
policy would therefore depend on consensus building between the member states, each 
pushing for its own maximization o f rationally-based interests or concerns.
As we shall see in Chapter 3, the inclusion of human rights and democracy in the EU’s 
declared foreign policy aims has entailed a degree of institutionalisation and 
coordination between diverse EU actors, involving increasingly complex decision­
making processes, suggesting that the purely intergovernmental framework is
1 OSinsufficient to understand the policy making dynamics behind EU actions on human 
rights and democracy. Institutionalist approaches have focused on actors others than the 
EU member states and their national policy-makers as initiators of EU commitments.
101 See, for instance, the edited volume by Christopher Hill (1996), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign 
Policy, London: Routledge, with chapters on the member states.
102 Pijpers (1991).
103 Ben Soetendorp (1999), Foreign Policy in the European Union, London and New York: Longman, 
especially chapter 9.
10* Ginsberg (1989).
105 Stanley Hoffman (2000), Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 189-198; Gordon (1997-8).
106 John Peterson (1995), ‘Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework for analysis’, 




Concepts borrowed from institutionalism can provide insights into the meso-level of EU 
decision-making rather than at the macro-level where the ‘history-making’ decisions are 
taken,109 analysing decision-making processes, the role of institutions, the extent to 
which the latter have constructed their own agenda and the ways in which states have 
adapted their behaviour as a consequence of EU membership. Studies on the dynamics 
of ‘socialisation’ and the creation of policy networks and groups, increasingly speaking 
a common language, see these as constituting the main rationales for EU action. The 
socialisation of participants in the foreign policy making process with its ‘engranage’ 
effects, the upgrading of common interests, the ‘spillover’ process, can act to expand the 
scope or increase the level of the commitment of policy makers,110 providing insights 
into role that EU institutions might have played in shaping choices regarding human 
rights and democracy.111 Analyses in the field of ‘epistemic communities’ challenged 
some of the rationalist assumptions behind state-based approaches, contradicting ‘three 
common explanations for the development of convergent state policies: foreign pressure 
(coercion), public opinion, and the rational anticipation of future benefits by a unitary 
government’.112
The empowerment of these groups would have enabled them to shape the policies of EU 
institutions. In other words, this hypothesis would attribute the EU ’s inclusion o f human 
rights and democracy in foreign policy to the supranational networks o f policy makers. 
Policy entrepreneurs would be the ‘catalysts’ for change, capable of rallying support 
towards their objectives. In EU literature, these have implicitly tended to be identified 
with the Commission, as a ‘true believer’, against the member states.113
109 Peterson (1995); John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg (1999), Decision-making in the European 
Union, New York, St. Martin’s Press; Jeremy Richardson (2001a), ‘Policy-making in the EU. Interests, 
ideas and garbage cans of primeval soup’, in Jeremy Richardson (ed.) (2001b), European Union. Power 
and policy-making, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 23-26.
110 Philippe C. Schmitter (1969), ‘Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration’ 
International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 161-66.
111 Jakob C. 0hrgaard (2004), ‘International relations or European integration: is the CFSP sui generisT, 
in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (eds.), Rethinking European Union foreign policy, Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press, pp. 26-44.
112Peter M. Haas (1989), ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution 
Control’, International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 377-403, quote on p. 401.
113 For this critique, and for definition of ‘policy entrepreneur’, see Federica Bicchi (2007), European
Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean, New York and Basingstonke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
especially pp. 28-34.
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I will broaden the definition of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to include the member states 
positions.114 Research will seek to identify the ‘constituencies’ of member states and 
policy networks within the EU that contributed to pushing for EU action on human 
rights and democracy. Expanding the range of ‘policy entrepreneurs’, however, also 
expands the range of hypotheses explaining EU responses. In other words, policy 
entrepreneurs might converge around developing human rights and democracy 
positions for different reasons that may cross the rationalist and cognitive divide. The 
question regarding EU processes, therefore, would regard the degree to which these 
actors and institutions relate with each other in shaping EU foreign policy decisions.
Policy entrepreneurs may manage to shape the foreign policy agenda also because of 
these more complex inter-institutional bargaining and negotiating methods that can help 
actors discover areas in which ‘common European interests’115 are developed, alongside, 
rather than in opposition to, individual state interests.116 Common interest between 
cooperating states,117 a ‘habit of cooperation’,118 or the need to manage relations 
between member states (inter-relational objectives)119 can provide a rationale for the 
maintenance of a foreign policy that includes human rights and democracy objectives. 
Human rights and democracy could be rhetorically subscribed to as a result o f 
bargaining between EU actors with the aim o f managing relations between them.
The meso-level of analysis can shed light on the processes that develop concrete policy 
proposals once the guidelines have been set and formalized at the intergovernmental 
level. Policy network models can help understand the transnational and 
transgovemmental dynamics that can influence the policy process.120 At this ‘meso- 
level’ of analysis, a ‘logic of appropriateness’ can guide policy-makers to act on the
Bicchi (2007), pp. 28-35.
1,5 Simon Bulmer (1991), ‘Analysing European Political Cooperation: The Case for Two-tier analysis’, in 
Holland (1991), pp. 70-91.
116 Other factors, such as domestic political culture, can also be considered as a variant in determining 
member states’ willingness to cooperate. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (2004), ‘Explaining Government 
Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy’, International Organization, Vol. 
58, No. 1, pp. 137-174. However, the domestic level is not included in this analysis.
117 Steven D. Krasner (1982), ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,’ International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 185-205.
118 Wallace (2000).
119 Keukeleire and MacNaughton (2008), chapter 1.
120 Risse-Kappen (1996).
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basis of expected norms and rules,121 for instance ‘institutionalised’ human rights and 
democracy.
The third international relations approach that can provide some explanation to our core 
questions is constructivism. It can lend itself to be used together with, rather than in 
opposition to, other analytical frameworks, proving to be flexible enough an approach
199for research that borrows from different disciplines. Constructivism has been used to 
understand norm and policy evolution at the EU level, by identifying changes in ideas, 
principles and norms and evaluating their impact on policies. Using constructivist views 
of identity as well as on two-level games and internal and external bargaining, norms 
have been considered as ‘major determinants’ of EU positions.123
The key constructivist challenge to rational and instrumental explanations is that an 
instrumental use of norms can work only if the norms have acquired a ‘certain degree of 
taken-for-grantedness within the relevant group or institutions’,124 although one should 
be aware of any pre-determinism (meaning that a certain identity or a shared belief do 
not necessarily lead to policy action). In other words, once the commitment has been 
made and policy positions become ‘institutionalised’, argumentative dynamics will 
persuade reluctant EU members follow suit or can ‘trap’ them into a position as a result 
of ‘shaming’ among peers. 125 Through this approach, human rights and democracy 
would be included among those ‘taken for granted’ norms that guide EU foreign policy
Many factors influencing EU responses regarding human rights and democracy have 
already been discussed and do not require further explanations. I will try summarise 
them by grouping them in two categories: external influences and triggers that lead the 
EU to respond, or an internal rationale that produces foreign policy outputs.
121 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1998), ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 943-969.
122 See, for instance, Caroline Fehl (2004), ‘Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ 
for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches’, European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 
3, pp. 357-394.
123 Ole Elgstrom (2000), ‘Lome and Post-Lome: Asymmetric Negotiations and the Impact of Norms’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 175-95.
124 Michael Merlinger, Cas Mudde, and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2001), ‘The Right and the Righteous? 
European Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sactions against Austria’, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 59-77, quote on p. 59.
125 Frank Schimmelfennig (2001), ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1, Winter, pp. 4 7 -  
80.
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The ‘politics of scale’, means that collective action provides greater benefits, with lower 
costs and risks, than when acting individually.126 This can provide one rationale for the 
member states acting together in world affairs. In a similar vein, attempting to bridge the 
‘capabilities-expectations gap’127 has been one of the stimuli for CFSP development.128 
‘Extemalisation’, entailing the consequences of internal EU policies on countries 
outside the Union, can put pressure on the EU to develop compensating external 
policies.129 External demands are not just limited to the consequences of the internal 
market but can also relate to demands from third countries for EU action.130 The ‘habit 
of cooperation’ has led to a ‘co-ordination reflex’ whereby policy-makers ask 
themselves what the position of their partners will be on a specific issue before defining 
a national position.131
Others prioritise instead internal dynamics in stimulating the ‘burst’ of external relations 
activities of the EU in the 1990s, which took place at the end of the initial legislative 
phase of the internal market as well as the completion of the GATT/WTO negotiations, 
arguing that ‘the external relations of any international organization are bound to take
t i n y
their impetus from its (internal) priorities and activities. One should allow not only 
for the member states to resort to the EU for the benefits of ‘the politics of scale’ to 
pursue national priorities, but also for cases in which ‘the EU initiates policy based not 
on external stimuli but on its own internal dynamic, interests, and instincts, a European- 
interest of “self-styled” logic is at work’.133 This logic may initiate foreign policy action 
with the aim of achieving internal, rather than external objectives, for instance to 
strengthen, weaken or influence European integration, to emphasise the specificity of
126 Ginsberg (1999).
127 Hill (1993).
128 Ginsberg (1999), p. 438.
129 Ernst Haas and Edward Thomas Rowe (1973), ‘Regional Organizations in the United Nations: Is There 
Externalization?’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 3-54.
130 K. Smith (2003).
131 Tonra (2003).
132 Marise Cremona (1998), ‘The European Union as an International Actor: The Issues o f Flexibility and 
Linkage’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 67-94.
133 Ginsberg (1999), p. 439. For an application of these concepts, see Karen E. Smith (1998a), ‘The 
Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Paradoxes o f European Foreign 
Policy, The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 67-85.
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the EU approach (as opposed, for instance, to that of the US), or to manage relations 
between the member states (inter-relational objectives).134
External and internal dynamics could well complement each other rather than represent 
competing stimuli to European Union foreign policy. Focusing on the ‘logic of 
diversity’ and expanding the concept of policy entrepreneurship to the member states, 
rather than limited to the EU’s supranational institutions, will enable us, on a case by 
case basis, to identify the actors pushing for the development of the EU’s human rights 
and democracy agenda, as well as those pulling the brakes to it. As we have seen the 
motivations of individual actors can vary along an instrumental or ideational spectrum. 
Precisely the ‘logic of diversity’ could allow us to discern potential competition between 
these motivations, identifying a bridge between rationalist and cognitive approaches. 
The dynamics of interaction between these stimuli will allow us to identify the dominant 
processes. Extemalisation, the ‘politics of scale’ and the ‘self-styled logic’, with the 
latter’s incorporation of concepts such as ‘European interests’ and ‘instincts’ also opens 
the door to apply ideational and constructivist interpretations. Dynamics related to 
policy networks, institutionalisation, persuasion and argumentative rationality may also 
shed light on the processes behind EU responses to human rights and democracy 
problems in Ukraine and Egypt.
4. Methodology
The previous sections have constructed five main hypotheses addressing whether and 
why the EU includes or claims to include human rights and democracy in its foreign 
policy.
The first considers the EU’s claim just a claim: human rights and democracy are not 
amongst the EU’s foreign policy priorities. Rather, they are used instrumentally to 
justify or to mask the pursuit of other objectives, which can range from establishing 
hegemonic power over third countries, to seeking legitimacy vis-a-vis domestic 
electorates. Alternatively, human rights and democracy concerns are not activated 
precisely because they do not correspond to or because they compete with EU foreign
134 Keukeleire and MacNaughton (2008), chapter 1.
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policy priorities. This extreme instrumentalist view is sceptical of the genuineness of the 
Union’s rhetoric on promoting human rights and democracy.
The second sees the EU’s claim as immersed in liberal views about peace and 
democracy, whereby the pursuit of human rights and democracy in foreign policy serves 
the purpose of increasing security and stability for the EU and its surrounding 
environment. In this case, what is often portrayed as a dichotomy between ‘values and 
interests’ would be merged into mutually reinforcing aims. This hypothesis is still 
instrumentalist, in the sense that it is tied to the achievement of certain external foreign 
policy aims.
The third hypothesis too is instrumentalist, but is related to internal rather than external 
aims: the EU pursues human rights and democracy as a consequence of 
intergovernmental and/or inter-institutional dynamics with the aim of building or 
maintaining consensus between member states. A foreign policy based on human rights 
and democracy can also serve the purpose of strengthening the EU’s CFSP or even its 
international identity or image.
The fourth hypothesis focuses more strongly on the role of EU institutions, mitigating 
and shaping state preferences. In this case, compared to the previous hypothesis, the 
agency is reverted to the institutions rather than to the member states. The EU’s 
rhetorical commitment would generate, through institutionalisation, further 
commitments to respond to human rights and democracy problems through EU foreign 
policy. Policy entrepreneurs, inspired by the ideas developed through ‘socialisation’ 
dynamics, can act as a constituency persuading and shaming more reluctant member 
states to address human rights and democracy.
The fifth sees human rights and democracy as part of the EU’s identity. On the basis of 
this hypothesis, one would expect the EU to pursue normative positions, even if it is 
recognised that ‘in the real world’ this is not always possible.135 Nonetheless, one would 
expect human rights and democracy to emerge in the foreign policy calculus.
135 H. Smith (2002), p. 271.
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How to uncover the validity and relevance of such hypotheses?
A ‘comprehensive human rights policy’ has been defined as one that contains both a 
multilateral dimension, such as the ratification of international treaties and the 
submission of internal human rights practices to international review, and an external 
policy dimension, which ‘exists when explicit human rights legislation or executive 
policy regulates aspects of foreign policy making so that human rights are incorporated 
in the foreign policy calculus’. One question that should guide empirical research 
regards what ‘incorporating’ the human rights principles into to the foreign policy 
calculus actually means. In EU jargon, it would translate into ‘mainstreaming’. As the 
Commission has pointed out, ‘to be effective, respect for human rights and democracy 
should be an integral, or “mainstream”, consideration in all EU external policies’.137 
Furthermore, this would require ‘coherent and consistent policies’ to promote human 
rights and democracy in third countries. This applies both to coherence between those 
policies and other EU action, especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It 
also relates to the promotion of ‘consistent and complementary’ action by the EU and its 
member states, especially in the promotion and mainstreaming of human rights through 
development and other official assistance.138
Consistency has been a constant objective of EU external relations since the Single 
European Act. The Maastricht Treaty states that
the Union shall [...] ensure the consistency of its external activities as a 
whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and 
development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible 
for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to this end.139
Though not a legal requirement, as the ECJ does not have jurisdiction over CFSP 
decisions, consistency should be considered ‘legally binding but not enforceable, much 
as [it is] politically constraining’.140 Consistency at the EU level thus has a twofold
136 Sikkink (1993), quote on p. 143.
137 European Commission (2001), The European Union’s Role in promoting human rights and 
democratisation in third countries, COM(2001) 252 final, Brussels: 8 May.
138 European Commission (2001), The European Union’s Role in promoting human rights and 
democratisation in third countries, COM(2001) 252 final, Brussels: 8 May.
139 Article 3 TEU.
140 Antonio Missiroli (2001a), ‘European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 177-196, quote on p. 182. See also Horst-Gunter Krenzler and
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dimension. The first is horizontal and regards coordination across pillars and policy 
fields; the second is vertical and regards coordination between the EC, the EU and the 
member states. Thus we can speak of internal consistency, as far as it regards the EU 
policy making process, and external consistency, regarding the ways in which the EU 
treats its partners in practice.
Much empirical research has been based on understanding the degree to which the EU 
was consistent with respect to the norms it claimed to advocate (see chapter 3, section 
5). This will constitute a first level of analysis. However, this thesis aims to go beyond 
the identification of EU inconsistencies and explain the reasons behind them.
The first methodological question regards how to discern between competing 
motivations and processes driving EU foreign policy, and the role human rights and 
democracy may play therein. Classical realism, by seeking to deconstruct claims over 
the influence of democracy, law, institutions, integration, and by explaining them 
through concepts of balance of power, manipulation, or distribution of resources,141 can 
help the student discriminate between norms and ideology, power and influence, interest 
and idea, instrumental and ideational (or normative) positions, and more specifically can 
serve to understand when and why human rights and democracy foreign policy 
objectives are trumped by other conflicting (to perceived as conflicting) objectives.
These competing or conflicting aims of foreign policy will be addressed especially in 
chapters 4 and 7 where the EU’s objectives of its relations with Egypt and Ukraine will 
be examined. These will be grouped in aims relating to stability and security, to 
achieving economic advantages, or tied to ideational concerns. This approach will 
enable an understanding of the limits of the EU’s claim about human rights and 
democracy. As chapter 1 illustrated, these two countries were chosen because they are 
both part of the EU’s so-called ‘neighbourhood’ which, according to EU policy 
documents constitutes one of the most important areas for EU foreign policy action, 
where strong interests of the member states lie, but also where the EU claims to promote
Henning C. Schneider (1997), ‘The Question of Consistency’, in Elffiede Regelsberger, Philippe de 
Schouteete and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) Foreign Policy o f the European Union: from EPC to CFSP and 
Beyond, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 133-151; Nuttall (2000), chapter 7.
141 Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999), ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, International Security. 
Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 5-55.
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human rights and democracy most vigorously. This will enable us to ascertain the 
importance of the various foreign policy aims at play.
Ideational interpretations also generate important sets of questions. The approaches 
explained in the previous section place much importance on the policy-making 
community and on the Commission in pushing for ideational concerns. But how can 
ideational shifts within policy-making communities be found? And are they sufficient to 
produce policy change? Both institutional and ideational approaches would understand 
such commitment to cooperate to promote certain principles as incremental and 
increasingly inevitable, in the light of the ‘habit of cooperation’ or the ‘power of ideas’. 
They do not therefore provide insights into cases in which policy choices are in 
contradiction with norms and cooperation, when EU foreign policy performance stands 
at odds with its rhetoric, or when a certain path is abandoned -  a policy shift that has 
been defined as ‘recidivism’.142
Constructivist approaches focus on the development of norms and principles as the main 
trigger for policy change, but this development also becomes a constitutive part of the 
framework and a defining element of its ‘identity’. However, owing its conceptual core 
to structuration theory, it provides no methodological indication to ascertain the relative 
role to give to ideational factors vis-a-vis the various material factors highlighted by 
rationalist explanations. Constructivists themselves claim that beliefs or identities may 
or may not be ‘activated’ in policy, but that this does not impinge on the strength of that 
belief or identity. So what relative role to give to beliefs and identity? What hierarchy of 
influencing factors can be established? And how can a research agenda be constructed?
The methodology used in this thesis is based on EU foreign policy analysis applied to 
Ukraine and Egypt. First of all, the exercise will be to explain EU foreign policy 
towards these two countries in general terms, exploring the various priorities of the EU 
member states and institutions when acting collectively (chapters 4 and 7). Once these 
priorities have been established, and the processes whereby they were included in the 
EU agenda, the hypotheses developed will be applied to the specific case studies
142 A term borrowed from Jennifer Sterling-Folker (2002), Theories of International Cooperation and the 
Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U.S. International Monetary Policy-Making after Bretton Woods,
Albany: State University of New York Press. See chapter 2 for a critique of liberalism.
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regarding human rights and democracy: in Ukraine with regard to freedom of expression 
and electoral competition, in Egypt with regard to the use of torture and elections.
But the prime problem when investigating human rights and democracy aims in foreign 
policy regards discerning between rhetoric and substance. How can an ‘ideational shift’ 
be traced? How can an identity-based argument be proved?
Primary sources include extensive research into EU documents and into contributions of 
EU political leaders for the period 1991-2004 with regard to Ukraine, and 1995-2007 
with regard to Egypt. These, however, are considered to illustrate what the EU claims to 
do and of how it justifies its policies. This (rather basic) argument is not without 
consequence: the expansion of theoretical conceptualisations of the EU has often been 
carried out at the expense of empirical research that goes beyond an analysis of EU 
documentation. Yet the distinction between discourse and political practice is crucial to 
understand the relative weight of foreign policy priorities.
Policy analysis can ascertain the relative importance of human rights and democracy in 
foreign policy also by analysing the attention that these received in official policy, the 
financial commitments to them through aid, the attention given to them through 
diplomatic visits and the formal and informal messages delivered. EU policies have also 
been dissected through the use of press chronicles. A broad variety of newspapers has 
been systematically examined: The Economist, the Financial Times and Le Monde have 
all been used to cover the period 1991-2007; the European Voice (for the period 1997- 
2007); Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (1999-2004), Al-Ahram weekly on-line (1998- 
2007). These were considered as offering the most comprehensive coverage of EU 
foreign policy towards Ukraine and Egypt, including reconstructions of member states’ 
positions on key events. Select issues of International Herald Tribune, the online 
EUobserver, Agence Europe, La Repubblica, II Corriere della Sera, El Pais and The 
Guardian have also been used, alongside other sources of information all appropriately 
quoted in footnotes.
The final stage of research was based on qualitative interviews with EU actors that were 
closely involved in all or aspects of the case studies treated here. The interviews were 
not conducted with the aim of obtaining background information; they were carried out
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once the hypotheses had been developed and the topics extensively researched. The 
interviews had the aim of testing the various hypotheses developed, asking questions 
regarding the motivations behind EU responses to specific human rights and democracy 
problems, the reasons for EU action or lack of action, the actors and processes that 
triggered the EU’s response. Unless specifically stated, all the research conclusions I 
have reached have been confirmed by more than one official.
Forty four qualitative and anonymous interviews were conducted with key officials 
working in the country-relevant departments of the Council and the Commission 
institutions, and at the Representations of Ukraine and Egypt in Brussels. Field work 
included research trips in the two case study countries, where further interviews were 
conducted with officials working at the Delegations of the European Commission and at 
the embassies of some EU member states. The officials met covered a broad range of 
responsibilities: they included members of the country and regional desks of EU 
institutions, heads of unit, official responsible for the regional policies, political 
directors, officials in charge of the human rights and democracy aspects, as well as of 
aid.
Over 50 hours of interviews seeking targeted information thus provide research with 
information that has not been addressed in any other account. Furthermore, with the 
exception of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, all the case studies treated here have barely 
been covered by secondary literature. Surprisingly, Egypt in particular has not been 
addressed by students of EU foreign policy, with very few exceptions.143 In addition, 
some NGO activists, journalists, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, 
and independent analysts have also been interviewed. These, however, have not been 
used to test the hypotheses developed in this thesis, as they would have constituted an 
opinion rather than first hand experience of the foreign policy making processes that led 
to EU responses.
143 See footnote 52 for the contextualisation of this thesis in existing literature on the two countries.
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5. Conclusions
This chapter has used International Relations as well as the EU theoretical literature to 
build some hypotheses about why the EU includes human rights and democracy in its 
foreign policy and about how it does so.144 In doing so, it has expanded the range of 
motivations that might guide EU action. Explanations tied to international relations 
theory regarding why an actor might pursue human rights and democracy are mostly 
applicable to states; using them for the European Union requires introducing further 
variables regarding the role of institutions, inter-institutional dynamics, international and 
supranational decision making processes, alongside the influence of domestic politics 
and national foreign policies, which are beyond the scope of this study that concentrated 
on the EU level.
Deconstructing the EU means that single theoretical frameworks are not appropriate to 
capture the complexities of its foreign policy-making. The search here will be for what I 
term ‘constituencies’ within the EU that have pushed the normative agenda, the 
processes that have led to the EU’s political commitment, and those determining its 
actual performance when put to the test of the world of empirical circumstance in 
Ukraine and Egypt.
The ‘policy entrepreneurs’ considered here will not be limited to those groups that refer 
to the supranational institutions. Within the framework of the ‘logic of diversity’, 
constituencies advocating EU responses can push other EU actors, through persuasion, 
argumentative rationality or shaming, to adopt specific positions on human rights and 
democracy. Hence, initial cost-benefit analyses on part of the member states driven by 
the politics of scale or a habit of cooperation in developing collective EU policies can 
lead to the institutionalisation of human rights and democracy, in turn raising the 
expectations (from within the EU as well as from external stimuli) to act.
144 It is surprising that this exercise has started to be carried out only recently. For a review of the 
relationship between International Relations theory and the EU, see Christopher Hill and Michael Smith 
(eds.) (2005), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
especially the chapter by Filippo Andreatta (2005), ‘Theory and the European Union’s International 
Relations’, pp. 18-38, dedicated to this topic.
62
In terms of processes, intergovernmental approaches underline the ‘logic of diversity’ 
governing EU relations with third countries. Here, different types of bargaining (or not) 
can lead to common positions, but the role of institutions in shaping policy choices as 
well as of the policy communities developed within the institutions also needs to be 
explored. One question will regard the degree to which the institutionalisation of norms 
at the EU level can generate pressure to address human rights and democracy problems 
in third countries, or whether the triggers are tied to intergovernmental processes, with 
the member states responding to specific circumstances.
In other words, can a pattern be identified that would substantiate the EU’s claimed 
profile as an international actor committed to human rights and democracy, albeit 
marred by inconsistencies and competing interests, or does the EU rhetoric reveal 
patterns of ‘ad hocery’ that challenge such portrayal? The final question regards the 
ultimate aim of the EU’s human rights and democracy foreign policy. Does the EU seek 
to modify the external environment through the promotion of norms, or is such exercise 
tied to internal negotiations and the search for unity between its members?
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C h a p t e r  3
R h e t o r ic  a n d  T o o l s :
E q u ip p in g  t h e  E U  w it h  H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  D e m o c r a c y  P o l ic ie s
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
individual freedoms [...].145
1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s the EU has claimed to have become a ‘unique’ global actor in the 
promotion of human rights and democracy abroad -  a claim based on its ‘political and 
moral weight’,146 but also on the specific features that have characterised its own history 
of integration, as the above quotation from the Lisbon Treaty illustrates. As this chapter 
will show, this claim is backed by a series of decisions that led to the inclusion of human 
rights and democracy into the vast array of the EU’s external policies, from contractual 
agreements with third countries to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
development of aid budgets devoted to promoting human rights and democracy abroad.
The literature on the topic has emphasised the distinctive nature of the EU as an actor 
pursuing ‘normative’ aims, using theoretical approaches that, it is argued here, are 
insufficiently substantiated by empirical research. Alternatively, it has examined the 
shortcomings of specific human rights and democracy promotion policies, without tying 
such empirical findings to broader theoretical explanations about European foreign 
policy.147 Therefore, it is contended here that, alongside the need for more empirically 
based research examining EU foreign policy on a case by case basis, this gap has not 
been sufficiently investigated or explained.
This chapter has a number of aims. First of all, it will reconstruct historically the 
commitments made by the EU that have fostered expectations about its international role
145 Treaty of Lisbon, Chapter 1, Article 10A, point 1.
146 Both quotations are from European Commission (2001), The European Union’s Role in promoting 
human rights and democratisation in third countries, COM (2001) 252 final, Brussels: 8 May.
147 The only exception being K. Smith (2003).
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and identity. In doing so, it will make use of the empirical questions regarding the 
actors, factors and processes that led to such choices (section 2). Secondly, it will 
examine the range of tools at the EU’s disposal: agreements with third countries, CFSP 
instruments, and aid. In doing this, it will introduce how human rights and democracy 
aims are included, on paper, in relations with Ukraine and Egypt (sections 3 and 4). 
Finally, it will place these findings in the context of the academic literature on the 
subject (section 5), and seek to find alternative explanations (section 6).
2. The rhetoric: the inclusion of human rights and democracy in EU foreign 
policy
The genesis of the incorporation of human rights and democracy in EU foreign policy 
can be traced back to the late 1970s, it gained momentum especially in the second half 
of the 1980s with enlargement to the emerging democracies of Southern Europe, and 
saw its most significant developments with the end of the Cold War, also in the context 
of enlargement towards Central Europe.
But development and cooperation policy was the foreign policy field in which human 
rights and democracy made their first appearance. Initially, this was limited to a 
statement of principle, recognising a place for human rights in international relations, 
but without guidelines for action in the field of European Political Cooperation.148 
Subsequently, some concrete steps were made in terms of contractual agreements with 
third countries. The third Lome agreement between the Community and the ACP 
(African-Caribbean and Pacific) countries contained a joint declaration making human 
dignity an objective of development aid.149 The following fourth Lome Convention 
agreed in 1989 introduced the principles of human rights and democracy for the first 
time in the agreement. Article 5 considered human rights as a basic factor of economic 
development, conceived cooperation as a means to contribute to their strengthening, and
148 For an overview of the EC’s approach to human rights and democracy in its external relations prior to 
the 1990s, see Daniela Napoli (1995), ‘The European Union’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights’, in 
Nanette A. Neuwahl and Allan Rosas (eds.), The European Union and Human Rights, The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, pp. 297-311.
149 Karen E. Smith (1998b), ‘The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third 
Countries: How Effective?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 253-274; Ward (1998).
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allocated some funds towards their promotion, though it did not provide a legal basis for 
the EC to act in cases of violations of the principles.150
These developments reflected a gradual consensus that had been emerging at the 
multilateral level on the appropriateness of tying aid to human rights and democracy or 
governance principles. From the 1980s onwards there was a growing awareness among 
international donors that aid was not producing economic development, and conditions 
were increasingly attached to aid on structural adjustment and on the free market.151 In 
1989, a few weeks before the Berlin Wall came down, an influential World Bank report 
concluded that the policies of the international financial institutions were not being 
implemented properly and raised the question of competence and the quality of 
government, also pointing out the benefits of pluralism and multi-party systems in good 
government.152
External demands played a role too. Democratic transitions in Latin America stimulated 
the establishment of conditions based on human rights and democracy. When 
negotiating agreements with the new democracies in Latin America at the very end of 
the 1980s, respect for democratic principles and human rights was considered a basis of 
the agreement, paving the way for the Council’s decisions in 1991 to include human 
rights and democracy in relations with all countries. Rather than from the EC, the 
initiative stemmed from the Latin American countries, whose newly elected 
governments wanted to ensure that the new trade and cooperation ties with the EC 
would be discontinued in the case of a reversal of their democratisation process and a 
return to authoritarianism.153
150 Napoli (1995); Gordon Crawford (1996), Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good 
Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors, 
Leeds: Centre for Democratisation, University of Leeds, 1996; Ward (1998).
151 Marjorie Lister (1998a), ‘Europe’s New Development Policy’, in Marjorie Lister (ed.), European 
Union Development Policy, Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, pp. 17-38.
152 Crawford (1996).
153 Gordon Crawford (1998), ‘Human Rights and Democracy in EU Development Co-operation: Towards 
Fair and Equal Treatment’, in Lister (1998b), pp. 131-178; Marcela Szymanski and Michael E. Smith 
(2005), ‘Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU-Mexico Global 
Agreement’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 171-92. This would validate 
Moravcsik’s thesis whereby it is ‘weak’ states which seek binding international agreements with human 
rights obligations to commit future governments and to increase their international credibility. Moravcsik 
(2000).
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The second major source of the EC/EU’s increasing commitment to the principles of 
human rights and democracy stemmed from the international context that emerged after 
the autumn of 1989 and the role of the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). The US took the lead in developing relations with Eastern Europe 
during the last months of the Cold War, but in May 1989 it granted a positive role to the 
EC with which the US should develop ‘new mechanisms of consultation and co­
operation on political and global issues, from strengthening the forces of democracy in 
the third world, to managing regional tensions, to putting an end to the division of 
Europe’.154 The Commission was given the crucial role of coordinating G-24 aid to the 
emerging European democracies. The US also identified the CSCE as the core 
institutional framework for post 1989 Europe.
The resort to the CSCE and the Helsinki process developed therein from 1975 onwards 
satisfied major players, from the US, the EC member states, the Soviet Union and the 
emerging democracies in Eastern Europe.155 It provided the institutional anchorage to 
the Warsaw Pact countries suitable to the end of the bipolar world that the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EC at the time could not provide, as well 
as a normative content that could serve as guidelines to new security issues in Europe. 
Even the sceptics, such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, gradually turned to 
the idea that the CSCE did provide a useful framework because, adopting a clear 
instrumentalist position, ‘it involved the Americans and the Soviet Union in Europe’s 
future, it was a good forum for discussion of border disputes, and the principles of 
private property and free markets could be built on the human rights content of 
Helsinki’.156 Indeed, at the Strasbourg Summit of December 1989 it was agreed that aid 
and trade would be granted in exchange for political and economic reforms, based on 
the principles agreed under the CSCE umbrella earlier in the month.157
These external stimuli met with developments occurring within the (then) EC, with the 
member states introducing some strings based on democratic principles in their
154 George Bush at Boston University in May 1989, quoted in Charles Grant (1990), ‘North Atlantic tryst’, 
The Economist, 7 July, p. 6 of the ‘Survey on the European Community’.
155 On the position of the major players on the CSCE, see Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley 
Hoffmann (eds.) (1993), After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 
1989-1991, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
156 Simon J. Nuttall (2000), European Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 55. Nuttall 
draws evidence from Margaret Thatcher (1993), The Downing Street Years, London, pp. 799-800.
157 ‘The European Summit. Just ignore her’, The Economist, 2 December 1989.
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assistance to the developing world, though driven by different motivations. A 
convergence of a mixture of principle-based national foreign policy traditions with more 
pragmatic considerations on the efficiency of aid spending, influenced by changing 
approaches towards aid in the international institutions were behind these developments. 
In 1990, Britain made an explicit link between aid for democracy, good government and 
the rule of law on the one hand and economic growth on the other, in a move that was 
also designed to address concerns about ‘wasting’ tax payers money on aid.158 In 1991 
Germany introduced criteria to development aid: respect for human rights, participation 
in the political process, the rule of law, a market-friendly approach to development and 
low military expenditure.159 Its development policy seemed more strongly based on 
ethics, while security, economics and power politics played a weaker role.160 Similar 
motivations could be found in the development cooperation and aid policies of 
Denmark,161 while the Netherlands had introduced the promotion of human rights as an 
essential element of its foreign policy already in 1979.162 By contrast, the aid 
programmes of the Southern member states have hardly contained these aims.
The Commission, which had guarded the political independence of its aid programmes 
from the geo-strategic considerations of the other donors during the Cold War, 
became sensitive to these developments only later, and agreed that it was ‘vital that 
human rights and democratisation figure more prominently in the guidelines for 
cooperation policy than has hitherto been the case’.164
At the EC level, the landmark for a formal commitment to the promotion of the 
principles of human rights and democracy in its external relations occurred in 1991, with 
the June European Council Declaration, the November ‘Resolution on Human Rights’, 
the agreement reached in Maastricht in December establishing a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in the new Treaty on the European Union (TEU), and the guidelines for
158 Crawford (1996) and Gorm Rye Olsen (1998), ‘Bureaucratic Interests and European Aid to Sub- 
Saharan Africa’, in Lister (1998), pp. 64-96.
159 Sabine C. Zanger (2000), ‘Good Governance and European Aid. The Impact of Political 
Conditionality’, European Union Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 293-317.
160 Olsen (1998).
161 Olsen (1998).
162 Peter R. Baehr (1996), The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, London and Basingstoke, 
MacMillan.
163 Crawford (1998).
164 European Commission (1991), On Human Rights, Democracy and Development, Brussels: November, 
SEC(91) 61 final.
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the recognition of the Newly Independent States (NIS). These constituted those ‘history- 
making decisions’165 made at the intergovernmental level.
The first comprehensive EC document adopted by the heads of government on the 
promotion of human rights abroad is the Luxemburg European Council Declaration on 
Human Rights of 28-29 June 1991, whereby
The Community and its member States undertake to pursue their policy of 
promoting and safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms 
throughout the world. This is the legitimate and permanent duty of the 
world community and of all States acting individually or collectively. They 
recall that the different ways of expressing concern about violations of 
rights, as well as requests designed to secure those rights, cannot be 
considered as interference in the internal affairs of a State and constitute an 
important and legitimate part of their dialogue with third countries.
Further substance to the June 1991 Declaration was given in the subsequent November 
Resolution of the Development Council on human rights, democracy and development, 
which considered human rights and democracy the tenets of sustainable economic 
development providing a justification for introducing stricter conditions to development 
assistance. The Council decided that all future cooperation agreements between the EC 
and third countries should include a clause human rights and democracy, outlined the 
positive initiatives to be adopted through political, diplomatic, economic, and aid means. 
It was the first time that the principle of conditionality was explicitly articulated.166 
What the Resolution failed to clarify were the ‘objective and equitable criteria’ that 
would be used to justify resorting to negative measures, which could range from 
confidential demarches to the suspension of the cooperation agreement altogether.
The final step in terms of making EC commitment officially formalised is represented 
by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), agreed in Maastricht in December 1991, 
which created the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty explicitly stated as 
one of the foreign policy objectives of the Union ‘to develop and consolidate democracy
165 Peterson (1995).
166 The Community reserved the right to adopt negative measures ‘in the event of grave and persistent 
human rights violations or the serious interruption of democratic processes, the Community and its 
Member States will consider appropriate responses in the light of the circumstances, guided by objective 
and equitable criteria’, Council on Rights, Democracy and Development (1991), Resolution o f the council 
and of the member states meeting in the council on human rights, democracy and development, 28 
November.
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1 (\1and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’. In the 
field of development cooperation, it also clarified that ‘Community policy [...] shall 
contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the
1 / : o
rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
In order to understand the motivations that led to the incorporation of human rights and 
democracy in the CFSP, it is necessary to take a step back to look at the negotiations in 
preparation of the Intergovernmental Conference convened for 1991. Initially dedicated 
to the European Monetary Union, events in Eastern Europe and the prospects of German 
unification led to the Kohl-Mitterrand joint initiative in April 1990 to put ‘political 
union’ on the agenda of the IGC:
the collapse of the Soviet empire had reinforced French fears that a stronger 
Germany might veer towards neutrality and away from its western allies. 
Whence Mr Mitterrand’s concern, shared by Mr Kohl, that Germany be 
tethered firmly to the West, not least with the help of a common EC foreign 
and security policy.169
If the Franco-German axis ensured that monetary and political union would be strived 
for together, the fundamental divide between intergovemmentalists and federalists led to 
little progress on the substance of a new foreign policy. The foreign ministers, 
informally convened by the Italian Presidency in Asolo in October 1990, came to the 
conclusion that it was impossible to define an a priori list of common foreign policy 
priorities, but they did set out a generic list of objectives that included the consolidation 
of democracy, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the development of the least favoured 
countries, support for the effectiveness of international organisations, especially the 
United Nations and the CSCE.170
The grounds for this policy shift around 1991 had thus been prepared by the 
developments of the 1980s and the end of the Cold War, which saw contextual and 
environmental changes, as well as a degree of convergence between the member states
167 Title V, Art. J.l TEU, Title V, Art. 11 in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
168 Art. 130u, TEU. The TEU also introduced human rights and democracy as internal principles upon 
which the EU is based (Art. 13) and Art. 6.2 makes the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms part of the acquis communautaire.
169 “The history of the Maastricht summit”, The Economist, 30 November 1991, pp. 57-59.
170 Nuttall (2000), p. 124.
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(albeit motivated by different reasons) over the opportunity of defining the post Cold 
War also on the basis of universal rights, international law, and of supporting processes 
of transition to democracy that were beginning in different parts of the world. The 
international context of ‘normative globalization’171 gave the EU some ingredients 
around which start develop a consensus for its nascent foreign policy, based on norms 
that had been institutionalised at the level of the United Nations.
3. Implementing human rights and democracy in EU foreign policies
The core tenets of the EC/EU’s foreign policy were established in 1991 and have 
remained relatively unchanged in terms of the substance, even if the 1990s were a 
decade rich of rhetorical commitments on human rights and democracy on part of EU 
leaders. Following the developments that culminated in the 1991 decisions, the next 
question should regard the extent to which the EU has been ‘mainstreaming’ its declared 
principles into its foreign policy objectives.172 In turn, this requires a brief analysis of 
the main policies and tools developed during the 1990s and 2000s.
The EU has included human rights and democracy objectives in the regional and 
country-specific policies, as well as developed global thematic strategies to support its 
normative stance on human rights and democracy.173 In 1998 it devised the guidelines to 
purse the fight against the death penalty which has involved a systematic condemnation 
through diplomatic tools of all cases capital punishment, including raising the issue with 
some of its major trade partners such as the US.174 Since 1994, through the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR, discussed below), the EU has 
funded around 30 projects against the death penalty worldwide, with an overall budget 
of around € 15 million).175 In 2000 the practice of sending election observation missions
171 K. Smith (2003), p. 19; Lisbeth Aggestam (2008), ‘Introduction: ethical power Europe?’, International 
Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 1-11, quote on p. 4.
172 Sikkink (1993).
173 Since 1998, the EU also draws up annual reports on its human rights policies world wide, though no 
equivalent exists for democracy promotion. Prior to these annual reports, on a request of the European 
Parliament (which had been producing annual reports on human rights in the world and on EC/EU action 
in this field since 1983), the Presidency of the Council would send a memorandum to the Parliament on 
the EC/EU’s activities in this field, following the example set by the Dutch Presidency in the early 1980s.
174 Council of the EU, General Affairs Council (1998), Council Declaration on the Death Penalty, 
Brussels: 25 May. On the EU campaign against the death penalty, see Manners (2002).
175 European Commission (2007b), The European Union: furthering human rights and democracy across 
the globe, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
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was consolidated. The following year the Council approved guidelines on the fight 
against torture, accompanied in 2005 by measures to improve coordination between the 
EU member states’ embassies, the EC Delegations in third countries and the EU 
institutions in Brussels, and the guidelines on initiating specific human rights dialogues 
with third countries. Other areas in which the EU tried to develop common normative 
positions were the support to children in armed conflicts, human rights defenders, and 
the rights of the child.176
With regard to Ukraine, the EU included human rights and democracy principles and 
objectives in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, in CFSP tools such as its 
Common Strategy, as well as in its aid programmes, as discussed below. Alongside 
bilateral relations, Egypt was also part of the broader policy framework developed with 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Of its three chapters, the first is represented by a 
political and security partnership, based inter alia on the principles of human rights and 
democracy, as enshrined in the UN Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.177 At the same time, however, the Barcelona Declaration endorses the principles 
of non-interference and of relativism through the recognition of cultural specificities, by 
including the respect for the sovereignty of each state and the right to develop one’s 
‘own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system’.178 Human rights and
176 European Commission (2000a), Communication on EU Election Assistance and Observation, 
COM(2000) 191 final, Brussels, 11 April; Council of the EU (2001f), Guidelines to EU policy towards 
third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TortureGuidelines.pdf, and Council of the EU (2005), EU 
Annual Report on Human Rights', Council of the EU (200 le), European Union Guidelines on Human 
Rights Dialogues, Brussels: 13 December; Council of the EU (2003c), EU Guidelines on children and 
armed conflict, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/GuidelinesChildren.pdf; Council of the EU 
(2004g), Ensuring Protection -  European Union Guidelines on human rights defenders, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/GuidelinesDefenders.pdf Council o f the EU (2007c), 
Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection o f the Rights of the Child, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/16031.07.pdf.
177 The Barcelona Declaration states, in terms of human rights and democracy objectives, that parties shall 
act on in accordance with UN Charter and Declarations as well as under international law, to ‘develop the 
rule of law and democracy in their political systems’, ‘respect human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of 
expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
[...], ‘give favourable consideration through dialogue between the parties, to exchange information on 
matters relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia’, respect and ensure for 
diversity and pluralism in their societies, promote tolerance between different groups in society and 
combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995), 
Barcelona Declaration, Barcelona: 27-28 November.
178 Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995), Barcelona Declaration, Barcelona: 27-28 November; 
Eberhard Kienle (1998a), ‘Destabiliazation through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the 
Barcelona Declaration’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.1-20; Feliu (2001).
72
democracy are also contained in the EMP’s third basket on a social and cultural dialogue 
between the two shores.179
In 2003 the Commission published a Communication suggesting methods to strengthen 
the human rights and democracy objectives of EU aid, regional and bilateral policies 
towards the South Mediterranean countries. Heavily influenced by the UNDP Arab 
Development Report published in 2002,180 the Commission recognised ‘a tension 
between internal security concerns and the promotion and protection of human rights 
[that] can result in negative consequences in human rights terms, particularly under the 
umbrella of the “war on terror” in the wake of September 11 2001’.181 Rather than 
address the political limitations to the EU’s promotion of human rights and democracy 
in the region, the Communication provided a number of guidelines to improve such 
policies which pertained mostly to the fields of information, mainstreaming, and 
institutional governance of the EMP. In particular, the Commission pointed at the need 
to ensure that political dialogue at all levels included human rights and democracy 
systematically, suggested a number of procedural measures for information gathering 
involving the Commission delegations that would report all the way up the institutional 
hierarchy to the Council, to produce national and regional action plans, and to improve 
aid management and objectives.
The 2004 accession round triggered the development of a stronger focus on the new 
neighbourhood of the enlarged EU. The European Neighbourhood Policy offered a 
broad framework for cooperation and eventual sectoral integration to all countries East 
and South of the EU’s borders. The innovative policy document was the Action Plan, 
jointly negotiated with each country, which highlights priority areas for cooperation and 
sets actions for their achievement.182 These included a focus on human rights and 
democracy.
179 The Barcelona Declaration states that parties ‘attach particular importance to respect for fundamental 
social rights, including the right to development’, ‘will encourage actions of support for democratic 
institutions and for the strengthening of rule of law and civil society’ especially carried out by civil 
society, ‘undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognised under existing legislation of 
migrants’ and support a campaign against racism, intolerance and xenophobia. Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference (1995), Barcelona Declaration, Barcelona: 27-28 November.
180 Interview, European Commission, Brussels: 9 April 2003
181 European Commission (2003f), Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and Democratisation 
with Mediterranean Partners. Strategic Guidelines, COM(2003) 294 final, Brussels: 21 May.
182 Rosa Balfour and Alessandro Rotta (2005), Beyond Enlargement. The European Neighbourhood 
Policy and its Tools’, The International Spectator, Vol. XL, No. 1, pp. 7-20.
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The priorities in the Action Plan with Ukraine ranged from political reform and respect 
for human rights and democratic standards, including the democratic conduct of 
presidential (2004) and parliamentary (2006) elections in accordance with OSCE 
standards (see Box 1 in the Annexes, p. 257). Political dialogue and reform received a 
greater emphasis and clarification than the more abstract wording of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement and the essentially ineffective CFSP Common Strategy (see 
section 4.2 in this chapter and chapter 4 on EU relations with Ukraine). Albeit 
resembling a shopping list, each of the overall objectives is accompanied by a 
description of specific actions to be taken, based on the implementation of international 
standards’ legislation (see Box 1 in the Annexes). The possibility of upgrading relations 
with the EU and achieving greater integration through the positive conditionality and 
differentiation that the ENP entailed was supposed to be the main benefit to entice Kiev 
to accept the Action Plan, while negative conditionality tools were not contemplated in 
the ENP policy documents.
Similarly to the Action Plan negotiated with Ukraine, Egypt’s Action Plan contains a 
rather long list of priorities that does not add any new areas to the broad fields dealt with 
through the EMP and the Association Agreement: political dialogue based on shared 
values, including on the Middle East Peace Process; enhance ‘effectiveness of 
institutions entrusted with strengthening democracy and the rule of law’, promote the 
protection of human rights. These priority areas are also supposed to reflect the 
government programme as illustrated to the Parliament by the President himself in 
December 2005.183 Although the ‘actions’ are more detailed, in terms of content, than 
the priority areas, the specific ways in which they are supposed to be implemented 
remains vague (see Box 2 in the Annexes, p. 259). The Commission recognised that the 
road towards strengthening human rights and democracy in Egypt was long, but that
1R4approving the list of priority areas was a first step.
183 See www.egvptiancabinet.gov.eg/Cabinet Programs/Cabinet Programs All.asp. Last accessed on 10 
October 2007.
184 Interviews, European Commission and Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007 and 15 May 2007 
(1) and (2).
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4. The tools to implement human rights and democracy policies
The EU has a number of tools at its disposal to promote human rights and democracy in 
third countries that cut across pillars and their decision-making processes. These tools 
have here been grouped in three broad categories. The first are bilateral agreements 
between the EC and third countries, they have the objective of institutionalising 
economic and political relations, and contain the legal provisions to exercise political 
conditionality.185 The second group refers to the tools available under CFSP, while the 
third relates to the assistance programmes the EU has developed to support human rights 
and democracy worldwide.
4.1 Agreements with third countries
Contractual agreements with third countries can be an important vehicle for pressing the 
other party to respect the agreed standards on democracy and human rights. By 2001 
all cooperation agreements covering 120 countries included the ‘human rights clause’, 
on the basis of which the EU can ‘punish’ the third country should those principles be 
breached.187 Sectoral agreements were excluded,188 but the Nice Treaty established that 
economic, financial and technical cooperation measures with third countries should 
‘contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the
185 First developed in the 1980s, by the 1990s the practice of attaching strings to aid and macro-financial 
assistance had expanded from economic governance to include political conditions linking aid to human 
rights and (liberal) democracy demands. The EU can exercise political, diplomatic and economic pressure 
through a broad range of tools, including positive and negative measures (from asymmetric trade 
liberalisation, to the threat of suspending technical cooperation agreements; from support to creating 
transnational networks to applying sanctions). For a discussion of the historical evolution of political 
conditionality changes, see Georg Sprensen (ed.) (1993), Political Conditionality, London: Frank Cass. 
For an analysis of EU conditionality, see K. Smith (1998a). For the identification of EU tools, see 
European Commission (1995b), The External Dimension o f the E U ’s Human Rights Policy: from Rome to 
Maastricht and Beyond, Brussels: 22 November, COM (95) 567 final; European Commission (1995a), On 
the inclusion o f respect fo r  democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the 
Community and third countries, COM(95) 216 final, Brussels: 23 May.
186 For a discussion on the human rights clauses see Eibe Riedel and Martin Will (1999), ‘Human Rights 
Clauses in External Agreements of the EC’, in Philip Alston, with Mara Bustelo and James Heenan (ed.), 
The EU and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 723-754; and European Commission 
(1995a), On the inclusion o f respect fo r  democratic principles and human rights in agreements between 
the Community and third countries, COM(95) 216 final, Brussels: 23 May, Annex 1.2.
1R7 European Commission (200le), The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and 
Democratisation in Third Countries, COM(2001) 252 final, Brussels: 11 May.
188 Martine Fouwles (1997), ‘The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Human 
Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly o f Human Rights, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 291-324.
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rule of law, and to the objective of respecting human rights and fundamental
1 RQfreedoms’. Through its contractual relations with third countries, the EU would thus 
be able to exercise a range of political, diplomatic and economic tools for the promotion 
of human rights, such as political dialogue, trade and external assistance. The May 1995 
Communication listed the negative measures that can be adopted should the principles 
be breached:
alteration of the contents of cooperation programmes or the channels used; 
reduction of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation programmes; 
postponement of a Joint Committee meeting; suspension of high-level 
bilateral contacts; postponement of new projects, refusal to follow up 
partner’s initiatives; trade embargoes, suspension of arms sales, suspension 
of military cooperation; suspension of cooperation.190
These tools overlap with CFSP tools, discussed below.191
Ukraine was the first of the Soviet successor states to sign a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, wrapped up only once Moscow had softened its opposition,192 
though its negotiation process was slow and it entered into force only on 1 March 1998 
due to ratification delays in many member states. The political dimension of the PC A is 
based on a set of principles: human rights and democracy, the CSCE principles, the 
Charter of Paris, and inspiration from Art. 11 of the TEU.193 It also included the 
‘essential element’, or ‘human rights’ clause (Article 2) that outlined the principles upon 
which relations between the EU and Ukraine were based and the suspension 
mechanisms in case of their breach.194
189 Treaty of Nice, Title XXI, Art. 181a.
190 European Commission (1995a), On the inclusion o f respect fo r democratic principles and human 
rights in agreements between the Community and third countries, COM(95) 216 final, Brussels: 23 May.
19 For an analysis o f the tools to exercise conditionality, see K. Smith (1998b).
192 Lionel Barber, ‘EU seeks even-handed policy towards Russia and Ukraine’, The Financial Times, 16 
May 1994.
193 Christopher Hillion (1998). ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the European Union 
and the New Independent States of the Ex-Soviet Union’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 
, 399-420.
194 Article 102 reads: ‘if either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under 
the Agreement, it may take the appropriate measures. Before doing so, except in cases of special urgency, 
it shall supply the Cooperation Council with all relevant information required for a thorough examination 
of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties’. See Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine, OJ L 
49/3, 19 February 1998.
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The Association Agreement with Egypt was amongst the last of those negotiated with 
the EU’s Mediterranean partners to be approved: initialled in January 2001, it was 
ratified by the Egyptian People’s Assembly in April 2003 and entered into force on 1 
June 2004 (preceded by an interim agreement in January 2004). As negotiations were 
painfully protracted, other issues, such as the human rights clause and the readmission 
of illegal migrants, also became bones of contention.195 On the human rights clause the 
initial problem was that Article 2 did not follow the exact wording of Israel’s AA. 
However, the fact that this issue found little resonance in the Egyptian press and the 
belief that its mechanisms would not be used were sufficient reasons at that time to 
agree to the inclusion of Article 2.196
4.2 Common Foreign and Security Policy
As we have seen, the human rights and democracy objectives outlined in the TEU were 
vague and reflected the lowest common denominator reached in bargaining between the 
member states. The new instruments that could help coordinate the member states on 
normative positions included: joint actions and common positions. In June 1992, the 
European Council approved a draft prepared by the foreign ministers on the fields that 
could be subject to joint actions, which included strengthening democratic principles 
and institutions, respect for human and minority rights, regional political stability, 
supporting good government, and contributing to the prevention of conflicts. The 
geographical areas of priority would be Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet 
Union, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.197 With the Amsterdam Treaty, negotiated in 
June 1997 and which entered into force in 1999, the member states gave themselves an 
additional tool: Common Strategies. All the three approved Common Strategies 
(towards Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean) contain human rights and democracy 
objectives, as the boxes below illustrate.
195 Mark Turner, ‘Haggling over agriculture delays Egyptian trade deal’, European Voice, 25 June 1998; 
Simon Taylor, ‘Negotiations between Egypt and EU move close to bearing fruit’, European Voice, 18 
February 1999.
196 Interviews, Egyptian Representation to the EU, Brussels: 16 May 2007; Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Cairo: 31 May 2007.
197 Fouwles (1997); Nuttall (2000).
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Box 3.1: The Common Strategy towards Ukraine198
Aims
• to contribute to the emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in 
Ukraine, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a stable functioning 
market economy which will benefit all the people of Ukraine;
• to cooperate with Ukraine in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe 
[.. .]
• to increase economic, political and cultural cooperation with Ukraine as well as
______ cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs._________________________
Box 3.2: The Common Strategy towards the Mediterranean199___________________
General aims
• contribute to the aims of the Barcelona Declaration
• promote conditions to enable peace in the Middle East, in the region, and good- 
neighbourly relations
• increase coordination and complementarity between the member states, and EU 
effectiveness and impact
Specific initiatives in the field of human rights and democracy:
• promote strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law through 
political dialogue, support for judicial reform, institution building, freedom of 
expression, strengthening of independent media, encourage good governance
• support for governmental and non-governmental actors
• urge accession to and implementation of international human rights instruments
• support the abolition of the death penalty.
The final CFSP tool that needs to be mentioned is the European Security Strategy. 
Developed during 2003, it responded to a Council request to draft a ‘concept’ for the 
EU’s security priorities resembling the model of the US’s National Security Strategy, 
also with the aim to repair the rifts that the 2003 invasion of Iraq had caused within the 
EU. The ESS too included human rights and democracy as principles guiding EU action 
and justified such inclusion with strategic arguments whereby
the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic 
states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, 
dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and 
protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the 
international order’ .200
198 Council of the EU (1999), Common Strategy on Ukraine, (1999/877/CFSP), Brussels: 11 December.
199 Council of the EU (2000), Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region, (2000/458/CFSP),
Brussels: 19 June.
200 Council of the EU (2003b), A Secure Europe in a Better World -  European Security Strategy,
Brussels: 12 December.
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The conceptual link between democracy and human rights on the one hand and stability 
on the other resembles in many ways the linkages that had been made over a decade 
earlier through the CSCE in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. This was to hold 
true especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, identified as one of the strategic priorities of 
the ESS. Indeed, one follow up was the publication of an EU Strategic Partnership with 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East which reiterated the importance of human rights 
and democracy.
Box 3.3: EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East201 
General aims:
• Contribute to the Middle East Peace Process
• Political dialogue on human rights and the rule of law
• Non-proliferation, security dialogue and counter-terrorism
• Migration
• Economic reform, social development and cultural dialogue 
Specific initiatives in the field of human rights and democracy:
• Stronger political dialogue
• Develop systematic support for the rule of law and good governance, especially 
on legal reform and human rights
• Support of electoral processes and judicial reform
• Engage with non violent political organisations and civil society movements
• Implement the recommendations of the 2003 Commission Communication on 
______ human rights and democracy____________________________________________
In addition, the EU can use other diplomatic instruments, such as public or confidential 
demarches, especially to voice concern and condemnation over human rights practices 
in third countries, usually through the embassies of the rotating presidency of the 
European Council or the Troika.202
The EU has also developed dialogues that focus exclusively on human rights, such as 
the ones with China and Iran, or on a ad hoc basis on human rights issues extending to 
CFSP related issues, such as the dialogues held with Cuba and Sudan at the level of 
heads of mission. Political dialogues involve the Presidency or the Troika, as well as 
senior level human rights officials. However, the political dialogues that include 
human rights discussions have been harder to carry out than the Council and the
201 European Council (2004c), Final Report on a EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, 17-18 June.
202 Fouwels (1997); and K. Smith (1998a).
203 Council of the EU (2001e), European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues, Brussels: 13 
December.
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Commission claim. In the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership multilateral dialogues were 
introduced only in 2001, at the instigation of the Swedish Presidency, but have been 
limited to presentations on the human rights practices in each of the countries belonging 
to the Partnership, north and south of the Mediterranean. At the bilateral level, these 
were never implemented through the EMP despite the Commission’s 
recommendations.204 This was the least satisfactory element of first chapter cooperation,
90Sas the Commission itself has recognised. Given their insufficient development, and 
prodded by the European Parliament, the Commission initiated the creation of bilateral 
sub-committees on human rights issues in the context of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (see chapters 8 and 9).
Many of the tools outlined in the two sections above cut across the first and second 
pillars of the EU as well as infringe on spheres of national foreign policy. This makes 
the process particularly complicated when resorting to trade embargoes or sanctions. 
Economic sanctions, for instance, require a CFSP common position which needs to 
implemented under the framework of the EC’s Common Commercial Policy; joint 
diplomatic sanctions can only be decided unanimously under the CFSP hat; and mixed 
agreements, such as the PCA and AA, require both the Council and the member states 
assent for their alteration.206
Nonetheless, in the 2000s the EU has been refining its negative tools. Measures could 
include suspension of cooperation with a third country, boycotts of sport or cultural 
events, trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, arms embargoes), financial 
sanctions (freezing of funds or economic resources, prohibition of financial transactions, 
restrictions on export credits or investments), flight bans, restrictions on admission, 
diplomatic sanctions (expulsion of diplomats, severing of diplomatic ties, suspension of 
official visits). On the whole, the EU has remained cautious of applying trade sanctions, 
preferring measures targeted against individuals, such as so-called ‘smart sanctions’.
204 European Commission (2003f), Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and Democratisation 
with Mediterranean partners. Strategic Guidelines, COM(2003) 294 final, Brussels: 21 May.
205 European Commission (2003a), ‘Commission Services Working Document to prepare the Euro- 
Mediterranean mid-term meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs’, Crete, 26-27 May.
206 K. Smith (1998a).
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The use of CFSP for human rights and democracy does suggest that the member states 
saw the EU as an appropriate level to deal with such issues. In fact, as we shall see with 
regard both to Ukraine and to Egypt, CFSP was used almost exclusively develop 
common positions on human rights and democracy rather than on other issues.
4.3 Aid for human rights and democracy
The Commission’s November 1995 Communication emphasised the ‘positive, practical 
and constructive approach’ to human rights and democracy promotion. Aid could entail 
the support of transition processes towards democracy and elections; promoting and 
consolidating the rule of law through the independence of the judiciary, strengthening 
parliaments, support for local and national institutions, support for pluralist society and 
the development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for the independent 
media, education and training activities, the promotion of good governance and the 
transparency of government, confidence-building activities to restore peace, civil 
accountability of the armed forces, support of vulnerable groups, such as victims of 
torture, migrants and refugees, and the protection of minorities and indigenous 
people.207
207 European Commission (1995b), The External Dimension o f the E U ’s Human Rights Policy: from  
Rome to Maastricht and Beyond, COM (95) 567 final, Brussels: 22 November.
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Graph 3.1: EC and EU global aid for government, civil society and NGOs as a 
percentage of total aid218
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As the graph above illustrates, aid for ‘government and civil society’ and for NGOs has 
indeed increased, reflecting the emergence of these objectives in external assistance, 
especially since 2000. The EC includes aid for human rights and democracy objectives 
in all its external assistance programmes: TACIS (Technical Aid for the Commonwealth 
of Independent States), developed for the states that had emerged from the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, MEDA (Mesures d ’accompagnement financier et technique a la 
reforme de structures economiques et sociales dans le cadre du partenariat euro- 
mediterraneen) for the EMP countries, and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Instrument (ENPI) are those relevant to Ukraine and Egypt. Human rights and 
democracy are also addressed through a specific programme created in 1994, following
208 Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Development
Statistics online database. The data is organised in the categories the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Given the difficulties in calculating the overall amounts spent
across diverse budget lines and in different regions, this data is considered the most reliable, despite the
fact that it is not broken down in the categories of ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ assistance. Indeed, ‘aid
for government and civil society’ includes some aims that are not directly relevant to human rights and
democracy, such as supporting policy planning for economics and development, the financial
management of the public sector, supporting legal and judicial development, the administration of
government, UN post-conflict and peace-building operations. On the validity o f such data, and EU
strategies in the 1990s, see Cox and Chapman (1999).
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a European Parliament initiative. The ‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights’ (EIDHR) now spends over € 100 million a year. The main categories to which 
EIDHR aid is directed are: democratisation and the rule of law, pluralist civil society, 
confidence-building for the restoration of peace, and target groups, which range from 
training journalists to rehabilitation for the victims of torture, while the main recipients 
and channels for aid are non-governmental organisations. The main characteristic of 
EIDHR is that it finances projects directly through the organisations implementing them, 
without having to go through the channels of partner governments. These funds should 
complement the various regional assistance funds.
The Commission has had difficulties in obtaining information from EU member states 
regarding bilateral funding in the human rights field, undermining the degree of 
coordination between EC and member state aid activities.209 Indeed, available 
comparative reviews of member states’ democratisation policies illustrate a significant 
diversity between national objectives, both in terms of spending and of priorities. For 
instance, in 2004 17% of Sweden’s total aid budget was for ‘democratic governance’ 
projects in contrast with only 1% for ‘governance’ projects in French aid.210
Ukraine
In Ukraine, the EC and its member states have been an important donor, even though 
about a quarter of total assistance went to nuclear safety and the closure of Chernobyl. 
Technical assistance was channelled through the TACIS programme that covered the 
entire former Soviet Union (excluding the Baltic states), of which Ukraine received 
about 20%.
In the 1990s about a third of TACIS funds were directed to multi-country and regional 
programmes, while the sectoral distribution of funds followed predictable priorities: one 
third went to economic infrastructure, of which the energy sector and nuclear safety 
absorbed about 60% (and was augmented by a separate budget supporting the fuel gap
209 European Commission (2004e), The Implementation of the Commission Communication on the EU ’s 
Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, SEC(2004) 1041, Brussels: 30 
July.
210 Richard Youngs (2006b) (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, 
Madrid: FRIDE.
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in Ukraine), the rest was food aid (mostly provided by the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund), social infrastructure and services, and NGO funding 
(also through the Link Inter-European NGOs Programme -  Lien) which reached around 
500 NGOs in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe.211 Up to 1997, EC aid for
democracy and human rights was channelled through the TACIS democracy
programme. As in the case of most democracy assistance, NGO support was the 
overwhelming feature of the TACIS democracy programme. The priorities of the 
programme were the development of NGOs, which received 46% of funding, awareness 
building (14% of funding), supporting the independent media (10%) and promoting 
human rights (10%).212 After 2000 objectives were concentrated in three main
categories, as the table below indicates, also revealing the increasing importance
attached to border management as EU enlargement approached and the modest 
contributions towards priorities related to human rights and democracy.
211 Aidan Cox and Jenny Chapman (1999), The European Community External Cooperation Programmes. 
Policies, Management and Distribution, London: Overseas Development Institute, chapter 7 on Newly 
Independent States.
212 ISA Consult (1997).
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Table 3.1; TACIS priorities in Ukraine, in million €213
2002 2003 2004-6 Total
1. Support for institutional, legal and 
administrative reform
33 26 110 169
Legal, judicial and administrative reform 10 11 15 36
Border Management 15 7 60 82
Civil society, training and education 8 8 16
Civil society, media and democracy 10 10
Training and education 15 15
2. Support to the private sector and assistance for 
economic development
28 12 60 100
Business, trade and investment promotion 8 12 20
Fuel gap 20 0 20
Assistance to enterprise development 25
Development of financial markets (banking, 
insurance)
8 8
Local development 15 15
Support to the energy sector reform 12 12
3. Support in addressing the social consequences 
of transition
6 10 42 58
Social Reform 6 10 16
Support to the health sector reform 18 18
Support to the development of social assistance 
policy and services targeting vulnerable groups
24 24
Total 67 48 80
In the 1990s, the rule of law and the training of advocacy groups to increase civil society 
awareness were included in the general TACIS programme, but its relevance to and 
impact on human rights and democracy has been highly fragmented and did not meet the 
demands stemming from Ukrainian civil society.214 This supports the widespread 
criticism, including on part of Commission officials themselves, over the 
‘ineffectiveness’ of TACIS.215
As far as human rights and democracy priorities are concerned, it is difficult to get 
homogeneous data on aid activities over time and across different countries. Based on 
the OECD database, less than 10% of total EC assistance was directed at supporting
213 Source: European Commission (200If), Ukraine. Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006. National 
Indicative Programme 2002-2003, Brussels: 27 December.
214 ISA Consult, European Institute, Sussex University, and GJW Europe [ISA] (1997), Evaluation of the 
PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme 1992-1997. Final Report, Brighton and Hamburg; MWH, 
ECDPM, ODI Consortium (2003), Evaluation of the European Commission's Country Strategy fo r  
Ukraine, Final Report, La Hulpe: June.
215 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (2), European Commission Delegation, 
Kiev: 4 July 2006 (2).
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government and civil society, 11% including the member states. Amongst these, Sweden 
and the Netherlands were the largest supporters of human rights and democracy 
(approximately 37 and 28% respectively of their total allocations, followed by the UK 
with 15%). But the largest donor, as the table below shows, was the US.
Table 3.2: Net Overseas Development Assistance of the EC, EU member states and 
select donors to Ukraine, 1992-2005, in US thousand $216________________________
Donor Total Government and civil 
society aid as % of total
EC 612,527 9.3







TACIS aid was accompanied by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights a budget programme which ran on a budget of over € 100 million a year directed 
at financing initiatives without the involvement of partner government, thus offering 
greater flexibility to operate in hostile countries. Comparative EIDHR cross-sectoral and 
country figures are not available. It conducts global campaigns focusing on target 
countries as well as micro projects. As a focus country, Ukraine received € 2.5 m in 
2002 (equivalent to 4% of the € 60 million directed at individual countries -  the 
remaining € 40 million were directed at regional programmes). The priorities were:
• Projects against torture and to improve prison conditions, improving access to 
justice; human rights monitoring, reporting and advocacy; improving the rule of 
law and enhancing legal protection of human rights
• Cooperation with CoE to provide human rights training for judges, training of 
Ukrainian police, promotion of rights of minorities and strengthening local 
democracy;
• Support to civil society, notably through local NGOs
• Media monitoring projects in view of parliamentary elections of 2002.217
216 Own elaborations the basis of data of the OECD, International Development Statistics online, 
Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD-DAC) database.
217 European Commission (2001b), Commission Staff Working Document, European Initiative for  
Democracy and Human Rights Programming Document, 2002-2004, Brussels: 20 December; and
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For 2004-6 the priorities were the two campaigns to foster ‘a culture of human rights’ 
and to promote ‘the democratic process’ through macro and micro projects. Between 
2001 and 2004 Ukraine received a total of € 1,720,000 through micro projects, 
overwhelmingly aimed at NGOs and civil society.218 In 2003-4, there was growing 
concern in the EU over the freedom of the press and media and its relation with civil 
society, one of the main problems in Ukraine at that time (see Box 3 on p. 261 in the 
Annexes). The extent to which this was tailored to suit political objectives will be 
discussed in the chapters 5 and 6. According to the evaluators of the programme, the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has proved to be the 
‘highest regarded and appropriate instrument to the Ukrainian context’.219
European Commission (2003b), Commission Staff Working Document, European Initiative fo r  
Democracy and Human Rights, Programming Update 2004, Brussels: 1 December.
2.8 European Commission (2004c), European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 
Programming for 2005 and 2006, Brussels: 6 December 2004.
2.9 MWH, ECDPM, ODI Consortium (2003), p. 25.
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Table 3.3: EIDHR funding for the Newly Independent States and Ukraine, in €220
NIS* Europe* No. of projects
1998 8 million 9







2001 8,409,661 11 projects
of which Ukraine:
913,423 Joint Commission-CoE programme to promote 
democratic stability and prevent conflict




4,532,970 8 projects on Prevention of Torture and 
rehabilitation of torture victims
of which Ukraine:
















797,947 Project on rights of the Roma minority and their 
access to justice
305,797 Project on Restorative social transformation







445,562 Improving access to justice for rural population
1 microproject
220 Sources: EU Annual Reports on Human Rights, years 1998-99, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006.
Until 2004 EIDHR had a geographical as well as thematic allocation. Thereafter, it had only a thematic 




Egypt is one of the largest recipients of EU assistance and has enjoyed the largest 
proportion of bilateral and EC funding to the ten EMP countries.
Table 3.4: Net Overseas Development Assistance of the EC, EU member states and 
select donors to Egypt, 1995-2006, in US thousand $221__________________________
Donor Total Human rights and 
democracy-related aid as 
% of total
EC 2116.73 0.48







Between 1995 and 199 MEDA committed € 3,057 million to the region, of which € 686 
million was for Egypt, while for 2000-2006 the Council endowed MEDA with €5.350 
million.
Table 3.5: EC and EU net assistance to Egypt (grants and loans), in million $
1995-
1999
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006




3420.02 392.46 386.85 246.97 291.53 387.93 265 85.63
Total 4149.79 464.96 457.82 291.16 350.36 571.76 447.83 314.1




11453.73 1534.9 1861.05 1529.84 1951.58 2488.32 2540.15 1634.99
% to 
Egypt
36% 31% 25 % 19% 18% 23% 18% 19%
222
221 Own elaborations the basis of data of the OECD, International Development Statistics online, 
Development Database on Aid Activities. The category ‘human rights and democracy-related aid’ is made 
up of the sum of aid for human rights, legal and judicial development, strengthening civil society, 
elections, women’s equality. The category is much narrower and more specific than the ‘government and 
civil society aid’ category used for Ukraine, due to difference reporting systems used in the IDS database. 
The data thus does not offer any comparative information on EU aid towards the two countries.
222 Source: Own elaborations on OECD, International Development Statistics online, Development 
Cooperation Directorate (DCC-DAC) Database.
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EC assistance has been channelled through the MEDA Programme, but throughout the 
1990s it suffered greatly from mismanagement and under staffing: between 1995 and 
2000 only 26% of the promised aid was issued,223 31.7% in Egypt.224 The reform of the 
aid management structures with the creation of the EuropAid Cooperation office, and by 
giving more responsibilities to the Commission Delegations (a reform process started in 
2002 in Egypt and completed in all the Mediterranean countries by 2004) all contributed 
to addressing MEDA’s shortcomings, and disbursements improved significantly in 
MEDA II. In 1999 a new regulation also improved the effectiveness, efficiency and 
relevance of aid with respect to the objectives of the Barcelona Process, though 
outstanding problems remained: themes such as good governance were insufficiently 
mainstreamed in the programmes, coordination between Commission and member state 
aid was seen as ‘inconclusive’, and resources were inadequate compared to the aims of 
the Partnership.226
The percentage of MEDA aid directed at political reform has been tiny. In the early 
years of MEDA, less than 1% was earmarked for democracy related programmes. Even 
funding of non-state actors was poor in the MEDA region compared to other 
geographical areas, with an average of only 3.9% of MEDA aiming at civil society 
development compared to 5% in African countries or 25% in Latin America.227 The 
sector of intervention most relevant to human rights and democracy of the MEDA 
programmes -  civil society and human rights -  received €2 million in 2001 and in 2002, 
and €25 million in 2003.228 Even within the MEDA Democracy Programme, between 
1996 and 1998 Egypt received only 4% of the share. This, however, was also due to a 
low number of applications for funds (given that 96% of the regional MEDA
223 ‘A Euro-Med muck-up’, The Economist, 16 November 2000.
224 European Commission (2001a), Annual Report o f the Meda programme 2000, Brussels, no document 
number available, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/reports/meda 2000 en.pdf.
225 ECORYS-NEI Macro & Sector Policies (2005), Mid-term evaluation o f the MEDA II programme.
Final report, Rotterdam: 18 July.
226 ECORYS-NEI Macro & Sector Policies (2005).
227 Participation of non-state Actors in EC Development Policy, http://europa.eu.int/eur- 
Iex/en/com/cnc/2002/com2002:0598en01.pdf.
228 ECORYS-NEI Macro & Sector Policies (2005).
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Democracy projects were implemented by NGOs, the amounts devolved also depend on 
the applications of NGOs).229
Funding was instead overwhelmingly aimed at economic and social development.230 
The 2002-2004 National Indicative Plan allocated a total of €351 million to Egypt, of 
which only 31 million were allocated to non-economic sectors, 11 million for the 
Tempus programme, and 20 million for civil society and social development; the overall 
2002-2006 strategy was overwhelmingly focused on economic development. The 
importance of human rights and democracy, however, seems to increase with the 
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which set aside 7% of its total ENP 
budget to promoting human rights and democracy, also through basic projects for voter 
registration in a country where half the population does not have identity cards.231 
According to one Commission official, Egypt would not have accepted a stronger 
insistence on human rights and democracy aims within the ENPI.232
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EIDHR assistance to Egypt has also been not been of major significance. However, as in 
the case of Ukraine, the geographical distribution and thematic prioritisation of EIDHR 
funds and do not hide any specific policy or political position on the relative importance
229 Nadim Karkutli and Dirk Butzler (1999), Final Report. Evaluation o f the MEDA Democracy 
Programme, 1996 -1 9 9 8 , Brussels: April 1999. The largest contributions were for West Bank and Gaza 
(20%) and Israel (16%).
230 Youngs (2006a), chapter 4.
231 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 15 May 2007 (3), and European Commission Delegation, 
Cairo: 28 May 2007 (2).
232 Interview, European Commission, Brussels: 15 May 2007 (2).
233 Source: European Commission (2001d), Egypt. Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National 
Indicative Programme 2002-2004, Brussels: no date available, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/egypt/csp/02_06_en.pdf; European Commission (2007a), Egypt. 
Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Brussels 4 January.
234 €13 million were earmarked for support for political development, decentralisation and the promotion 
of good governance while € 17 million for the promotion and protection of human rights; and €10 million 
for the modernisation of administration of justice.
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of human rights in a country. Rather, they reflect the management capacity of the 
Delegation and the absorption capacity of the NGO environment.235 Also, EIDHR was 
conceived as a tool independent of the political objectives of the general aid priorities, 
and for this reason the European Parliament ensured that it would not be merged into the 
ENPI, as the Commission had originally envisaged. One implication, however, is that 
EIDHR funding can lack relevance to the specific human rights and democracy 
problems in each country or can struggle to be complementary to other assistance.
235 Interview, European Commission, Brussels: 16 May 2007.
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Table 3.7: EIDHR funding in the Mediterranean and Egyp t, in
Mediterranean No. of projects Egypt
1998 10 million 
(Meda Dem.)
50 No country-specific data
1999 10 million 
(Meda Dem.)
6 No country-specific data
2000 8,698,500 
(Meda Dem.)
13 No country-specific data
2001 €9,410,973 Mediterranean Masters in Human Rights 
and Democratisation: 640,000 
Regional Assistance to NGOs, media and 
local government in Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, Egypt: € 797,260
Promoting independent journalism: a 
training and capacity building program for 
journalists in the Southern Mediterranean 
Region: € 661,617
Regional: International 
Campaign to Eradicate 
Female Genital Mutilation: € 
925,584
Program for the 











Mediterranean (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
West Bank & Gaza): Promotion of 
Women’s Rights Through Empowerment, 
Awareness and Legal and Political 
Reform: € 890,000
Enhancing the Role of Civil 
Society in Human Rights and 





€ 4,536,568 4, including the Mediterranean Masters in 
Human Rights and Democratisation: € 
713,890
Promoting the Rights of 







€4,100,350 6 projects in Support for Democratisation, 
Good Governance and the Rule of Law
None in Egypt (but funding 







Mediterranean Master's Degree in Human 
Rights and Democratisation: € 720,00
Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and 
the Rule of Law in the Middle East and 
Southern Mediterranean MEDA 






Strengthening of civil society capacity to 
participate in democratic transformation 
and to implement national strategies for 
the promotion of human rights in the Arab 
world: €735,107.
Developing Synergies between regional 
and local human rights work, the human 
rights instruments of the Barcelona 
Process as well as the wider Arab World: 
€ 1 million
Mediterranean Master's Programme in 
Human Rights and Democratisation 
Worldwide: € 1,488,705
1 micro-project
236 Given the changing planning structure of EIDHR, it is not possible to have homogeneous country-by- 
country data on EIDHR. Sources: EU Annual Reports on Human Rights, editions between 1998 and 2006.
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Egypt was excluded from the group of focus countries in 2004, but the Commission 
Delegation in Cairo managed to obtain some funding which was used to support an 
association for the assistance of prisoners, an advocacy group for the empowerment of 
women, an NGO dealing with the rehabilitation of torture victims and refugees, and in 
strengthening local capacity to monitor elections.237
5. The gap between rhetoric and implementation
The commitment in rhetoric, in integrating human rights and democracy in external 
policies, and in developing a variety of tools to pursue such aims globally and in 
Ukraine and Egypt over the past two decades suggests that the EU has been trying to 
build an international profile as a promoter of human rights and democracy. The 
academic literature, however, has come to divergent conclusions in explaining these 
developments. Observers have pointed out dynamics internal to the logic of integration 
that pushed towards the shift in giving such substance to the emerging EU foreign 
policy. Endogenous explanations focus on the expansion of Community competencies 
as a consequence of completing the Single Market in 1992 as one of the drivers behind 
such developments,238 together with the development of an increasing European 
‘identity’.239
Actor- or identity-based conceptualisations have appeared to provide appropriate 
frameworks to place the EU’s claims regarding human rights and democracy. ‘Civilian 
power models’, initially developed in the 1970s, focused on the EU’s capacity to 
‘domesticate’ relations between states, between the members of the community as well 
as outside its frontiers, by raising the stakes of common responsibilities and breaking 
down the distinction between ‘home’ and foreign affairs, and a ‘built-in sense of 
collective action’ which expresses internal ‘values’ of equality, justice and tolerance.240 
These features have been successively re-defined to include the need to accept
237 Interview, European Commission Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (2).
238 For this argument, see Nanette A. Neuwahl (1995), ‘The Treaty on European Union: A Step Forward 
in the Protection of Human Rights?’, in Nanette A. Neuwahl and Allan Rosas (eds.), The European Union 
and Human Rights, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 1-22; and Fouwles (1997). At a more 
general level, see Cremona (1998).
239 Neuwahl (1995).
240 Francois Duchene (1973), ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’, in 
Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the 
European Community, Basingstoke: MacMillan, pp. 1-21, quote on pp. 19-20.
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cooperation, a concentration on non-military tools and a willingness to develop 
supranational structures.241
The foreign policy outputs of a civilian power would include long-term goals rather than 
purely utilitarian short-term and cost-benefit objectives, aiming to ‘modify the basic 
structural conditions’ of the environment, have an impact on the ‘economic, social, 
political (democratization) and ideational components of partners’, and would be 
implemented through peaceful and civilian means, encompassing the set of external 
relations of the three pillars, moving beyond the narrow CFSP field.242 Approaches 
focusing on the EU’s international identity,243 or as a ‘normative power’,244 single out 
the uniqueness of the EU, which derives from its ‘historical context, hybrid polity, and 
political-legal constitution’, which predisposes the EU to act normatively on the global 
scene by diffusing its principles through ideational interaction.245
One limitation to the normative power model is that it has been substantiated by very 
little empirical research, and the few attempts have carried out an overview of 
circumscribed areas of EU activity where there was little controversy between the 
member states.246 Normative Power Europe insights fail to provide explanations to the 
cases in which the EU does not behave normatively, does not interpret them as 
incompatible with an ‘ethical foreign policy’,247 or appears to consider the realm of fact 
as less important than the realm of discourse and communication. In other words, the 
research agenda promoted by the innovations of Normative Power Europe is self- 
referential and inward looking rather than aiming to uncover empirically what the EU 
does.
241 Frangois Duchene (1972), ‘Europe’s Role in world Peace, in Richard J. Mayne (ed.), Europe 
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London: Fontana, pp. 32-47; Duchene (1973); Hans Maull 
(1990), ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 91-106; 
Karen E. Smith (2000), ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or a Cause for Concern?’, 
The International Spectator, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 11-28; Telo (2006).
242 Telo (2006), p. 228. On structural foreign policy see also Stephen Keukeleire (2002), who includes 
enlargement policies and the external impact of internal policies.
243 Manners and Whitman (1998); Whitman (1998).
244 Manners (2002).
245 Manners (2002), p. 240.
246 Manners (2002) on the abolition of the death penalty; Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli (2007), 
‘Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, (No. 2), pp. 
435-457 on the agreements over the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol.
247 H. Smith (2002), p. 270.
248 Henrik Larsen (2004), ‘Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy’ in Tonra and 
Christiansen (eds.), pp. 62-80.
Indeed, research has pointed out the limits to such conceptualisations. The EU has been 
notoriously reluctant to criticize human rights failures in the partner countries. In 
Eastern Europe, only with Belarus did the EU use the negative tool of suspending the 
entry into force of the PCA in 1997 on human rights grounds. With regard to the South 
Mediterranean countries, the ‘human rights clauses’ have never been used, and even 
through aid the EU has been timid.249 Here, it is argued that the ‘normative’ dimension 
has been increasingly trumped by the ‘securitisation’ of migration and terrorism,250 a 
general critique of human rights promotion that had been raised already in the late 
1980s.251 Globally, the occasions in which the ‘human rights’ clause was invoked has 
been limited in number and geographical scope often towards countries of little 
economic or geostrategic interest to the EU and its member states, thus making the EU’s 
pursuit of a normative position costless.252 These studies have pointed out the 
inconsistencies and double standards of the EU’s human rights agenda, which would 
most often be in conflict with or secondary to other foreign policy priorities.253 How can 
this gap between rhetoric and implementation be explained?
6. Conclusions: Explaining the emergence of the human rights and democracy 
agenda
On the basis of the hypotheses regarding motivations and the framework regarding 
actors, factors and processes guiding foreign policy developed in chapter 2, I will 
develop some explanations to understand the rise of human rights and democracy 
rhetoric and decisions over the past twenty-odd years.
249 Federica Bicchi (2004), ‘L’Unione Europea e la promozione della democrazia’, in Bicchi, Guazzone 
and Pioppi (eds.), pp. 143-170; Richard Youngs (2005), Ten Years of the Barcelona Process: A Model for 
Supporting Arab Reform?’, FR1DE Working Paper No. 2; Roberto Aliboni (2005), ‘EMP Approaches to 
Human Rights and Democracy’, in Haizam Amirah Fernandez and Richard Youngs (eds.), The Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, Madrid: FRIDE and the Real Instituto Elcano de 
Estudios Internacionales y Estrategicos, pp.47-58.
250 Joffe (2008).
251 Raymond J. Vincent (1989), ‘Human Rights in Foreign Policy’, in Dilys Hill (ed.), Human Rights and 
Foreign Policy. Principles and Practices, Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, pp. 54-99.
252 K. Smith (2001).
253 Crawford (1998); K. Smith (1998b); Olsen (2000); K. Smith (2001); Ward (1998); Richard Youngs 
(2001), Democracy Promotion: The Case o f European Union Strategy. Brussels, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Working Document No. 167, October, K. Smith (2003).
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First of all, the processes whereby human rights and democracy made their way up EU 
rhetoric show that diverse normative agendas were at play. In terms of actors, those that 
determined the start of the process through ‘history-making’ decisions were the member 
states, which converged on considering such normative positions a basis for the nascent 
EU foreign policy. Beneath this convergence, however, member states were driven by 
different motivations, spanning from instrumentalism (such as Britain in the very early 
1990s) to more consolidated normative positions (for instance in the case of 
Scandinavian countries), illustrating the dynamics of the ‘logic of diversity’. Also, the 
conceptual link between security and human rights and democracy developed through 
the CSCE reinforced strategic arguments in favour of promoting democratisation in 
Eastern Europe, providing a justification for pursuing such principles in which 
Realpolitik aims of security and stability were backed up by normative positions. This 
continued to be one of the key justifications used by all the EU institutions. In terms of 
motivations, instrumental, realist, as well as normative positions can be discerned, upon 
which consensus between member states was built.
The Commission started to incorporate such principles into Community external 
relations only at a later stage. It was only once the process was initiated that the 
Commission found itself in a privileged position to develop these principles and draft 
policy proposals, also thanks to its key role in coordinating aid to the countries East of 
the fallen Iron Curtain. It contributed to the debate on aid to developing countries only 
in 1991, prior to the Council’s 1991 November Resolution, but after the World Bank 
opened the debate and after many member states had introduced those principles in their 
national development cooperation policies. Thus, in the early 1990s the policy 
entrepreneurs were to be found in some member states rather than in the Community’s 
supranational institutions.
Once the process of including normative principles in the guidelines for relations with 
third countries had begun, the Commission started to play a role in seeking to 
‘mainstream’ human rights and democracy considerations in the EU’s external policies, 
in pursuing the consistency of instruments in line with its Treaty-based responsibility 
and in the execution of assistance programmes. Successive reforms of the internal 
structures and practices of the Commission also brought about some consequences on 
the processes of ‘mainstreaming’ human rights and democracy. The introduction of
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Country Strategy Papers in the early 2000s, for instance, drafted by the Commission 
with input from its Delegations, contributed to the monitoring of the political situation 
in third countries and to identifying the areas that were supposed to be prioritised 
through diplomacy and aid.254
The European Parliament (EP) too contributed by repeatedly insisting for the 
standardisation of the ‘human rights’ clause in external agreements, by pursuing its 
insertion in all external agreements, by scrutinising the use of aid and, since the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, by approving budgetary proposals, and was the key actor that led to the 
creation of the EIDHR fund and ensured its continuation after the Commission, in 2004, 
proposed to merge it into the geographical assistance programmes. As we have seen, its 
requests to the rotating Presidency for information on EU action on global human rights 
problems (also to complement those that the EP had been compiling from 1983 
onwards) was instrumental to establishing the practice of drafting annual reports on 
these matters, even if the reports do not always satisfy the demands of the curious 
observer.
Once human rights and democracy had become institutionalised, the European 
Parliament also raised the profile of the EC/EU on human rights questions by issuing 
numerous declarations, and prodding the Council and the Commission to act in response 
to human rights violations. Despite its limited influence in foreign affairs, the EP played 
a role in stimulating the other institutions and the member states to take fundamental 
rights into account and can be considered a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in this field. The 
Commission too contributed to institutionalisation through its role in mainstreaming and 
standardising the essential element clause.
Internal or identity-led dynamics seem weaker than the processes driven by responding 
to externally induced changes in the international environment coupled with the search 
for a compromise between different interests of the member states. This is demonstrated 
also by the fact that the internal process of integrating human rights and democracy 
principles into the Treaties proceeded a few steps behind their incorporation into foreign
254 Vaughne Miller (2004), The Human Rights Clause in the EU’s External Agreements’, House of 
Commons Research Paper, 04/33, London: 16 April.
255 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); K. Smith (1998b), p. 258. See also Napoli (1995).
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policy provisions.256 This also makes the capabilities-expectations gap relevant to 
understanding the external-internal dynamics stimulating EU foreign policy.
Secondly, the motivations for ‘deepening’ the standards within the EU were also 
determined by applications to accede to the EC/EU on part of European countries. 
Indeed, together with the introduction of Article 6, the EU also added article 49 to 
reiterate that candidate countries must meet the requirements of article 6 to join the 
Union. Thus, even if one accepts the spillover assumption from the Single Market 
project to increasing standards within the Community, this cannot be explained as a shift 
from internal human rights and democracy standards to their application in external 
policies. In other words, amongst the factors influencing EU member states’ decisions to 
include human rights and democracy was the interaction with the external environment. 
External demands for deeper ties with the EC/EU, and especially those for accession 
played a particularly important role.
The EU ‘identity’ and constructivist argument is also weakened as the source of 
legitimacy of the human rights and democracy principles to which the EU refers to 
justify its external policies lies not within the EU, but within the international and 
regional conventions, declarations and agreements to which the EU member states, 
alongside many other states, were party.
On the other hand, the consensus reached between the member states on the inclusion of 
human rights and democracy among the aims of the nascent Common Foreign and 
Security Policy also reflects an internal logic of seeking to strengthen the EU’s 
international capabilities and its international image. In other words, even if the sources 
of human rights and democracy were not to be found in the Community as such (but in 
the member states, driven by different motivations, and in extemalisation dynamics),
256 The Treaty on the European Union introduced the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedom as part of the acquis communautaire in Article 6.2, but it was only in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam that the principles upon which membership was based were spelt out and that the 
possibility o f suspension mechanisms for the breach of such principles within the EU was envisaged (Art. 
7). The Nice Treaty agreed in December 2000 modified the article from ‘the existence of a serious and 
persistent breach to ‘a clear risk of a serious breach’. But the Charter of Fundamental Rights agreed in 
Nice was annexed to the Treaty as a protocol, and it will be only with the ratification of the Treaty of 
Lisbon that this will acquire a legally binding status. This will give the European Court of Justice 
jurisdiction over ensuring compliance with such articles, which it does not over CFSP.
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their inclusion in foreign policy could also serve the purpose of building the EU’s 
external identity and act as a glue to strengthen cooperation in foreign policy.
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C h a p t e r  4
E U  F o r e ig n  P o l ic y  t o w a r d s  U k r a in e
1. Introduction
Ukraine’s importance to the EU is intertwined with its history of independence. 
Domestic developments have been influenced by its relations with the outside world and 
viceversa, and its oscillation between East and West has had a direct link with the 
human rights and democracy situation as much as on its position vis-a-vis the EU. Given 
the fluidity of Ukraine’s recent history and the degree to which its importance to the EU 
was interlocked with domestic and exogenous developments, this chapter is organized in 
a historical fashion, and deals with developments within Ukraine as well as EU policy 
towards the country for the period 1991 to the end of 2004, when the successful 
outcome of the Orange Revolution improved the country’s human rights and democracy 
standards. The aim is to understand Ukraine’s importance to Europe. This is 
methodologically necessary understand the priorities of the Union’s foreign policy 
(security, economic or ideational), and thus gauge the relative weight of human rights 
and democracy.
Section 2 assesses Ukraine’s relative international and regional importance in general 
terms. Sections 3 and 4 focus on the EU, first on the process of institutionalisation of 
relations with Ukraine during the 1990s, exploring the motivations that led to EU 
engagement, arguing that the country was peripheral to the post-Cold War map of 
Europe. It was only the prospect of enlargement to Central Europe, which would make 
the EU share a border with Ukraine, that led European capitals to attempt to develop a 
broader range of policies, through increasing cooperation in JHA and CFSP and by 
developing the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU’s increased engagement 
coincided with the deterioration of the skeleton of democracy put in place in Ukraine 
with independence. This period was also marked by great uncertainty over Ukraine’s 
international orientations and by difficulties with the West, putting EU commitment to 
human rights and democracy to test. The concluding section will illustrate the priorities 
and processes behind EU foreign policy towards Ukraine, as a preparatory ground for 
chapters 5 and 6, which will delve into greater depth over human rights and democracy 
issues.
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2. The foreign relations o f a state in search o f  sovereignty
As its name suggests, Okraina -  the land in between - is the largest country between the 
EU and Russia, a cross-roads with the Caucasus, the northern shore of the Black Sea, 
and a gateway to Central Asia.257 Its location has ensured one continuous predicament in 
Ukraine’s history: that exogenous factors and external actors have always played an 
important role in determining its path.258 After the fall of the Iron Curtain most of 
Eastern Europe embarked on an arduous ‘triple transition’ to a pluralist democracy, 
market economy and fully independent statehood.259 For Ukraine this ‘transition’ was all 
the more complex as it was an integral part of the Soviet Union and had virtually no 
history of independence. With a historical legacy of 337 years of Russian rule, Ukraine 
seemed one of the republics ‘least likely to assert its independence and undertake 
democratization’. Two previous attempts at independence (1917-1927 and 1941-45) 
ended in failure, a mixture of endogenous socio-historical reasons and forced 
russification made the nationalism of the early 1990s a weak feature of opposition to the 
Soviet regime compared to other USSR republics and satellite states.261
The nationalist movements that emerged during the era of perestrojka, such as the Rukh, 
alone were unable to steer the country towards a new course; sovereignty was attained 
through the Ukrainian Communist leadership which seized the opportunities offered by 
changing events in Russia. Moscow’s loosening grip on the Soviet Union’s periphery 
led the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) nomenklatura, headed by Leonid Kravchuk, 
to absorb some of the nationalist arguments. The August 1991 attempted coup that led to 
the disintegration of the USSR led the CPU leadership to switch to a nationalist 
discourse, thus ensuring its continuation in power. Following a Soviet style campaign,
257 James Sherr (1999), ‘After Yugoslavia: Whither Ukraine?’, in Kurt R. Spillman, Andreas Wenger and 
Derek Muller (eds.), Between Russia and the West: Foreign and Security Policy o f Independent Ukraine, 
Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 123-144.
258 Alexander Motyl and Bohdan Krawchenko (1997), ‘Ukraine: from empire to statehood’, in Ian 
Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.), New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 235-275.
259 Richard Bideleux and Ian Jeffries (1998), A History of Eastern Europe. Crisis and Change. London: 
Routledge, chapters 21-24, especially chapter 22.
260 Prizel (1997), quote on p. 331.
261 Prizel (1997); Motyl and Krawchenko (1997).
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over 90% of Ukrainians voted in favour of independence and 60% elected Kravchuk the 
new president in December 1991.
During this period, Russia and the US were the two most important external actors in 
determining Ukraine’s course. The country remained economically dependent on 
Russia, especially in energy, having to import much of its fuel without being able to pay 
for it. This pattern of dependence did not change significantly over time: in 2001 a third 
of Ukrainian exports still went to Russia, from which it bought around 40% of its 
imports. Ukraine thus adopted a policy of neutrality hoping that the interest in the 
country of one would ensure the involvement of the other former Cold War foe. Caught 
between giants, the strategy was based on the view that internal stability and Western 
support were the precondition for friendly relations with Russia, and viceversa.264 This 
geopolitical choice was also the only strategy upon which the divided political elite 
could agree.265
Russia’s aim was to ensure that Ukraine stayed out of the Western camp, to establish its 
influence over the former Soviet space through political and economic integration into 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while Ukraine was adamant about 
maintaining its newly found sovereignty. Relations with Moscow hit their lowest point 
during 1993-1994 over the USSR’s nuclear arsenal stationed on Ukrainian territory, the 
question of the Crimean peninsula (a region Brezhnev had given to Ukraine, home to a 
Russian majority and the military base of Sevastopol), the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, 
and Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia. Kravchuk tried to use these issues as 
‘bargaining chips’ to ensure international attention and to obtain political and economic 
advantages from Russia and the West. As a nuclear and security liability, Ukraine soon 
climbed up the US foreign policy agenda. But it was only after the war in former 
Yugoslavia had broken out, that first Washington and then gradually the EU and West in
262 For the history of Ukrainian’s path to independence see Orest Subtelny (2000), Ukraine. A History, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Prizel (1997), especially on the role of Moscow; and Motyl and 
Krawchenko (1997), with their greater emphasis on nationalist movements and on the popular 
demonstrations that caused the unrest of 1990-1991.
263 Stephen White, Ian McAllister, Margot Light and John Lowenhardt (2002), ‘A European or Slavic 
Choice? Foreign Policy and Public Attitudes in Post-Soviet Europe’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2, 
Spring, pp. 181-202.
264 James Sherr (1998), ‘Ukrainian Security Policy: The Relationship between Domestic and External 
Factors’, in Taras Kuzio (ed.), Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics o f Post-Soviet Transformation, Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharp, pp. 245-277.
265 Subtelny (2000).
103
general began to grasp Ukraine’s insecurity and the need to tackle its problems more 
comprehensively rather than as merely a proliferation issue.
Relations with the West thus expanded from denuclearisation to economic assistance, 
defence and security ties and the development of political ties, while domestic reform, 
the rule of law and human rights remained the most neglected area of US concern. By 
the end of the decade Ukraine was the third largest recipient of US aid, after Israel and 
Egypt, indicating a geopolitical view of the country.
Thanks to US mediation, in January 1994 Ukraine signed the tripartite agreement with 
Russia and the US whereby Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security 
assurances of its territorial integrity. This and OSCE mediation over Crimea paved 
the way for the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a Partnership for Peace 
agreement (PfP) with NATO (the first country to do so in 1994), the start of negotiations 
of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 1994, and the 1997 Charter 
on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO. In 1995 Ukraine became a Council of Europe 
member and participated in UN peacekeeping missions, and signed treaties with its 
neighbours (on border and minority issues) to stabilise Central Europe. In 1997 relations 
with Russia were normalised through the important friendship, cooperation and 
partnership treaty that recognised Ukrainian sovereignty and its borders, and solved
n /T Q
Crimea’s quest for autonomy and the Black Sea Fleet questions in Ukraine’s favour.
Kravchuk’s successor, the former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma elected in Ukraine’s 
first free elections in 1994, continued to pursue this foreign policy that can be summed 
up as a balancing act between Russia and the West, and by declaring its willingness to 
accede to the most important Western regional organisations. Ukrainian authorities have 
(somewhat euphemistically) labelled this balancing act as ‘multi-vectored foreign
266 Peter van Ham (1994), Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western Policy, 
Chaillot Paper No. 13, Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies.
267 Roman Solchanyk (2001), Ukraine and Russia. The Post-Soviet Transition. Lanham, Maryland: 
Roman and Littlefield; Oleksandr Pavliuk (2002), ‘An Unfulfilling Partnership: Ukraine and the West, 
1991-2001’, European Security, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring, pp. 81-101.
268 Solchanyk (2001); and Subtelny (2000).
269 Pavliuk (2002).
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policy’.270 This geographical predicament represented one core dilemma of Ukraine’s 
internal and international development. Although elected on a pro-Russian platform, 
Kuchma’s policies were in these years more geared towards the West.271
In parallel to seeking to consolidate relations with the major Western actors (within 
Europe, Germany was the country’s most important interlocutor, providing half of its 
foreign aid by the mid-1990s), Ukraine’s foreign policy also focused on the new Central 
European democracies, with Poland leading the way as the very first country to 
recognise Ukraine’s independence. To the Central European countries, and to Poland in 
particular, Ukraine was seen as a buffer state between them and an unpredictable Russia; 
to Ukraine, Central Europe was seen as a stepping stone towards the West. The final 
area of Ukraine’s attention was the EC/EU, towards which it sought to intensify 
relations and long-term integration, considered the best way to limit hostilities with 
Russia.272
Ukraine’s importance to the EU was therefore overwhelmingly tied to regional security 
and non proliferation, in a framework where the US and Russia were the two agenda- 
setters. The country’s regional importance became increasingly evident not just as a 
transit for Russian gas, but also with regard to its relations with the other countries of 
Central Europe.
3. Developing relations with the EU
3.1 The early 1990s
During the early 1990s, Ukraine was seen in the EU mostly as a security problem 
addressed largely by the US. Crimea’s declaration of autonomy in 1992 (a potential 
crisis which Kravchuk managed to avert) led to fears of conflict on the lines of warring 
Yugoslavia. EU policy followed the lead of other actors and focused on non­
proliferation and on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear plant. In June 1991 the EC
270 See the various chapters analysing Ukraine foreign policy in Kurt R. Spillman, Andreas Wenger and 
Derek Muller (1999) (eds.), Between Russia and the West: Foreign and Security Policy of Independent 
Ukraine, Bern: Peter Lang.
271 Prizel (1997); Taras Kuzio (2003), ‘EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?’, Occasional Papers No. 
47, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, November..
272 ‘The new cold war’, The Economist, 9 September 1993.
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established the TACIS assistance programme, and in December, having agreed the 
guidelines for the recognition of Newly Independent States, which included the 
principles of human rights and the basic tenets of democracy,273 its members granted 
recognition to Ukraine. But as the EC/EU prepared to commit to integrate Central 
Europe into its structures, Ukraine seemed peripheral to the emerging post-Cold War 
map of Europe.274
The first high level meeting between the EC and Ukraine took place only in the autumn 
of 1992 between Jacques Delors, then European Commission President, and Kravchuk. 
During that same year, the first decisions on what type of relations to build with Ukraine 
were made: in February the Protocol on the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the New Independent States concerning Technical Assistance was 
agreed, and in April the Commission gave its opinion to Council to start negotiations on 
a new cooperation agreement with Ukraine.
The primacy of key security issues was evident. A form of conditionality was exercised 
in 1993 when the EU tied the PC A to the ratification of the START 1 and Non 
Proliferation treaties.275 This did not prevent the EC from signing a sectoral agreement 
in the textiles field in June of the same year.276 The same Copenhagen European Council 
of June 1993 that pressed Ukraine over proliferation promised a prospect of accession to 
Central European countries. For Ukraine, the possibility of signing a Europe Agreement 
of the kind used with those countries that asked for EU membership was not envisaged.
Russian pressure on the EU to keep a distance from Ukraine also played a role in
*777shaping EU policy, and divisions between the member states and the lack of a 
common vision towards the country hampered the development of a collective foreign 
policy. The aid programme offered to Ukraine, rather than the PHARE programme for
273 European Political Cooperation (1991), Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting 
concerning the Guidelines on the Recognition o f New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, 
Brussels and The Hague: 16 December.
274 Edward Mortimer argued that ‘western Europe has failed conspicuously to respond to the challenge of 
events in the east’, in ‘Wake up, Europe’, The Financial Times, 18 November 1992.
275 European Council (1993), Council Conclusions, Copenhagen: 21-22 June.
276 Anna Herranz (2003). ‘Relaciones UE-Ucraina 1991-2003: Una politica de reaction’, Working Papers 
No. 52, Barcelona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
277 David Cronin, ‘Solana still has work to do over Russian reaction to the “Orange Revolution”’, 
European Voice, 9 December 2004.
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the potential candidate countries to EU membership, was TACIS, a programme that 
brought together under the same budgetary umbrella all the Soviet successor states and 
Mongolia. The post-Cold War map of Europe gradually being drawn in European 
capitals through enlargement did not include Ukraine as a potential member, even after 
the Baltic states, as Ukraine formerly part of the Soviet Union, became included among 
the potential candidates for accession in 1994.
3.2 Engaging Ukraine: the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
With the break up of the Soviet Union, of all the EC countries, Germany seemed the 
most concerned with Central Europe and shouldered much of the aid effort towards the 
CIS.278 Addressing the Ukrainian fear of being considered secondary to Russia, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Kiev told journalists that ‘there can be no question of 
either/or, there can only be relationships with both’.279 The EU began to wake up to the 
issues that Ukraine was posing,280 by reaching a CFSP Common Position outlining the 
areas of priority in November 1994. These were economic and social stability, regional 
security, and nuclear disarmament.281
At that time, Germany, concerned about the economic crisis in Ukraine and its relations 
with Russia, advocated a stronger policy towards the whole Eastern Europe. Its 
position, however, was often blocked by considerations (that did not always regard 
Ukraine) of other member states. 283 France wanted to ensure that the EU’s Eastern 
foreign policy focus would be counterbalanced by equal attention to the Mediterranean; 
Italy was against a balance of payments loan because Ukraine had outstanding debts 
towards Italian companies; while in the first half of the 1990s Britain, despite US
278 Anthony Robinson, ‘Donors to draw up plan for aid to CIS’, The Financial Times, 22 May 1992.
279 Chrystia Freeland, ‘Kohl backs Ukraine in fight for EC markets: Pro-Russian stance denied during visit 
to Kiev’, The Financial Times, 11 June 1993.
280 According to one analyst, ‘it is amazing how little the European Union has contributed to this process 
[of stabilisation]. The EU has managed to think about enlargement into central Europe, but no further’, 
Anders Aslund, ‘Behind the new iron curtain of Europe’, The Financial Times, 23 January 1996.
281 Council of the EU (1994), Common Position on the objectives and priorities o f the European Union 
towards Ukraine, (94/779/CFSP), Brussels: 28 November.
282 While he spelt out support for Russia as a key element of any policy, German foreign minister Klaus 
Kinkel underlined the need for a coherent policy towards Ukraine that needed to be ‘brought rapidly 
within our European cooperation system’. The wording reserved instead for the Baltic states was to ‘draw 
these countries ever closer to the Union’. Quentin Peel, ‘Bonn and Paris plan cooperation’, The Financial 
Times, 25 March 1994.
283 ‘US-German aid package for Ukraine blocked’, The Financial Times, 28 November 1994.
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criticism, was cautious towards Ukraine, concerned not only with the amount of aid 
spent there but also about giving the Commission too strong a role in managing aid.284 
Eventually, Germany’s Ostpolitik found France’s support in return for a greater backing 
of French policy towards Algeria and North Africa. The debate over aid to Ukraine 
was also conditioned by the decision to enlarge to Central Europe and the discussions 
over the preparations for and costs of the pre-accession strategy unveiled in the Essen 
European Council at the end of 1994. These differences between the member states over 
aid to the country, the role of the Commission in managing aid, and the strategic 
importance attached to Ukraine was thus the main reason behind the EU’s late start in 
engaging with Kiev.
Although slightly less generous than the PCA negotiated with Russia, the EU, under 
pressure from Germany, was trying to send the message that it was not putting Ukraine 
behind Russia. The PCA institutionalised relations between the two sides. But it had 
little to deliver: short of offering some kind of European prospect, the Ukrainian 
leadership considered most EU strategies insufficient.
The political dimension of the PCA has been discussed in chapter 3. In economic terms, 
as well as providing the framework for trade, it institutionalised the EU’s support for the 
integration of Ukraine into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), though it did not 
provide a roadmap for such accession. It contained a so-called ‘evolutionary’ clause 
through which the parties involved can decide to bring their economic cooperation onto 
to a higher level through the creation of a Free Trade Area. The PCA ‘constitutes an 
example of what could be seen as a mixed external action of the EU, with a cross-pillar
284 Britain was in the mind of Clinton’s administration when an official stated, after Ukraine’s accession to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that ‘we believe that President Kuchma needs a strong vote of confidence 
from the west, and we are very disappointed with the EU’s lack of response’, Lionel Barber and Chrystia 
Freeland, ‘UK, France block Ukraine reform aid’, The Financial Times, 28 November 1994. On the 
position of the other member states see Lionel Barber, ‘EU split over Ukraine loan: UK resistance to 
Germany’s aid call’, The Financial Times, 8 November 1994.
285 Quentin Peel and David Buchan, ‘Paris, Bonn discuss EU strategy: Plans for two Presidencies’, The 
Financial Times, 30 May 1994.
286 Lionel Barber, ‘EU seeks even-handed policy towards Russia and Ukraine’, The Financial Times, 16 
May 1994.
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dimension, ensured in particular by the dual nature of the Council of the European 
Union’.287
Notwithstanding the thorny issue of membership, the PCA framework has been
^ o o
criticised as a policy designed by default, as a ‘photocopy’ of the Russian one, for its 
heavily technocratic and insufficiently political nature, without a clear prospect of long­
term development, heavily focused on trade issues and on Ukraine’s legislative 
harmonisation, and ‘reflecting a mixed bag of tools transplanted from other EU 
policies’.289 The time gap between its conception and its implementation in 1998 was 
long: the PCA did not reflect changes that had occurred during the process, such as the 
start of enlargement negotiations, internal political dynamics and steady economic 
decline.290 According to some, this made the PCA a ‘piece-meal document, where each 
partner has picked what has best suited its agenda’.291
Despite the institutional meetings and summits, which included the Commission, the 
Council and its ministers or the Presidency (at the yearly summits), and the High 
Representative for CFSP, political dialogue remained limited, especially in the field of 
human rights and democracy (as box 3, p. 261 in the Annexes shows). In the economic 
sphere, the dialogue between ministers remained focused on Ukraine’s onus to speed up 
reform which, given that it was not forthcoming, ensured that the PCA framework did 
not evolve much over the years (see box 3 in the Annexes). Furthermore, the PCA did 
not provide the prospect of EU membership that Ukraine had been asking. According to 
its ambassador in Brussels, enlargement was distracting the EU from the eastern 
countries: ‘there should be a long-term strategy towards Ukraine, to show us where we 
are heading. We want to be within the EU’s sphere of influence’.292 Throughout these 
relations, a fundamental misunderstanding over the meaning of ‘European integration’
287 Christopher Hillion (2000), ‘Institutional aspects of the partnership between the European Union and 
the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union: Case studies of Russia and Ukraine’, Common 
Market Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 5 pp. 1211-1235, quote on p. 1219.
288 In the words of a European Commission official, interview, Brussels, April 2006 (1).
289 Dov Lynch (2003), ‘The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU’, in Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, 
Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triataphyllou, Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP fo r  a 
wider Europe, Chaillot Papers No. 65, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, pp. 34-59.
290 Commission officials, later involved in the drafting of the European Neighbourhood Policy, agree with 
many of the critiques of the PCA described here. Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 24 April 
2006 (1) and 25 April.
291 MWH ECDPM, ODI Consortium (2003), p. 13.
292 Mark Turner, ‘EU strategy for Kiev hinges on reforms’, European Voice, 4 June 1998.
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persisted: while the Ukrainian side interpreted it as the eventual possibility of accession, 
the EU focused on the process and avoided membership as a carrot to stimulate reform. 
These different interpretations had an impact not only on political relations but also on 
policy implementation.293
As a follow up to the CFSP Common Position, in December 1996 the Council approved 
the first Action Plan towards Ukraine. The aims were broader than the 1994 document: 
development, democracy, market economy and de-nuclearisation, but it did not provide 
any specific initiatives.294 The Action Plan was a response to Kiev’s demands for a 
similar treatment to that towards Russia, which had been dealt with in an earlier Action 
Plan. The difference, however, was that the Plan was drafted by the Commission rather 
than the Council,295 indicating the lesser importance the member states attributed to 
Ukraine compared to Russia.
In terms of EU priorities, economic penetration and expansion continued to be 
secondary to security concerns, though EU investments were growing in the 2000s. 
Trade with the EU accounted for just 20% of Ukraine’s total trade.296 This figure hides 
an imbalance: the EU became Ukraine’s most important trade partner, but Ukraine 
remained of much lesser importance to the EU as a whole representing less that 1% of 
its trade,297 even after the accession of central European countries with stronger 
economic ties with Ukraine. Once Ukrainian GDP started to grow after 2000,298 thanks 
to a set of market reforms introduced by Prime Minister Yushchenko, the country started 
to become more appetising to EU investments. By 2005 56% of Foreign Direct 
Investments into Ukraine came from EU-25 member states (37% from EU-15). In 2004 
the biggest European investors were the UK (US$ 896 million), Germany (US$ 632
293 This was recognised by the two sides themselves, see EU-Ukraine Cooperation Committee (2003), 
‘Joint Report on the Implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine’ europa.int.eu/comm./external_relations/Ukraine/intro/pcarep2.pdf.
294 European Commission (1996), Action Plan for Ukraine, COM/96/0593/FINAL, Brussels: 20 
November; Herranz (2003).
295 ‘EU to send “frank message” in action for Ukraine’, European Voice, 24 October 1996.
296 European Commission (2003), Wider Europe -  Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003g) 104 final, Brussels: 11 March, chart 5.
297 European Commission, DG Trade, Ukraine, 5 July 2005, available at http://trade- 
info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/iuly/tradedoc 113459.pdf, accessed 14 February 2006.
298 Between 2000 and 2004 Ukraine had an average growth rate of 7.3% per year, industrial output grew 
by 16% and exports by 28%. See Anders Aslund (2004), ‘Ukraine’s Future and US interests’, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, Washington: US Government, 12 May.
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million), the Netherlands (US$ 548 million) and Austria (US$ 346 million).299 This 
trend was to increase after the end of the Kuchma era with the Orange Revolution.
Ukraine is also a crucial transit country hosting 35,000 km of pipelines to transport 
natural gas from Russia to Central and Western Europe, and transporting 94% of the 
natural gas consumed in Europe,300 but has never become as important as the energy 
provider. Indeed, EU member states have dealt with these issues directly with 
Moscow,301 and in April 2005 Germany and Russia signed an agreement for the 
construction of the North European Gas Pipeline that will transport gas under the Baltic 
Sea bypassing Poland, Ukraine and Belarus.302
As enlargement approached, security interests were expanded to include illegal 
migration, illegal trafficking, border management, priorities also reflected in the 
distribution of aid (see table 3.1, p. 85). Cooperation with Kiev was sought also in 
peace-keeping operations and over the resolution of the Transniestria conflict in 
Moldova.
3.3 CFSP and the Common Strategy
In June 1998 Kuchma issued a decree on ‘Ukraine’s Strategy of Integration into the 
European Union’ which stated that the ‘national interests of Ukraine require the 
identification of Ukraine as an influential European country, full-fledged EU member’, a 
nine point plan in which the EU figured in most objectives.303 In December 1999 the 
Parliament approved the appointment of the governor of the central bank Viktor 
Yushchenko as Prime Minister, widely seen as a reformer not affiliated to the oligarchic 
groups304 who managed to find a majority in favour of reform, later helped by the fact
299 Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, ‘Foreign Direct 
Investments from the European Union to Ukraine’, www.delukr.cec.eu.int/site/pag 32099.htm.
300 Marko Bojcun (2001), ‘Russia, Ukraine and European Integration’, EUI Working Paper HEC No. 
2001/4, Florence: European University Institute.
301 See, for instance, Pavliuk (2002), p. 87; Charles Clover and John Reed, ‘Pipeline ploy displeases 
Poland and Ukraine’, The Financial Times, 31 October 2000.
302 Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is a consultant in the joint Russian-German company 
that won the construction contract of the new pipeline. See Angelantonio Rosato, ‘E usando il gas, Putin 
riaccende una seconda guerra ffedda’, II Venerdi di Repubblica, 3 February 2006.
303 Decree by the President of Ukraine, Strategy of Ukraine’s integration into the European Union, Decree 
615/98, 11 June 1998.
304 ‘Viktor Yushcenko, Ukraine’s faint hope’, The Economist, 4 May 2000.
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that in 2000 Ukraine saw its economy grow for the first time in a decade. Under 
pressure from the Council of Europe, for example, at the start of 2000 the Rada finally 
abolished the death penalty, in a move that seemed to indicate commitment towards 
international obligations. In April 2000, on the basis of Kuchma’s indications, the 
Parliament adopted a reform programme that focused on five strategic goals: the 
development of human resources; the reduction of poverty and economic development; 
increasing the country’s economic competitiveness; protecting human rights, freedoms, 
personal security and the integrity of the state; integration into EU.305
On the EU side, Ukraine was to be dealt with through foreign policy rather than as a 
potential candidate for accession. In December 1999 the European Council in Helsinki 
recognised Turkey, but not Ukraine, as a potential candidate, which dealt a blow to the 
pro-European elites in Kiev. The Foreign Minister of the time, Anatol Zlenko, later 
pointed out the differential treatment the EU reserved to Ukraine compared to the other 
countries of Central Europe:
while the countries of Eastern Europe were told “we will admit you to the 
EU, but only after you have carried out reforms and met certain criteria”, 
Ukraine was told “first you must carry out reforms and meet certain criteria 
and only after we will discuss the possibility of membership”.307
Instead, at Helsinki the EU produced a Common Strategy for Ukraine. If on the one 
hand the Common Strategy signalled the greater importance that the EU attributed to 
Ukraine, it also implied that the country was intended to be dealt with under CFSP 
rather than a potential candidate. The exclusion of Ukraine from the list of potential 
candidates had an important domestic impact and was used instrumentally to justify 
Kiev’s unwillingness to carry out reforms, on the grounds that there was no direction 
towards which head, and its increasing leaning towards Russia.308
305 MWH, ECDPM, ODI Consortium (2003).
306 Stephen White, Margot Light, John Lowenhardt (2000), ‘A Wider Europe: The View from Moscow 
and Kyiv’, International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 77-88.
307 Anatol Zlenko (2001), ‘Ukraine and the EU: It Takes Two to Tango’, in Lewis (ed.), pp. 21-25, quote 
on p. 22.
308 Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, The EU’s response to Ukraine turmoil’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol. 6 No. 47, 23 December 2004.
112
The Common Strategy (CS) essentially confirmed the institutional framework and the 
priorities established by the PCA, though it focused more on stability and economic 
development. It also implicitly recognised the need for greater coherence between the 
policies of the member states and those of the EC and that political dialogue with 
Ukraine needed strengthening (see box 3.1, p. 78).
But aside from pinpointing some of the problems of the policies, especially in the 
political dimension, the CS had little follow up. In subsequent years, the effectives and 
appropriateness of Common Strategies as a whole came under scrutiny by the High 
Representative for CFSP himself, arguing that while they contributed to rejoining EU 
overall objectives, they did not provide any added value compared to existing policies, 
that their broad scope and the composite interests of the member states made them ‘a 
Christmas tree’ based on the ‘lowest common denominator’, where all possible aspects 
of relations are treated without any sense of priority. Also, they were considered too 
static to provide any tools at times of crisis, nor did they prove to be a means to 
introduce Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in CFSP matters,309 which would have 
helped overcome the problem of unanimity in decision making.
It is significant, however, that the content of CFSP action did revolve around building 
declaratory positions of normative content (see box 5.2 on the use of CFSP towards 
Ukraine, p. 147). Many of the topics addressed through CFSP did indeed regard human 
rights and democracy related issues. This will be discussed at greater length in Chapters 
5 and 6.
Ukrainian leaders were increasingly frustrated with the EU’s ambiguity over the 
country’s accession prospects. In Kuchma’s words, ‘There is just talk, nothing else [...]. 
Could you explain the strategy of the European Union towards Ukraine? When we ask 
such a question, we don’t understand the answer’.310 Repeated criticism from Kiev was 
answered by confirming the validity of the existing framework and by pointing at 
Ukraine’s lack of progress in reforms -  a dialogue between the deaf.
309 Secretary General/High Representative (2000), Common Strategies Report, Brussels: 21 December, 
reprinted in Antonio Missiroli (ed.) (2001b), ‘Coherence for European Security Policy: Debates -  Cases -  
Assessments, Occasional Papers, No. 27, Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, 
May, Annex E. These views were also widely shared among officials at the Council of the EU and at the 
Commission. Interviews, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1), (3) and (4).
310 Stefan Wagstyl, ‘Russian PM in warning over EU strategy’, The Financial Times, 2 July 1999.
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3.4 Conclusions
EU foreign policy towards Ukraine suffered from a number of internal and external 
constraints which undermined the development of a strategic view of the country. In the 
first half of the 1990s the EU’s role was secondary to US leadership in addressing 
security challenges. Thereafter, a collective strategy failed to develop due to an 
insufficiently strong constituency within the EU to drive it. With the exception of 
Germany, the other member states did not share a clear view of where Ukraine should 
stand in relation to the EU nor of what the priorities of foreign policy should be.311
The fact that the responsibility for drafting the 1996 Action Plan was left to the 
Commission did not imply that it was the driving force behind it; rather it reflected the 
lack of attention on part of the member states.312 The absence of inputs from the member 
states also ensured that the PCA was designed on the basis of the Russian one and that 
the content of the meetings was largely technical, relating to issues such as the closure 
of Chernobyl and the abolition of trade barriers.
The only priority that emerged was that Ukraine was not deemed part of those countries 
to which the EU was promising a prospect of accession. Maintaining friendly relations 
with Russia, especially as the Baltic states submitted their applications for EU 
membership in the mid 1990s, was a very strong factor slowing down the pace and 
degree of engagement with Kiev and influencing negotiations for the PCA. As we have 
seen, some member states, such as Britain, France and Italy, were also concerned with 
the costs of external assistance towards the whole of Eastern Europe, a confirmation of 
the ‘logic of diversity’ in dealing with Ukraine.
If the lack of a collective vision, the role of external actors, the prioritisation given to 
Central Europe and Russia, and the inadequacy of the foreign policy instruments and 
capabilities explain the weaknesses of EU foreign policy towards Ukraine, they do not 
explain the motivations for engaging it in the first half of the 1990s. Germany, which
311 Interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (3), European Commission, Rome: 30 May, 
embassies of EU member states, Kiev: 5, 6 July (1) and (2), 7 July 2006.
312 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1), and in Rome: 30 May 2006.
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pioneered EU policies towards the East, was the policy entrepreneur that put Ukraine on 
the EU foreign policy agenda, while external demands from Kiev to deserve a similar 
treatment to Russia also influenced the Commission and Germany.
As we shall see, and as box 3 in the Annexes on PCA priorities shows (p. 261), Ukraine 
started to acquire a more prominent position in EU foreign policy only towards the very 
end of the 1990s, largely as a result of approaching EU enlargement.
4. The EU and Ukraine in the context of enlargement
4.1 Uncertainties in Ukraine’s transition
The Yushchenko government’s pro-Western reform policy was short lived, starting with 
the dismissal of the Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyk in October 2000, apparently 
because of Kuchma’s priority of placating Russia.313 The signs that the process of 
transition were regressing continued:314 in 2001 Kuchma’s standing in the West was 
severely damaged by his alleged involvement in the murder of an independent journalist 
(the Gongadze case, discussed in the next chapter), and by the 2002 parliamentary 
elections all the pro-Western elements in government had been dismissed.
These internal developments had a significant impact on (and to an extent were also 
shaped by) Ukraine’s relations with the rest of the world. Russia started to strengthen its 
policy towards Ukraine and the former Soviet space with the election of Vladimir Putin 
to President in 2000. One of his first foreign trips was to Kiev, followed by numerous 
ministerial meetings and investments in the country, using energy dependence to 
reassert Russian influence in Ukraine.315 Viktor Chernomyrdin (former Russian Prime 
Minister and former head of Gazprom) was appointed in 2001 ambassador to Kiev and 
Special Presidential Envoy on the development of Russian-Ukrainian trade and 
economic relations, interpreted as move to strengthen Russia’s chances of winning the
o  1 f .
final phase of privatisation that involved the gas transit network, and to increase its
313 ‘Plenty of plots, not much reform’, The Economist, 19 October 2000.
314 Paul Kubicek (2001), ‘The Limits of Electoral Democracy in Ukraine’, Democratization Vol. 8, No. 2, 
pp. 117-139. Kubicek argues that the 1994 elections were the only free ones (rather than free and fair).
15 ‘Frost and Friction’, The Economist, 28 September 2000.
316 Bojcun (2001).
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political influence over Ukraine.317 The two countries got as close as to sign an 
agreement in September 2003 also with Belarus and Kazakhstan to create a single 
economic space, putting relations with the EU under strain.318
Ukraine thus increasingly tied its fortunes to Russia. As Kuchma later put it, ‘separating 
Ukraine from Russia is as impossible as separating Russia from Europe’.319 This 
approach found resonance in those member states that had the deepest historical ties 
with Moscow and which were also most dependent on Russian gas.320 But as Russia 
started to warm to the West in the wake of September 11, Ukraine too announced the 
abandonment of its traditional ‘multivectored foreign policy’ in favour of seeking 
NATO membership and integration in the EU. According to Yevhen Marchuk, secretary 
of the national security and defence council chaired by Kuchma, ‘there is no value in 
neutrality, a multi-vector foreign policy, and uncertainty about the nature of [Ukraine’s] 
principles’.321 Among the US’s new allies in the fight against terrorism, Ukraine thus 
opened its airspace to aircraft en route to Afghanistan. During the summer of the same 
year, however, the same tapes that had implicated Kuchma in the Gongadze murder 
revealed his alleged involvement in the sale, in 2000, of Kolchuga radars to Iraq, which 
led the US to suspend $55 million in aid.322 A previous US Congressional Research 
Service report had expressed preoccupation at Ukraine’s arms exports that had increased 
to make it the 10th world arms’ exporter.323 Ukraine’s later participation in the post war 
effort in Iraq with 1,800 soldiers only partly mended fences,324 but did not prevent the 
US administration from criticising the conduct of the 2004 presidential elections.
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EU position towards Ukraine started to change at a time of such fluidity. Germany’s 
leading role in supporting EU engagement with Ukraine, was not to last. By the late 
1990s Germany’s position shifted towards France’s, which seemed to consider Ukraine 
as ancillary to Russia and expected that it would eventually be subsumed.325 A joint 
report of the French and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs recognised that there 
were significant Ukrainian political forces advocating greater integration with the EU, 
‘but, nevertheless, the admission of Ukraine would imply the isolation of Russia. It is 
sufficient to content oneself with close cooperation with Kiev’. Germany, France, and 
Italy viewed Ukraine through the lens of their ties with Moscow and their growing 
dependence on Russian gas.327 After 1995 it was Britain that led the EU in considering
328the importance of Ukraine as a ‘pivot’ (the official British term) in European security, 
joined by some Nordic countries in the 2000s. The UK became, together with Sweden 
and some of the acceding countries of Central Europe, the main initiator of the ENP.
Within the enlarged EU the country with the most significant interests in Ukraine has 
been Poland, which tabled proposals for EU-Ukraine relations as early as 1998.329 
Politically, the core of mutual interests between Poland and Ukraine had been 
throughout the 1990s to counterbalance Belarus’s ‘integration’ into Russia. Both 
countries shared a common interest because of their minorities living across each other’s 
borders.330 Despite the regular discussions with Germany about Eastern policy issues, 
Warsaw did not share Berlin’s view whereby Russia was the strategic partner in the 
East.331 According to Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Member of the European Parliament (MEP) 
and former Polish defence minister: ‘at least Ukraine does not offer us burning borders
325 Bojcun (2001).
326 Quoted in Berdychowska, Grajewski (2002), p. 11.
327 This view has been confirmed in interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (3), European 
Commission, Rome: 30 May 2006; and embassies of the member states, Kiev: 5 July, 6 July (1), 6 July 
(2) and 7 July 2006.
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Wohlfeld (ed.), The Effects o f Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Chaillot Paper No. 26, Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, pp. 29-42 ; Roman 
Wolczuk (2002), ‘Ukraine. Poland's Failing Project’, in Lewis (ed.), pp. 171-179.
331 Marcin Zaborowski (2004), ‘From America’s protege to constructive European. Polish security policy 
in the twenty-first century’, Occasional Papers No. 56, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 
December.
117
with Syria, Iran and Iraq’.332 Once Poland joined the EU, its MEPs were also active in 
the European Parliament, elected to head working groups on Ukraine and Belarus -  a 
development which proved to be of major significance in issuing the Parliament’s 
resolutions on the Belarusan referendum in October 2004 and on Ukrainian elections in 
November 2004.
The accession of the new member states thus modified EU views of Ukraine, though the 
key question of membership posed by Kiev remained unanswered. Whereas Belgium, 
France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and, by the 2000s, Germany were opposed to 
deeper integration with Ukraine in case it was seen as a commitment towards 
enlargement, Poland pressed hard to keep the door open, and the UK, the Scandinavian 
countries, the Baltic states all favoured closer ties.333 After the Orange Revolution, when 
Kiev renewed demands for an accession prospect, the case against Ukraine was 
strengthened by the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and so- 
called enlargement fatigue.
The prospect of the 2004 enlargement of the EU to ten countries, eight of which are in 
Central and Eastern Europe,334 increased the regional importance of the country. In 
terms of security, the 526 km of Polish-Ukrainian border, now the best part of the EU- 
Ukrainian border, was a difficult area for the EU that presented plenty of so-called 
‘micro-security’ risks: illegal migrant crossings and illegal trafficking, and trans-border 
criminal activities.335 The prospect of sharing a border directly with Ukraine raised the 
awareness in the EU-15 that the external impact of domestic change in Ukraine would 
be felt directly in the enlarged EU. Also, some of the accession countries, which were to 
bring into the EU the heritage of their relations developed with Ukraine during the 
1990s, as well as their foreign policy priorities vis-a-vis Russia, were pushing for the EU 
to develop an ‘Eastern dimension’. The main activities of the EU towards Ukraine 
entailed a few attempts to improve diplomatic relations, the introduction of new fields of
332 Quoted in Wieslaw Horabik, ‘Torn between Russia and the West, Ukraine must make a crucial choice’, 
European Voice, 29 July 2004.
Andrew Beatty, ‘Ukraine threatens to reject new EU deal’, EU observer, 11 June 2004.
334 These are Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and 
Slovenia. Malta and Cyprus are the other two countries of the 2004 enlargement round.
335 Heather Grabbe (2000), ‘The sharp edges of Europe: extending Schengen eastwards, International 
Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, pp. 519-536.
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cooperation, especially in the second and third pillars, and the development of a new 
policy towards the neighbourhood of the enlarged EU.
But political dialogue followed roughly the same terms: little substance so long as 
change was not forthcoming from Ukraine (see box 3 in Annexes, p. 261). The 2003 
Yalta EU-Ukraine summit mentioned for the first time the possibility of membership of 
the European Economic Area, but the only concrete results were increased cooperation 
in energy, transport and scientific fields. The EU did not commit to increase technical 
assistance, running at an average of €100 m during the previous 10 years, nor did it offer 
any compensation for enlargement (according to Kiev, the country was due to loose €1 
bn in trade).336 The EU emphasised instead that the Presidential elections were an 
‘excellent opportunity to demonstrate that remaining shortcomings in the areas of media 
freedom and conduct of elections are being effectively addressed in a positive and 
tangible manner’.337
At the same time, the EU was concerned with the ways in which enlargement would 
change its relations with Ukraine and the likelihood that migratory pressure on the new 
border would increase, given that Ukraine had become a route for illegal migration.338 In 
view of these challenges, the EU sought Kiev’s cooperation in managing ‘soft security’ 
issues, a rare field in which both sides have willingly gone beyond the PCA remit, by 
launching an Action Plan in Justice and Home Affairs in December 2001. The areas of 
cooperation included migration and asylum, border management and visa policies, 
organised crime including terrorism, and strengthening the judiciary, rule of law and 
good governance.339 The innovation contained in the methodology of the Action Plan 
was the fact that the priorities were negotiated jointly with Kiev: at the first meeting 
held in November 2002, a limited number of areas were identified as the first step of 
joint activity (readmission and migration, border management, money laundering, 
trafficking in human beings and drugs, corruption and child exploitation).340 CFSP and 
ESDP too have been areas in which Ukraine has shown interest by aligning itself to 
many EU declarations and positions and by participating in peacekeeping missions in
336 Dick Leonard, ‘Ukraine still years away from joining EU’, European Voice, 13 November 2003.
337 EU-Ukraine Summit, Yalta, 7 October 2003, Press Release IP703/1343, Brussels: 6 October 2003.
338 Pavliuk (2002), footnote 27.




the Western Balkans and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, if 
political dialogue during these years rarely went beyond empty rhetoric, the EU did 
show an interest in Kiev’s cooperation in select security fields and in JHA.
4.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy
The European Neighbourhood Policy represented an attempt to end the EU’s ‘soul 
searching’341 policy towards Ukraine. The UK and Sweden, backed by some future 
member states, were the main instigators of the need to develop a policy aimed at those 
countries left out of the enlargement process. The first Communication from the 
Commission offered ‘the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market and further 
integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of -  persons, goods, 
services and capital’,342 as the carrot in exchange for cooperation in the building of 
stability around the EU’s borders. The aims ran parallel to those outlined in the 
European Security Strategy, drafted during the same year: to create a ‘ring of friends’ 
that would share greater prosperity, stability and security.343
Initially, the ENP was conceived mostly for Ukraine and the Eastern neighbourhood, as 
a means to enhance relations that were stagnating under the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements negotiated in the mid 1990s. The inclusion of North Africa and the Middle 
East under pressure from the EU Mediterranean states, and of the Southern Caucasus in 
2004, satisfied those member states that wanted to clarify to aspiring members in 
Eastern Europe that the ENP was not an antechamber to an accession process.344 These 
developments were not welcome in Ukraine. The terminology itself was contested: 
Ukraine does not see itself as a ‘neighbour’ but as a ‘European’ country. Indeed, the 
response in Kiev was not positive: a foreign ministry spokesperson criticised the 
proposals as they did not meet Ukraine’s aspirations and put the country in the same 
league as those without an accession prospect (North Africa and the Middle East) and on
341 In the words of one Council of the EU official, Brussels, 24 April 2006 (3).
342 European Commission (2003), Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A new Framework fo r  Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels: 11 March.
343 Council of the EU (2003g), A Secure Europe in a Better World -  the European Security Strategy, 
Brussels: 12 December.
344 Interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (3), 14 May 2007, European Commission, 
Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1), 15 May 2007 (2).
120
a par with Belarus and Moldova,345 and did not make any distinction between aspiring 
countries to EU membership and those that are not, implying that none of them were 
eligible. In the evolution of the ENP from the first 2003 proposal to the 2004 Strategy 
Paper,346 to the outcome of the budgetary negotiations for the 2007-2013 financial 
framework, the most generous and ambitious aspects of the policy were substantially 
scaled down, signalling a more haphazard commitment to the policy.
Divisions between the member states over the areas to prioritise (along the traditional 
East versus South division) have historically led to compromises on a middle ground 
between the two. In 2004 the Council extended the list of priorities with a stronger focus 
on security issues (contrasting illegal migration, illegal trafficking, and cooperating on 
security threats), reduced the incentives of economic integration into the EU internal 
market.347
Negotiations with Kiev on the Action Plan continued throughout 2004, as the 
presidential campaign heated up. Supposed to identify more specific priorities than the 
PCA, the 3-year Action Plan covered a broad ground (see box 1 in the Annexes, p. 257, 
for the political priorities). However, the carrots did not have their desired effect upon 
Kiev, the first country to start ENP negotiations in January 2004. In May, Commission 
President Romano Prodi hinted at the possibility of granting market status to Ukraine, a 
first step towards the WTO, but that the elections would be a fundamental threshold in 
determining the future development of relations.348 By June the contents of the Action 
Plan met the disapproval of Ukrainian officials. At the July 2004 EU-Ukraine summit in 
The Hague, the Action Plan was slammed by Kiev on the grounds that it did not add 
anything new to the text of the PCA.349 According to Kuchma, ‘fixing Ukraine’s status 
as an EU neighbour will freeze relations, rather than promote their development’.350 At
345 Valentinas Mite, ‘Ukraine: EU Proposals For Future Relations Spark Disappointment’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 14 March 2003. Interviews, Ukrainian Representation to the EU, Brussels: 25 
April 2006.
34 European Commission (2004d), European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373 
final, Brussels: 12 May.
347 Council of the EU, General Affairs and External Relations (2004b), Conclusions, Luxemburg: 14 June. 
For a comparison of the aims of the ENP proposed by the Commission and then approved by the Council, 
see Balfour and Rotta (2005).
348 Andrew Beatty, ‘Market status to come soon for Ukraine’, EUobserver, 19 May 2004.
349 Andrew Beatty, ‘Ukraine threatens to reject new EU deal’, EU observer, 11 June 2004.
350 ‘European neighbourhood policy fails to meet Ukraine’s interests, Kuchma says’, Interfax-Ukraine, 8 
July 2004.
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the same summit, the EU did not give Ukraine market economy status. The EU’s 
position, repeated to the Ukrainian government publicly and informally, was that the 
upcoming elections would represent the crucial test for the further development of 
relations.351 Eventually, the EU published the Action Plan in December 2004 in the 
midst of the Orange Revolution, but it was approved without modifications only once 
the new government was in place in February 2005.
4.3 Conclusions
After 2001-2 EU policy towards Ukraine entered a phase of even deeper uncertainty. 
With enlargement approaching, the interests of the member states in a stable and 
predictable Ukraine increased, especially in the security and JHA fields, where 
cooperation was expanded. However, diplomatic relations were strained by the 
deterioration of human rights and democracy standards in Ukraine, as the next chapter 
will show, amplified by Kuchma’s continuous oscillation between East and West. But 
the main cause of uncertainty was the ‘logic of diversity’ governing EU foreign policy. 
The sensitivity that some key member states manifested towards Russia were only 
confirmed by Putin’s renewed policy of influencing the former USSR. The brakes 
pulled by Germany, France and Italy can be found in the compromises that led to the 
ENP and in the entire management of the human rights and democracy issues discussed 
in the next chapters. Conversely, other member states, such as Sweden and Britain 
pushed towards a greater engagement with Ukraine. Throughout this period, EU policy 
oscillated between being increasingly ‘tiresome’ of Ukraine’s derailment, in the words 
of one national embassy official, and the inability to find a consensus over what course 
of action to take, overwhelmingly because of the role Russia played with some member 
states.352
The Commission began to acquire a greater role especially through the ENP, but 
remained a secondary actor with regard to policy towards Ukraine, and its ability to 
influence the member states was limited. While sensitive to the ‘policy spillover’ of
351 Ahto Lobjakas, ‘Ukraine: Holding Out For A Better Deal, Kyiv To Shun EU’s Neighborhood Offer’, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 July 2004.
352 Interview, embassy of one EU member state, Kiev: 6 July 2006 (2).
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enlargement into EU-Ukraine relations, the Commission was also aware of the ‘red line’ 
of the large member states posed by relations with Moscow.353
5. Conclusions: explaining EU policy towards Ukraine
Intergovemmentalism and the logic of diversity has been the dominant threme in EU 
relations with Ukraine: EU member states have been overall the main actors, but that the 
diversity of views between the capitals led to selective engagement over time. The other 
European institutions have played a secondary role in influencing policy towards 
Ukraine. Although the European Parliament did on occasion ‘lobby’ for Ukraine’s 
cause, its positions have not been reflected in EU policy, while the Commission has 
mostly followed the inputs from the member states. Officials in the Commission 
recognised that the member states were in the driving seat.354 Apart from the drafting of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, in which the Commission played an important 
role, it never proposed any initiative to deepen or upgrade relations with Ukraine. Its 
reports on the PCA suggested that the existing framework was appropriate. In 2002- 
2003, when Ukraine’s fate was marred by uncertainties, the Commission suggested a 
line of continuity with the existing set-up.
The understanding of the problems of European foreign policy through the 
institutionalist framework that sees mechanisms and processes at the level of institutions 
as the main source of foreign policy (and the main cause of its limits) thus does not 
seem to apply to the Ukrainian case. Furthermore, when there was consensus within the 
EU on the type of cooperation and policy areas that needed strengthening or developing, 
such as in Justice and Home Affairs cooperation, the decision-making process did 
produce its results. The limits to EU foreign policy towards Ukraine thus need to be 
found in the member states rather than in the institutions.
With regard to external influences, the US has been one of the most important external 
actors in determining Ukraine’s fortunes; it has not acted as a constraint for the EU (in 
the sense that its policy was competing with the EU), but throughout the 1990s it
353 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 24 April (1), 25 April 2006, and Rome, 30 May 2006.
354 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1), Rome, 30 May 2006, and interviews, 
Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1) and (2).
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prioritised security and geopolitics over domestic politics and reform. Later, the Bush 
administration, following its ‘regime change’ policy, significantly raised the stakes with 
regard to human rights and democracy, acting as a stimulus to EU action.
If the motivations behind engagement were largely security based, so were the 
constraints: the fate of Ukraine was sacrificed to much broader balance of power 
considerations between the EU and Russia: ‘most European governments would very 
happily leave Ukraine in Russia’s orbit, rather than worry about the problems of a large,
'jc/:
backward and fissiparous country’. EU caution towards Russia has been the key 
external constraint determining a weak engagement with Ukraine.
The window of opportunity offered in the second half of the 1990s, when Russian policy 
towards its ‘near abroad’ was at its weakest,357 and when Ukraine itself had swung more 
towards the West, was not seized. France, Germany (in the late 1990s) and Italy were 
consistently identified as the countries with the friendliest relations with Russia. As 
Kuchma himself put it, ‘Ukraine will always been looked at in the light of its relations 
with Russia whether we like it or not’.358 Interviews with a variety of officials in 
European embassies in Kiev and in the EU Council suggested that there were shades of 
difference in the ways EU member states saw Ukraine under the light of Moscow, to 
which they were tied by history, personal relations between leaders, and gas. Some key 
states (Germany, France and Italy) saw their dependence on Russian energy supplies as 
the sine qua non: strategies towards Ukraine were not to interfere in any way with 
Russia’s sensitivities. Secondly, unlike the position developed towards the Baltic states 
(they too part of the Soviet Union until 1991), many Western European capitals still saw 
Ukraine as within Russia’s orbit.
Ukraine was thus a complicating factor in relations with Russia. Those which did 
perceive Ukraine as a country which merited some kind of a policy, ranged from 
considering it a country with which establish a ‘strategic partnership’ based on
355 Taras Kuzio, Jennifer D.P. Moroney, and Mikhail Molchanov (2002), Ukrainian foreign and security 
policy : theoretical and comparative perspectives, Westport, Conn.: Praeger
56 Katynka Barysh and Charles Grant, ‘Ukraine should not be part of a “great game”4, Open Democracy,
7 December 2004, downloaded from www.cer.org.uk/articles.
357 Tor Bukkvoll, (2001), ‘Off the Cuff Politics - Explaining Russia’s Lack of a Ukraine Strategy’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 8, pp. p i 141-1157.
358‘Ukraine President on joining EU’, The Russia Journal, 1 October 2003, 
www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=40646.
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cooperation, to constituting a ‘buffer zone’ between Europe and Russia. ‘Outright 
indifference’ too characterized those countries geographically further away from 
Ukraine.359 These different views ensured that the demands coming from Kiev were not 
met -  and such ambiguity did not help the EU’s credibility there.
This points to intergovemmentalism and traditional realism as the main interpretative 
frameworks for understanding EU foreign policy towards Ukraine. It also points to an 
instrumental use of the human rights and democracy rhetoric to counter Kiev’s demands 
for accession. These explanations, however, need to be tested further. To what extent 
and how did security concerns and cooperation with Russia compete with human and 
democracy aims?
359 For a summary of these views - confirmed in the interviews carried out by the author - see Hryrhoriy 
Nemyria (2005), ‘The Orange Revolution: Explaining the Unexpected’, in Michael Emerson (ed.), 
Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, pp. 53- 
62.
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C h a p t e r  5
I m p l e m e n t in g  H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  D e m o c r a c y : P r e s s  F r e e d o m  in  U k r a in e
1. Introduction
The assassination of Georgy Gongadze in 2000 was by no means an isolated episode of 
physical elimination of a investigative journalist uncovering uncomfortable evidence in 
Ukraine, where around forty journalists experienced violent deaths during its first 
decade of independence. Nor was it a unique case in Eastern Europe. A few months 
earlier, for example, a very similar story caught the attention of international observers 
following the disappearance of the independent Russian journalist Andrei Babitsky.
However, the Gongadze case, with its spy-story developments, its role in stimulating an 
eventually unsuccessful anti-Kuchma movement, and the ensuing strengthening of the 
President’s powers made it an emblematic illustration of the deterioration of Ukraine’s 
already fragile situation with regard to the respect of basic human rights and of 
democratic principles. Indeed, former US ambassadors to Ukraine considered the case 
as ‘a litmus test of the rule of law.361
On the domestic front, the Gongadze case triggered a protest movement against the 
President that coalesced in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ movement. Although the 
protests never gathered more than 10,000 people at one time, they were the largest since 
independence and lasted throughout the winter and spring of 2001. By March, the police 
were clearing the protest tents laid out in Kiev and dealing with demonstrators with 
fairly brutal means. Many protestors were arrested and convicted with ‘disproportionate 
penalties’. In 2003 many were still in prison, and could be considered as ‘political
' lfsy
prisoners’.
360 See John Thornhill, ‘Putin strengthens his levers of power’, Financial Times, 25 May 2000.
361 Carlos Pascual and Steven Pifer (2002). ‘Ukraine's Bid for a Decisive Place in History’, The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 175-192, quote on p. 186. The authors were respectively 
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia at the National 
Security Council and US ambassador to Ukraine, both between 1998 and 2000.
362 Council o f Europe (2003), Resolution 1346 Honouring o f obligations and commitments by Ukraine, 
text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 29 September 2003.
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At the same time, Kuchma started to dismiss those uncomfortable and reform-oriented 
elements in his government. After the dismissal of the pro-Westem Foreign Minister 
Borys Tarasiuk, in October 2000, the Energy Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested 
in February 2001 on the accusation of corruption. In March, responsibility for the lack 
of progress in investigating the Gongadze murder was attributed to the Interior Minister, 
to the chief of the state security agency, and to top officials of the police authorities, all 
dismissed. The final and most important change, probably manoeuvred from above, was 
the fall of the Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, an economic reformer with much 
popular support despite the fact that he repeatedly condemned the protest movement, 
who was replaced by one of Kuchma’s former aids.
Furthermore, the murder investigation fell at a particular international conjuncture for 
Ukraine. Russia, under newly elected President Vladimir Putin, was a developing policy 
of re-asserting its influence in the former Soviet space. Putin used the crisis to deepen 
ties with Ukraine, and in February 2001 a meeting between the two Presidents resulted
' J Z ' J
in agreements to cooperate in the fields of defence, space and energy. The West too 
tried to entice Ukraine into its fold: in July 2001 NATO Secretary General Lord George 
Robinson visited Kiev and pledged to support Ukraine in getting closer to Europe 
providing it respected democratic norms and made political, economic and defence 
reforms;364 US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice followed, emphasising that 
the US did not see Ukraine as a ‘bridge between Russia and Europe’, but needed to 
build greater confidence in the country that could be achieved through economic and 
political reforms; Solana then delivered a more encouraging message coated in 
friendlier terms, but the emphasis on the need for reform was pretty similar. In other 
words, the importance of the Gongadze case needs to be understood within the broader 
context of Ukraine’s collocation between East and West.
363 Amelia Gentleman, ‘Putin dogdes Ukraine scandal’, The Guardian, 12 February 2001; Charles Clover 
and Robert Cottrell, ‘A wasted country’, Financial Times, 16 February 2001.
364 ‘NATO: Ukraine Must Respect “Democratic Norms” To Receive Aid’, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 4 July 2001.
365 Tony Wesolowsky, ‘Ukraine: Rice Delivers Stern Message During Kyiv Stopover’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 July 2001.
366 Kathleen Knox, ‘Ukraine: Kyiv Gains From Playing East Against West’, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 1 August 2001.
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For these reasons, the Gongadze case will be used as a starting point to explain the 
particular ways in which the media was unfree in Ukraine and to evaluate EU action on 
the specific case as well as on media freedom in general.
2. The case o f  Georgy Gongadze and the deterioration o f  press freedom
On 16 September 2000 the outspoken journalist Georgy Gongadze, founder of the 
independent internet newspaper Ukryinska Pravda, who had been carrying out 
investigations into government corruption, did not return home. A decapitated and 
mutilated body was found in a wood outside Kiev on 3 November, later identified with 
near certainty as Gongadze’s. During the same month, what became known as the 
Kuchma-gate scandal erupted, which made Watergate ‘look pretty harmless’,367 when 
the release of some tapes, later proved to be authentic if perhaps doctored, implicated 
the President, among other things, in the murder of Gongadze.368 After denying 
paternity of the voice ordering the journalist’s assassination, Kuchma accused a variety 
of possible culprits of doctoring the tapes to oust him from office, from secret external 
actors, to ‘the same people who have blocked Ukraine’s transformation to a free 
market economy’.370
Notwithstanding the intricate developments in the investigations over Gongadze’s 
murder,371 the case exemplified the deterioration of the rights of freedom of expression 
that had become increasingly evident since the second half of the 1990s, so much so that 
in 1999 the Committee to Protect Journalists, based in New York, included Kuchma on
367 Jonathan Steele, ‘Kuchmagate. Ukraine’s President is accused of ordering murder and intimidation, yet 
the west is not keen to comment’, The Guardian, 27 February 2001.
368 The tapes were allegedly made by a presidential bodyguard Mykola Melnychenko who put a tape 
recorder under the sofa in Kuchma’s office, and later handed over to the leader of the Socialist party 
Oleksander Moroz. The bodyguard eventually found asylum in the United States. Those same tapes later 
accused Kuchma of authorising the sale of Kolchuga radars to Iraq.
369 The Financial Times quoted his statement: ‘I consider that if this crisis were supported, especially from 
the outside, it could lead only to one thing: the collapse of Ukraine’, in Charles Clover and Robert 
Cottrell, ‘A wasted country’, Financial Times, 16 February 2001. Resorting to the spectre of the country’s 
collapse was a strategy repeatedly used by the Ukrainian leadership throughout its history of 
independence to ensure international attention but at the same time to keep it away from meddling in 
domestic politics. Indeed, it was resorted to during the Orange Revolution.
370 Leonid Kuchma, ‘Those responsible for journalist’s death should be brought to justice’, Letters to the 
editor, Financial Times, 27 February 2001.
371 Schemes and scandals in Ukraine’, The Economist, 18 January 2001. For a comprehensive coverage of 
the Gongadze case, see also the many articles published on the websites of Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, www.rfe-rl.org and of Gongadze’s internet newspaper, Ukryinska Pravda 
http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en.
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its list of the ten worst enemies of the press.372 On paper, the press and media were free, 
as censorship was declared illegal, but a variety of forms of pressure existed and 
denunciations by journalists of violence and intimidation were increasingly reported 
from the mid-1990s onwards, up to the assassination of journalists for alleged political 
reasons. Control over the press increased during the period under examination and in 
2003 Freedom House downgraded the country’s media from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’.
Despite the fact that only around one third of the print media was state controlled, the 
private sector never managed to build its autonomy from power as most of its ownership 
was by oligarchs with strong business and political interests often close to the President. 
The media were subject directly to presidential pressure, but censorship was exercised 
also through other less direct means, given that the printing houses and distribution 
networks were state-owned.373
These precarious conditions of press freedom deteriorated when the crackdown on the 
press increased during the presidential election campaign in 1999, and continued 
thereafter with the closure of opposition newspapers and the censorship of television 
broadcasts.374 According to the Institute of Mass Information, in 2001 Ukraine 
experienced 73 known major violations of press freedom, including 5 murders of 
journalists and 26 felony offences.375 Other forms of harassment included the resort to 
criminal libel, to the extent that, according to one journalist, ‘the absurd amount the 
government is demanding in compensation now totals three times the national 
budget’.376 Even the Ukrainian representative in Brussels Roman Shpek admitted that 
‘although most of our media is not state-owned, it is not actually independent’ and that 
‘there is a great dependence between journalists and the shareholders of newspapers’.377
The international criticism and internal opposition caused by the Gongadze affair 
(discussed in the following section) did not trigger any improvement on the situation of 
media freedom in Ukraine. In July 2001 another journalist was allegedly killed. Once
372 Freedom House (2000), Nations in Transit, chapter on Ukraine
373 Prizel (1997).
374 Freedom House (2001), Nations in Transit, chapter on Ukraine.
375 Mentioned in Freedom House (2002), Nations in Transit, chapter on Ukraine.
376 Jonathan Steele, ‘Kuchmagate. Ukraine’s President is accused of ordering murder and intimidation, yet 
the west is not keen to comment’, The Guardian, 27 February 2001.
377 David Cronin, ‘Envoy admits Ukraine faces image problem after death of journalist’, European Voice, 
25 October 2001.
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street opposition was crushed and the composition of the government changed, the new 
Interior Minister Yuri Smirnov announced the resolution of Gongadze’s murder as not 
politically motivated but carried out by a gang of common criminals who were later 
killed themselves.
Recognising that some changes had been introduced, notably the removal from the 
criminal code of the offence of criminal libel, a Council of Europe report concluded that 
media freedom had nonetheless ‘deteriorated’ since 2000. Change in media ownership 
put many outlets under the direct control of ‘people loyal to the authorities’, the 
presidential administration interfered with public and private television stations over the 
content of their news services, especially after the 2002 parliamentary elections, and 
there were shady disputes over licenses, a very high incidence of violence against 
journalists, intimidation on part of the tax, regulatory and police authorities. According 
to the report,
a theme common to a number of those developments is an apparent desire on 
the part of the executive authorities to change what has been a defensive 
strategy of reacting to media coverage into an offensive one of guiding or 
even controlling it. 78
After media tycoon Viktor Medvedchuk was named head of the President’s
Q'lQ
administration the media coverage of opposition activities deteriorated further. In 
September 2002 the head of the parliamentary Committee for the Freedom of Speech 
and Information disclosed the so-called temnikis, or lists of topics, sent to the mass 
media (especially the TV channels) by the President’s administration instructing them 
precisely on how to cover or ignore current events (including events that had not yet 
taken place!), mostly those regarding domestic politics and relations with the West and
378 Council of Europe (2002), Compliance with member States ’ commitments, Committee of Ministers 
Declaration of 10 November 1994, Freedom of Expression and Information, Experts’ report on the 
situation in Ukraine, CM/Monitor (2002)24 (confidential): 19 December, declassified on 27 February 
2003. The Council of Europe’s analysis of the deterioration of press freedom is confirmed by Amnesty 
International (2003), State o f the w orld’s human rights, Section on Ukraine, AI Index POL 10/003/2003, 
and by the Human Rights Watch (2003), World Report, Section on Ukraine.
379 Freedom House (2003), Nations in Transit, Chapter on Ukraine; ‘Kuchma weaker, but still boss’, The 
Economist, 17 October 2002.
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Russia. Failure to comply could lead to various forms of harassment, such as tax audits, 
cancelled licenses and libel suits.380
The Independent Media Union leader, Andriy Shchevchenko: ‘Maybe we don’t have 
censorship de jure, but it certainly exists de facto’.3*1 Had it not been for the founding in 
2003 of Channel 5 by Yushchenko ally Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s entire television 
network would have been in the hands of Medvedchuk. Channel 5, however, only 
reached about 30% of the country and was obscured in the East.382 Some independent 
media outlets that did not exercise self-censorship did continue their activities, 
especially internet-based outlets including Ukryinska Pravda, the newspaper Gongadze 
used to work for, and some radio stations.
3. EU policy on press freedom
Prior to the explosion of the Gongadze case, press freedom in Ukriane did not emerge as 
an issue for EU attention, despite the clear signals of its deteriorating situation at the end 
of the 1990s reported by international NGOs and the Council of Europe. Aid projects of 
the 1990s were not geared towards supporting the independent media or the training of 
journalists (pretty standard aims of democracy aid in transition countries) until 2003. It 
was only in the period between 2004 and 2006 that TACIS earmarked € 10 million for 
‘civil society, media and democracy’ (see table 3.1 on TACIS priorities on p. 85). CFSP 
declarations and positions did not address the situation of the media during the 1990s 
(see box 5.2 on the use of CFSP towards Ukraine on p. 147).
Conversely, in 2001 the reaction of external actors was widespread and used 
unprecedented terms of condemnation of the problems the case raised. As The 
Economist put it,
380 Freedom House (2003), Nations in Transit, Chapter on Ukraine. Domestic politics were the field in 
which presidential pressure was strongest, but this applied also to any international relations that might 
affect the image of the President. The opposition virtually got no media coverage of its activities. In many 
cases, the tenmiki were so detailed that journalists added nothing to the text. Interview with Ukrainian 
journalists, Kiev, 4 July 2006 (1) and (2).
381 Maryann Bird, ‘No News Is Bad News’, Time Europe, 23 December 2002.
382 Yuriy Shafarenko, ‘Ukraine: Media Circus’, Transitions Online, 29 April-5 May 2003, 
www.ciaonet.org/pbei/tol/tol_2003/apr29-may5/ apr29-may5_e.html.
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the President [Kuchma] is [...] facing unaccustomed criticism from western 
politicians who used to back him (holding their noses) as a bulwark against 
Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union. Both the State Department 
and the European Union have criticized official bungling in the 
investigation of Gongadze’s disappearance. An EU foreign-policy team [...] 
visited Kiev this week with a mixed message: criticism of Mr Kuchma and 
his friends but continued support for Ukrainian reform and integration with 
the rest of Europe.383
But the international response was in all cases ambiguous: all the major actors seemed 
uncertain over how to tread the thin line between condemning and exercising negative 
conditionality on the one hand, and trying to make some extra efforts towards engaging 
the country on the other. Even the most outspoken regional organisations seemed to be 
caught in the dilemma regarding the most appropriate action to take with regard to 
Ukraine. The Council of Europe repeatedly urged Ukrainian authorities to investigate 
the disappearance and to take all possible measures to curb violence against 
journalists.384 But beyond these messages, it did not find a common view on how to 
address the multiple issues that the Gongadze case raised. While its human rights 
monitoring committee proposed threatening the suspension of Ukraine’s membership 
(which would have constituted the CoE’s first expulsion in its 51 years’ history), its 
Secretary General and the Assembly’s President warned against the measure arguing 
that the Council could better exercise its influence by keeping Ukraine in its 
organization.385 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe offered a 
fairly muted response: at the Permanent Council the Representative on Freedom of the 
Media recommended that the Ukrainian authorities take new efforts to investigate the 
case,386 and later the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) 
Director stated that it was ‘unacceptable that after so many months we still don’t know 
anything about who was behind the murder of Mr Gongadze’.387
383 ‘Falling apart’, The Economist, 15 February 2001.
384 See Council of Europe (2001a), Resolution 1239, Freedom o f expression and the functioning o f  
parliamentary democracy in Ukraine, text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 25 January 2001, 
and Council of Europe (2001b), Resolution 1244, Honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine, 
text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 26 April.
385 See Ian Traynor, ‘Ukrainian MPs prepare to sack prime minister’, The Guardian, 24 April 2001; 
‘Ukraine: No-Confidence Vote In Government Due Today, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 April 
2001 .
386 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2001), Representative of Freedom of the Media, 
‘Statement to the Permanent Council’, 8 February.
387 See Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2001), Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights, ‘Press release’, 21 September.
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The EU followed a dual track policy based on a formal and informal diplomatic 
condemnation of the events, urging Ukrainian authorities to respect democratic and 
human rights principles, while making some steps towards reinforcing cooperation in 
general with Kiev. What the EU avoided was to threaten the possibility of using any 
negative measures, in contrast with the position of the Bush Administration, which 
raised the possibility of downgrading Ukraine’s position as an aid beneficiary, after the 
police tore down protest tents in Kiev in March 2001.388 The message was reiterated by 
the US Secretary of State Colin Powell, after a meeting with EU top officials, 
emphasizing Ukraine’s need to demonstrate that it was ‘worthy’ of the kind of 
investment that will help it achieve reforms.389 In her July visit to Kiev, US National 
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was further explicit stating that bilateral ties would 
depend on political reform, fair elections (referring to the parliamentary elections due in 
2002) and transparent investigations into the recent killings of journalists.390
EU diplomacy resorted to a number of formal and informal ways of communicating its 
disapproval over the Gongadze case and its consequences. In January 2001 the President 
of the Commission Romano Prodi spoke at length with Kuchma regarding the 
disappearance of Gongadze.391 In February the Swedish Presidency of the EU stated that 
it ‘is not convinced that this [Gongadze] case has been investigated with sufficient 
transparency and thoroughness’ and expressed concern over media freedom, where 
much of the press and television had ignored or treated superficially the Gongadze 
case.392 Solana’s spokesperson said that the EU ‘will be pressing for a transparent
388 In the words of US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher: ‘there is no change in our aid 
programme at this point. But I think the message that we delivered makes quite clear that our ability to 
help them in the future depends on their willingness to abide by the constitution, abide by their 
commitments to the rule of law’. Stephen Fidler, ‘More US aid for Ukraine depends on rule of law’, 
Financial Times, 2 March 2001.
389 Robert McMahon, ‘Ukraine: FBI To Probe Gongadze Death’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 
March 2001.
390 Tony Wesolowsky, ‘Ukraine: Rice Delivers Stern Message During Kiev Stopover’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 July 2001.
391 Mentioned by Chris Patten (2001), Speech to the European Parliament Plenary on the Vayrynen Report 
on the Common Strategy, SPECH/01/121, Strasbourg: 14 March.
392 Council of the EU (2001a),‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU about working 
conditions for media and to remind about concerns regarding the Gongadze case’, CFSP Statement, 
5922/01 (Presse 41), P. 24/01 Brussels, 5 February; Askold Krushenycky, ‘Ukraine: Anti-President 
Demonstrations Continue’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 February 2001; Charles Clover, ‘EU 
criticises Kiev on missing journalist’, Financial Times, 7 February 2001.
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investigation of the Gongadze case’ and ‘will stress the need for continued political 
[reform] and express concern over democratic principles’, especially press freedom.393
The EU Troika visited Ukraine, stressing ‘the need for continued political [reform] and 
express concern over democratic principles’, especially press freedom.394 The Swedish 
Prime Minister too visited Kiev in June; while Solana returned to Kiev in April and July 
of the same year, and raised the Gongadze question alongside political developments in 
Ukraine and the state of relations with the EU on all occasions, formally and informally, 
though his message was not always delivered in the same tone, at least according to the 
press coverage (the only written sources available regarding these visits). If in July he 
had praised the new Prime Minister’s ‘commitment to human rights’ and urged him to 
follow that line,395 in October he stated at a conference in Warsaw that ‘the course 
Ukraine is taking now is not getting closer to European institutions’.396
The member states also coordinated on the question of press freedom through CFSP by 
issuing two confidential demarches between 2000 and 2003397 and one declaration in 
2001 and three in 2004 on media freedom in the run up to the presidential elections that
<7QO
led to the Orange Revolution (discussed in the following chapter). The sacking of 
Prime Minister Yushchenko also triggered EU criticism about a possible set back in 
economic and political reform process, and the Presidency reiterated that Ukraine’s 
priority should be political and economic reform to build a ‘stable and prosperous
393 Askold Krushenycky, ‘Ukraine: Politicians Form a New Anti-Kuchma Alliance’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 February 2001.
394 Anna Lindh (2001), Statement by Anna Lindh in Kiev, Press Release, 13 February, 
eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news_reas.asp?iInformationID=11869; Askold Krushenycky, ‘Ukraine:
Politicians Form a New Anti-Kuchma Alliance’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 February 2001.
395 ‘EU: Solana Has Talks In Ukraine And Macedonia’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 19 April 2001; 
Kathleen Knox, ‘Ukraine: Kyiv Gains From Playing East Against West’, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 1 August 2001.
396 Tom Warner and Stefan Wagstyl, ‘Kuchma under more pressure to step down’, Financial Times, 21 
October 2001.
397 Council o f the EU (2001), Annual Report on Human Rights, and Council of the EU (2003), Annual 
Report on Human Rights. The reports do not indicate the exact dates of the demarches.
398 Council of the EU (2001a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union about 
working conditions for media and to remind about concerns regarding the Gongadze case’, CFSP 
Declaration No. 5922/01, Brussels, 5 February; Council of the EU (2004e), ‘Declaration by the 
Presidency on behalf o f the European Union on media freedom and democratic standards’, CFSP 
Declaration No. 7186/04, Brussels: March; Council of the EU (2004f), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on 
behalf of the European Union regarding the Gongadze case in Ukraine’, 12452/04, Brussels, 16 
September; Council of the EU (2004c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on the forthcoming elections and media freedom in Ukraine’, CFSP Declaration No. 1296/04, Brussels:
29 September.
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society based on shared values of democracy, a strong civil society and market economy 
principles. This is crucial for Ukraine, but also very important for maintaining the 
confidence of the outside world’.399
On the one hand, such criticism failed to impress the leadership in Kiev. De facto, both 
sides were refining the art of empty words. According to critics the EU’s ‘involvement 
in the matter is not expected to go beyond a lecture on the significance of free media in a 
democratic society’.400 Indeed, the EU did not threaten to resort to any negative 
measures. On his part, Kuchma ‘reiterate[d] emphatically my commitment to a free and 
open democracy in Ukraine and to protecting freedom and safety of the press, which is 
an essential element to any democracy’,401 while not substantiating such statements with 
any action.
On the other hand, Kuchma used the Gongadze issue to fuel the debate over Ukraine’s 
position vis-a-vis the EU: ‘if Europe [that is, the EU] wants to help -  and not only by 
criticism that says Ukraine does nothing -  then I propose that we discuss everything 
openly’.402 He did get some response. That same month the European Parliament called 
for Ukraine’s right to aspire to EU membership 403 As illustrated in the previous chapter, 
the Persson-Prodi letter published in the International Herald Tribune in May404 was 
followed by the invitation to participate in the European Conference, to which Ukraine 
participated as a special guest in October on the fight against terrorism.405
The institutionalised meeting that followed reflected this search for maintaining 
cooperation while urging Ukrainian authorities to do something about its deterioration
399 Council of the EU (2001c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf o f the European Union on 
developments in Ukraine, Press Statement’, 01/086, Brussels: 27 April.
400 Ahto Lobjakas, ‘Ukraine: European Union Expected to Keep Kyiv On Hold’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 February 2001.
401 Leonid Kuchma, ‘Those responsible for journalist’s death should be brought to justice’, Letters to the 
editor, Financial Times, 27 February 2001.
402 Quoted in Askold Krushenycky, ‘Ukraine: Politicians Form a New Anti-Kuchma Alliance’, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 February 2001.
403 European Parliament (2001), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy, Report on the Common Strategy of the European Union on Ukraine, Rapporteur Paavo 
Vayrynen, C5-0208/2000-2000/2116(COS)), Final A5-0083/2001, Brussels: 28 February 2001.
404 Goran Persson and Romano Prodi, ‘Ukraine’s Progress Should be Top Priority for All Europe’, 
International Herald Tribune, 23 May 2001.
405 Council o f the EU (200lh), Report to the European Council on the implementation o f the Common 
Strategy o f the European Union on Ukraine, 15195/01, Brussels: 11 December.
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of democratic practices. The Ukraine-EU Summit held in September in Yalta did see 
human rights and democracy issues in the discussion. According to an EU spokesperson,
politically for us the most important thing is that we wish to deliver across a 
strong message to the leadership of Ukraine that if they are serious about the 
country’s European choice and about putting the recent scandals behind 
them, they must demonstrate their readiness to do so.
Prodi praised progress in economic reform but said that the authorities should 
demonstrate their intention to follow democratic standards through the conduct of 
parliamentary elections the following year.406 A similar message was delivered at the 
Cooperation Council meeting in 2002.
At a more informal level, in July 2001 a Consultative Group was set up by the Heads of 
Mission of the EU national embassies in Kiev to observe the situation of press freedom, 
and to provide elements for political action, which drafted a report for the Council on 
the media, the consolidation of institutions, the independence of the judiciary and 
respect for human rights. It advocated keeping a close and constant watch on the 
situation regarding the media, especially given the forthcoming parliamentary elections 
of 2002, and called for sustained political follow-up of demarches reminding Ukrainian 
authorities of their obligations.
The report of the Consultative Group also advised EU institutions to lay emphasis, in its 
contacts with the Ukrainian authorities, on the necessary independence of the judiciary 
and on Council of Europe commitments 407 After the Gongadze episode, the Council of 
the European Union did continue to deliver messages to Ukrainian authorities, mostly 
confidentially, though they were also concerned with maintaining dialogue and 
cooperation in the implementation of the Common Strategy.408 During the year before
406 All in Askold Krushelnycky, ‘EU/Ukraine: Kuchma Confirms Desire To Integrate Into Europe’, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 September 2001.
407 Council of the EU (2001h), Report to the European Council on the implementation o f the Common 
Strategy o f the European Union on Ukraine, 15195/01, Brussels: 11 December.
408 Council of the EU (2002), EU Annual Report on Human Rights, Brussels: 21 October, which did 
highlight that freedom of expression and the independence of the media ‘were still a matter of concern’, p. 
186. In 2002 these issues were confirmed as one of the EU’s preoccupations regarding Ukraine and during 
that year the EU conducted demarches and declarations on the media situation and the harassment of 
journalists. But at the same time, the EU responded to the 2002 Parliamentary elections expressing its 
satisfaction with the conduct of the elections. EU-Ukraine Summit (2002), ‘Joint Statement’, 10607/02 
(Presse 195), Copenhagen: 4 July.
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the presidential elections, the EU initiated the creation of an ad hoc group in Kiev 
involving diplomatic staff, on the basis of a work plan on promoting diversity of 
information that was drafted by the Italian presidency for the EU-Ukraine summit of 
2003.409 The ad hoc group was expanded to include ‘like-minded countries’, and 
addressed a wide range of issues related to press freedom and the conduct of elections 
through meetings of subcommittees, on the basis of which a few demarches were 
delivered to the presidential administration.410 Some ambassadors did follow up 
informally with the Ukrainian authorities on issues relating to press freedom (the 
Canadian ambassador for instance criticised the tenmiki directly with Medvedchuk 
himself). Yet notwithstanding the ad hoc group’s recommendation to EU institutions in 
Brussels to raise the issue of the tenmiki, this was done only two years after their 
introduction in the run up to the presidential elections of 2004 411
In terms of targeting assistance to media freedom issues, the Swedish Presidency 
included support for the establishment of a free media into its Working Programme on 
the Implementation of the Common Strategy in Ukraine and organised a seminar on 
independent media in Kiev held in May.412 Amongst the areas identified for EU 
assistance were the privatization of state television, the training of journalists, and 
drafting legislation in line with Council of Europe and OSCE standards. These were 
carried out through TACIS funding of € 10 million in 2004 in preparation for the 
presidential elections (see Table 3.1, p. 85) but no specific EIDHR projects on media 
freedom were selected (Table 3.3, p. 88) 413
This dual track, supported by limited targeted initiatives of modest financial substance, 
did not alter the fundamentals of EU policy towards the country, especially in the field 
of JHA, as box 3 in the Annexes illustrates. Much in the same line, the Commission, in
409 The draft, however was criticised by observers in and outside Ukraine due to Italy’s Prime Minister’s 
media empire. Indeed, the meeting of the ad hoc group were not chaired by the Italian Embassy but by the 
Canadian Embassy, whose ambassador was particularly outspoken on pressing for the respect o f human 
rights and democracy standards. Interviews embassies of the member states, Kiev: 6 (2) and 7 July 2006, 
and David Cronin, ‘Italians face double-standards charge over media demand’, European Voice, 25 
September 2003.
410 Interviews, embassies of the member states, Kiev: 6 July (2), 6 July (3) and 7 July 2006.
411 Interviews, embassies of the member states, Kiev: 6 July (2), 6 July (3) and 7 July 2006.
412 Mentioned by Chris Patten (2001), Speech to the European Parliament Plenary on the Vayrynen Report 
on the Common Strategy, SPECH/01/121, Strasbourg: 14 March; Council o f the EU (2001h), Report to 
the European Council on the implementation of the Common Strategy o f the European Union on Ukraine, 
15195/01, Brussels: 11 December.
413 This is also due to the fact that much of EIDHR spending occurs through calls for proposals.
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the Country Strategy Paper drafted at the end of 2001, considered that the ‘continuing 
process of reform in Ukraine and major policy orientations do not call, at the present 
stage, for a fundamental review of EU strategy’.414 ‘Business as usual’ continued in the 
international financial institutions too, where the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development approved a loan to complete two nuclear reactors as a substitute for the 
closed Chernobyl plant. The International Monetary Fund approved a loan of US$ 250 
million, lifting the year-long freeze on its lending programme to Ukraine,415 gesture that 
can be understood as a sign of encouragement towards Yushchenko’s economic reforms.
4. Explaining the EU’s response
EU reactions to repeated violations of media freedom are not straightforward to 
interpret. Although there had been plenty of prior episodes indicating the democracy, 
human rights and press freedom were under danger in Ukraine throughout the 1990s, it 
was only once the Gongadze case erupted that the EU pursued action, as the box below 
indicates.
414 European Commission (200If), Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006: Ukraine, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/ukraine/csp..
415 Tom Warner, ‘IMF set to lift freeze on loans for Ukraine’, Financial Times, 19 December 2000.
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Box 5.1; Violations of press freedom in Ukraine and EU response416
Event Explanation EU Response







CFSP Statement on the media and on 
concerns over the Gongadze case
2002 Parliamentary 
elections:
Opposition parties had unfair 





Temnikis were detailed 
instructions from the 
Presidential administration to 
the media on how to report the 
news
None
March 2004: Closure of radio stations and 
harassment by tax 
administration against 
independent journalists and 
media outlets
CFSP Declaration noting EU’s ‘great 
dismay’ to events in relation to 
democratic standards in the run up to 
elections
September 2004: Unfair press coverage of the 
electoral campaign
Presidency declaration on the 
Gongadze case
CFSP declaration on the need for 
media freedom, on media coverage of 
opposition candidates, on the use of 
temniki, on the need for neutrality of 
state bodies and officials
Once press freedom came in the spotlight of international media, the EU developed a 
declaratory position through CFSP but also through diplomatic contacts with Ukraine 
(two demarches were delivered). These expressed concern about the situation and 
reiterated the need for the respect of international standards. At the same time, the EU 
did advance some initiatives designed to engage Kiev on press freedom issues. In the 
following years, press freedom did emerge on the CFSP agenda, (see box 5.2 on CFSP
416 The selection of events is based on international reporting. See Human Rights Watch, World Report, 
chapters on Ukraine in the editions between 1991 and 2007; Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 
chapters on Ukraine in the editions from 1991 to 2007; Freedom House, Nations In Transit, chapters on 
Ukraine in the editions from 1997 to 2007; Amnesty International, State of the world’s human rights, 
Sections on Ukraine in the editions between 1991 and 2007; US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, chapters on Ukraine in the 
editions between 1993 and 2007. Council of the EU (2001a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of 
the European Union about working conditions for media and to remind about concerns regarding the 
Gongadze case’, 5922/01 (Presse 41) Brussels, 5 February; Council of the EU (2004e), ‘Declaration by 
the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on media freedom and democratic standards’, CFSP 
Declaration No. 7186/04 (Presse 74), Brussels: 18 March; Council of the EU (2004f), ‘Declaration by the 
Presidency on behalf of the European Union regarding the Gongadze case in Ukraine’, 12452/04 (Presse 
267), Brussels, 16 September; Council of the EU (2004c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf o f the 
European Union on the forthcoming elections and media freedom in Ukraine’, CFSP No. 1296/04 (Presse 
272) P 110/04, Brussels: 29 September.
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actions on p. 147 of this chapter), and as elections approached in 2004 the tone of EU 
statements was of condemnation, and some aid was used to support media education 
projects. However, no negative measures were resorted to or even threatened, apart from 
vague statements questioning Ukraine’s European future that were scarcely credible 
given that the EU seemed to have closed the door to Kiev anyhow (see Chapter 4).
Contemporary observers were highly critical of the West’s response and considered it 
partly responsible for the crisis for not having paid sufficient attention to domestic 
politics and for not having attached strings to its aid.417 According to The Guardian's 
Jonathan Steele,
Western silence over this catalogue of misrule appears to be motivated by 
two things. One is the notion that Kuchma is the best hope for “market 
reform”. The other is fear that criticism will drive Ukraine back into 
Moscow’s arms. Are western governments willing to understand that a 
process of democratization provides better security than weapons sales or 
putting flags on a map to denote which countries “belong to us” and which 
are linked to “the bear”?418
In order to explain the EU’s response, it is necessary first to address the empirical 
questions regarding the foreign policy processes outlined in chapter 2 about the actors 
and factors stimulating or hampering the EU’s response. By understanding how the EU 
reacted it will be possible to address the broader question of why the EU reacted in the 
ways described.
First of all, the member states had quite diverse views of the country’s strategic 
importance. The logic of diversity dominating EU foreign policy towards Ukraine in 
general can be found with regard to the cases of violations of the freedom of expression. 
A few players, especially Sweden, acted as ‘policy entrepreneurs’, stimulating an EU 
response, though as we have seen only once the question of press freedom became 
internationally visible with the Gongadze case.
417 See, for instance, George Soros, ‘Step aside, Mr Kuchma’, Financial Times, 2 March 2001; ‘Kuchma 
in a comer’, Leader, Financial Times, 10 March 2001.
418 Jonathan Steele, ‘Kuchmagate. Ukraine’s President is accused of ordering murder and intimidation, yet 
the west is not keen to comment’, The Guardian, 27 February 2001.
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Sweden, traditionally a country promoting human rights and democracy globally, and 
indeed a country that had spent over half its bilateral assistance for Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine on these aims,419 was at the same time keen to maintain Kiev engaged with 
the EU. During its six months as holder of the EU Presidency, it managed to promote 
the dual track of diplomatic condemnation while offering some incentives to the 
Ukrainian leadership. This contributes to understanding the EU reaction to the 
Gongadze case in the first half of 2001. Support for the economic and democratic 
transition process was also the first priority of Stockholm’s work plan on the Common 
Strategy on Ukraine.420 Speaking to the European Parliament Persson highlighted how 
foreign policy, alongside enlargement and the environment, were the Presidency’s 
priorities. Regarding foreign policy, he underlined that ‘foreign policy action is 
increasingly a matter of values, democracy and human rights’. Regarding Ukraine, 
Persson claimed that it was a country with a ‘European identity, a country that must be 
given a European option’ 421
The European Parliament was also clear on its view of Ukraine:
The focus should be on internal developments in Ukraine. The case for this is 
not only a moral one: that the welfare of its people should not be subordinated 
to power ambitions or often ill perceived security interests of others. There is 
also a very strong pragmatic argument: that internal developments are the 
underlying cause of both internal and some external problems and that 
successful reforms will provide a key to fruitful and harmonious development 
both in Ukraine and in the region. It will indeed also facilitate the deepening 
of EU-Ukraine relations 422
The EP statement clearly resorted to a strategic argument to persuade the other 
institutions to support human rights and democracy in Ukraine as a means to ensure 
stability -  reflecting much EU rhetoric and declarations on the importance of these 
principles in its relations with the rest of the world. The European Parliament was
419 Kristi Raik (2006), ‘Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU’s Policy 
towards the Eastern Neighbourhood’, CEPS Working Paper No. 237, February.
420 European Council (2001a), Common Strategy o f the European Union on Ukraine. The Swedish 
Presidency Work Plan, Final Version, (no date or document number available),
http://eu2001 se/static/pdf/eng/ukraineplanorgdf.pdf.
421 Goran Persson (2001), ‘Speech by Prime Minister Goran Persson to the European Parliament’, (no 
document number available), Strasbourg: 3 July.
422 European Parliament (2001a), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy, Report on the Common Strategy of the European Union on Ukraine, Rapporteur Paavo 
Vayrynen, C5-0208/2000-2000/2116(COS)), Final A5-0083/2001, Brussels: 28 February 2001.
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considered important in raising the attention in the EU and in contributing to triggering a 
response from the other institutions.423
Sweden, but also Britain, the other Scandinavian countries and Ireland were not keen to 
see Ukraine’s deterioration of its human rights standards as an indication that it was to 
be thrown into Moscow’s embrace.424By 2002-2003 Britain was increasingly concerned 
about Ukrainian internal developments and it 2003 the unit dealing with Ukraine at the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office was moved from the East European to the European 
department, signalling that Kiev was no longer viewed in terms of relations with 
Russia.425
Yet the other member states were far more cautious, illustrating the ‘logic of diversity’ 
governing EU relations with Ukraine. As we have seen in chapter 4, France, Germany 
and Italy, highly dependent on Russian gas and whose relationships with Moscow were 
seen as national priorities, were the countries least inclined towards interfering in what 
was still seen as Russia’s zone of interest, and the Gongadze case erupted just as Putin 
was reinforcing its policy of exerting pressure on its previous empire. Personal relations 
with Putin also counted for some national leaders in the EU.426 Alongside these general 
positions regarding maintaining friendly relations with Russia, other issues would get in 
the way of the EU’s agenda towards Ukraine. Spain, for instance, lobbied against a 
diversion of attention towards the Mediterranean.427 Not far in the background was a 
widespread reluctance to offer any prospect of membership to Kiev, especially after 
Turkey was recognised as a candidate for accession in 1999 and the Balkan states had 
been offered a similar option in 2000.
Throughout the period, the Commission privileged a line of greater policy continuity 
advocating the appropriateness of the existing framework. In the EU institutions,
423 Interviews, Delegation of the Commission, Kiev: 4 July 2006 (1); embassy of one EU member state, 
Kiev: 6 July 2006 (3).
424 Interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (4); Ukrainian Representation to the EU, 
Brussels: 25 April 2006.
425 Interview, embassy of one EU member state, Kiev: 6 July 2006 (1).
426 French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi were all mentioned as leaders willing to follow Putin’s suit in Ukraine. Interviews at the 
Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April; at embassies of the EU member states, Kiev: 5 and 6 July 2006 (2).
427 This was confirmed in interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1) and at embassies of 
EU member states, Kiev: 5 July, 6 July (1), 6 July (2) and 7 July 2006.
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notwithstanding the constraint posed by relations with Russia, there were tactical 
reasons for choosing a soft line on Ukraine’s human rights violations. Officials at the 
Council of the EU and at the Commission428 pointed out that the EU’s experience in 
Belarus did not bode well for its policy on Ukraine. The EU had suspended the entry 
into force of the PC A negotiated with Minsk in 1997 on human rights grounds and had 
since frozen relations with the country. Yet this ‘principled’ position had not bom any 
fruits: Lukashenka strengthened his relationship with Moscow and the country became 
increasingly impermeable to any Western external influence whatsoever. If Belarus was 
strategically inconsequential enough to EU interests to warrant such isolation, Ukraine’s 
importance was evident in European capitals, even if secondary to Russia’s.
In addition, on the Ukrainian dossier the Commission’s role was secondary, if not 
subservient, to the member states, in particular to the three largest member states: 
Britain, France and Germany, which were themselves divided on their views of Ukraine 
and Russia429 Throughout the period treated in this thesis, the Commission did not 
propose any specific measures or actions towards tackling the freedom of expression in 
Ukraine, reflecting a reluctance to engage more strongly in Ukraine because of the 
general indecision over the country’s prospects.430
At the same time, with the approaching of enlargement to Central Europe, Ukraine’s 
importance to the EU as a whole (and not as ancillary to Russia) had grown. The need to 
ensure Kiev’s cooperation on a number of key dossiers, especially in the field of Justice 
and Home Affairs, was illustrated in the previous chapter (see box 3 on PCA priorities 
in the Annexes, p. 261). This was virtually the only sector in which EU-Ukraine 
relations continued to progress and where the EFP system seemed to function 
efficiently. On the whole, the perceived need to maintain cooperation with Kiev on 
certain security-related issues prevailed over resorting to punitive measures. Conversely, 
the role of Kuchma as the ‘best hope for market reform’ was less strong as a motivation. 
The ousting of Yushchenko in April 2001 was received as a blow in European
428 Interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (4), and European Commission, Brussels: 24 
April 2006 (1); embassies of EU member states, Kiev: 5 and 6 July 2006 (2).
Especially, interview, official of the Commission, Rome, 30 May 2006, but also interview, Ukrainian 
Representation to the EU, Brussels: 25 April 2006; interview, European Commission, Brussels, 25 April 
2006.
430 Interview, Delegation of the European Commission, Kiev: 4 July 2006 (1).
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capitals,431 and its ensuing condemnation could certainly be interpreted as an 
instrumental appeal to human rights and democracy principles while the major concern 
was ‘market reform’, as suggested by Steele.
But more than market reform, the EU and its member states were at that time concerned 
with the lack of an appealing alternative to Kuchma. As pointed out by many officials, 
in 2001 Kuchma was still seen as the least worse option available in Ukraine. Up until 
the parliamentary elections of 2002, when the opposition coalesced with Yushchenko 
gained good results, even the most vocal EU member states viewed Kuchma as a ‘victim 
of the situation’ who should not be demonised, making EU reactions ‘balanced and 
measured’.432
In short, EU policy aimed at maintaining the status quo of Ukraine’s ‘multi-vector’ 
foreign policy -  not out in the cold of Russia’s sphere of influence - and was held back 
by the divergences among the member states on relations with Russia and the 
unwillingness to offer a prospect of integration into the EU, while fostering cooperation 
on security-related dossiers. These realist and intergovernmental challenges competed 
with a development of a stronger normative position on human rights and democracy, 
which was, by and large, limited to declaratory positions and statements when 
stimulated by specific ‘entrepreneurs’, such as a few member states and the European 
Parliament.
5. Conclusions
Chapter 2 identified a set of hypotheses regarding why the EU would or would not 
include human rights and democracy in its foreign policy: the first claims that the EU 
does not genuinely address them if not as a mask for the pursuit of other interests; 
alternatively they can converge with such interests; they can serve purposes of internal 
cohesion, they can be the result of policy entrepreneurship at the level of policy-making 
groups within the institutions; or finally, they are an expression of the EU’s constitutive 
features.
431 ‘Ukraine’s reformer goes’, The Economist, 26 April 2001.
432 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (3).
144
In terms of processes, intergovemmentalism was the dominant decision-making 
mechanism. The role of the member states has been considered the key trigger 
determining the EU response, with some Northern EU member states acting as policy 
entrepreneurs, blocked by others which prioritised key national interests. The 
divergences of the views on and importance of Ukraine (also vis-a-vis relations with 
Russia) as well as on the importance attached to human rights and democracy were the 
main reasons for which the consensus-building exercise led to a response that was by 
and large limited to declaratory positions. Instead, policy entrepreneurship at the level of 
the Commission was not observable; rather, the Commission in particular was deeply 
influenced by the differences between the member states and did not promote stronger 
EU normative positions.
Patterns indicating a ‘logic of appropriateness’ or a ‘taken-for-grantedness’ too were not 
apparent, and even ‘common European interests’ did not emerge towards Ukraine, 
except for the shared reluctance to offer a prospect of EU membership to the country.
The timing of responses should not be underestimated. The total absence of a response 
(and even of aid targeting issues relating to the freedom of expression) throughout the 
1990s reflects the general absence of a shared view and of a committed policy towards 
Ukraine as a whole, as chapter 4 had shown. Thereafter, the ‘brakes’ to the development 
of a stronger response were ‘pulled’ by the perceived need not to step on Moscow’s toes 
(also a key gas exporter via Ukrainian pipelines), by the need to cooperate with Kiev on 
emerging security-related issues in the context of advancing enlargement towards 
Central Europe, and by the reluctance to offer a prospect of membership to Ukraine. In 
fact, the lack of progress on Ukraine’s domestic human rights and democracy front was 
repeatedly mentioned to justify the EU’s non-commitment towards offering the country 
some prospect of accession, however distant. Conversely, motivations tied to promoting 
economic interests or to foster economic interdependence, highlighted by some liberal 
and institutionalist theories, were not apparent.
But these do not explain why the EU did develop a declaratory position and why it used 
CFSP to convey its condemnation of Ukraine’s shortcoming. The triggers for an EU 
response, found in the policy entrepreneurship of some member states, were 
compounded by he fact that the Gongadze case received much attention in the European
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Parliament and in the European press, which strongly criticised the EU response. This 
contributed to raising the costs of not responding, following rhetorical action patterns. 
Conversely, ideational institutionalism, whereby changes within the EU institutional 
structures led by networks of policy makers promoting a set of ideas, did not constitute a 
feature in the case of Ukraine and freedom of the press. The use of CFSP tools also 
suggests a ‘habit of cooperation’ between the member states on these issues. In 
particular, for the policy entrepreneurs, the logic of the politics of scale can explain the 
preference for collective rather than national responses, while for the member states 
most reluctant to criticise developments in Ukraine, a rationale of maintaining cohesion 
while bargaining for a ‘soft’ condemnation was at work. Indeed, the divergences 
between the member states and the primacy of realist considerations ensured that the EU 
normative stance did not go beyond declaratory positions, unevenly maintained over 
time.
146
Box 5.2: EU Use of CFSP towards Ukraine433
Date Tool
November 1994 Common Position
December 1994 Statement on Ukraine’s accession to NPT
May 1996 Declaration on Ukraine on relations with the EU and NPT accession
June 1996 Declaration on nuclear warheads’ removal from Ukraine
December 1999 Common Strategy
June 2000-June 
2001*
1 Demarche Press freedom
February 2001 Statement on the media and on concerns over the Gongadze case




CFSP Declaration: notes progress towards international election 





1 statement at UN General Assembly
December 2003 Council decision on participation in EU PM in Bosnia-Herzegovina
July 2002-June 2003* 1 demarche
1 demarche on freedom of expression
July 2003-June 2004* 1 demarche
January 2004 CFSP Declaration on constitutional amendments to allow President to 
run for a third time
March 2004 CFSP Declaration noting the EU’s ‘great dismay’ to event in relation to 
democratic standards in the run up to elections
September 2004 Presidency declaration on the Gongadze case
433 Council of the EU, EU Annual Reports on Human Rights, editions between 1998 and 2007; Council of 
the EU (1994), ‘Common Position on the objectives and priorities of the European Union towards 
Ukraine’, (94/779/CFSP), Brussels: 28 November; Council o f the EU (1996a), ‘Declaration by the 
Presidency of the EU on behalf of the European Union on Ukraine’, 7319/96 (Presse 140), Brussels: 21 
May; Council of the EU (1996b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the EU on behalf o f the European 
Union on the removal of nuclear warheads from Ukrainian territory’, 8076/96, Brussels: 12 June; Council 
of the EU (2001a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU about working conditions for 
media and to remind about concerns regarding the Gongadze case’, CFSP Statement, 5922/01 (Presse 41), 
P. 24/01 Brussels, 5 February; Council of the EU (2002a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the 
European Union on parliamentary elections in Ukraine on 31 March 2002’, CFSP Declaration No. 
7815/02 (Presse 93), Brussels: 10 April; Council of the EU (2002d), ‘Council Decision concerning the 
Agreements between the European Union and Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey and 
Ukraine on the participation of these states to the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, 2003/663/CFSP, Brussels: 10 December; Council of the EU (2004d), ‘Declaration by the 
Presidency on behalf of the European Union on proposals for constitutional change in Ukraine’, CFSP 
Declaration, 5614/1/04 (Presse 32), Brussels: 29 January; Council o f the EU (2004e), ‘Declaration by the 
Presidency on behalf of the European Union on media freedom and democratic standards’, CFSP 
Declaration No. 7186/04 (Presse 74), Brussels: 18 March; Council o f the EU (2004f), ‘Declaration by the 
Presidency on behalf of the European Union regarding the Gongadze case in Ukraine’, 12452/04 (Presse 
267), Brussels, 16 September; Council of the EU (2004c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the 
European Union on the forthcoming elections and media freedom in Ukraine’, CFSP No. 1296/04 (Presse 
272) P 110/04, Brussels: 29 September; Council of the EU (2004b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the 
European Union on the presidential elections of 31 October 2004 in Ukraine’, Brussels: 1 November; 
European Council (2004b), Council Conclusions, 14292/04, Brussels: 5 November; Council of the EU 
(2004a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on Ukraine’, 22 November (document 
number not available),
www.eu2004.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=B2C459EC419347E59AA019D53CAE787EXlX60623X25.
The time period reflects that covered by the Council of the EU, EU Annual Reports on human rights.
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CFSP Declaration on the need for media freedom, on media coverage 
of opposition candidates, on the use of temniki, on the need for 
neutrality of state bodies and officials
November 2004 Repeated declarations on the two electoral rounds
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C h a p t e r  6
Im p l e m e n t in g  H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  D e m o c r a c y : U k r a in ia n  E l e c t io n s  a n d  t h e  
O r a n g e  R e v o l u t io n
1. Introduction
The presidential elections of 2004 were widely seen as a ‘make or break’ test for 
Ukraine’s international alignment between Russia and the West, rekindling Cold War- 
type interpretations of a struggle for mastery over Ukraine. As The Economist put it, 
among the many consensual commentators, ‘Ukraine’s [vote] will help map out not only 
the future shape of Europe but also the relations between the West and another, colder 
East: Russia, and its former dominions’.434 For Russia, the fate of Ukraine was 
considered crucial in the context of its policy of consolidating its influence in the ‘near 
abroad’, and the electoral test exemplified Moscow’s fears of a ‘democratic wave’ in the 
former Soviet empire, following Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ of end 2003,435 to the 
extent that the Orange Revolution has been defined as ‘Russia’s 9/11’.436
The literature that has since been published has used the Orange Revolution as a case 
study for theories of transition,437 and as an example of democratisation due mostly to 
internal factors, where civil society played an important role.438 Few have undertaken an 
examination of the role of external actors and of the EU in particular.439 And fewer still
434 ‘Watch Ukraine’, The Economist, 30 October 2004, p. 11. In fact, some commentators have suggested 
interpretations that follow the Cold War logic of playing geopolitical games to establish areas of 
influence. Nina Khrushcheva, Nikita Khrushcev’s granddaughter, wrote that Putin was attempting to 
revive the Russian empire (in Roman Kupchinsky, ‘Why Putin voted for Yanukovych’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol. 6 No. 41, 10 November 2004), while the British 
journalist Jonathan Steele ran a series of articles on The Guardian on the US role in supporting 
Yushchenko via American NGOs. For a critique, see Katinka Barysh and Charles Grant, ‘Russia should 
not be part of a “great game’” , OpenDemocracy, 7 December 2004.
435 According to Russian MP Mikhail Zadornov, ‘if the rules of the game are followed in Ukraine, that is a 
strong example that it is possible in the post-Soviet space’, quoted in Chrystia Freeland, ‘Ukraine’s lively 
election contest is a rebuke to autocracy’, Financial Times, 20-21 November 2004. For an analysis of 
Russian policy towards Ukraine, see also Steven lee Myers, ‘Putin re-extends Russian influence’, 
International Herald Tribune, 13 November 2004.
436 Ivan Krastev, ‘Russia’s post-orange empire’, OpenDemocracy, 19 October 2005.
437 McFaul (2007).
438 McFaul (2007); Nemyria (2005); Andrew Wilson (2005) Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, New Haven, 
Conn., and London: Yale University Press; Karatnychky (2005).
439 The exceptions are McFaul (2007) whose systematic research, however, is based largely on US and 
Ukrainian sources; Sushko and Prystayko (2006); Piccone and Youngs (2006).
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have examined previous electoral competitions,440 let alone with a focus on the EU’s 
role. The following chapter will thus focus on the problems inherent to election 
campaigns in Ukraine, devoting much attention to the 2004 presidential elections that 
triggered the Orange Revolution, using an empirical approach based on original research 
and extensive interviewing, and making reference to the few existing interpretations 
where necessary.
2. Elections in Ukraine, 1998-2004
Alongside media freedom, the conduct of elections in Ukraine, especially from 1998-99 
onwards, provided the EU with plenty of opportunities to make its voice heard over 
human rights and democratic standards (see box 6.1, p. 156). The 1998 parliamentary 
elections were considered by OSCE standards free, despite some episodes of violence, 
but not fair. To the West, Kuchma’s authoritarian tendencies became clearer mainly in 
the 1999 presidential elections, which ‘brought Ukraine closer to the Russian version of 
democracy’.441 The campaign witnessed, perhaps to a greater degree than in the 1998 
parliamentary elections, episodes of violence against campaigners and candidates, a 
biased media, and the direct involvement of state officials in the campaign,442 a 
worrying pattern that was repeated in the 2000 referendum increasing the powers of the 
Presidency and in the 2002 parliamentary elections. The 2002 elections saw for the first 
time the consolidation of a strong opposition to the Kuchma regime, with the creation of 
two allied groups, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and Timoshenko’s Fatherland which 
both gained more votes through the proportional system, though an insufficient number 
of seats to form a majority. In the bitterly fought presidential elections of October- 
December 2004, electoral fraud reached such unacceptable levels that it constituted the 
final trigger for the outbreak of the Orange Revolution.
These elections were widely read through the lens of a confrontation between the East 
and the West. In 2004 the candidates were pitted as reflecting a simplistic division
440 With the exception of Kubicek (2001), who argued that the 1994 elections were the only free ones 
(rather than free and fair).
441 Berychowska, Grajewski, Gromakzki (2002).
442 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2000), Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights, ‘Ukraine Presidential Elections, 31 and 14 November 1999, Final Report’, Warsaw: 7 
March. The head of the election observation mission admitted that there were ‘some retrograde steps 
during the presidential election’, in Breffni O’Rourke, ‘1999 in Review: Free and Fair Elections: Under 
Threat in Region?’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 December 1999.
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between East and West: Viktor Yanukovich, designated by the outgoing President and 
supported by Putin, put closer relations with Russia at the top of its agenda, while Viktor 
Yushchenko valued greater ties with the West, though he had pledged to withdraw 
Ukraine’s troops from Iraq. But according to the opposition, the battle was also between 
corruption and democracy:
Cold War-style confrontation presents Ukrainians with a desperate dilemma.
They cannot afford to choose between east and west, and yet they are being 
forced to do so, against their better inclinations. For most Ukrainians, these 
elections were not about being pro- or anti-Russian. The elections were 
primarily about ousting a corrupt clique from power in Kiev. It just 
happened that the clique came from the Russian-speaking east of the
4 4 3country.
The election campaign for the first round of elections, held on 31 October, was far from 
free and fair and witnessed, rather, the abuse of all possible means at hand in a pseudo­
democracy. Of the 23 candidates, the 75% of the electorate that went to vote (a very 
high turnout for the country) expressed 39.9% of its preference towards Yushchenko 
and 39.3% for Yanukovich, making the second round necessary. But the international 
600-member election observation mission stated that the elections failed to meet a 
considerable number of European standards: the media coverage of the campaign was 
almost exclusively of the candidate chosen by outgoing President Kuchma, 
harrassement and beatings of opposition candidates and supporters were widespread up 
to the poisoning of Yushcenko, allegedly during a meal with the deputy head of the 
Secret Services.444 Russian President Vladimir Putin, who had offered Kuchma his 
support since the latter was in the murky waters of the Gongadze case, joined the 
campaign also by appearing on television praising the economic reforms carried out by 
Yanukovich just a few days before the vote.
443 Quentin Peel, ‘A faultline between Russia and the west’, Financial Times, 25 November 2004. 
According to Yushchenko’s ally Yulia Tymoshenko, the ‘battle is between a criminal group and those 
who want to put the country on the track of normality’, quoted in Fabrizio Dragosei, ‘Kiev, ultimo atto 
della sfida tra i due Viktor’, Corriere della Sera, 21 November 2004. See also Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘Ukraine 
at the brink of a break-up?’, The Guardian Unlimited, www.guardian.co.uk, 30 November 2004.
444 International Election Observation Mission (2004a), ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings and 
Conclusions, Presidential Election, Ukraine -  31 October 2004’, Kiev: 1 November. The mission was a 
joint initiative of OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
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The second round of elections replicated a similar disrespect of democratic standards. 
On 24 November the Central electoral committee decreed Yanukovich the winner of the 
second round (held on 21 November), in contrast with the evaluation of the OSCE 
electoral observation mission.445 Yushchenko announced a general strike and the 
opposition took to the streets, blocking access to government buildings. Yushchenko’s 
supporters invaded the streets of Kiev wearing orange scarves and banners, staging a 
permanent mass mobilisation protest that deserved the name of ‘Orange Revolution’. 
Yanukovich threatened that the Eastern regions would demand autonomy if ‘the state 
coup continues and the illegitimate President comes to power’,446 triggering the fear of a 
split along the East and West regional divisions, magnified by rumours of troop 
movement in the country and by Kuchma raising the spectre of ‘civil war’.447
At this point, a profound crisis in Ukraine appeared likely. But on 25 November the 
Supreme Court, to which both candidates had appealed by filing complaints on electoral 
frauds, suspended the decision over the winner. This prepared the ground for 
negotiations between sides, mediated by international representatives. The negotiation 
table included Javier Solana, Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski, Lithuanian 
President Valdas Adamkus, Kuchma, the two contenders, the President of the Russian 
Duma Boris Gryzlov, and the OSCE Secretary General Jan Kubis, with the association 
of the President of the Ukrainian Parliament, Volodimir Litvin.448
The EU plan was based on negotiating with all the parties involved rather than 
supporting the opposition, also to ensure that Russia as well as Ukrainian institutions 
were part of the negotiations, and to persuade the parties, individually and collectively, 
on a package of legislative reforms that would allow another electoral round. Three 
round tables were necessary to reach the agreement that was eventually found on 8 
December.
445 International Election Observation Mission (2004b), ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings and 
Conclusions, Presidential Election (Second Round), Ukraine -  21 November 2004’, Kiev: 22 November.
446 ‘Pro-Russia Ukriane Regions Threaten Back’, Deutsche Welle, 28 November 2005, www.dw-world.de.
447 Nick Paton Walsh, ‘US rejects Ukraine poll as protestors dig in’, The Guardian, 25 November 2004. In 
fact, though troops were mobilised to attack the demonstrators, the military and security services began to 
fragment as the protests gained strength and the authorities dared not intervene. See Kartnycky (2005).
448 Stefan Wagstyl and Tom Warner and Arkady Ostrovsky, ‘Ukraine’s election rivals sit down with 
mediators’, Financial Times, 26-27 November 2004.
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The key to unlocking the crisis came from Ukrainian institutions: on 27 November the 
Rada approved a no-confidence vote in the Central Electoral Committee and condemned 
the second round of elections. On 3 December the Ukrainian Supreme Court annulled 
the elections and fixed another date to hold the second round on 26 December,449 and on 
7 December Parliament approved a package of political reforms that strengthened the 
safeguards against electoral fraud, replaced the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), 
increased the powers of the Prime Minister and Parliament at the expense of the 
President -  to come into force after the parliamentary elections of March 2006 -450 and 
gave new powers to the regions in an attempt to sedate the secessionist temptations that 
had arisen at the height of the crisis 451 In the final round, which saw an electoral process 
that was ‘substantially’ closer to OSCE and Council of Europe standards,452 Viktor 
Yushchenko obtained nearly 52% of the vote.
3. The response of the EU
The box below illustrates that prior to the 2004 presidential elections, the unfair 
campaigns that characterised most previous elections went barely noticed in the EU. The 
1998 and 1999 elections warranted no response whatsoever. According to officials 
interviewed, this was also due to the fact that Kuchma’s rival, the leader of the 
Communist party Simonenko, was not seen as a satisfying alternative to the governing
449 According to Gwendolyn Sasse, this decision ‘marked the most important moment for Ukraine’s 
judiciary since 1991. That the judges successfully navigated their way through uncharted legal territory 
under immense pressure from both sides of the political divide, and under an international spotlight, is an 
immense achievement and bodes well for the future’, in ‘So near yet so far...’, The Guardian, 6 
December 2004.
450 It is worth pointing out that this package had been criticised by the international community the 
previous January. See Council of the EU (2004d), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the 
European Union on proposals for constitutional change in Ukraine’, CFSP Declaration No. 04/015, 
5614/1/04 (Presse 32), Brussels: 29 January.
451 See Stefan Wagstyl and Tom Warner, ‘Ukraine’s top politicians poised to reach pre-poll deal on 
reforms’, Financial Times, 7 December 2004; ‘Compromise in Kiev, confrontation abroad’, The 
Economist Global Agenda, 8 December 2004, www.economist.com. Judy Dempsey argued that the reason 
behind the deal lies in the change of position of powerful oligarchic groups coming to terms with the 
likelihood of Yushchenko winning the elections. This would also be the reason for which the reform 
package included extending the powers of Parliament where the oligarchs are represented. See Judy 
Dempsey, ‘Powerful economic clan are the king-makers in Ukraine’s political drama, International 
Herald Tribune, 9 December 2004.
452 International Election Observation Mission (2004c), ‘Presidential Election (Repeat Second Round), 
Ukraine, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 26 December 2004’, Kiev: 27 December. 
This mission more than doubled the number of observers compared to the previous round: from 600 to 
1370. Altogether, there were 300.000 Ukrainian observers and 12.000 foreign ones. Askold 
Krushelnycky, ‘Ukraine: New Vote Reflects Transformed Political Landscape’, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 27 December 2004.
153
elite.453 The campaign and conduct of the referendum held in 2000 with the aim of 
increasing the powers of the President at the expense of the Parliament too did not 
provoke a response from the EU, despite reported and widespread malpractices (whereas 
the EU encouraged the government to respect the Constitution in implementing the 
reforms approved through the referendum).454
It was only with the 2002 elections and the emergence of the leadership of Yushchenko, 
that the West began to envisage potential change in Ukraine. Aided by Kuchma’s 
involvement in the Kolchuga sale to Iraq and the appointment of shady Medvechuk at 
the Presidency, EU member states unofficially and informally started to limit contacts 
with the Presidency455 with the exception of Berlusconi 456 and Schroder who met with 
him in 2002 and 2003 respectively.
In terms of the use of aid for supporting the establishment of democratic electoral 
standards, empowering civil society to monitor elections, or raising awareness through 
media training, the EU developed programmes late. According to one official, until 
2003 there was no strategy related to elections whatsoever.457 Only for 2004-2006 was € 
10 million allocated for ‘civil society, media and democracy’ (including objectives 
relating to supporting democratic electoral standards) and in 2004 a €1 million electoral 
project was developed, half of which was directed at training officials of the Central 
Electoral Commission, and the other half at voter education at the level of civil society 
(see table 3.3 on p. 88).458
Informal diplomacy was used, mostly on the instigation of the Ukrainian opposition to 
Kuchma’s Presidency than of the EU. In the run up to the 2004 elections Yushchenko
453 Interview, European Commission official, Rome: 30 May 2006; embassies of EU member states, Kiev: 
6 July (2) and 7 July.
454 The kind of changes that Kuchma was trying to pass through the referendum had been criticised by the 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly on the grounds that they would change the balance of power 
unconstitutionally. Askold Krushelnycky, ‘Ukraine: Ignoring European Criticism, President Perseveres 
With Referendum’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 April 2000.
455 Interviews, embassies of the EU member states, Kiev: 6 July 2006 (2); Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 
April 2006 (3), Piccone and Youngs (2006), chapter 4.
45 Though it appears that the Italian President of the Republic condemned the deterioration of human 
rights and democracy standards. Interview, embassy of EU member state, Kiev: 6 July 2006 (2).
457 Interview, Delegation of the Commission, Kiev: 4 July 2006 (2).
458 Interview, Delegation of the Commission, Kiev: 4 July 2006 (2). The 6 TACIS Projects were launched 
on voter education, voter mobilisation and media monitoring for a total of € 472,000. Delegation of the 
European Commission to Ukraine (2004), ‘Press Release’, Kyiv 19 March.
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and his allies established regular contacts with the Western embassies in Kiev -  contacts 
which were maintained throughout the Orange Revolution.459 Nonetheless, this 
development did not correspond to an official policy. According to officials at the EU 
embassies in Ukraine, it corresponded to a growing discomfort with the Kuchma 
entourage,460 but some member states (including Germany, Italy and France) were 
nonetheless prepared to work with the government and its Prime Minister and 
designated presidential heir Yanukovich.461
459 The US and Canadian embassies were, unofficially, quite openly supportive of the opposition (the 
Canadian ambassador was know for wearing an Orange scarf during the revolution). The EU embassies
refrained from ‘taking sides’ in the run up to the elections.
460 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (3), and embassy of EU member state, Kiev: 6 
July 2006 (2).
461 Interveiws, embassies of EU member states, Kiev: 5 July, 6 July (1) and (2), 7, July 2006, and
Delegation of the European Commission, Kiev: 4 July 2006 (1).
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Box 6.1: Elections in Ukraine and EU response462










OSCE considered them free but 





On constitutional changes to 
increase powers of the President 
to dissolve parliament, reduce the 
number of deputies, introduce a 
second chamber, and restrict 
parliamentary immunity
EU-Ukraine Summit Joint Statement: ‘We 
expressed the importance we attach to democratic 
character of political reform in Ukraine and the 
implementation in accordance with the constitution 
of the results o f the referendum held on 16 April 
2000’.
President of the European Commission speech in 
Kiev: ‘it is essential that the results of the 
referendum be implemented fully in accordance 
with the constitution. Political reform must 
continue to be conducted in a democratic and 
legally consistent manner. It is also essential that 




Considered free but not fair by 
international observers: 
involvement of public officials in 
the campaign and unfair media 
coverage
EU: CFSP Declaration: notes progress towards 





CFSP Declaration appeals to ensure free and fair 
elections
GAERC Conclusions: deepening of EU-Ukraine 
relations will depend on democratic transformation 
of Ukraine. Democratic standards and media 
freedom in elections will be an important 
consideration.
462 The selection of events is based on international reporting. See Human Rights Watch, World Report, 
chapters on Ukraine in the editions between 1991 and 2007; Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 
chapters on Ukraine in the editions from 1991 to 2007; Freedom House, Nations In Transit, chapters on 
Ukraine in the editions from 1997 to 2007; Amnesty International, State o f the world’s human rights, 
editions from 1991 to 2007; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, chapters on Ukraine in the editions between 1993 and 2007; 
EU-Ukraine Summit (2000), ‘Joint Statement by the President of the European Council Jacques Chirac 
assisted by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU Javier Solana, the 
President of the Commission Romano Prodi, and the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma’, Paris: 15 
September; Council o f the EU (2002a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on parliamentary elections in Ukraine on 31 March 2002’, CFSP Declaration, 7815/02 (Presse 93), 
Brussels: 10 April 2002; Council of the EU (2004c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the 
European Union on forthcoming elections and media freedom in Ukraine’, CFSP Declaration No. 
12696/04 (Presse 272), Brussels: 29 September 2004; Council of the European Union, General Affairs 
and External Relations Council, Conclusions, Luxemburg: 11 October 2004; ‘Declaration by the Heads of 
Mission of the European Union on the presidential election process in Ukraine’, Kiev: 27 October 2004, 
www.eu2004.nl/default.asp7CMS TCP=tcpPrint EU2004&CMS 1TEM=AEA; Council of the EU 
(2004b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on the presidential elections of 31 October 
2004 in Ukraine’, 1 November; European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 14292/04, Brussels: 5 
November 2004; Council of the EU (2004a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on 
Ukraine’, 22 November (document number not available),
www.eu2004.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=B2C459EC419347E59AA019D53CAE787EXlX60623X25.
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Repeats call for end to violations of democratic
norms, but continued support of Ukraine’s
progress towards integration with the EU whoever 
wins the elections.
_________________________________________________ Repeated declarations on the two electoral rounds
Against this background, the West placed great importance in these elections, seen as a 
test of Ukraine’s democratic credentials. According to Gunter Verheugen, then the
Enlargement Commissioner, ‘the year 2004 will see important events [...]. The way
Ukraine will conduct the coming elections this year will be a kind of benchmark, and we 
will watch it very closely’ 463 In the run up to the first round on 31 October 2004, there 
were repeated calls for free and fair elections, underlining that these would ensure the 
deepening of ‘Ukraine’s relationship with Europe and its institutions. A bad election, on 
the other hand, will force us to re-examine our relationship’.464 The EU too emphasised 
the importance of the elections for Ukraine’s future, the fact that ‘an independent 
Ukraine which respects human rights and the rule of law [...] is in the interest of the 
EU’, but, in contrast with the US, that it was ‘prepared to work closely with any 
candidate who wins in a free and fair contest’.465
The response of international actors to the first round of elections was immediate. The 
US offered harshest criticism, warning the country its ties with it would be put into 
question should the next round of elections not be free and fair. This message was 
delivered to Ukraine but also to Russia, considered as pulling the threads of Ukraine’s 
fate.466 The EU issued two declarations urging the Ukrainian authorities to ensure a 
more democratic second round and reiterating the importance of the elections in
463 Quoted in Ahto Lobjakas, ‘Ukraine: “Pragmatic” EU Dodges Request For Membership Prospects’, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 February 2004.
464 Richard Armitage (Deputy US Secretary of State), ‘Ukraine can ill afford an unfair election’, Financial 
Times, 29 October 2004.
465 ‘Declaration by the Heads of Mission of the European Union in Kyiv on the presidential election 
process in Ukraine’, Kiev: 27 October 2004.
66 Bush, according to the US radio station Radio Svoboda, transmitting in Russia, warned Putin against 
supporting Yanukovich, and warned Ukraine of the implications of following Moscow’s lead by 
clarifying that participation in the Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan would 
jeopardize its efforts of integration in the WTO and EU. In ‘Vladimir Poutine en Ukraine a la veille du 
second tour de la presidentielle’, Le Monde, 12 November 2004. On the eve of the second round of 
elections, Kuchma received a visit from Richard Lugar, head of the US Senate’s foreign relations 
committee, who delivered a personal message from the President stressing the importance of fair 
elections. Bush gave a final warning in a letter to Kuchma that stated that ‘a tarnished election [...] will 
lead us to review our relations with Ukraine’. See Peter Finn, ‘Partial Vote Results Show a Tight Race In 
Ukraine Runoff, The Washington Post, 22 November 2004. This policy line of threatening sanctioning 
measures was confirmed in McFaul (2007).
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relations with the EU.467 But at this stage EU representatives avoided direct involvement 
in the matter. The Commission clarified that it would not send officials to Kiev on the
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grounds that ‘we do not believe in interfering with the democratic process’. The High 
Representative for CFSP Javier Solana limited his message to a telephone conversation 
with Kuchma.469
International condemnation of the second round of elections was widespread. On 22 
November the Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot, holder of the Presidency, 
announced that the EU did not accept the results and that all the member states would 
call their Ukrainian ambassadors to deliver formal protests.470 The EU line was to avoid 
at all costs any violence against protestors and to take no step to validate the election. In 
addition, it was suggested that there was talk of ‘many [EU] countries putting Ukraine at 
a certain distance if this turns out to be the results of the election’,471 while the US, via 
Richard Lugar, sent to Kiev to monitor the elections, raised the possibility of using 
sanctions should an enquiry into the fraudulent elections not take place.472
The Polish Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, making use of his position as 
(rotating) Chair of the Council of Europe, visited the country to encourage free and fair 
elections between the first and second rounds,473 a move that the EU had avoided 
fearing accusations of interference. Prior to his arrival in Kiev together with Solana, 
Aleksander Kwasniewski had sent his foreign affairs adviser Stanislaw Ciosek, to Kiev 
with a three-point plan that was later to become the basis for negotiations. The Polish
467 Council o f the EU (2004b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on the presidential 
elections of 31 October 2004 in Ukraine’, 1 November; European Council (2004a), ‘Declaration on 
Ukraine’, in Annex I, Presidency Conclusions, 14292/04, Brussels: 5 November.
468 Andrew Beatty, ‘Putin’s Ukraine visit raises eyebrows’, EUobserver, 12 November 2004.
469 Tom Warner, ‘Old geopolitical rivalry casts shadows over Ukraine election battle’, Financial Times, 
20-21 November 2004.
470 Council o f the EU (2004a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on Ukraine’, 22 
November 2004 (document number not available),
www.eu2004.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=B2C459EC419347E59AA019D53CAE787EX1X60623X25. 
The General Affairs and External Relations meeting held on the same day decided to toughen sanctions 
against Belarusan dictator Lukashenko after he won a referendum in October 2004 allowing him to stand 
for a third term as President. General Affairs and External Relations, ‘Press Release’, 14724/04 (Presse 
325), Brussels, 22-23 November 2004.
471 According to one senior diplomat, quoted anonymously in C.J. Chivers, ‘Protests over election 
growing in Ukraine’, International Herald Tribune, 24 November 2004.
472 Stefan Wagstyl and Tom Warner, ‘Ukrainian election dispute set to spread’, Financial Times, 23 
November 2004; ‘Europe et Etats-Unis denoncent les fraudes’ and ‘Washington “gravement preoccupe’”, 
both in Le Monde, 24 and 25 November 2004
473 Andrew Beatty, ‘Putin’s Ukraine visit raises eyebrows’, EUobserver, 15 November 2004.
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President himself had been contacted by Solana as well as Kuchma to take part in the 
negotiation table, thanks to his previous experience as a mediator in clashes between the 
government and opposition in Ukraine in 2002.474 Solana’s engagement was justified in 
the EU to avoid the matter becoming a matter for Polish involvement. Eventually, 
Solana arrived in Kiev 26 November, backed by a decision of 24 November of the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) to give him ample space in conducting 
negotiations in Kiev 475 and with the US’s acceptance to let EU negotiators take the 
lead476
4. Explaining the EU response
A closer look at events shows that EU engagement in the Orange Revolution was due to 
a number of external and internal factors. Firstly, all officials interviewed agreed that the 
EU intervened because it perceived a security problem in its immediate 
neighbourhood.477 The unexpected mass mobilisation raised fears that the opposition 
might try to take power through non-democratic and violent means, and rumours of 
troop movement and police mobilisation suggested that the authorities might suppress 
the protest through violence. According to one Council official, there had been much 
discussion in the PSC and Council about whether to intervene prior to the second round: 
it was ‘the streets’ that changed the EU position.478
EU action was thus dictated by developments in Ukraine. The realist reading that sees 
security as the key motivation driving foreign policy is useful in explaining EU 
involvement in the Orange Revolution negotiations -  a case in which security concerns 
could be merged with more normative human rights and democracy elements (for 
instance with regard to the solutions identified for the settlement of the crisis), though 
not as far to justify a ‘security community’, given the EU’s continued reluctance to 
make a choice over Ukraine’s accession prospects.
474 Thomas Ferenczi, ‘La mediation de l ’Union europeenne a favorise une solution pacifique’, Le Monde, 
26 December 2004; Christophe Chatelot, ‘La Pologne reve de voir Kiev rejoindre a son tour 1’ Union 
europeenne’, Le Monde, 26 December 2004.
475 Thomas Ferenczi, ‘La mediation de l ’Union europeenne a favorise une solution pacifique’, Le Monde, 
26 December 2004.
476 Daniel Dombey, ‘Powell points up differences with Russia’, Financial Times, 9 December 2004; 
McFaul (2007).
477 This can also be found in Sushko and Prystayko (2006), and in Piccone and Youngs (2006).
478 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (4).
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The backing of the US, which became deeply involved in Ukraine despite its need to 
ensure Russia’s cooperation on a number of issues considered vital in Washington, such 
as the fight against terrorism and dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme, provided an 
important external facilitator for the EU, letting it take the lead in negotiations.479 Thus, 
the Political and Security Committee nominated Solana as the EU representative to deal 
with the crisis, flanked by the Polish and Lithuanian Presidents.
This unity, essential to ensuring EU credibility in Ukraine and Russia, was considered 
an essential ingredient of the successful involvement of external actors in the 
management of the crisis 480 Yet it masked internal differences over how to handle the 
Ukrainian crisis. It has been argued that the EU put aside its traditional ‘Russia first’ 
policy thanks to the new member states, and that Solana followed the lead of the Polish 
President481 Alternative explanations see a consensus within the EU over keeping 
Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of interests, even if until the Orange Revolution its 
involvement in the country had been piecemeal and did not reveal a strategy of
4 8 2democratisation.
The 2004 enlargement of the EU no doubt constituted one single important change that 
determined the EU’s response 483 The lines of division were between the new and old 
member states. But some of the old ones too, such as Sweden and Britain which, 
alongside the US, preferred a strong position against Russia, while France, Germany and 
Italy were more inclined towards accommodating Moscow 484 Some member states 
(Sweden, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia) feared that EU unity over the Ukrainian crisis 
would not go beyond calling for a review of the ballot, because of the interests of 
France, Germany and Italy in preserving relations with Russia, which explained why the
4RSEU did not criticise Moscow for its interference in the electoral campaign in Ukraine.
479 At this stage, the US preferred to stay behind the scenes. See McFaul (2007).
480 Sushko and Prystayko (2006), and in Piccone and Youngs (2006), McFaul (2007).
481 Sushko and Prystayko (2006).
482 Piccone and Youngs (2006).
483 This was confirmed in interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (3) and (4), and 
European Commission, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1) and (2).
484 ‘Ukraine: la Russie defend son pre carre face a l’Europe’, Le Monde, 7 December 2004. On the role of 
the new member states, see also ‘Pologne, Hongrie et Estonie se rangent aux cotes de l ’opposition’, Le 
Monde, 25 November 2005.
485 Judy Dempsey, ‘EU needs to act, some say’, International Herald Tribune, 23 November 2004. Even 
if the EU did not officially criticise Russia’s role in Ukraine, it was raised at the EU-Russia summit of 25
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Indeed, Germany’s position was ambivalent during the crisis. Members of Parliament 
critical of the Chancellor accused him of disregarding Russian human rights abuses and 
of supporting Yanukovich because of Germany’s extensive vested interests in the
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Russian gas market. Although Fischer criticised the ballot, and Schroder spoke to 
Putin twice over the phone during the Ukrainian crisis, agreeing on 30 November on the 
need to hold new elections, the German Chancellor responded to domestic parliamentary 
pressure by clarifying that the Ukrainian crisis would not distract him from his main aim 
of establishing a ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia.488
The Commission too was internally divided due to different inputs from the member 
states 489 On 9 December it unveiled the first Action Plans agreed within the framework 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the one on Ukraine that Kuchma had 
criticised at the previous EU-Ukraine Summit. The Action Plan was published despite 
the fact that Kiev had not signed it and despite the disapproval of the Commissioner 
responsible for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. The pressure came from the 
UK through its Commissioner Peter Mandelson and the Commission President himself, 
Jose Manuel Barroso, who saw the move as ‘positive signal’ towards the country, 
though there was an agreement not to take further steps until free elections were held.490
The external security risk alone, did not modify significantly the substance of the 
positions of the those member states most inclined towards friendly relations with 
Moscow. The internal factor that enabled the EU to take on its leadership role in the 
negotiations was due to policy entrepreneurship of some member states. Polish activism, 
backed by many of the new member states,491 the Netherlands (holder of the rotating EU 
Presidency), Sweden and Britain forced the issue up the agenda, and called for
November, which ended in failure, in which Putin accused the West of encouraging ‘mayhem’ on the 
streets in Kiev. See Nick Paton Walsh and Ewen MacAskill, ‘EU anger at Putin’s role in election’ and 
‘Ukraine vote on hold after court ruling’, both in The Guardian, 25 and 26 November 2004.
486 Bertrand Benoit, ‘Schroder and Putin’s “cosy” relationship under scrutiny’, Financial Times, 2 
December 2004.
487 APCom, ‘Ucraina/Germania, Fischer: Preoccupati per accuse di brogli’, 22 November 2004.
488 Bertrand Benoit, ‘Schroder and Putin’s cosy “relationship under scrutiny’, Financial Times, 2 
December 2004.
489 Interviews, European Commission, 25 April 2006, and with official of the European Commission, 
Rome: 30 May 2006.
490 Daniel Dombey, ‘Brussels endorses Ukraine thaw plan’, Financial Times, 4-5 December 2004.
491 ‘Statement of the Visegrad Group Meeting of Foreign Affairs on the situation in Ukraine’, Cracow: 7 
December 2004.
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conceited EU involvement. The European Parliament, also thanks to the activity of the 
nine Polish MEPs (out of 75) in the Foreign Affairs Committee, contributed to raising 
the stakes over the affair also by attracting the attention of the media, by wearing orange 
scarves and ties during sessions.
The activism of these actors, which contributed to raising expectations in the EU and in 
Ukraine, led Solana to be concerned with ensuring a united EU response, rather than a 
plethora of representatives (for instance the envoy of the Dutch Presidency and of 
Poland) -  to ‘avoid having too many cooks stirring the same soup’.492 With the backing 
of the US, and after consultations with Kwasniewski, Solana secured a mandate to travel 
to Kiev and facilitate negotiations between the parties. According to one official, Solana 
managed to obtain the PSC mandate before the ambassadors had the time to consult with 
their respective capitals.493
The other priorities were not altogether abandoned. Although the ground for Javier 
Solana’s involvement in mediation had been prepared between 22 and 24 November, he 
flew to Kiev only after the EU-Russia summit of 25 November,494 therefore only after 
having consulted directly with Putin. The format of negotiations, with the inclusion of 
the Russian representative, also illustrated the priority of trying to maintain cooperation 
with Moscow. Nonetheless, given the great importance that Putin attached to the 
elections and given the extent to which he was personally involved in the campaign and 
ostensibly supported Yanukovich, the outcome of the crisis was a severe blow to his 
credibility and to his near abroad policy.
In the case of the Orange Revolution, the EU and US (presumably unexpectedly to 
Putin495) ran the risk of jeopardising their relations with Moscow. This risk ran against 
key interests of some EU member states such as energy supplies. However, it is worth 
noting that while countries such as Germany, Italy and France, those most inclined to 
maintain good relations with Moscow, import around 25% of their energy supplies from 
Russia, the new member states are almost entirely dependent on Russian gas and oil and
492 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels, 24: April 2006 (3).
493 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (4).
494 Prior to that time he considered EU involvement ‘premature’. See Thomas Ferenczi, ‘La mediation de 
l ’Union europeenne a favorise une solution pacifique’, Le Monde, 26 December 2004
495 Nemyria (2005).
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this did not prevent them from taking the strongest position against Russia in the 2004 
elections, though it can be argued that the EU provided a shield to such clear-cut 
positions. But other interests in were also important, such as cooperation with Russia in 
regional security and in the UN Security Council over key international relations 
matters, such as Iran, Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and negotiations on the status 
of Kosovo. In this matter, EU action was more cautious than that of the US, refusing to 
take sides in the dispute (although the Parliament did manifest its support of the 
opposition), getting involved only when the crisis reached its peak, and by conducting 
negotiations with all the parties.
Poland, Lithuania and the EP, with the backing of other new member states, Sweden, the 
UK, and the Netherlands were successful in ensuring EU participation in the 
negotiations in Kiev. From the point of view of Warsaw, Solana would provide 
legitimacy to Western involvement.496 However, the new member states were less 
successful in persuading the other member states to offer a renewed prospect to 
Ukraine’s relations with the EU. The Commission rejected the Parliament’s idea of 
keeping the doors open to Ukraine’s ‘European aspirations’, with the argument that the 
EU had ‘done what could be done’.497 The other member states rejected a Polish 
proposal, backed by Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, of 
going beyond the Action Plan to develop a ‘strategic partnership’ with Ukraine (a 
proposal that carefully avoided offering an accession prospect not to antagonise the 
other member states).498 The General Affairs and External Relations Council of 13 
December and the following European Council of 16-17 December agreed instead to 
modest aid increases and support for a quick recognition of market status and for 
integration into the WTO. Ukraine was treated in the context of the discussion on the 
ENP, the ‘Declaration on Ukraine’ annexed clarified that ‘the EU aims at an enhanced 
and distinctive relationship by making full use of the new opportunities offered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy’ 499
496 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (4).
497 David Cronin, ‘Fresh Ukraine election moving ever closer’, European Voice, 2 December 2004.
498 Jacek Pawlicki and Robert Soltyk, Tim e to offer more to Ukraine during “birth of a new European 
nation”’, European Voice, 16 December 2004.
499 European Council (2004a), ‘Declaration on Ukraine’, in Annex I, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels:
17 December.
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The fact that security concerns and the presence of the new member states were the two 
external and internal factors that led to the EU involvement in the resolution of the 
Orange Revolution -  a reading that lends itself to interpreting the case as a form of 
conflict resolution in favour of the restoration of democratic standards -  is confirmed if 
one looks backwards to previous EU responses to the conduct of elections and to the 
period running up to the 2004 elections. Officials have pointed out that it was the extent 
of fraud that triggered the EU response and gave it legitimacy. Yet the first round of 
elections, after which the EU’s response was pretty modest, was evidently fraudulent 
too. This was justified claiming that the EU wanted to differentiate itself from the US 
‘regime change’ rhetoric,500 but also by the expectation that the next round, following 
widespread international condemnation of the first, would be freer.501
Prior to the second round of elections, EU involvement was modest. Whereas the US 
sent many high level visitors to Kiev during 2004, for example non governmental 
personalities such as George Bush senior, Henry Kissinger, John MacCain, Richard 
Holbrook, Madeleine Albright,502 and launched a substantial aid programme to support 
election efforts, as well as non-governmental organisations, little aid was made available 
to back EU words. Washington spent $ 18 million in the two years running up to the 
elections. Political foundations also funded many of the NGOs later leading the Orange 
Revolution, including political ones such as Pora.503
In contrast with the US, the EU as a whole was reluctant to fund any kind of initiative 
that might be interpreted as training or funding partisan politics. Whereas US party 
foundations, but also some foundations of member states financed with government 
aid,504 carried out projects aiming at the training of young party officials, EC assistance 
was limited to raising voter awareness and training of election observation professionals. 
Between 2003 and 2004 the US spent $64 million on funding local Ukrainian groups
500 This was spontaneously expressed by all the interviewees.
501 Interviews, Council of the EU and European Commission, Brussels: 24 April (4) and 25 April 2006.
502 See Nick Paton Walsh, ‘Challenger for Ukraine presidency cries foul over mystery illness’, The 
Guardian, 22 October 2004; and Jonathan Steele, ‘Where the cold war never died’, The Guardian, 28 
October 2004.
503 McFaul (2007).
504 The UK, France and Germany financed some initiatives directed at supporting political parties through 
foundations and party foundations: the Westminster, Robert Schuman, and Konrad Adenauer 
Foundations. Interviews, embassies of the member states, and Delegation of the European Commission, 
Kiev: 4 July (2), 5 July, 7 July 2006.
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involved in education, legal reform and election monitoring,505 which puts the EC’s €10 
million democracy assistance under a significantly different light.
Critics from within the EU institutions pointed to a number of reasons for this: the lack 
of a policy behind aid, the need for financial transparency and budgetary control, the 
lengthy processes between the conception and realisation of aid priorities making 
assistance tools inflexible and not adaptable to changing environmental needs, and the 
need to ensure political neutrality in funding democracy promotion.506 Yet the EC’s 
claim to avoid ‘taking sides’ was not matched by diplomacy: officials have pointed out 
that the turning point in EU relations with Kuchma occurred only once Yushchenko 
emerged in 2002 as an appealing competitor for the presidency.
The diversity of views within the EU over relations with Russia and over the 
geographical scope of the EU’s enlargement process was a crucial ‘brake’ to the 
development of a stronger position on the conduct of elections, to the extent that, in 
contrast with press freedom, the EU did not develop a declaratory position on this issue 
prior to the 2004 crisis. Even in the policies and aid programmes developed largely 
through the Commission, the conduct of elections and other related issues did not 
feature prominently. Essentially, EU policy towards Ukraine had never been a policy 
aiming at democratic change.
505 Jeremy Bransten, ‘’’Orange Revolution”: part homegrown uprising, part imported production?’, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol. 6, No. 47, 23 December 2004.
506 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1) and (2), and embassies of the EU 
member states, Kiev: 5, 6 July 2006 (3). Referring to the EP and some member states, one of these 




The case study on electoral processes in Ukraine reveals similar patterns to the press 
freedom case study up until the 2004 Orange Revolution. During the 1990s the EU was 
poorly engaged with Ukraine and human rights and democracy issues failed to reach its 
radar screens, despite the fact that it was the decade of rhetorical commitment to those 
principles. Box 5.2 on the use of CFSP (p. 147) and 6.1 (p. 156) summarising EU 
responses clearly indicate the absence of any position on human rights and democracy in 
this period beyond including them in the policy documents and agreements with 
Ukraine.
It was only after 2002 that the EU started to develop some declaratory positions and 
express a degree of concern at domestic developments in Kiev that can be explained in 
the same terms as the response that the Gongadze case received. In other words, until 
the end of November 2004, the primacy of intergovemmentalism in EU relations with 
Ukraine is confirmed even when human rights and democracy principles are at issue. 
The underlying diversity of views within the EU also explains the reasons behind the 
cautious response at the first round of elections, justified with the notion that the EU 
should not interfere in domestic processes. It was only once the crisis became perceived 
as threatening to Ukraine’s stability that the EU became effectively engaged, human 
rights and democracy became merged in the conflict resolution package to which the EU 
contributed.
This also suggests that the institutionalisation of human rights and democracy beyond 
including respect for these principles in all the documents and policy statements 
regarding external relations does not necessarily lead to their implementation or to 
ideational changes within policy communities or institutions. This claim is backed by 
the Commission’s low profile in promoting these principles. There was no evidence to 
suggest that the policy communities developed within the EU institutions dealing with 
Ukraine contributed significantly to defining EU policy, let alone to promoting human 
rights and democracy. The Commission did not fully exploit its powers in proposing to 
use to negative tools, as foreseen by art. 2 of the PCA in neither of the two cases 
examined in this thesis; it did not resort to its competences in managing assistance to 
pursue clearer democracy promotion strategies, including EIDHR funds; and it did not
166
influence the policy process in such a way as to contribute to stronger normative 
positions in the EU. In fact, in the case of Ukraine it revealed quite a subservient role 
compared to the large member states.
The European Parliament has played a role not so much in influencing the type of 
policies to pursue but in taking advantage of events to raise the stakes of the EU in terms 
of its credibility triggering ‘shaming’ processes. The case studies reviewed here confirm 
its role as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ (which resorts to ‘rhetorical action’ as well as strategic 
arguments to persuade the member states and other institutions of its arguments, as it 
tried to do, for instance, in 2001 (over the question of offering some prospect of 
membership to Ukraine) and in 2004 with its support of the Orange Revolution.
However, the intergovernmental framework complicates the explanation of the role of 
human rights and democracy in EU foreign policy, as there were diverse dynamics 
motivating the positions of the member states. This also makes the human rights and 
democracy dimension of EU foreign policy a sphere for negotiation and compromise, 
with competition between different perceptions on the importance of the principles, 
different geopolitical visions of Ukraine, as well as different views on approaches (for 
instance between conditionality and engagement). These differences can interpreted as 
divergent cognitive views on Ukraine and on the role of human rights and democracy.
By and large, the dialectic between human rights and democracy principles on the one 
hand, and security and geopolitical concerns on the other have been the playing field 
upon which the main decisions were made, mostly but not exclusively at the expense of 
the former. The ways in which the EU does promote human rights and democracy 
abroad depends largely on the relationship between these and other concerns. In the case 
of Ukraine, human rights and democracy remained subservient and, in the words of one 
official, ‘obscured by relations with Russia’507 rather than entirely neglected -  
essentially a declaratory policy where the principles were ‘trumped’ by other interests, 
except when they became intertwined with security concerns. The role that Russia 
played in influencing the member states was also more complex than has been assumed. 
Rather than an uncertain EU policy backed by an understanding that Ukraine should not
507 Interview, embassy of EU member state, Kiev: 6 July 2006 (2).
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be subjected to Russia’s sphere of influence,508 empirical evidence has shown that the 
member states were quite uncertain and divided on Ukraine’s position on the map of 
Europe, and that some would have been quite comfortable with Ukraine staying in 
Russia’s orbit.
This lends itself to an interpretation based on an instrumental use of human rights and 
democracy principles, for instance to keep Ukraine at arm’s length from the possibility 
of one day joining the EU, rather than to ideational or constructivist interpretations of a 
policy shift within the EU institutions. The importance of human rights and democracy 
was also determined by the ways in which they related mainly to other interests, 
especially in relations with Russia. Secondly, if perhaps paradoxically, the fact that such 
a neglected area of foreign policy remained firmly anchored to the domain of the 
member states (indeed, in the Ukrainian case the presence of human rights and 
democracy in EU policies emerges mostly at the level of CFSP), suggests that they are 
perceived as an important tool that merits limited institutionalisation. This is confirmed 
by the lack of transparency and openness with which the EU conducts its diplomatic 
dialogue on these issues. As the European Parliament highlighted,
the conclusions on the assessment of human rights dialogues or press 
statements published on EU Summits with third countries or 
Association/Cooperation Council meetings have not proven to be an adequate 
source of information. [...] In its oral statement on the outcome of the 6th 
Meeting of the Cooperation Council between the EU and Ukraine in March 
2003, the Presidency announced that the issue of media freedom had been 
discussed, but the official conclusions of the meeting do not refer to that 
discussion. This gap has to be filled, while taking into consideration the 
sensitivity of the issue and the necessary diplomacy and discretion in talks.509
By maintaining an informal channel, the EU gives itself some space for manoeuvre 
behind the scenes at its discretion and on the basis of the positions of the member states.
Nonetheless, some questions remain. If human rights and democracy were merely 
instrumental, why did the EU pursue a declaratory policy, especially on press freedom? 
On the other hand, if security and geopolitical concerns were paramount, why did the
508 Piccone and Youngs (2006).
509 European Parliament (2003), Annual Report on human rights in the world in 2002 and European 
Union’s human rights policy, A5-0274/2003 final, 16 July 2003, p. 41.
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conflict resolution package of end 2004 include the restoration of democratic principles 
as one of its conditions?
Within the negotiating space of intergovemmentalism, there was space for policy 
entrpreneurs which could push the attention on human rights and democracy. The 
European Parliament and some active member states, especially the new member states, 
but also those most concerned with human rights issues such as Sweden, did raise the 
stakes and the rhetoric, backed by commitments made, on paper, in CFSP and in the 
PCA. The European Neighbourhood Policy, with its stronger focus on supporting 
democratisation processes, further raised the level of commitment expected of the EU. 
In other words, processes of persuasion on the appropriateness of pursuing a declaratory 
policy, and the possibility of ‘shaming’ should the EU not coalesce on condemning the 
breach of principles upon which all had converged in the treaties, can be evident 
especially when the events are being closely followed by the European press (as in both 
the Gongadze case and the Orange Revolution).
A final aspect that needs to be taken into account is the fact that, despite the logic of 
diversity, especially as far a Russia was concerned, EU member states did manifest a 
preference for coordination on human rights and democracy issues, or a ‘habit of 
cooperation’. In fact, the fear that Poland and Lithuania would pursue unilateral policies 
in the Orange Revolution was one of the reasons behind the backing of Solana’s 
involvement. CFSP has been used as the main vehicle of the EU’s human rights and 
democracy positions, and in the 2000s it has been used mostly for these purposes. In 
Ukraine, CFSP appears to have been used to help produce a degree of unity at EU level. 
In other words, CFSP can be a tool to manage ‘inter-relational’ objectives and to pursue 
consensus-building.
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C h a p t e r  7
EU F o r e ig n  P o l ic y  t o w a r d s  E g y p t
1. Introduction
EU foreign policy towards Egypt is framed by the regional policies that have been 
developed towards the entire Mediterranean basin. Thus, in order to understand the role 
human rights and democracy play in EU policy towards Egypt, it is necessary to take 
some steps back and ask a number of broader questions. First of all, the relative global 
and regional importance of Egypt needs to be addressed: in what environment did the 
EU shape its policy towards Egypt? What other actors were important? This is necessary 
to take into account the external constraints on and opportunities enabling the EU 
foreign policy system (section 2). Secondly, the drive towards developing a collective 
policy towards the region too needs to be explored, as it was within this framework that 
EU policy towards Egypt was defined (section 3). The following section 4 will focus 
more closely on EU relations with Egypt within the necessary framework of policies 
towards the Mediterranean: the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) in the 1990s (section 4.1), foreign and security policy (section 4.2), and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the 2000s (section 4.3).
The aim is to ascertain Egypt’s importance from the point of view of European interests 
and motivations (security, economic and ideational) and to identify the role that EU 
institutions and member states have played in developing EU policies towards the 
Mediterranean and Egypt in particular. Section 5 will tie the empirical results of this 
overview to more theoretically driven questions about the main drivers, actors, 
processes, and limits in shaping EU policy towards Egypt, while the final section will 
offer the main conclusions and explanations.
2. Egypt’s regional and global role
Egypt’s historic strategic importance can be grasped in a few words. For millennia it has 
been a crossroads between Europe, Asia and Africa linking the Mediterranean to the 
Indian Ocean, and a target of external powers since the days of the Roman Empire. The 
politics of its geographical position have played a greater role in shaping Egypt’s
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importance in the world than its relative economic importance -  and its foreign policy 
has been regarded, in the words of a senior western diplomat in the Middle East, as ‘the 
country’s biggest export earner’.510 ‘Whether we like it or not we are always at the 
centre of things,’ according to its longstanding president Hosni Mubarak.511 
Economically, the country constitutes the largest Arab market, with an educated elite 
and large labour force, enjoys modest oil reserves and ample gas reserves, and is at the 
centre of strategic communications networks between Europe and the Gulf.512 But its 
economic importance has been thwarted by underdevelopment, due to a rapidly growing 
population (on average by about 2% a year), concentrated into the 5% of its territory that 
does not belong to the desert, uneven economic growth, often badly hit by the 
consequences of terrorist activities on the important tourism industry.
Since decolonisation, Egyptian presidents, have thus capitalised on the country’s 
geographical position to guarantee much needed foreign economic and military aid.513 
External constraints and opportunities have been the most important determinants of 
Egyptian regional and international policies, together with the personalisation of foreign 
policy thanks to the President’s ample powers.514 With the exception of a period under 
Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970), who sought Soviet support, the country has been a 
close partner of the United States.
After two wars (1967 and 1973), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) was the first president of an 
Arab state to agree a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, at the cost of Egypt’s leadership 
role in the Arab League. Thanks to its pivotal role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Egypt became a cornerstone of the policies of the Western states in the Middle East, 
able to entertain a dialogue with Israel, and enjoying fairly extensive contacts with the
510 Quoted in David Gardner, ‘Egypt: Regional influence on the way back’, Financial Times, 20 May 
1996.
511 James Whittington, ‘Mubarak returns to Arab centre stage’, Financial Times, 12 June 1996.
512 Ibrahim A. Karawan (2002), ‘Identity and Foreign Policy. The Case of Egypt’, in Shibley Telhami and 
Michael Barnett (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press: pp. 155-168; Rosemary Hollis (1999), ‘Capitalising on Diplomacy’ in Marr (ed), pp. 
129-152.
513 After depending on Soviet funds in the second half o f the 1960s, on Arab sources in the 1970s, since 
1978 Egypt has depended on US aid, and is the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel. Ali E. Hillal 
Dessouki (1991), ‘The Primacy of Economics: the Foreign Policy of Egypt’, in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and 
Bahgat Korany (eds.), The Foreign Policies o f Arab States, Boulder, Oxford, San Francisco: Westview 
Press, pp. 156-185.
514 Raymond Hinnebusch (2002), ‘The Foreign Policy of Egypt’, in Raymond Hinnebusch and 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policy o f Middle East States, Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner, pp. 91-114; Dessouki (1991).
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Palestinian leadership. With the biggest regular army in the Middle East, as a privileged 
interlocutor of the United States, and through its role in the Middle East negotiations, its 
importance within the Arab world remained as a counterbalance to Iran after its 1979 
Revolution and as an ally of the Gulf states especially after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. 
Indeed, Egypt recovered its leadership of the Arab League once it took the lead in 
mediating between Arab states, for instance between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990 and 
participating in the war against Iraq in 1990-1991,515 for which the country had a large 
proportion of its foreign debt nearly written off.516 For all these reasons, the US 
remained a fundamental actor in the region and without doubt the most important 
external policy shaper, at the expense of the European states.
3. Relations with Europe
Prior to the 1990s, Egypt’s pro-Westem foreign policy orientation inaugurated by Sadat 
never became a pro-European foreign policy because of the dominance of the 
relationship with the US and the EC’s inability to offer any alternative options to US 
hegemony.517 The end of the Cold War stimulated major shifts in Egypt’s regional and 
geostrategic position, not least because of the greater regional fluidity that superpower 
competition had frozen.518 Since taking over after Sadat’s assassination in 1981, 
Mubarak sought to ‘reinvent’ Egypt’s role by diversifying its regional and international 
policies, with the aim of re-establishing its central role.519 Participation in the Gulf War 
brought Egypt back into the fold of the Arab world, and many Arab states followed 
Cairo’s example in normalising relations with Israel. With regard to the peace process, 
even if Egypt is technically not involved in negotiations, it acted as a facilitator, 
established a direct relationship with Yasser Arafat, and promoted talks on regional 
issues, such as refugees, security and economics. The final pillar of Mubarak’s
515 On the Gulf, the Middle East and relations with the US see also Abdel Moneim Said Aly and Robert H. 
Pelletreau (2001), ‘U.S.-Egyptian Relations’, Middle East Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 2, June, pp. 45-58.
516 Of its foreign debt that totalled $50 billion, $15 billion were cancelled and $10 billion were 
rescheduled on easy terms. See The Sphinx knows how’, The Economist, 18 January 1992. The reduction 
of foreign debt provided an opportunity for the Egyptian government to start introducing macro-economic 
reforms, though not as bold as promised to the donor community. See Brad Glasser (2001), ‘Foreign Aid 
and Reform: The Diverging Paths of Egypt and Jordan in the 1990s’, EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 
2001/20.
517 Selim (1997).




foreign policy strategy was to establish closer relations with European states, also to 
counterbalance its dependence on US aid.
The long history of economic and human interdependence between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean has not been translated into a strong role of the EU in the region,
C'} I
especially if compared to the US. Because of the legacy of colonial ties and specific 
national interest of some member states in certain countries in the Mediterranean, 
collective EC/EU policy was slow to develop. Former imperial powers cultivated 
bilateral relations with their ex colonies, despite the difficult heritage of liberation wars 
and decolonisation processes. The key interests in Egypt of countries like the UK and 
France were - and remained - political dialogue on regional security issues, trade, access 
to energy, and security, especially with regard to Arab-Israeli relations.522 But rather 
than develop a collective policy towards individual countries, Community initiatives 
were directed to the entire basin. Their development requires some analysis, because 
some of the key features are relevant towards explaining the nature of EU policy 
towards Egypt.
At the Community level even economic relations have been piecemeal, ‘random, 
unsystematic and on a case-by-case basis’.523 A ‘Global Mediterranean Policy’ was 
developed only in the 1970s, motivated by trade interests, access to oil, an attempt to 
counterbalance the increasing Soviet penetration in the region, and a desire to make the 
weight of the European Economic Community (EEC) felt internationally, especially in 
view of increasing divergence with the US over the Middle East.524 But it was 
effectively a commercial policy to govern bilateral relations between the EEC and 
individual Mediterranean states even if it was occasionally used politically, for example 
by excluding Libya after 1986.525 The 1973 oil crisis and the OPEC embargo against 
some EEC member states constituted the trigger towards developing more concerted
521 Rosemary Hollis (1997), ‘Europe and the Middle East: power by stealth?’, International Affairs, Vol. 
73, No. l,p p . 15-29.
522 S0ren Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjaer (2002), The European Union and the Middle East, London, 
New York: Sheffield Academic Press, chapter 4.
523 A. Haiifaa Jawad (1992), Euro-Arab Relations: A Study in Collective Diplomacy, Reading: Ithaca 
Press, quote on p. 7; Ricardo Gomez (1998), ‘The EU’s Mediterranean policy. Common foreign policy by 
the back door?’, in Helen Sjursen and John Peterson (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy fo r Europe? 
Competing Visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge), pp. 133-51.
524 Jawad (1992), pp. 27-30; Gomez (1998); Bicchi (2007), chapter 3.
525 Dosenrode and Stubkjaer (2002), chapter 4.
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collective action, articulated around two fields: Euro-Arab dialogue and involvement in 
the peace process.526 The first initiative ended when Egypt was expelled from the Arab 
League in 1979; the second eventually led to the 1980 Venice Declaration on the Israel- 
Palestine conflict, a lasting common EPC position on the subject, even if during the 
1980s the member states, France and the UK in particular, returned to bilateral policies. 
Throughout this period, however, the many declarations adopted by the member states, 
mostly related to the conflict in the Middle East, did not amount to more than 
declaratory positions.527
The EEC’s enlargements of the 1980s entailed negative economic repercussions on the 
Southern Mediterranean. By the time Spain and Portugal acceded to the EEC in 1986, 
the restriction of trade preferences (especially on agricultural goods) and the reduction 
of aid led Egypt and the Southern partners to demand a more comprehensive and 
generous policy.528 The Gulf War, and the way in which it highlighted the limits of EPC, 
also constituted another stimulus towards a stronger Mediterranean Policy,529 
inaugurated in December 1990. This too, however, was limited to governing economic 
and trade relations between the two shores.530 Increasing engagement was thus driven by 
extemalisation processes and the ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap.
On the EU side, during the first years of the 1990s a growing convergence in 
perceptions regarding concerns over migration and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism
C O  1
started to become visible between the member states as well as in the institutions. In 
contrast with France’s policy entrepreneurship of the 1970s,532 in the 1990s, Spain and 
Italy (both exposed by geographical proximity to the risks emanating from the Southern 
Mediterranean shore, but alone too weak to pursue bilateral foreign policies) and the 
Commission were the actors that most pushed for the development of a collective 
Mediterranean policy. 533 The context of enlargement towards the East also played a
526 Jawad (1992); Bicchi (2007), chapter 3.
527 Gomez (1998).
528 Dosenrode and Stubkjaer (2002), chapter 4. See also Gomez on the impact of the accession of Spain.
529 Dosenrode and Stubkjaer (2002), chapter 5.
530 Hollis (1997).
531 Gomez (1998); Bicchi (2007), chapter 4.
532 Bicchi (2007), chapter 3.
533 Richard Gillespie (1997a), ‘Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med Partnership Initiative’, in 
Gillespie (ed.), pp. 33-48; Alison Pargeter, (2001) ‘Italy and the Western Mediterranean’, ESRC 'One 
Europe or Several?' Programme Working Paper 26/01; Monar (1998).
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role. Rome had been arguing for rebalancing the distribution of resources between 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean and that the two regions should 
receive 25% each of the external relations budget.534 France too, hitherto keen to 
preserve its standing in North Africa and autonomy of action over its politique arabe, 
shifted towards a politique mediterranee through multilateralism after its involvement in 
the 1991 Gulf War had stained its reputation in the Arab countries, and because of its 
inability to prevent civil war in Algeria.536 Paris’s commitment to counterbalance 
Germany’s role in championing eastwards expansion ensured that the Mediterranean 
project gained political weight. The Commission also took advantage of the French and 
Spanish consecutive presidencies of the EU to contribute to shaping the emerging policy 
towards the Mediterranean.537 According to its Spanish Commissioner Manuel Marin, 
‘just as the future of the Baltic states cannot be a matter of interest only to Danes, 
Germans and British, so the fate of Algeria and Egypt cannot be of interest only to 
France, Spain and Italy’.538
The pro-Mediterranean constituency, mostly thanks to the ‘policy entrepreneurship’ of 
Spain, backed by Italy, France and the Commission,539 had to negotiate with the 
Northern member states, especially Germany and the UK, most interested in EU 
enlargement towards the East.540 In essence, the development of an EU position on the 
Southern Mediterranean was a result of a compromise between Eastern and Southern 
priorities, rather than a common view towards the region.541 The balance between these
534 Gomez (1998).
535 Pia Christina Wood (2002), ‘French Foreign Policy and Tunisia: Do Human Rights Matter?’, in Middle 
East Policy, Vol. IX, No. 2, June, pp. 92-110.
536 David Gardner, ‘EU turns strategic eyes to south’, Financial Times, 17 May 1995.
537 Monar, Jorg (1998), ‘Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Mediterranean Policy’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 1998, pp. 39-60. Paris and Madrid had reached 
an agreement to coordinate the development of EU Mediterranean policies, See Reuter, ‘Franco-Spanish 
summit opens’, published in Financial Times 21 October 1994.
538 Quoted in Lionel Barber and Francis Ghiles, ‘Maghreb nations test EU’s united front: No common 
mechanism for handling powder-keg to the south’, Financial Times, 6 April 1994. Marin was 
Commissioner for development and cooperation, but was also responsible for economic external relations 
with southern Mediterranean countries, Latin America, Asia, African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, 
and humanitarian aid. See also David Gardner, ‘Brussels urges wider trade zone’, Financial Times, 20 
October 1994, with the Commission insisting on the need to ‘rebalance’ the EU’s relationships with its 
neighbours.
539 Bicchi (2007), chapter 5.
540 Gillespie (1997a).
541 Esther Barbe (1998), ‘Balancing Europe’s Eastern and Southern Dimensions’, in Zielonka (1998b), pp. 
117-29; Gomez (1998); David Buchan, ‘France aims to divert aid southward’, Financial Times, 9 
December 1994; Lionel Barber, ‘Essen Summit: Europe recovers its sense of direction’, Financial Times, 
12 December 1994.
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two dimensions of EU external relations was worked out during the 1994 Essen 
European Council, and at the June 1995 Cannes summit the member states reached an 
agreement on increasing funds towards the Mediterranean and on the creation of the 
MEDA external assistance programme.
External contingencies and demands were also to play a role in the development of a 
collective policy. Growing optimism over the Oslo Accords, as well as fear of social and 
political collapse in Algeria,542 helped convince the other member states of the need to 
develop a stronger collective policy, while the North African states too had been 
demanding a revision of bilateral agreements, concerned about the impact of the Single 
Market on preferential trade concessions. Morocco introduced the concept of free trade 
in a ‘Mediterranean space’.
In 1991, in a speech at the European Parliament, Mubarak proposed the creation of a 
‘Mediterranean Forum’ which would give priority to economic and trade issues but 
could also include political, security, and cultural issues.543 Egypt’s motivations 
originated in its attempt to diversify its foreign policy position after the Cold and Gulf 
Wars, to develop trade relations with European states, and in the fact that it was 
excluded from the so-called ‘5+5 group’:544 by expanding participation to the Middle 
East it wanted to ensure that EU interests were not limited to the Maghreb, which 
appeared the priority of the ‘sponsors’ of a Mediterranean policy, nor undermined by the 
EU’s increasing attention towards Eastern Europe.545 Thus when the EU proposed the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in October 1994, the project found a positive 
response in Cairo, whose trade and foreign ministries in particular were confident that 
the Association Agreement would contribute to creating employment, attracting foreign 
investments, offering market opportunities for Egyptian exports and providing 
additional loans and technical assistance.546 The Arab states also had been calling for a 
greater European involvement in the region as a counterbalance to the dominance of the
542 David Gardner, ‘Europe looks for southern comfort’, Financial Times, 28 October 1994.
543 Selim (1997); Dosenrode and Stubkjaer (2002), chapter 5; interview with officials at the Egyptian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 31 May 2007.
544 The group includes Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania and Spain, Portugal, France, 
Italy, and Malta.
545 Interview with officials at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 31 May 2007.
546 Selim (1997); Interview with officials at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 31 May 
2007.
176
US, especially with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,547 a view that persisted 
even during the war against Iraq (2003 onwards).548
In terms of motivations, economic and commercial interests of the member states were 
not the prime aim, given the small size and limited significance of the Mediterranean 
market, although access to and investments in energy did represent an element for some 
countries such as Italy (Egypt’s second largest trade partner), the UK, and the 
Netherlands (through the investments of their petrol giants ENI, BP and Royal/Shell).549 
On the other hand, the level of development and the growing population of the southern 
shore did represent a collective concern.550 Coupled with growing discontent towards 
the more or less authoritarian post-colonial regimes, this fuelled perceptions of mass 
migration flows towards Europe of people in search of employment opportunities and of 
a revival of Islamic fundamentalism.551 In the case of Egypt, home to the oldest and one 
of the largest Islamist parties in North Africa and the Middle East (the Muslim 
Brotherhood), this concern was expressed by all member states.552 According to The 
Economist, what united the two shores was fear:
in Europe the fear is of Islamic fundamentalism on the other shore, and of 
immigrants fleeing either that or poverty. In North Africa and the Middle 
East, it is the fear that Europe will turn inwards and expel migrants, who will 
return to make their matters worse at home.553
These concerns, if strongly felt by the more directly exposed southern EU member 
states, were increasingly understood by the northern ones too, such as Sweden, but also 
UK and Germany.554
However, the northern EU member states remained focused on more traditional security 
concerns, such as security in the Middle East, and broader regional security concerns,
547 Hollis (1997).
548 Hanaa Ebeid (2004), ‘The Partnership in Southern Eyes: Reflections on the Discourse in the Egyptian 
Press’, EuroMeSCopaper, No. 37, October.
549 Interviews, embassies of the member states, Cairo: 29 (1), 30 May 2007 (1) and (4).
550 Kienle (1998a).
551 Isabel Romeo (1998), ‘The European Union and North Africa: Keeping the Mediterranean “Safe” for 
Europe’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 21-38.
552 Interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007; 1 April 2008, and in the embassies of EU 
member states, Cairo: 29 May (2) and (3), 30 May 2007 (1) and (4).
553 ‘A new crusade’, The Economist, 2 December 1995.
554 Tobias Schumacher (2001), ‘The Mediterranean as a New Foreign Policy Challenge? Sweden and the 
Barcelona Process’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 81-102.
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such as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.555 It is significant, 
therefore, that the convergence between member states over the need to cooperate on 
Mediterranean affairs was driven by different interpretations and perceptions of security 
concerns.556
With respect to Egypt, the UK, France and to an extent Germany, saw the country as an 
important partner for key regional and global security issues. Even if London’s relations 
with Cairo had loosened since the Suez affair, with fewer direct material interests there, 
Britain continued to view it as a fundamental partner in a broad range of international 
and regional dossiers, first and foremost the Middle East, where it is seen as the most 
important local facilitator of dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian authorities.557 
Nonetheless, Egypt also retained its importance bilaterally, and UK policy towards the 
country was not significantly influenced by EU policy or positions.558 France too has 
courted Cairo for its role in the Middle East, equally eager to enjoy a leadership role in 
negotiating the conflict, though the strength of bilateral ties has not been as important as 
Britain’s.559 Apart from the Middle East, both countries see Egypt as a partner on a 
broad range of issues regarding Iraq, the broader Middle East, Africa, Sudan, and 
cooperation on terrorism (though on this issue London, having offered asylum to many 
Egyptians, and Cairo did not always see eye to eye before September 11). Other 
countries have different priorities with regard to Egypt. Italy, for instance, is Egypt’s 
second largest trade partner after the US, and places much importance on cooperation in 
migration management.560 The Netherlands, in recent years, has privileged cultural 
dialogue and developing relations with Islamic countries, especially in view of the 
domestic difficulties that the country has experienced in integrating communities of 
immigrant origin after September l l . 561
555 Rosemary Hollis (2000), ‘Barcelona’s First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Security Relations?’, in 
Sven Behrendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds.), Bound to Cooperate. Europe and the Middle East, 
Giitersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, pp. 107-130.
556 Bicchi (2007).
557 Mark Huband, George Parker, ‘Blair to call for bigger EU role in Mideast’, Financial Times, 18 April
1998. At that time Britain also held the Presidency of the EU.
558 Interview, embassy of EU member state, Cairo: 30 May 2007 (1).
559 See for instance, Judy Dempsey and Robert Graham, ‘France, Egypt seek Mideast peace summit’, 
Financial Times, 29 July 1998.
560 Interviews, embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 29 May 2007 (1) and (2).
561 Interviews, embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 30 May 2007 (3) and (4).
178
Engagement of EU member states with Cairo thus depended largely on the issue at 
stake. Per se, Egypt has not been the partner of any particular member state in a similar 
way to relations between Spain and Morocco or France and the countries of the 
Maghreb. In other words, Egypt does not enjoy the ‘sponsorship’ of any particular 
member state.562 It was its role vis-a-vis other issues that ensured its perceived 
importance in European capitals as a key partner. And the paramount importance of 
some of these other issues was such that member states pursued bilateral policies 
regardless of the EU framework.563 Bilateral ties have also been strengthened on select 
issues since September l l . 564
4. Institutionalising relations with Egypt
This section is divided into three parts. The first examines the multilateral framework 
within which EU relations with Egypt were developed. Given that the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership aimed to be an all-embracing framework with a strong 
regional dimension, relations with Egypt inevitably need to be examined through this 
initiative. Furthermore, the Association Agreement with Egypt that replaced the 
outdated 1977 agreement came into force only in 2004, after protracted negotiations and 
considerable resistance in Cairo, making the EMP the main institutionalised forum for 
EU relations with Egypt. The second section examines CFSP proper. Here there was a 
regional and a bilateral agenda. The 2000 Common Strategy and the 2004 Strategic 
Partnership are directed to the entire region, whereas at the bilateral level CFSP was 
used, but to a limited extent. The third part examines the developments in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy from 2003 onwards. In this framework the bilateral dimension 
was stronger, as the ENP entailed the development of a more tailor-made policy towards 
individual countries.
The chronological dimension should not be overlooked. Over time, EU policy towards 
Egypt became more focused. First of all, bilateral relations between the EU and Egypt 
were strengthened by the ratification of the AA. In 2005 the two sides started
562 Interviews, embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 29 (2), 30 (1) May 2007, and embassy of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Brussels, 16 May 2007.
563 This was confirmed through interviews, embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 29 May (1) and (4), 30 
May 2007 (1) and (4), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo: 31 May 2007, and embassy of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Brussels: 16 May 2007.
564 Joffe (2008).
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negotiations for an Action Plan in the framework of the ENP, which was approved only 
in 2007. Secondly, international changes following September 11 contributed to 
rethinking EU strategy towards the region. On the one hand the focus on terrorism and 
Islamic fundamentalism was detrimental to the reform process that was supposed to be 
entailed in the Barcelona Process. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq deepened the 
rift between the Arab world and the West, especially with the US and those EU member 
states involved in the military interventions. On the other hand Washington’s ‘regime 
change’ rhetoric brought the democratic and human rights deficits in Egypt to the fore, 
while the EU initiated a partial evaluation of its policies thus far, also in the field of 
human rights and democracy.
4.1 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
Launched in Barcelona in 1995, the logic behind the very broad set up of the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership was that supporting the economic development of the 
Southern Mediterranean partners would support their stability which in turn would 
automatically contribute to the stability of the EU as a whole. This was seen as the best 
means to address those ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security challenges that were the prime 
motivation behind the EU’s engagement.565 Economics were thus intended as the means 
for securing stability. One underlying assumption was also that economic development 
and prosperity would also lead to democratisation, despite the lack of evidence to 
support this proposition.566
The EMP -  also known as the Barcelona Process - is structured in three broad chapters 
inspired by the Helsinki process developed during the last fifteen years of the Cold War 
through the Conference for Security and Partnership in Europe:
i) a political and security partnership, based inter alia on the principles of 
human rights and democracy, and of dialogue and cross cultural respect. In 
this field the aim was to build security through partnership, cooperation, and 
mutual confidence building, on the model of the Helsinki process.
565 Bicchi (2007).
566 Kienle (1998a).
567 Beverly Crawford (2004), ‘Why the Euro-Med Partnership? Explaining the EU’s Strategies in the 
Mediterranean Region’, in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty (eds.), Between Regionalism and 
Globalism: European Union Interregional and Transregional Trade Strategies, New York: Palgrave, pp. 
93-117.
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ii) An economic and financial partnership with the ambitious aim of creating a 
Free Trade Area across the two shores. Here the ultimate aim is to create a 
‘zone of prosperity’ through economic integration.
iii) A social and cultural dialogue to nourish cross-shore exchanges.
The EMP created a number of multilateral and bilateral institutions through which 
relations between the two shores were managed (see box 7.1 below). Alongside this 
multilateral structure, the Association Agreements, signed between the EU and the 
individual Southern Mediterranean states, are governed bilaterally following the same 
pattern (Ministerial Council and Senior Officials Committees) of the EMP (box 7.2 
below). Responsibility for managing and implementing the EMP lies largely with the 
Commission, though it acts on the basis of the Council decisions.568
The EMP is thus characterised by a dense institutionalisation of multi- and bilateral 
policy making processes involving EU and national bureaucrats and politicians from the 
two shores flanked by many networks formed by non-governmental actors including 
advocacy groups and associations, academics and universities, research institutes and 
think tanks, journalists and media representatives and so on. This means that there is 
ground to explore the possibility of ‘policy-shaping’ processes occurring at the ‘sub- 
systemic’ level, and for socialisation dynamics.
568 See also Eric Philippart (2003), ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A Critical Evaluation of an 
Ambitious Scheme’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 201-220.










Meets twice yearly (informally and formally) at Ministerial 
level with representatives of the EU troika and the Southern 
Mediterranean governments. It has the overall responsibility 
for the running of the EMP, including political dialogue, and 
is responsible for handling any dispute.
Senior officials’ 
Committee
Meets six times a year. Is in charge with the functioning of 
the EMP. Composed by members of the EU Troika and the 
partners but work is prepared by the Commission.
Human rights dialogue was introduced in the EMP under the 




Includes members of the EP and the national parliaments of 




Sectoral networks of cultural and research institutes, of 
NGOs (Euromed Non Governmental Platforms)etc.
Negotiations with Cairo for the AA were protracted and difficult. The main reasons for 
the delay regarded EU trade protectionism in certain goods, Egypt’s search for greater 
concessions on agricultural exports, its concern about the social impact of industrial and 
trade liberalisation, and competition with EU products -  issues that were widely 
discussed in some of the press569 but that found little appreciation among the EU 
member states.570 However late in being approved, one advantage offered by the AA 
was that since its entry into force relations with Egypt have not been confined to the 
multilateral framework of the EMP, as the box below illustrates. The aims of the AA are 
similar to those of the PCA with Ukraine: it provides a framework for political dialogue 
aimed at a process of liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital, is supposed to 
contribute to economic and social development in Egypt, to promote regional
569 Niveen Wahish, ‘Egypt-EU partnership enters final stage’, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 1-7 July 1999: 
Simon Taylor, ‘Patten seeks to boost EuroMed ties’, European Voice, 3 August 2000; Niveen Wahish, 
‘Free trade or false hopes?’ Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 28 June-4 July 2001; Ebeid (2004).
570 Elizabeth Wise, ‘EU ministers face dilemma in Egypt talks’, European Voice, 17 October 1996; David 
Gardner, ‘Relations With Europe: “Partnership” falls well short of expectations’, Financial Times, 13 
May 1997.
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cooperation, and further cooperation with the EU. In addition, it envisages the 
completion of a Free Trade Area (theoretically by 2010). Given the volume of Egypt’s 
trade with the EU (around 40% of its exports and 34% of it imports are with the EU) the 
agreement contained a strong economic incentive for Cairo.571
Box 7.2: Institutional structures governing relations with Egypt
The EU-Egypt 
Association Council
Is supposed to meet regularly at ministerial level, Since the 




Held at the level of senior officials to discuss political and 
economic issues as well as bilateral or regional co-operation.
EU institutions repeatedly recognised that the Barcelona Process had not made sufficient 
progress (box 4 in the Annexes synthesises developments of the EMP and of relations 
with Egypt, p. 264). By 1999 diplomats were making efforts to communicate the 
positive aspects of the Partnership: the fact that the Arab and Israeli states sat around the 
same table (though not on all occasions), and that the Southern Mediterranean countries 
had began to accept the inclusion of the ‘human rights clause’ in the Association 
Agreement.572 But in 2000 the planned Charter for Peace and Stability was abandoned, 
while by 2001 the agenda was expanding to include a stronger focus on migration and 
the growing Justice and Home Affairs dossier in the first and third baskets (as was the 
case with Ukraine), but also on cultural dialogue projects. Both received new impetus by 
September 11, the first in terms of strengthening cooperation, the second based on a 
widespread belief among Commission officials and some member states (notably 
Sweden and Spain) of the need to counter the ‘clash of civilisations’ mantra.573 Counter­
terrorist cooperation was thus launched through the Valencia Action Plan in 2002 and 
all new Association Agreements included anti-terrorism clauses.574 After the terrorist 
bombings in Casablanca in May 2003, MED A aid was also directed at counter-terrorist 
programmes. Even if it was agreed that cooperation in the fight against terrorism should
571 James Drummond, ‘EU agreement to kick-start policy reforms’, Financial Times, 9 May 2001.
572 Simon Taylor, ‘Arab-Israeli stalemate threatens EuroMed programme’, European Voice, 4 February
1999.
573 Richard Gillespie (2003), ‘Reshaping the Agenda? The Internal Politics of the Barcelona Process in the 
Aftermath of September 11’, in Jiinemann (ed.), pp. 21-36.
574 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part (2004), Official 
Journal L 304, 30 September, art. 59.
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cnc
respect human rights principles, this area of security cooperation stood uneasily with 
respect of human rights.
As the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process in 2005 came closer, the institutions 
and bodies involved in the EMP began a process of evaluation of the achievements and 
merits of the structure and its policies.577 The evaluation that emerged of the EMP was a 
‘mixed picture’, where the relevance of the Barcelona Declaration was recognised, 
notwithstanding the changing circumstances,578 though results were considered far less 
satisfactory than the principles, structure and aims. But the summit to celebrate the 
anniversary was widely seen as a failure, with the attendance of few high-level 
Mediterranean partners and the ensuing impossibility of reaching commonly agreed 
conclusions. The conference held the following year under the Finnish Presidency was 
left to pick up the pieces: the simple acceptance of the conclusions was considered an 
achievement itself.579
4.2 CFSP
The transition from EPC to CFSP did not change the political and security deficit of the 
EU’s policies towards its immediate south.580 In fact, the CFSP continued the EU’s 
selective engagement with regional issues. While it was resorted to with regard to Libya 
and the Middle East Peace Process, on other issues it remained silent, such as over 
Algeria throughout the 1990s and the Western Sahara conflict.
At the request of Spain, Italy, and Greece, in 2000 the EU’s third and last Common 
Strategy was devised to satisfy those member states that had a stronger commitment
575 Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (2004), Presidency 
Conclusions, Dublin, 5-6 May
576 Youngs (2005); Joffe (2008).
577 See European Commission (2005d), Tenth Anniversary o f the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A 
work programme to meet the challenges of the next five years, Commission Communication to the 
Council and the European Parliament, Document number not available,
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/barcelona_l0/docs/lOth_comm_en.pdf; EuroMeSCO 
(2005), Barcelona Plus. Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States, Lisbon: 
EuroMeSCO Secretariat; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2005a), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
10 Years After Barcelona: Achievements and Perspectives. Conclusions, Luxembourg: 30-31 May.
578 Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2005), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 10 Years After 
Barcelona: Achievements and Perspectives. Conclusions, Luxembourg: 30-31 May.
579 Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2006), Conclusions, Chairman’s statement annexed, Tampere: 27-28 
November 2006 See also box 4 in the Annexes.
580 Gomez (1998), p. 141.
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towards the South (see box 3.2, p. 78).581 But it received support by some northern 
member states also because it was seen as strengthening the EU’s position as a unitary 
actor in the region, symbolically reaffirming the EU’s commitment towards the 
Mediterranean, and helping simplify EU decision-making structures because it allowed 
for the use of QMV for joint actions.582
Despite the problems that the Barcelona Process had encountered during its first five 
years, the Common Strategy did not offer any evaluation of it, but reiterated its structure 
and three ‘chapter’ philosophy. It did, however, reflect developments in the EU by 
referring to the 1999 Tampere Conclusions of the European Council on Justice and 
Home Affairs regarding the coordination on migration policy, and ESDP 
developments.583 In other words, as much as the Common Strategy on Ukraine, it did 
not introduce any innovative approach nor did it play an important role in pushing for 
increased cooperation between the member states, as the Council Report later 
commented,584 but contributed to broadening the areas of interest for cooperation.
Given its failure, and in the context of rethinking Barcelona after September 11 and the 
US changing policy towards the Middle East, in 2004 the High Representative 
produced, in coordination with the Commission, a ‘Strategic Partnership with the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East’ which fine-tuned the EU’s approach to the region 
(extended to the Gulf), somewhat identifying a new hierarchy of priorities, which also 
included new policy fields reflecting novel challenges posed by the consequences of 
September 11. The cornerstones of the Strategic Partnership can be found in an implicit 
recognition that the EU had failed to develop a concerted policy towards the region, also 
due to an inability to prioritise the areas for action, and that cooperation of partner 
governments was fundamental for domestic change. Among the principles recognised 
were: the importance of the partnership approach, the need for differentiation between 
countries (as the European Neighbourhood Policy was preparing to do), the recognition 
that reform processes need to be generated endogenously and cannot be imposed by
581 Simon Taylor, ‘Hopes rise for early deal on EU strategy for Mediterranean’, European Voice, 20 
January 2000; Claire Spencer, (2001), ‘The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the 
Mediterranean’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 31-51.
582 Schumacher (2001).
583 Spencer (2001).
584 The Secretary General/High Representative (2000), Common Strategies Report, Brussels: 21 
December, reprinted in Missiroli (2001b), Annex E. See also Chapter 3, section 4.2 on CFSP.
185
external actors, the need for consistent EU policies, and the need for a more pragmatic 
and concrete policy agenda. It is worth noting the change in terminology whereby 
democracy was abandoned in favour of rule of law and good governance (see box 3.3, p. 
79). This also followed the ENP concept of ‘ownership’, whereby both the Commission 
and the Council considered it essential to ensure that their partners would not feel that
cor
relations were exogenously imposed. Here too the Council recognised the need for
r o c
differentiation between partners.
The general guidelines on EU action towards Egypt were therefore included in the 
framework of EU policy towards the whole region. At the same time, Cairo was the 
object of specific CFSP positions. As box in chapter 8.2, p. 202, shows, and as was the 
case with Ukraine, the EU resorted to CFSP to express its concern on a number of 
specific cases relevant to human rights and democracy. In fact, CFSP in Egypt has been 
used mostly on such issues, such as over the trial of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, or elections in 
2005. The content of such statements was largely declaratory: the EU never mentioned 
the possibility of taking any action nor did it voice the possibility that such domestic 
problems could have an impact on the country’s relations with the EU. Instead, stronger 
condemnation was used at the confidential level through a few demarches issued over 
the years. It is also worth noticing, before a more in-depth discussion on these issues in 
Chapters 8 and 9, that this occurred largely after 2000.
4.3 The European Neighbourhood Policy
The recognition of the need to differentiate between countries rather than tie them to a 
regional framework was also contained in the European Neighbourhood Policy 
developed between 2003 and 2004. Although initially conceived with the East European 
countries in mind, the Mediterranean partners were soon included in the ENP, largely as 
a consequence of the preoccupation of the Southern EU states that with enlargement, 
resources and political attention would move further East at the expense of the
585 This point was reiterated by officials interviewed in the Council but especially the Commission, 
Brussels, 15 May 2007 (1) and (2).
586 European Council (2004c), Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, June.
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Mediterranean.587 The failures and problems encountered in the regional framework of 
the Barcelona Process, largely but not exclusively due to the downward spiral of the 
Middle East Peace Process, also strengthened the rationale in favour of introducing a 
more country-specific approach towards the Southern neighbours. With regard to some 
EMP partners, whose non EU members were being reduced by the accession to the EU 
of Cyprus and Malta in 2004 and Turkey starting accession negotiations in 2005, the 
ENP represented a chance for those countries most willing to strengthen relations with 
the EU to do so at bilateral level, disengaging themselves from the regional format that 
for some represented a setback, given the diversity of countries involved and the high 
level of conflict in the region. The ENP added a further layer to EU policies towards its 
South rather than a replacement of existing structures.
The Action Plan negotiations with Egypt were extremely long compared to those carried 
out with the other ENP countries (the Country Strategy Report was published March 
2005 while the Action Plan was approved in January 2007), and the biggest hurdles 
were over political matters, with human rights as the hardest obstacle.588 Initially, the 
EU attempted, without success, to include lifting the emergency laws in the aims of the 
Action Plan.589 Later, the major controversy emerged over the EU proposal to set up a 
subcommittee on human rights (as had been done with Morocco and Tunisia), which 
Cairo opposed. Eventually, the subcommittee was given the broader mandate of 
‘political matters: human rights and democracy and international and regional issues’, 
on the model of the one established with Israel.590 These issues will be discussed at 
greater length in chapter 8.
587 Interviews, European Commission and Council of the EU, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1) and 14 May , 15 
May 2007 (2). See also chapter 4.
588 According to the head of the European Commission Delegation in Cairo interviewed in Niveen 
Wahish, ‘Liberalise or bust’, Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 6-12 April 2006; interviews, European 
Commission, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1) and 15 May 2007 (1) and (2), and European Commission 
Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (1); interviews, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo: 31 May 
2007.
589 Andrew Beatty, ‘Human rights doubts could hit Egypt deal’, European Voice, 8 June 2006, meeting 
with officials of the European Commission, Rome, January 2005.




The Barcelona Process did not produce a strong incentive for further cooperation 
between the EU member states. In the case of Egypt, European capitals continued their 
bilateral ties, especially in key security fields such as counter-terrorism.591 Despite the 
fact that relations between the EU and Egypt have been characterised by the creation of 
highly institutionalised regional relations, spanning across very broad spectrum of 
policy fields, and involving a broad range of actors, the main actors remained the 
member states.
The Commission has had significant responsibilities in shaping and influencing policies 
in both the EMP and the ENP. In turn, and together with the European Parliament, the 
dialogue with non-institutional actors that the EMP and the ENP both entail, has 
exposed them to external influences. On paper, human rights and democracy figured 
prominently in both policy frameworks, yet EU institutions has themselves recognised 
that this aspect has been one of the hardest to carry out. The key interests that did 
emerge, as box 4 in the Annexes (p. 264) clearly illustrates, were cooperation in justice 
and home affairs issues, in terrorism, migration, economic development.
Conversely, human rights and democracy were the subject of CFSP cooperation 
between the member states: declaratory positions were on occasion accompanied by 
confidential condemnation (see box 8.2, p. 217), though the use of any form of negative 
conditionality was never envisaged. In this area, the limited degree of convergence 
between member states hampered the development of a stronger collective policy 
towards Egypt: national bilateral relations on important foreign policy dossiers persisted 
despite the experience of Barcelona.
5. The drivers ofEU policy towards Egypt
EU foreign policy towards its immediate South, and the EMP especially, has been 
subject to extensive academic analysis focusing primarily on its limits and failures, 
whereas EU policy towards Egypt has been virtually absent from the literature.. This
591 Joffe (2008).
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section will therefore try to identify the factors and processes that are relevant to 
understanding EU-Egypt relations.
There is a general agreement in the literature that contextual factors and regional crises 
have played an important role in developing the EMP, but also in constraining its 
performance. From its conception and inception, the Barcelona Process was intended to 
be kept separate from the Middle East Peace Process. But it was always haunted by the 
problems of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab relations that spilt over into all issues relating 
to the EMP, not just the political and security ones. So long as antagonism persisted 
between the Southern countries, the EMP was bound to have difficulties in fostering 
cooperative relations.592 The hegemonic presence of the US also put constraints to the 
EU’s role in Middle East, especially due to Washington’s direct involvement in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.593
All these fed directly into relations with Egypt, compounded by the country’s 
importance as a partner in the search for a peace settlement. This is reflected in the 
Council’s priorities: as a frequent destination of Solana’s trips, Cairo is inevitably 
consulted on any policy regarding the Middle East, the Gulf, the Arab League, and parts 
of Africa, such as Sudan. But beyond a convergence on strengthening the EU’s role in 
the Middle East, a convergence of interests of the EU member states on Egypt was not 
equally evident. Even if the importance of partnership with Cairo was recognised by all, 
individual states have pursued bilateral interests and relations notwithstanding the dense 
relations and policies that the EU developed collectively through the EMP, the CFSP 
and the ENP. EU cooperation on Egypt depended on the issue at stake.594 Human rights 
and democracy did represent an area for cooperation in CFSP; chapter 8 and 9 will 
explore how, when, and why this occurred.
Such a ‘logic of diversity’ was also at the heart of the problems of the Barcelona Process 
which made the EU ‘a clearing house of different interests rather than a unitary actor’,
592 Hollis (2000).
593 Dosenrode and Stubkjaer (2002), chapter 7.
594 This point has been confirmed in all interviews, Council of the EU and European Commission, 
Brussels: May 2007, and embassies of the member states, Cairo: May 2007.
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largely to the ‘dual’ nature of foreign policy making.595 Coordination at both cross-pillar 
level and between the EU and its member states has been extremely hard.596 If the 
‘politics of scale’ has driven the member states to resort to the EU to strengthen their 
interests and influence, this has not necessarily led to a shared vision, and the lack of 
convergence between priorities is often felt.597 In an intergovernmental reading, the 
member states were the main drivers, led by the Mediterranean countries concerned with 
their geographical exposure to the South and unable, alone, to address the broad variety 
of risks. The collective framework could thus serve the purpose of enhancing their role 
in international dossiers such as the Middle East Peace Process and in supporting the 
pursuit of national interests.
This was implicitly recognised by MEP Pasqualina Napoletano:
we need to overturn structural limits on the policy towards our southern 
partners. In fact, Euro-Mediterranean policy cannot be founded only on 
bilateral relations. Particularly with regard to the question of human rights 
and democracy, it is important to have a multilateral vision’. [Bilateral 
approaches] could be useful to several regimes, which are far from interested 
in the introduction of democratic reforms.598
The incentive towards developing a ‘politics of scale’ was strong also for some Northern 
member states that shared some perceptions of risks with the Southern states, such as the 
fear of immigration and of a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, there were 
concerns about the balance of power in Europe in the context of enlargement towards 
the East.
September 11 had a contradictory and paradoxical impact. On the one hand, it did not 
significantly change the EU’s relations with Egypt, though it did modify the agenda of 
the EMP in favour of a sharpening of both the new security and strategic elements as 
well as heightening, albeit for a limited timeframe, the political reform rhetoric (as
595 Monar (1998), quote on p. 50; Richard Youngs (1998), ‘The Barcelona Process after the UK 
Presidency: The Need for Prioritization’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-24.
596 Spencer (2001).
597 This point has been confirmed in all interviews, Council of the EU and European Commission, 
Brussels: May 2007, and embassies of the member state, Cairo: May 2007.
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Pasqualina Napoletano, ‘Helping Europe’s southern neighbours take a leap forward’, European Voice, 
12 May 2005.
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opposed to human rights).599 In part this reflected the shift in US policy and the ensuing 
debate in Brussels and within the European foreign ministries on ‘Arab democracy’, but 
as we shall see, the emphasis on political reform was also the result of dynamics internal 
to the EU policy process, where the debate following the UNDP Arab Human 
Development Reports, the ‘reflection’ over the ten years of Barcelona, the development 
of the ENP, and the failures of the EMP to generate a momentum for change, all 
contributed to raising awareness over the relationship between authoritarianism, security 
and development.
If the democracy rhetoric was raised for a while, it remains to be seen whether the 
substance of policy actually changed. According to most observers, the ‘stability versus 
democracy’ dilemma that had characterised the EMP from its inception was sharpened 
in favour of the latter.600 The next chapter will investigate these questions more 
thoroughly in the Egyptian case.
6. Conclusions: explaining EU policy towards Egypt
Why do the member states choose to act together on Egypt? what actors and processes 
make EU foreign policy? and what are the limits of the policy? This chapter has tried to 
illustrate the evidence to provide some answers to these questions.
In terms of foreign policy making processes, a collective policy towards the 
Mediterranean was developed largely driven by logic of the ‘politics of scale’, led by the 
Southern member states seeking political and financial support to deal with the problems 
that could materialize on their border. But, however important Egypt has always been as 
a partner to Europe in key international dossiers, it has never enjoyed the ‘sponsorship’ 
of single states. The southern EU member states most interested in the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership have seen Egypt as an important member of Barcelona, but 
have fewer historical ties with Cairo. When dealing with political stability, containing 
terrorism, illegal migration, and economic relations, they have been the least interested 
in promoting human rights and democracy and have considered these issues even
599 Roberto Aliboni (2005), Youngs (2006a).
600 For a synthesis, see Annette Junemann (2003a), ‘Security Builiding in the Mediterranean after 
September 11 ’, in Junemann (ed.), pp. 1-20; Youngs (2006).
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harmful towards maintaining the stability of relations with Arab governments.601 The 
large member states have continued pursuing their bilateral agenda despite the 
development of a collective EU policy towards Egypt.602
These intergovernmental and realist interpretations, coupled with a strong influencing 
role of external dynamics in the region and of the US, provide the most powerful 
explanations for EU engagement with Egypt. However, this does not explain the reasons 
for which the human rights and democracy components were included in the rhetoric of 
the EU when developing policies towards the Mediterranean through the EMP and the 
ENP. The EMP in particular has a strong focus on ‘holistic’ approaches to issues, on 
political dialogue, confidence building measures, aid policies, including human rights 
and democracy promotion, and socio-cultural exchanges.
Ideational interpretations seem more apt to explain the nature of the EMP regime, as a 
dense network characterised by multi- and bilateral policy making and shaping 
processes where there is scope for ‘spillover’ from NGO networks, at least in normative 
terms.603 This comprehensive approach had been pushed by different EU institutions, 
starting from the Commission, and supported by the European Parliament.604 The 
influence of the 2002 UN Arab Development Report in particular, can be interpreted as 
evidence of an ideational change within a restricted group of Commission officials.605
The relationship between the two dynamics -  ie the extent to which 
intergovemmentalism and institutional and ideational dynamics were influencing each 
other -  will be further explored with regard to the role human rights and democracy 
played in EU foreign policy through empirical testing.
It will be argued that, thanks to its role in shaping the EMP and the ENP, the 
Commission had a stronger role (compared to Ukraine) with regard to Egypt, aided by a 
dynamic Delegation that has developed relations with Cairo that go beyond the technical
601 Pargeter (2001), Wood (2002), Laura Feliu (2003), ‘A Two Level Game: Spain and the Promotion of 
Democracy and Human Rights in Marocco’, in Junemann (2003b), pp. 90-111; interviews, embassies of 
EU member states, Cairo: 29 May (1), (3) and (4).
602 Interviews, embassies of the member states, Cairo: 30 May 2007 (1).
603 Crawford (2004).
604 Gomez (1998), p. 142.
605 Interview, European Commission, Brussels: 9 April 2003.
192
matters of cooperation. Furthermore, the Commission exploited the opportunities 
offered by its role in negotiating the ENP Action Plan. Although the member states were 
the key decision-makers, especially at the beginning and at the end of the process, the 
Commission did manage to carve out some influence in its direct dealings with Cairo.
The Egyptian case study nevertheless confirms the problems of coordination between 
collective and bilateral policies of the EU member states. The degree of coordination on 
the ground between the embassies was extremely limited, and in Brussels Egyptian 
diplomacy often succeeded in pursuing policies that would undermine the member 
states’ consensus (an example of which will be described in the following chapter). This 
was possible because of the lack of unitary views on Egypt, also due to the multiple 
roles that the country could cover as an important partner in a number of broader 
security dossiers.
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Ch a p t e r  8
Im pl e m e n t in g  H um a n  R ig h ts  a n d  D e m o c r a c y : T o r t u r e  in  E g y pt
1. Introduction
Torture has been identified as the single largest human rights violation in Egypt, both 
for its pervasiveness as a method used by the secret services and by ordinary police 
officers, and for its recurrence over time. Individual cases as well as the general problem 
were repeatedly raised by international and Egyptian NGOs throughout the period under 
consideration (between 1995 and the present), even if the issue has rarely raised any 
attention in the European press.
However, torture has not been just an internal matter. It continues to be justified because 
Egypt is at the forefront of the fight against terrorism of Islamic inspiration.606 
Mubarak’s strategy shifted from appeasing the Muslim Brotherhood (the largest Islamist 
group in Egypt) while cracking down on extremist militant groups, to harassing the 
Muslim Brotherhood and more moderate Islamist groups in the mid-1990s, at the height 
of Egypt’s struggle with internal terrorism, which caused close to 1000 deaths and 
severely damaged its important tourist industry. The government’s fight against 
terrorism was conducted also thanks to the freedom of manoeuvre insured to the security 
forces by the emergency law.
This policy was never challenged in Washington607 until after the terrorist attacks on 11
September 2001 (in which an Egyptian was involved), prompting the US to scrutinise
more closely Egyptian domestic affairs. This sent some alarm bells ringing in Arab
608countries that appeasement of authoritarian regimes may not last. After seeking the 
cooperation of intelligence and security services in the Arab states in the fight against 
terrorism, for a brief period during the George W. Bush administration (2004-2005), US 
policy towards Egypt appeared to change. In the context of the so-called ‘forward 
strategy of freedom’ in the Middle East, and of military interventions in Afghanistan 
(2001 onwards) and Iraq (2003 onwards), the US launched a policy that saw ‘regime
606 Hinnebusch (2002); Micheal Doran (1999), Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian power politics and 
the Palestine Question, New York: Oxford University Press.
607 See, for instance, ‘A Wobbly Hand of Friendship’, American Survey, The Economist, 26 August 1995.
608 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2005), Country Report: Egypt, London: September.
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change’ as an integral part of its ‘war’ against terrorism.609 Chapter 9 will show that 
Mubarak did introduce some short-lived changes.
The consequences of September 11 on Egypt were manifold and contradictory. Egypt 
itself suffered a string of terrorist bombings in Red Sea resorts from 2004 onwards. First 
all, the ensuing fight against terrorism legitimised the Egyptian government to brand 
internal opposition as ‘terrorist’, to step up the crackdown on opposition. In the 
immediate wake of September 11, US Secretary of State Colin Powell appreciated 
Egypt’s cooperation and claimed that the country was ‘ahead of us on this issue [the 
fight against terrorism]. [...] We have much to learn from them and there is much we 
can do together’.610 One form of cooperation of US and European states was the practice 
of ‘rendition’ of suspects to the Egyptian authorities despite reports of them being 
tortured -  a practice forbidden by international law.611
Thus, it is necessary to place the issue of torture within the international context of the 
fight against terrorism, in order to understand the background against which the EU 
developed its responses. Nonetheless, it did constitute a field in which the EU had the 
means and tools to respond. Alongside the foreign policy tools developed towards 
Egypt, the EU has also developed global guidelines to fight torture, providing it with 
additional tools to address these concerns. This makes the case of torture in Egypt 
particularly fruitful area of investigation to explain the role of human rights and 
democracy in EU foreign policy.
2. The practice o f torture in Egypt
Torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, prison and detention conditions are 
overwhelmingly considered the single largest human rights abuse in Egypt, despite the 
fact that its laws and Constitution include some provisions for the protection from these 
violations. This has been recognised not just by international NGOs but also by the EU
609 See Steven A. Cook (2005), ‘The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No.
2, pp. 91-102; Gregory Gause III (2005), ‘Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84,
No. 5, pp.77-86.
610 Secretary Colin L. Powell (2001), ‘Remarks with Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Maher’, 
Washington, DC: 26 September, http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5066.htm.
611 Amnesty International (2007).
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619and the US in their assessments of the country. Even the first report of the Egyptian 
Council for Human Rights, established in 2003 and headed by Boutros Boutros Ghali, 
singled out torture as one key shortcoming of the country.613
Article 42 of the Constitution states that any person arrested, detained or restricted in his 
freedom shall be treated in the manner concomitant with the preservation of his dignity. 
If a confession is proved to have been made by a person under duress or coercion, it 
shall be considered invalid and futile. The Constitution and other legislation protect civil 
liberties and freedoms such as the right to bodily integrity. The state, embodied in the 
executive must not only respect but actively protect these rights and put in place laws 
which will deter transgression of them. The Penal Code too criminalises torture.614 
Finally, Egypt had acceded in 1986 to the UN Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) though it has not 
implemented all its provisions (which would allow the UNCAT to decide on the 
complaints filed by individuals), and it has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (which would allow UN inspection of detention places).
The emergency law has allowed the State Security Investigation Services (SSIS) and the 
various security forces to bypass all these constitutional and legal provisions. The 
emergency law gives ample powers of arrest and detention for long periods (up to 6 
months detention without charge) and without granting the right to access lawyers. 
Under the emergency law ‘terrorist suspects’ are tried by military rather than civilian 
tribunals, giving undue power to the military in repressing Islamist opposition in 
particular and curbing the powers of the judiciary. The extraordinary increase in the use
612 US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2006), Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices 2005, Washington: 8 March; US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor (2007), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -  2006, Washington: 6 
March; European Commission (2005b), Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to : “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” Country Report Egypt COM(2005) 72 final, SEC(2005) 287/3 Brussels: 2 March.
613 National Council for Human Rights (2004-2005), Annual Report o f the National Council fo r Human 
Rights 2004-2005, Cairo. Whereas the first report of the Council was critical of human rights standards in 
Egypt, following editions offered far less insightful assessment due to pressure from the government. 
Interview, European Commission Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (1).
614 Nonetheless, according to Egyptian human rights NGOs, freedom from torture and ill-treatment would 
still require constitutional modifications beyond abolishing the emergency law. See Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights Studies (2006), Recommendations on the Plan of Action o f the European Neighbourhood 
Policy with the Government o f Egypt on enhancing political dialogue and reform, 
www.cihrs.org/Act_file/PDF/33773200672824.pdf.
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of administrative detention during the 1990s represented an infringement on personal 
liberties, which was renewed in the aftermath of September 11 as a means to crackdown 
on secular and Islamist opposition.615
The issue of torture thus became more salient in the 1990s during the security forces’ 
repression of Islamist violence, and cases involving Islamists were transferred to 
military courts.616 During this period, it has been estimated that over 20,000 people were 
detained.617 Cases of torture, disappearances, administrative detention without charge or 
trial increased substantially in the 1990s and from the end of 1992 onwards an 
increasing number of civilians were sentenced by military courts. Towards the end of 
the decade the successful repression of terrorist activities after the 1997 Luxor attack 
and the imprisonment and ceasefire of the two main groups {Jihad and Gamaa al- 
Islamiyya) led to a brief relaxation of anti-Islamist policies and the release of hundreds 
of prisoners. But September 11 justified the government’s renewal of ‘anti-terrorist’ 
policy and the use of brutal investigative, arrest, prison detention and judicial tools that 
arguably amounted to a breach of fundamental rights on many counts: torture, unfair 
detention and trials, and further severe limitations of the freedom of association and
r i o
expression, while western governments turned a blind eye. According to Amnesty 
International, in 2007 there were 18,000 administrative detainees (people held without 
charge or trial) in degrading prisons.619
Human rights monitors believe that torture and mistreatment are also carried out by the 
regular police. One NGO has documented 567 cases of torture, including 167 deaths 
allegedly due to torture and mistreatment between 1993 and 2007. The Egyptian 
Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) regularly reports on instances of torture and 
beatings for suspects of petty crimes, claiming that ‘torture has changed from being “an
615 Kienle (2001), chapter 4, Amnesty International, State o f the world’s human rights, sections on Egypt 
in the editions from 1991 to 2007; Human Rights Watch, World Report, chapters on Egypt in the editions 
between 1991 and 2007.
616 Brown (1997), chapter 4.
617 The retreat from fundamentalism’, The Economist, 29 April 1999.
618 ‘Chance for a clampdown’, The Economist, 25 October 2001; ‘For whom the Liberty Bell tolls’, The 
Economist, 29 August 2002; Diane Singerman (2002), ‘The Politics of Emergency Rule in Egypt’, 
Current History, January, pp. 29-35; Roula Khalaf, ‘Freedom becomes a casualty of the war against 
terrorism’, Financial Times, 6 January 2002.
619 Amnesty International (2007).
620 Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (2007), Torture in Egypt, culprits without punishment,
Report, Cairo: 8 August, www.eohr.org/report/2007/re0808.shtml
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ordinary crime” to a widespread phenomenon’, present in all Egyptian govematorates 
(the 28 administrative divisions of the country) and affecting all social classes, age or 
gender. About a third of cases followed by EOHR over a decade ended in the death of
f\91the suspect, and a majority of cases occurred in police stations. While political 
activists are at risk of torture when detained on SSIS premises, in the case of non­
political detainees, torture and mistreatment seems to occur largely in police stations, 
regardless of the crime the suspect is allegedly held for and of the sex or age of the 
suspect (complaints have been filed on behalf of children too).622 The token sentencing 
of low-ranking police officers that has occurred supports these allegations. Torture is 
resorted to as an interrogation method and its most common methods include beatings, 
electric shock, suspension by the wrists and in contorted positions for long periods, and 
threats of violent repercussions on the victims and their families.623
Until recently, the very word ‘torture’ was de facto censored by the authorities. Despite 
the existence of a livelier press in Egypt compared with much of the Arab world, there 
was virtually no debate in newspapers over such grave a human rights abuse. The 
revelations about torture and mistreatment in the Abu Grahib prison in Iraq by US army 
officials, the rendition of the Egyptian imam Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr, better known 
as Abu Omar (see below section 3.2), and the alleged existence of CIA detention centres 
in some EU member states all triggered some discussion on the use of torture in Egypt, 
especially against members of the Muslim Brotherhood.624 Technology overcame the 
silence when an Egyptian blogger posted on YouTube a video showing the rape and 
mistreatment of a male prisoner in early 2006, which paved the way for a stronger 
public debate, forced the case to be put on trial, and provided the EU with a reason to 
discuss the problem of torture with Egyptian authorities.
621 Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (2004), Torture in Egypt...an unchecked phenomenon, 
www.eohr.org/report/2004/re3.htm.
622 Amnesty International (2003), Egypt: Time to implement the UN Committee against Torture 
recommendations, Index: MDE 12/038/2003, London: 20 November.
623 Amnesty International (2007).
624 Torture in camera’, Al-Ahram Weekly online, 24-30 June 2004; Gihan Shahine, ‘NCHR speaks out, 
finally’, Al-Ahram Weekly online, 21-27 April 2005; Amira Howeidy, ‘Zero tolerance for torture’, Al- 
Ahram Weekly online, 30 June-6 July 2005; Ayman El-Amir, ‘Power bears its teeth’, Al-Ahram Weekly 
online, 22-28 December 2005.
625 Interviews, Delegation of the European Commission, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (1) and (2); interviews, 
embassies of the EU member states, Cairo: 29 May (4), 30 May 2007 (3) and (4), and based on 
observations on the occurrence of articles on torture in the English language Egyptian press.
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3. EU policy on Torture
EU policy on torture in Egypt was not shaped in a vacuum. Protest and reporting on the 
use of torture in Egypt has not been limited to national and international NGOs but also 
to international organisations. The UN’s Committee against Torture has examined 
Egypt’s case in 1988, 1993 and 1999, and in 2002 the UN’s Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR) too addressed the country’s shortcomings. The Committee against Torture 
has also repeatedly condemned Cairo for failing to respond to a request -  outstanding 
since 1996 - of its special rapporteur to visit the country.
From the point of view of EU policy towards Egypt, two issues need to be explored 
which bear relevance to the role that human rights issues played in the EU’s relations 
with Cairo: its actions against torture, and its position against the emergency law which 
enables the state to pursue anti-constitutional practices.
Before this, however, EU action against torture in Egypt should also be placed in the 
framework of its general policy against torture, one of its global policies on select 
human rights issues (see chapter 3). The prevention of torture is considered a ‘priority’ 
in bilateral and multilateral cooperation and should be included in the EU’s political and 
human rights dialogues.626 Since 2001 the Guidelines against torture list the various 
international conventions and instruments that underpin EU policy, of which the most 
important and relevant to the case of Egypt are the UN Convention Against Torture, and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its two Optional 
Protocols.627
The Guidelines also specify the process that the EU response to cases of torture should 
follow, the tools to be used, and the issues to address with third countries. First of all, as 
far as action is concerned, they refer to the EU as whole, including all its institutions, its 
Delegations in third countries, as well as the embassies of the member states. The 
process of reporting and evaluating should start with the EU member states’ Heads of
626 Council of the EU (2002c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the 
Implementation of the EU Guidelines on Efforts to Prevent and Eradicate Torture’, 15493/02 (Press 398) 
P 188/02, Brussels: 11 December.
627 Council of the EU (2001f), Guidelines to EU policy on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, available at
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TortureGuidelines.pdf.
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Mission in third countries, which are supposed to inform the Council Working Group on 
Human Rights (COHOM) of the occurrence of torture and ill treatment in third 
countries. Together with the geographic Working Groups, and on the basis of 
information available also from other organisations (such as UN bodies, NGO reports), 
the COHOM should identify the situations where EU actions are called upon, and make 
recommendations to the Council. If action is adopted, the Heads of Mission should 
offer, ex post, an evaluation of EU performance.
The instruments to convey EU condemnation of episodes of torture include: raising the 
issue of torture in multilateral institutions and support resolutions at UN bodies such as 
the General Assembly and Human Rights Council (which replaced the Commission on 
human rights in 2006), bilateral and multilateral political dialogue, diplomatic 
demarches, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and aid - including EIDHR - to 
combat and prevent torture and ill-treatment. In addition, the Guidelines explicitly 
mention the types of measures that the EU should encourage third countries to adopt. 
These include: adherence to international norms and procedures; cooperation with the 
relevant international bodies; establishment of domestic legal guarantees and procedures 
for complaints and reporting; and introduction of changes, training and of procedures in
f% 9Qprisons, in medical assistance, in the police and judicial sectors and so on.
In 2005 the EU initiated a system of regular reporting from the Heads of Mission in 
third countries and started to issue demarches systematically to those countries, such as 
Egypt, that had not ratified the UNCAT, its Optional Protocol and implemented its
f/i(\
provisions. In addition, in 2005 the EU adopted a Regulation which prohibited the 
export and import of goods whose only practical use is to carry out capital punishment
/ : - l i
or to inflict torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
This sets out a broad range of tools governed by Community and CFSP decision making 
processes.
628 Council of the EU (200If), Guidelines to EU policy on torture.
629 Council of the EU (2001f), Guidelines to EU policy on torture.
630 Council of the EU (2005), EU Annual Report on Human Rights.
631 Official Journal (2005), ‘Reglement (CE) n° 1236/2005 du Conseil du 27 juin 2005 concernant le 
commerce de certains biens susceptibles d'etre utilises en vue d'infliger la peine Capitale, la torture ou 
d'autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou degradants’, L2000, Brussels: 30 July.
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Despite the availability of a global policy, and of the multilateral and bilateral tools and 
channels through which condemn widespread reporting of episodes of torture, over the 
years EU’s record in Egypt has on the whole been patchy, as the table below shows.
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Box 8.1: Torture in Egypt and EU response632





International human rights groups have 
raised the issue of torture in every yearly 
report
Aid: EU has supported local 
NGOs dedicated to torture 
victims’ rehabilitation and 
advocacy.
Diplomacy: EU raised issue in 
the Association Council in 
2006.
CFSP: demarche in 2005. 
Multilaterally: EU raised the 
issue at the UN in 2000, 2001 
and 2004.
European Parliament: 
Resolution in 2003 and 2008 on 
a variety of human rights issues 
including torture and prison 
conditions
2002-3 Arrest 
and trial of 
over 20 men
Tried and sentenced for their 
homosexuality. Reported mistreatment and 
torture.
2003: EP Resolution on gay 





Former journalist and lawyer, became 
leader of Al-Ghad Party, member of the 
Egyptian Parliament, and presidential 
candidate in 2005 was sentenced to 5 years 
of imprisonment on 24 December 2005, 
charged with forging signatures in an effort 
to obtain formal party status for Al-Ghad. 
He was also the victim of mistreatment.
EU demarche
Statement of EU Presidency 
European Parliament: 
Resolution in 2006, included in 
Resolution of 2008.
May 2006 Imprisonment of activists protesting 
against the renewal of the emergency law
In raising concern at the 
‘disproportionate measures’ 
used against activists, the EU 
urges Cairo to respect its 
commitment to use emergency
632 The selection of events is based on: Council of the EU, EU Annual Reports on Human Rights, 1998- 
2007; European Parliament, Annual Reports on human rights, 1995-2007; Human Rights Watch, World 
Report, chapters on Egypt in the editions between 1991 and 2007; Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 
chapters on Egypt in the editions from 1991 to 2007; Amnesty International, State o f the world’s human 
rights, sections on Egypt in the editions from 1991 to 2007; US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, chapters on Egypt in the editions 
between 1993 and 2007. Also: European Parliament (2003), Resolution on human rights violations in 
Egypt, P5_TA(2003)0192, Strasbourg: 10 April; UK Presidency of the EU, ‘EU Presidency statement on 
the outcome of the trial of Mr Ayman Nour in Egypt’, 27 December 2005,
http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=QpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c-Page&cid=l 10 
7293561746&a=KArticle&aid= 1134650253515&date=2005-12-27: Council of the EU (2006e), 
‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on measures by the Egyptian authorities 
against civil society activists’, CFSP 9364/06, Press 143, Brussels: 15 May; General Secretariat of the 
Council (2006), Second Meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council on 13 June 2006, ‘Statement by 
the European Union’, Brussels: 12 June; Council of the EU (2007a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on 
behalf of the European Union on the constitutional reform process in Egypt’, CFSP 8205/07, Press 73, 
Brussels: 3 April; European Parliament (2008), Resolution on the situation in Egypt, P6_TA(2008) 0023, 
Strasbourg: 17 January.
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law powers only in the fight 
against terrorism
April 2007 Referendum on Constitutional changes that 
included incorporating emergency laws in 
the Constitution
CFSP Declaration on 
constitutional reform
Through its multilateral policies, the EU has called upon Egypt to invite the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture to visit the country, but has not used the United Nations General 
Assembly, the Committee against Torture or the CHR/Human Rights Council to 
condemn Egypt’s shortcomings in this field. The strongest words of condemnation were 
at the General Assembly, in 2001, in which the EU criticised the emergency law but fell 
short of making the issue of torture explicit:
while stating that the situation had remained unchanged in Egypt, the 
European Union expressed its grave concern, particularly, over the use of 
emergency powers such as laws and tribunals, when concerning civilian 
cases. The EU also expressed its preoccupation with the increase in 
administrative obligations of nongovernmental organisations, impeding the 
development of an active civil society.633
Furthermore, in 2004 Denmark, with the co-sponsorship of the EU member states, 
presented a Resolution on Torture the 59th session of the UN General Assembly and at 
the 61st UN Council on Human Rights, in which it ‘reiterated the absolute prohibition on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in international 
law and underlined its concern at the use of torture in several countries and regions’, but 
Egypt was not mentioned among the countries singled out. Instead, it was called upon to 
extend an invitation of the UNCAT’s Special Rapporteur on Torture.634
Hence, at the multilateral level, the EU has been reluctant to condemn Eygpt’s record. 
Indeed, in 2007 Egypt ran unopposed and was elected at the first round to the new UN 
Human Rights Council without stirring the opposition of EU member states as Belarus’s 
candidacy did, and despite the messages of protest filed by human rights groups to the 
UN General Assembly.635 According to one official interviewed, there was a ‘division’
633 Council of the EU (2002), EU Annual Report on Human Rights.
634 Council of the EU (2005), EU Annual Report on Human Rights.
635 See Gihan Shahine, ‘Seat of mystery’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 24-30 May 2007; Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights (EIPR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Human Rights Council Membership Requires 
Steps to Address Violations’, Briefing Paper, May 2007, hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/egypt0507/;
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on this issue between the Northern and Southern EU member states, with the latter 
‘pragmatically’ arguing against ‘isolating’ Egypt. This split, however, might not have 
been so clear-cut. While the NGO community saw the EU as a whole as supporting 
Egypt’s election, the UK claimed it was not ‘actively’ supporting Egypt (but was not 
opposing it either).638
The implementation of the EU’s policy on torture at the bilateral level was also patchy, 
confirming a general evaluation of the Guidelines commissioned by the European 
Parliament, according to which while the Commission Delegations knew about the 
Guidelines, only a few member state embassies had included them in their work 
programmes. In Cairo, member states’ embassies and the Commission Delegation 
were especially cautious on the specific issue of torture. While concern has been raised 
publicly and unofficially even at the highest levels at the prison conditions of 
individuals such as Ayman Nour, with both the UK and France raising the issue 
informally at ministerial level during diplomatic bilateral visits’ 640 there has been no 
systematic diplomatic policy of delivering messages to the Egyptian authorities on this 
matter. Even the countries most active in including human rights and democracy 
priorities in their bilateral relations and aid programmes, such as the Netherlands, prefer 
to avoid direct confrontation on torture in favour of disseminating ideas about human 
rights and torture, and supporting those groups that are combating torture within the 
country.641
Freedom House and UN Watch (2007), Evaluation o f 2007 -  2010 UN Human Rights Council 
Candidates, Joint Analysis 7 May, www.unwatch.org.
636 Interviews, embassy of EU member state, Cairo: 30 May 2007 (2), and NGO representative, Cairo: 30 
May 2007.
637 Interview, embassy of EU member state, Cairo: 29 May 2007 (1).
638 Interviews, embassy of EU member state, Cairo: 30 May 2007 (2), and NGO representative, Cairo: 30 
May 2007.
639 Interviews, Delegation of the Commission and embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 28 May (1), 29 
May (2), 30 May (2) and (3) 2007; Anna-Lena Svensson-McCarthy (2007), The implementation of the EU 
guidelines on Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Directorate 
General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate for Interparliamentary Delegations and Policy 
Department, Policy Department External Relations, Brussels, European Parliament: March.
640 UK Presidency of the EU (2005), ‘EU Presidency statement on the outcome of the trial of Mr Ayman 
Nour in Egypt’, 27 December,
http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=QpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=110 
7293561746&a=KArticle&aid=l 134650253515&date=2005-12-27: interviews, embassies of EU member 
states, Cairo: 29 (3), 30 (2) May 2007.
641 Interviews, European Commission Delegation and embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 28 May (1), 
30 May 2007 (3) and (4).
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At the CFSP level, torture has been the subject of one confidential demarche and was 
included in a broader demarche, both in 2005 (when the EU launched a concerted round 
of demarches). In May 2006 the Presidency issued a declaration on the measures used to 
repress activists in which it also criticised the Egyptian government’s recent renewal of 
the emergency law, despite its pledges to end it, and recalled the promise to use the 
emergency law powers only with regard to combating terrorism.642 But in general the 
member states have preferred avoiding the Troika format to relay such messages to the 
Cairo authorities, reflecting a widely shared view that official public condemnation was 
counterproductive to political dialogue.643 Furthermore, the government would often 
refuse to receive the Troika delegation, making the member states prefer informal and 
confidential discussions with the authorities.644
On the other hand, torture, prison conditions and the emergency law were explicitly 
discussed in the Association Council meetings held in 2006 and 2007, and in 2006, 
under the Austrian Presidency, the EU’s position was unusually open in mentioning ‘its 
concern at the alleged use of torture’, ‘urging’ Cairo to end the emergency law and the 
practices of torture,645 a position that was not well received in Cairo.646
In 2007 the government passed a constitutional reform package that included, among 
other things, the replacement of the emergency laws with a new anti-terrorist law, and 
the suppression of judiciary in supervising the elections. Despite the controversies that 
these reforms raised, the EU’s response was quite muted due to differences between the 
member states, some of which claimed confidence that the new anti-terrorist law would 
conform to international standards.647 The draft statement prepared by the German 
Presidency was thus significantly watered down (the EU position on this matter will 
thus be discussed in the following chapter).
642 Council of the EU (2006e), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf o f the European Union on 
measures by the Egyptian authorities against civil society activists’, CFSP 9364/06, Press 143, Brussels: 
15 May.
643 Interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007, embassies of EU member states and European 
Commission Delegation, Cairo: 28 May (1), 29 May (1), 30 May 2007 (4).
644 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007.
645 Council of the EU (2006h), ‘Second Meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council’, Luxemburg 13 
June; Council of the EU (2007b), ‘Third Meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council’, Luxemburg 27 
February.
646 Interview, Egyptian Embassy in Brussels, 16 May 2007
647 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels, 14 May 2007, and EU member state embassy, Cairo, 30 May 
2007 (3). See also section 3 in chapter 9.
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The European Parliament mentioned issues related to torture in its various resolutions on 
Egypt. This was seen in the Commission as a ‘healthy’ contribution to the debate,
f L A Q
helping put the issue on the agenda. However, it did not produce a specific resolution 
on torture, while it did on other issues such as gay rights and the imprisonment of Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim and Ayman Nour.
Whereas the EMP as a whole was silent on issues of torture in its members, the 
Neighbourhood Policy seemed to promise to play a stronger attention to human rights 
issues.649 The European Parliament had been backing a stronger role for human rights 
and democracy issues. When the Commission was preparing to identify the themes to be 
included in its draft Action Plan, the possibility of including the abolition of the 
emergency law was debated within the Commission and with the member states.650 
Torture had also been identified as a fundamental problem in the Country Report that 
had preceded the Action Plan.651 Yet in the final text, the word torture is not even 
mentioned, a fact that came under the scrutiny of Egyptian NGOs, disappointed with EU 
performance on this issue.652
This was due to the Egyptian government’s veto on including the issue. Faced with the 
choice between abandoning the negotiations on the Action Plan over human rights 
disagreements, the Commission (according to one Egyptian official, on the prompting of 
the member states)653 opted for a compromise solution by eliminating any explicit 
mention of the word torture while maintaining issues pertaining to it by keeping all the 
references to the relevant international instruments and conventions that Egypt was 
supposed to implement. The Commission maintained that all the key issues were 
included in the human rights and political reform section of the Action Plan, albeit not
648 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 15 May 2007 (1).
649 And it was perceived to do so in Cairo. Interviews, Egyptian Embassy, Brussels: 16 May and Egyptian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo: 31 May, 1 June 2007.
650 Informal meeting with officials from the Commission and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Rome, January 2005.
651 European Commission (2005), Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to : “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” Country Report Egypt COM(2005) 72 final, SEC(2005) 287/3 Brussels, 2 March.
652 International Federation of Human Rights, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, World 
Organization Against Torture, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, Egyptian Organisation for Human 
Rights, Cairo Institute for Human Rights (2007), ‘EU-Egypt Association Council: Action Plan’s Human 
Rights Section Falls Short of NGO Expectations’, Press Release, Brussels and Cairo: 7 March, 
www.cihrs.org/print press en aspx?per id= 197; interview, Egyptian NGO, Cairo, 30 May 2007.
653 Interview, Egyptian Embassy, Brussels: 16 May 2007.
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explicitly.654 The idea was that torture could be addressed ‘through the back door’, 
through other priorities such as strengthening the judiciary, police reform, addressing 
prison conditions.655 The ways in which the EU was to keep up a dialogue with Egypt 
on human rights issues was supposed to be through the subcommittee envisaged in the 
ENP dealing with human rights issues.
Negotiations on the subcommittee were a tortuous affair. The precedent within the ENP 
framework was set by Morocco, Jordan and even by Tunisia, making it difficult for 
Egypt to oppose its creation. However, Israel had managed to negotiate a subcommittee 
that would focus on broader issues as well. Egypt thus insisted on the same formula: 
‘human rights and democracy, international and regional issues’. While the 
Scandinavian member states insisted that the subcommittee should focus on human 
rights and democracy, the Commission was weary of insisting on this with Cairo 
because of the protracted difficulties in negotiating the political dimension of the Action 
Plan in the first place (see chapter 7).656
The Commission justified its position and openness to compromise through its 
commitment to the concept of ‘partnership’ that was supposed to underpin the ENP, 
arguing that it would be pointless to try to impose issues that would not be approved or 
implemented. This negotiation was particularly complicated and delicate in the case of 
Egypt. According to Commission officials, the Egyptian government was sensitive to 
the EU’s insistence on human rights and democracy, because it cared about the 
country’s image abroad, even if it was aware that the EU would never exercise any
f.cn
credible disincentive or sanctioning measure.
If the ENP has not led to a fundamental change in EU policy against torture in Egypt, it 
does appear to have offered opportunities to develop strategies based on informal 
diplomacy. According to Commission officials interviewed, since 2005 pressure on 
human rights issues in general (rather than torture in particular) has been exercised 
informally, and at all levels - ‘never missing an opportunity’, according to one
654 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 15 May 2007 (1) and (3).
655 Interviews, European Commission: Brussels: 15 May 2007 (1) and (3).
656 Interviews, European Commission: Brussels: 15 May 2007 (1) and (2), European Commission
Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (1).
657 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 15 May 2007 (1) and (2); interviews, European 
Commission Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (1).
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Commission Delegation official. Given that Cairo has been ‘masterful’ in avoiding the 
Troika format, EU Delegation and member state representatives in Egypt have discussed 
repeatedly the best means through which to convey messages to the Egyptian 
authorities.658
The subcommittee set up through the ENP had been considered by many of the officials 
interviewed as the ‘litmus test’ of the ENP’s ability to discuss human rights issues. 
However, concentrating the dialogue on torture and human rights in Egypt in the 
subcommittee did not pay off. The first meeting that was to take place in November 
2007 was rescheduled to January 2008 allegedly due to the engagement of the EU and 
of Egypt with the Annapolis conference on the Middle East. The rescheduling was 
accepted on part of the EU precisely because it was preoccupied that the meeting would 
focus overwhelmingly on issues relating to the plight of the Palestinians,659 replicating 
an oft-occurring experience during meetings in the framework of the Barcelona Process. 
Yet the January meeting was cancelled as well, following Cairo’s protest at the 
European Parliament’s Resolution on human rights in Egypt.660
Until recently, EU sensitivity to Egyptian opposition to any discussion on torture has 
meant that even its aid programmes did not tackle the problem directly. In fact, as 
chapter 3 illustrated, human rights and democracy did not figure high in EU assistance 
towards Egypt or in EIDHR funding (see table 3.7, p. 93). In 2004, torture was singled 
out among the thematic priorities of EIDHR, yet Egypt did not feature in the list of 
micro-projects. It was only later that the Delegation in Cairo managed to retrieve €1 
million from unspent resources. Since 2005-2006 the question of torture has made its 
way up the EU aid priority list, if perhaps through the back door. EIDHR has included 
projects on improving prison conditions, and has been supporting the Human Rights 
Center for the Assistance of Prisoners (HRCAP) through its micro-project funding.
658 Interviews, Council of the EU and European Commission, Brussels: 14 and 15 May 2007 (3); 
interviews, European Commission Delegation, and embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 28 May (1), 30 
May 2007 (4).
659 Phone interview, Council o f the EU, Brussels: 1 December 2007.
660 European Parliament (2008), Resolution on the situation in Egypt, P6_TA(2008) 0023, Strasbourg: 17 
January. Phone Interview, European Commission, Brussles: 14 February 2008.
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MED A has also taken over a project initially funded by some member states on training 
police officers.661
Another final issue needs to be taken into account: bilateral relations between the EU 
member states and Egypt in the practice of rendition of so-called terrorist suspects. Even 
if this area is strictly speaking not within the remit of traditional EU foreign policy, it 
overlaps uncomfortably with a number of its external activities.
The question of renditions of terrorist suspects has become, since the introduction of 
new anti-terrorist laws in many EU member states, an issue of foreign policy. Some 
member states have ignored their obligations under the Convention against Torture, 
which prohibits states to return foreign citizens to their countries of origins if that 
country practices torture, by seeking ‘diplomatic assurances’ against torture or ill- 
treatment of the suspect. Alongside the most notorious case of Abu Omar extradited in 
2003 from Milan to Cairo by the CIA with the alleged cooperation of the Italian secret 
services; other cases involved the Swedish government for the rendition of two men 
to Egypt in 2001, and the UK, Netherlands, Austria, and Germany towards other 
Southern Mediterranean countries. However, international human rights experts 
maintain that diplomatic assurances do not provide an effective safeguard against torture 
and ill-treatment, as reflected in strong statements against their use during 2006 by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur 
on torture, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, and the EU 
Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights.664
The consequences on human rights of the anti-terrorism policies of EU member states 
also undermined the EU’s ability to demand certain human rights standards in its 
neighbouring countries:665 ‘we are no longer angelic’, as one Council official put it.666 
This has undermined EU credibility, according to many Egyptian NGOs, in its positions
661 See table 3.7, p. 93; interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 16 May 2007; interview, European 
Commission Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (2).
662 Cecile Hennion, ‘Enleve par la CIA, torture en Egypte’, Le Monde, 8 June 2007.
663 Human Rights Watch (2006), World Report 2006, pp. 352-364, Human Rights Watch (2005), World 
Report 2006, pp. 369-381.
664 Human Rights Watch (2007), World Report 2007, pp. 376-378.
665 Ana Carbajosa, ‘El precio de ser complice en la guerra de Bush’, El Pais, 28 January 2007.
666 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 1 April 2008.
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against torture as well as in the 2005 elections, discussed in chapter 9.667 Indeed, it has 
been argued that counter-terrorism cooperation since September 11 has diverted the EU 
from its ‘normative agenda’ towards the South Mediterranean. However, it is 
debatable whether such normative agenda actually ever existed. In fact, although it 
cannot be denied that September 11 led to a stronger attention to fighting terrorism, for 
instance by including anti-terrorist clauses in agreements with third countries,669 and far 
greater difficulties in balancing out security versus normative aims, the rhetoric on 
human rights and democracy actually increased during the 2000s. As box 8.2 shows (p. 
217), prior to 2000 human rights and democracy were hardly addressed through CFSP 
declarations and the issue of torture was never raised in formal and informal diplomacy. 
This suggests that the security versus human rights and democracy argument is not the 
prime explanation for EU action (or inaction).
4. Explaining the EU response
The EU has a global, regional and country-specific commitment to combating torture, as 
well as a wide range of tools to do so. Yet the discrepancy between its commitment and 
its actions in Egypt is significant. During the first decade of the Barcelona Process, 
which introduced human rights and democracy in relations between the two shores of 
the Mediterranean, torture did not feature in relations with Egypt, even through aid 
programmes or EIDHR. It was only after 2005 that some timid and largely informal 
attempts were made to address issues regarding torture in Egypt.
But even after 2005, at the EU level, a generalised reluctance to engage with Cairo on 
the issue of torture was apparent. The Egyptian authorities were repeatedly and 
ostensibly opposed to any such discussion on a domestically extremely sensitive issue 
and, after the demarches of 2005, would not receive official delegations and the Troika 
to discuss torture and the mistreatment of prisoners. Such position was acknowledged by 
member states, Council and Commission officials who, as we have seen, agreed to drop
667 Hossam Bahgat, ‘Match your words with action: Britain can help expand human rights 
and political freedom in Egypt, but only if it leads by example in its anti-terror campaign’,
The Guardian, 7 September 2005.
668 Joffe (2008); Youngs (2006a).
669 Youngs (2006a).
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the issue of torture in the ENP Action Plan, despite having recognised it as a key deficit 
in Egypt in the preparatory Country Report.
For all the actors involved, the priority that emerged in this case was the need to 
maintain a relationship of partnership with Egypt. For the Commission, ‘partnership’ 
was the keyword to the recently developed Neighbourhood Policy, and Egypt’s
f \ lC \participation in it was seen as crucial to the success of a policy that also strengthened 
the Commission’s role in EU external relations. For the member states, the importance 
of partnership differed from country to country, as chapter 7 illustrated.
In the case of Egypt, a line of division emerged between the Mediterranean EU member 
states, more inclined towards maintaining dialogue, and the Northern ones, led by the 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, which would push for stronger EU 
positions on human rights and democracy. Nonetheless, on torture there was caution 
throughout.
For the larger countries, especially Britain and France, Egypt represented a key partner 
with regard to all their relations with the Middle East, the Arab world and Africa. 
Nonetheless, there were shades of difference between the two. When the French 
officials at the Cairo embassy raised the issue of torture with Paris, the reply was to
f \71maintain a distinction between international issues and the internal affairs of Egypt. 
This general French position of non interference is shared by other member states such 
as Italy, and has been confirmed by EU officials too. Conversely, Britain was more 
attentive towards human rights and democracy issues, but would measure carefully any 
condemnation of Egyptian authorities against its long list of priorities towards the 
country, often to the detriment of human rights issues.
Even the Northern EU member states, traditionally more concerned and vocal about 
human rights issues, found the issue of torture particularly difficult to deal with in
670 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1) and 15 May 2007 (1).
671 Interview, embassy of EU member state, Cairo: 29 May 2007 (4).
672 Interviews, embassy of EU member state, Cairo: 29 May 2007 (1) and (2), 30 May 2007 (4), Council 
of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007. See also Rosa Balfour (2005), ‘Italy’s Policies in the Mediterranean’, 
in Fernandez and Youngs (eds.), pp. 121-130.
673 Interviews, embassy of EU member state, Cairo, 30 May 2007 (2), confirmed in interviews, Council of 
the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007, and Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo: 1 June 2007.
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relations with Cairo. The Netherlands, whose interests in Egypt were important 
compared to the other Northern member states, had to weigh condemnation of torture 
against one of its priorities of establishing a dialogue with Islamic culture, due to its 
recent domestic problems in relations with Muslim communities.674
In essence, for different reasons, there was a convergence between the member states 
towards adopting a ‘soft’ position (in the words of one Council official) on torture in 
Egypt due to shared perceptions of the need to maintain friendly relations with Cairo. 
Secondly, condemning torture could have led to retaliatory positions by Cairo, given the 
occurrences of renditions of terrorist suspects to Egypt. The motivations behind this 
emphasis on partnership, however, were driven by different logics and priorities within 
each European capital, confirming intergovemmentalism as one of the main processes 
guiding European foreign policy. Furthermore, there were differences in emphasis on 
the importance of human rights and democracy issues in the capitals. Even after the 
publication in 2001 of the Guidelines on torture and in 2005 of systematic reporting 
from the Heads of Mission, not all embassies were aware of the Guidelines and few 
were monitoring the situation in Egypt.675
Despite this ‘logic of diversity’ guiding EU relations with Egypt, human rights issues 
were debated between the member states, especially on the ground, and cooperation was 
sought.676 This needs to be explained. First of all, EU commitment to pursue a global 
anti-torture policy at the multilateral and bilateral levels suggests that there was a 
general convergence between the EU member states on the appropriateness of 
developing certain positions collectively -  a ‘habit of cooperatin’. However selective 
and inconsistent its engagement with torture in Egypt, the fact that the EU did issue 
some measures undermines the hypothesis that the principles did not exist, or that they 
were resorted to just instrumentally.
Internal EU actors played a secondary role compared to the member states, but had 
some scope to influence policy. The European Parliament called upon the EU to
674 Interviews, embassy of EU member state, Cairo: 30 May 2007 (4).
675 Svensson-McCarthy (2007); interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007; interviews, 
embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 29 May 2007 (2).
676 This coordination on human rights issues was confirmed in interviews, embassies of the member 
states, Cairo: 30 May 2007 (4), although at Council o f the EU the stronger emphasis was on the diversity 
of national priorities, interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007.
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f t 7 7strengthen its policy on fighting torture in Egypt, but did not produce a Resolution 
devoted to this issue and focused instead its efforts in Egypt on other concerns. By 
contrast, the Commission, once the negotiations on the ENP Action Plan started, did 
seek to identify the key political deficits in Egypt, and used, also through a dynamic 
Delegation, many of the informal tools that it had at its disposal in its dialogue with the 
Egyptian authorities, suggesting some degree of ‘ideational shift’ amongst its officials.
It was recognised in Brussels and Cairo that the ENP does introduce some form of bland
•^70
conditionality on human rights principles that in practice was absent from the EMP. It 
also provided an opportunity for the Commission to have a greater role in shaping policy 
and it had the possibility to resort to informal diplomacy through the new avenues 
opened by the negotiations on the Action Plan. These windows of opportunity have 
strengthened its ability to conduct diplomatic efforts on human rights issues in Egypt.
But, according to Commission officials, torture represented a taboo subject by Cairo and 
the final draft of the Action Plan was substantially watered down on all human rights 
and political issues. Nonetheless, Commission officials maintained that since 2005 
torture has been a subject for dialogue and considered this a substantial improvement. 
However, due both to internal considerations regarding the appropriateness of 
antagonising a government which it was seeking to engage on the ENP, and to the final 
word of the member states, the Commission compromised on the text of the Action 
Plan, also claiming to expect the thorniest issues (such as torture) to be discussed in the 
framework of the ENP subcommittee for political dialogue. This bet did not pay off. 
Cairo has managed to repeatedly postpone the first meeting of the subcommittee without 
incurring any retaliation or condemnation. The Commission did, however, start to 
address issues related to torture through its aid programmes.
The Commission in particular, but also the European Parliament’s activism in raising 
some human rights issues in Egypt (though without a focus on torture) contribute to 
explaining the internal EU dynamics that led to the policy shift in 2005. However, other 
factors played an important role too, and these can be located in environmental changes
677 European Parliament (2006), Resolution on on Egypt: Violence against Sudanese refugees, 
P6_TA(2006)0031, Brussels: 19 January.
678 Interviews, Council of the EU, European Commission and Egyptian Representation to the EU, 
Brussels: 14 May, 15 May (1), 16 May 2007.
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outside the EU foreign policy making process. The short-lived change in US policy was 
probably the largest single factor that influenced the position of the member states.679 
Even in France, among the least critical countries of human rights abuses, US policy 
triggered a debate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on whether its traditional approach 
of non-interference and cultural tolerance was justifiable.
Secondly, the fact that torture began to be discussed in the Egyptian press, and that the 
government addressed some cases of torture and mistreatment with some token trials 
against low ranking police officers, opened a window of opportunity for EU institutions 
and some member states to start mentioning torture in their informal dialogue with the
f\R1Egyptian authorities. Even if the general issue of torture in Egypt has barely been 
noticed in the European press, the question of renditions and the revelations of torture 
on part of the US army in the Abu Grahib prison in Iraq put the member states in a 
difficult position subject to accusations of double standards.
5. Conclusions
What do these research conclusions highlight about the patterns of EU foreign policy­
making and the role of human rights and democracy? The first hypothesis developed 
considered human rights and democracy as a residual aim due to competing priorities. 
This approach certainly explains the absence of any normative position on torture 
throughout the 1990s, as boxes 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate (pp. 202 and 217). Even aid did not 
focus on projects that might be connected to torture, prison conditions, or police 
training.
This argument can also be found in the research that has focused on the consequences of 
September 11, whereby security policies stifled EU condemnation of human rights 
abuses in the South Mediterranean countries.684 Yet research findings in this case study 
show that it was precisely in the 2000s, when security concerns were stronger, that the
679 This was confirmed by all officials interviewed in EU institutions and member states’ embassies.
680 Interview, embassy of EU member state, Cairo: 29 May 2007 (3).
681 Interviews, European Commission Delegation and embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 28 (1), 30 
May 2007 (4).
682 On the basis of a review of major newspapers, such as The Financial Times, The Economist, Le 
Monde, El Pais, II Cornere della Sera, European Voice.
683 Interview, Council o f the EU, Brussels: 1 April 2008.
684 Junneman (2003b), Youngs (2006a), Joffe (2008).
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EU began to raise some concerns over human rights and democracy in a ‘quietly 
declaratory’ fashion.
The positions that the Union did develop remained declaratory to the extent that they 
were never followed by action, though one torture-related project aid was funded in 
2005. Only the more notorious case of Ayman Nour’s ill treatment, despite his frail 
health, merited a concerted response through CFSP. In fact, the response to Ayman 
Nour’s imprisonment and to the earlier trial against Saad Eddin Ibrahim (discussed in 
chapter 9), suggests that the EU preferred referring to clear cases against individuals, 
especially if westernised and secular, as the two ‘famous’ critics of Mubarak’s regime 
are, rather than to thematic or structural human rights shortcomings, such as torture. In 
other words, concerns over the persistence of the use of torture were quietly expressed 
confidentially and through informal diplomatic channels.
In this case, hypotheses regarding processes can help explain more than the security 
versus human rights argument. The logic of diversity between the EU member states and 
the primacy of national interests to be pursued bilaterally rather than within the 
institutionalised framework that the EU had put in place especially through the 
Barcelona Process can be considered as the main factors limiting the development of an 
EU position on torture in Egypt. A split that follows the division between Northern and 
Southern member states has emerged, with the EU Mediterranean countries preferring 
engagement with Cairo to condemnation, also in view of the negative reactions that any 
form of condemnation have encountered with the government. The primacy of the need 
for cooperation with Egypt represented the single largest factor jeopardising stronger 
normative positions -  a priority that was shared by all EU member states.
Intergovernmental and realist interpretations, however, do not offer a complete 
explanation of processes and dynamics occurring within the EU. While they can explain 
why the EU did not develop normative positions, in the case of torture in Egypt they do 
not explain the reasons for the responses that were, after all, produced. Unprecedently, 
the EU did call on Cairo to end the emergency law, even if the counter-terrorist agenda 
was becoming increasingly important.
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Within the EU, rhetorical action patterns triggered by stronger ‘policy entrepreneurs’, 
and helped by public attention through the media or NGOs, were not strong, especially 
given that even the most principled EU member states were debating the opportunity 
and the tactics to address the problem of torture. So the question does remain of why the 
EU did mention such issues, albeit marginally and not forcefully, in its relations with 
Egypt. Furthermore, however inconsequential EU positions on the substance of relations 
with Cairo, Egyptian authorities did resent any form of interference on these issues, as 
demonstrated by the ways in which the negotiations for the AA and for the Action Plan 
were tiresomely protracted.
First of all, contextual influences played an important role. Washington’s ‘regime 
change’ rhetoric, notwithstanding its underlying motivations, did trigger a debate within 
EU capitals and institutions about the appropriateness of its policy based on partnership, 
as interviews with officials confirmed. This not only raised the stakes of EU credibility 
in terms of the consistency between its rhetoric and action; it also it also contributed to 
questioning the validity of the EU’s approach.
This process was also occurring within the EU institutions, where hypotheses derived 
from institutionalism can offer some insights. In contrast with the Ukrainian case study, 
the role of the Commission appears to have been stronger in Egypt, especially since the 
beginning of negotiations for the ENP Action Plan which, incidentally, coincided with 
the year in which Mubarak made promises of reform under pressure from the United 
States (see chapter 9) and held presidential and parliamentary elections.
In terms of foreign policy processes, dynamics that can be interpreted through 
institutionalism the fact that changing beliefs within the Commission did make their way 
into the EU-Egypt agenda -  a recognition of which has been offered by Council and 
Egyptian officials -  suggests not just a degree of ideational shift within an EU 
institutions, but also that it had the scope to have some influence on policy. Thus, in this 
case there is some evidence to suggest a role for other constituencies, such as EU 
institutions, epistemic communities and the press, in influencing EU behaviour. These 
issues will be treated further in the conclusions of chapter 9.
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Box 8.2: EU Use of CFSP towards Egypt685
Date Tool Mention of human rights 
and democracy
April 1996 Declaration killing of Greek tourists No
June 2000 Common Strategy on the Mediterranean 
Demarche on human rights
Yes
May 2001 Declaration on Sentence against Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim and his colleagues
Yes





Demarche on human rights
March 2003 Declaration on the acquittal of Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim and colleagues
Yes
2004 Strategic Partnership Yes
July 2003-July 
2004
Demarche on human rights 




Demarche on human rights Yes
June 2005-June 
2006
EU raised questions regarding the use of the 
death penalty
Demarche on torture and ill-treatment 
Demarche to promote the universality and 
integrity of the Rome Statute 
Demarche on Ayman Nour’s trial and 
imprisonment
Yes
July 2005 EU Presidency statement condemning 
bombings in Egypt
No
September 2005 Declaration on Presidential elections Yes
December 2005 Statement on Parliamentary elections 
Statement of EU Presidency on the trial 
against Ayman Nour
Yes
685 EU Annual Reports on Human Rights, various editions EU Annual Reports on Human Rights, various 
editions; Council of the EU (1996c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on 
the killing of Greek tourists in Cairo’, CFSP 6717/96, Press 105, 22 April; Council of the EU (2001b), 
‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the sentences against Dr. Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim/Ibn Khaldoun Centre, CFSP 9119/01, Press 204, 28 May; Council of the EU (2002b), 
‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the trial in Egypt against Dr. Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim and the employees of the Ibn Khaldoun Centre and Hoda Association’, CFSP 11415/02, 
Press 225, Brussels: 30 July; Council o f the EU (2003a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the 
European Union on the acquittal of Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and his associates’, CFSP 7796/03, Press 94, 
Brussels: 26 March; Council o f the EU (2005b), ‘EU Presidency condemns bombings in Egypt’, 23 July; 
Council of the EU (2005a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the 
presidential elections in Egypt’, CFSP 12084/05, Press 229, 8 September; Council of the EU (2005d), 
‘Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Egyptian Parliamentary elections’. 
CFSP 15631/05, Press 355, 9 December; UK Presidency of the EU, ‘EU Presidency statement on the 
outcome of the trial of Mr Ayman Nour in Egypt’, 27 December; Council of the EU (2006f), ‘Declaration 
of the Presidency on the ferry disaster in the Red Sea’, CFSP Statement, 3 February; Council of the EU 
(2006e), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on measures by the Egyptian 
authorities against civil society activists’, CFSP 9364/06, Press 143, Brussels: 15 May; Council of the EU 
(2006g), EU Presidency statement on the train collision in Egypt, Press release 303/2006, 21 August; 
Council of the EU (2007a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the 
constitutional reform process in Egypt, CFSP 8205/07, Press 73, 3 April; Germany’s Presidency of the 
EU (2007), ‘EU Presidency statement on the Shura Council elections in Egypt’, 22 June.
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February 2006 Declaration on ferry disaster in the Red Sea No
May 2006 Declaration on measures against civil society 
activists
Yes
August, 2006 EU Presidency statement on the train 
collision in Egypt
No
April 2007 Declaration on constitutional reform Yes




Ch a p t e r  9
Im p l e m e n t in g  H um an  R ig h ts a n d  D e m o c r a c y : E l ec t io n s in  E g y pt
7. Introduction
In February 2005 Mubarak unexpectedly announced the first multi-candidate 
presidential elections in Egypt’s history, to be held a month before the parliamentary 
elections of October-December. This marked an important departure from previous 
practices, and was heralded by some as the start of a process of reform within Egypt. 
This chapter therefore, while overviewing the EU response to previous rounds of 
parliamentary and presidential elections, will focus the analysis on the 2005 events.
The EU’s positions on elections in Egypt needs to be understood in relation to the role 
that the US played in stimulating such changes, and in the context of the international 
debate triggered by Washington’s ‘regime change’ rhetoric. According to external 
observers, ‘any elections that have been held in the region seem to owe more to 
American abruptness than to European patience’.687 Early in 2005, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice had recognised the mistakes of US governments:
for 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense 
of democracy in this region here in the Middle East - and we achieved 
neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the
zoo
democratic aspirations of all people.
Arab regimes were not deaf to such pressure and subscribed to the universal principles 
of human rights and to political reform during meetings of the Arab League.689 In Egypt 
Mubarak had partly responded to US pressure by creating the Human Rights Council, 
reforming the National Democratic Party, and by introducing multi-party elections.
686 Bahgat Korany (2006), ‘Egypt’s Overdue Reform: A Prototype of the Middle East to Come?’, 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 83-89.
687 ‘Barcelona dreams’, The Economist, 24 November 2005.
688 Condoleezza Rice (2005), Secretary of US State Department, ;Remarks at the American University in 
Cairo, Cairo: 20 June, www.state.gov/secretarv/rm/2005/48328.htm, accessed 23 April 2007. For a review 
of US democracy promotion under G. W. Bush, see Katerina Dalacoura (2005), ‘US democracy 
promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001 ’, International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5, pp. 
963-979.
689 See for instance Arab League (2004), ‘Tunis Declaration of 16th Arab Summit’, Tunis: 23 May, 
www.saudiembassy.net/2004News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?c!ndex=421.
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These, as we shall see, did not challenge the status quo.690 The free elections in Iraq in 
January 2005 also sparked a debate about political reform in the Arab world,691 though 
the breakthrough that they seemed to promise was shortlived.
But this change did not last. Washington’s inability to bring any form of stability in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian parliamentary 
elections at the end of 2005, the democratic election of Islamist Hamas in the Occupied 
Territories of Palestine in January 2006 all stifled the US ‘regime change’ discourse. By 
2006, relations between the two countries appeared to do a U-tum back to the previous 
track.
As we shall see, these policy changes in Washington played an important role in shaping 
EU policy.
2. The conduct o f elections in Egypt
After 27 years of uninterrupted power, Egyptians have invented many jokes to describe 
Mubarak’s ‘pharaonic tendencies’. Until 2005, presidential elections were essentially a 
referendum confirming the People Assembly’s nomination of Mubarak -  referenda 
whose outcomes have overwhelmingly been an endorsement of Mubarak and his 
National Democratic Party.
Elections to the People’s Assembly (Parliamentary) in 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 all 
witnessed unfair campaigns, unequal access to the media, widespread manipulation of 
results, insufficient and bypassed judicial supervision despite repeated Constitutional 
Court sentences requiring the presence of judges at the ballot boxes, and serious
f\ QOharassment of opposition candidates, including prison detention.
690 Dalacoura (2005).
691 Dalacoura (2005); Fahmi Hweidi, ‘Ieri a Bagdad, domani nel mondo arabo’, Corriere della Sera, 31 
January 2005, translated from the Cairo daily Al-Ahram.
692 US State Department (2006), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -  2005, Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Washington: 8 March; US State Department (2007), Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices -  2006, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
Washington: 6 March; European Commission (2005b), Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to: 
“European Neighbourhood Policy” Country Report Egypt COM(2005) 72 final, SEC(2005) 287/3 
Brussels, 2 March.
220
If the late 1980s had seen a degree of pluralism, with over 20% of members of 
parliament elected from the lists of independent candidates (mostly Muslim Brotherhood 
affiliates who could not stand as representatives of an illegal organisation), by 1990 the 
NDP’s share of the vote started to increase again. The 1990 election represented a 
turning point, with a new mode of manipulating the elections and managing them from 
above. They were called two years early following the Supreme Constitutional Court’s 
ruling that had declared the electoral system adopted in 1987 illegal, giving the 
appearance of a new course in Egyptian politics. But the ways in which the new 
regulations were drafted and the constituencies formed favoured NDP candidates to the
z: q i
extent that the main opposition parties boycotted the elections.
The 1995 elections were preceded by a law that restricted freedom of the media and by 
the arrest of over 80 influential Muslim Brotherhood members, and the timing of the 
announcement of the elections severely limited the opposition’s ability to mobilise and 
campaign.694 According to the Economist,
Egypt is a master at the art of electoral manipulation: when it sent observers 
to oversee last year’s Palestinian elections [in 1996], voters in Gaza joked 
that the winner was sure to be Egypt’s President Mubarak. Its election 
record, says a European Union observer, is “exceptionally awful”.695
Whereas in 1990 the opposition parties boycotted parliamentary elections, in 1995 a 
record 3,980 candidates and 14 political parties vied for the 444 seats in the parliament 
that were open to electoral competition (a further 10 seats were allocated by 
appointment of the President). After an assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis 
Abeba, the campaign was characterised by government pressure on its critics and 
opposition groups, a ban on public gatherings, and a new press law that imposes harsh 
penalties for criticising public figures. Many candidates complained that their agents 
were prevented from entering polling booths to monitor the procedures and there were 
widespread allegations of electoral abuses. At the end of an election marred by violence 
(with dozens of deaths) and widespread abuses, Egypt’s ruling National Democratic 
Party won 317 of the 444 available seats in parliament. Independent candidates, many of
693 Kienle (2001), chapter 2.
694 Kienle (2001), chapter 2; James Whittington, ‘Egypt: The active political arena shrinks’, Financial 
Times, 20 May 1996.
695 Quoted in ‘Arab autocracy for ever?’, The Economist, 7 June 1997.
221
whom were supporters of the NDP, took 114 seats while candidates from the 13 
opposition parties standing won a collective 13 seats.696
In 2000 the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that judges must fully oversee elections, 
implying that Egypt’s parliaments elected in 1990 and 1995 were illegitimate. The 
Parliament responded surprisingly quickly by passing amendments establishing full
6 Q 7judicial supervision. But the NDP found other ways to thwart it. The result was that 
the 2000 elections increased multi-party competition and eliminated some of the most 
outrageous forms of fraud, so that the NDP’s control of parliament fell from 94 to 85% 
of the seats, even if the elections were far from being considered free and fair. The 
practice of NDP candidates standing in so-called ‘independent’ lists, only to join the 
NDP upon election, increased so much that they outnumbered the NDP official 
candidates (who alone did not achieve half of the seats). The Egyptian press ironically 
described the competition as one of ‘the NDP running against the NDP’. Whereas in 
the 1995 elections security forces had concentrated on harassing the opposition 
candidates, especially those affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, in 2000 they focused 
on their aides and allies. The presence of the judiciary at the polling booths gave an 
appearance of legitimacy, but the change was ‘cosmetic’.699
In early 2005, Mubarak surprised the Egyptians by announcing direct multi-candidate 
presidential elections. The announcement came just after Bush had urged Cairo to 
accelerate political reform during his European tour,700 one day after Condoleezza Rice 
had postponed a visit to Egypt amid growing US concern at the detention of Ayman 
Nour, the head of the al Ghad party.701 But internal factors were to play a role too. First 
of all, Egypt was hit by economic slump that forced the population to queue for bread 
for the first time in a generation, causing dissatisfaction with the government. Secondly, 
the influence of Gamal Mubarak, the son of the President, in the ruling party began to be
696 James Whittington, ‘Egyptians vote amid tough restrictions’, Financial Times, 30 November 1995; 
James Whittington, ‘Mubarak wins huge majority’, Financial Times, 8 December 1995.
697 Brownlee (2002); Mona Makram-Ebeid (2001), ‘Egypt’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections’, Middle East 
Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 32-44; ‘The law v the state’, The Economist, 22 October 2001.
698 Makram-Ebeid (2001), p. 38.
699 According to Muhammad Sid Ahmed, a leading Egyptian commentator, quoted in James Drummond, 
‘Tight lid kept on Egyptian poll dissent’, Financial Times, 31 October 2000.
700 Khaled Diab, ‘Will Mubarak let Egypt’s people pick a president?’, European Voice, 3 March 2005.
701 For a review of the reactions of the Egyptian press on the role of the US in pushing Mubarak’s 
decision, see Fatemah Farag, ‘Egyptian press: “Respect yourself” , Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 3-9 March 
2005.
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felt.702 He had been appointed head of the NDP’s policy bureau with the aim of 
modernising its internal organisation and image to help the party recover from the losses 
of the 2000 elections.703
Thus, under international pressure and supported by some domestic dynamics, in March 
2005 the People’s Assembly adopted a bill amending the Constitution to allow for direct 
presidential elections, approved through a referendum the following May. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, the three main opposition parties and the protest movement Kifaya 
boycotted the referendum, as the constitutional amendments still posed numerous 
restrictions: only legal parties vetted by a state-controlled committee could propose a 
candidate, while for independent candidates 250 endorsements from elected officials 
were required, most of whom belonged to the ruling party. In the end, of the thirty-nine 
applications, ten candidates stood against Mubarak on 7 September 2005, of which only 
two were credible: Noman Gomaa, head of the liberal Wafd party, and Ayman Nour, 
temporarily freed on bail, who had split from the Wafd to form the al Ghad (Tomorrow) 
party. The results were, nonetheless, a forgone conclusion: of the 23% of Egyptians who 
went to the ballot box, over 88.6% confirmed Mubarak for another term, while Ayman 
Nour obtained only 7.6% of the vote and Noman Gomaa 2.7%.704 According to 
observers, ‘the fight was lopsided, hastily arranged, poorly refereed and pitted a big 
bruiser against bantams. Still, Egypt’s first-ever multi-candidate presidential election 
marked a watershed’.705 Even the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) 
recognised that despite the many pitfalls in the conduct of elections, they did represent
HC\£L
an ‘important step’. In the run up Mubarak made lots of promises: to repeal 
emergency laws as well as laws restricting freedom of the press, the judiciary and the 
formation of parties.
Parliamentary elections were then held in three rounds in November-December 2005.707 
Independent monitors complained of the procedural methods used to elect the members
702 ‘Surgery on hardened arteries’, The Economist, 2 October 2003; William Wallis, ‘Breaking the mould 
of inertia’, Financial Times, Special Report Egypt, 23 November 2004.
703 Michele Dunne (2006), ‘Evaluating Egyptian Reform’, Carnegie Papers, No. 66, January.
704 Amira Howeidy, ‘Beyond the figures’, Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 15-21 September 2005.
705 ‘Only a first step, but it matters’, The Economist, 8 September 2005.
706 Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (2005a), The 2005 presidential election: a critical analysis, 
Cairo: 10 September, www.eohr.org/report/2005/re0910.shtml.
707 Three rounds were necessary because of a Constitutional Court ruling that required judicial supervision 
in every polling station.
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of parliament, and of violations during the election process including violence, 
tampering with electoral registers, bribery, abuse of public funds, assaults on 
supervising judges, media representatives, and civil society observers, which for the first 
time organised themselves in the Civil Society Election Monitoring Coalition to 
supervise presidential and parliamentary elections in the absence of international 
monitors.708
The results were a victory for the independent candidates tied to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, who ran for only 141 of the total 454 parliamentary seats and obtained 88 
-  nearly 20% of the seats, whereas the NDP’s parliamentary group’s share dropped to 
below 70%. The rise of Islamists was probably the main reason for the subsequent 
clamp down of democratic practices: Mubarak has since postponed local elections 
indefinitely, mounted pressure on the judges who had protested against vote-rigging, 
had Ayman Nour put in jail in December 2005 together with the arrest of dozens of 
Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers, and in May 2006 renewed the emergency law. By 
the end of the year, The Economist spoke of ‘one of the fiercest campaigns of repression 
against the Muslim Brotherhood and other dissidents’, including the intimidation of 
judges.709 This backtracking, after the partial and largely symbolic responses to Western 
pressure for reform between 2004 and 2005 in Egypt and in other countries in the region 
(that witnessed the holding of some elections and the Cedar revolution in Lebanon), was 
interpreted also as a response to the rise of Hamas which won elections in the 
Palestinian territories at the start of 2006, frightening the Arab and Western 
governments alike,710 as well as a consequence of prolonged crisis and violence in Iraq 
that undermined US policy in the Middle East.
In March 2007, the same amendments that constitutionalised some of the emergency 
law provisions on torture also concerned the electoral process by curbing the powers of 
the judiciary in supervising elections, widely considered by the opposition as the only
708 Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (2005b), "Future Parliament”? Not Yet! EOHR Report on 
Parliamentary Elections 2005 Results, Cairo: 14 December, www.eohr.org/report/2005/rel214.shtml; 
‘Not yet a democracy’, The Economist, 8 December 2005.
709 The president digs in, yet again’, The Economist, 30 November 2006.
710 ‘Not yet, thanks’. The Economist, 29 June 2006; interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 
2007, embassy of Egypt, Brussels: 16 May, embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 29 May 2007 (1) and 
(3).
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means to ensure some degree of transparency of the vote despite the experience of 
restraints in 2005.711
3. The responses of the EU
The EU was silent and policy-less on all electoral processes preceding the 2005 
announcement of the first multi-candidate presidential elections and the subsequent 
parliamentary elections. The only case related to electoral issues in which the EU 
engaged regarded protesting at the imprisonment and trial of Said Eddin Ibrahim and his 
colleagues, who had directed a project on voter education at the Ibn Kaldun Centre, 
financed by the Commission (see box 9.1, p. 226)
It was only after Mubarak’s announcement that the EU made some timid steps towards 
encouraging a more open electoral process. In March, the Commission stated: ‘We 
welcome this development in Egypt as a positive step in the right direction’, according 
to Emma Udwin, the Commission’s External Relations spokesperson. But she also 
added that reforms cannot be ‘imposed from outside’ and that ‘we hope we can be 
supportive of Egypt in its own efforts to modernise’.712 Solana too welcomed the 
‘potentially positive changes’ occurring in Egypt, though he added that
democratic movements have to be home-grown [...]. But outsiders can and 
should play a role. They can help create a context conducive to political 
change. Once change is underway, they can support and reward reformist 
forces.713
The two main institutions of the EU were thus implicitly underlining the limits of EU 
involvement in pushing for the introduction of some democratic change in Egypt, 
emphasising the need for domestic ownership of political reform processes as well as 
seeking to characterise the EU as an actor that supports -  rather than exports - human 
rights and democracy. This approach had also been outlined in the CFSP’s Strategic 
Partnership with the Mediterranean, as a way to differentiate EU policy from 
Washington’s regime change mantra:
711 Mouna Naim, ‘Le president Moubarak somet a referendum des amendements constitutionnels 
contestes’, Le Monde, 23 March 2007.
712 Khaled Diab, ‘Will Mubarak let Egypt’s people pick a president?’, European Voice, 3 March 2005.
7,3 Javier Solana, ‘Europe’s role in the spread of democracy’, Financial Times, 14 March 2005.
225
These challenges will not be overcome by maintaining the status quo; 
political, social and economic reform is required. Such reforms can succeed 
only if they are generated from within the affected societies; they cannot 
and should not be imposed from outside.714
Box 9.1: Elections in Egypt and EU response715




Opposition candidates and 
campaigners jailed. Military court 







Until 2005 elections, President was 
‘nominated’ by Parliament for a 6 year 
term (he was the only candidate) and 
confirmed through a referendum. 






Not free and fair.




Case of Said 
Eddin Ibrahim 
and his
colleagues of the 
Ibn Khaldun
Arrested in June 2000, found guilty in 
May 2001 of embezzlement and 
receiving funds from the European 
Commission (€315.000 on voter 
education), sentenced to 7 years of 
imprisonment, and released in May
EU reaction: three CFSP 
Declarations
Chris Patten: ‘I was dismayed to 
learn of these sentences and 
reiterate that the European 
Commission has no evidence of
714 European Council (2004c), Final Report on a EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, 17-18 June.
715 Council of the EU, EU Annual Reports on Human Rights, editions from 1998 to 2007, European 
Parliament, Annual Report on human rights in the world and European Union's human rights policy, 
editions between 1995 and 2007; Human Rights Watch, World Report, chapters on Egypt in the editions 
between 1991 and 2007; Freedom House, Freedom in the World, chapters on Egypt in the editions from 
1991 to 2007; Amnesty International, State o f the world's human rights, sections on Egypt in the editions 
froml991 to 2007; US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, chapters on Egypt in the editions between 1993 and 2007; Council of 
the EU (2001b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the sentences against 
Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim/Ibn Khaldoun Centre’, CFSP 9119/01, Press 204, 28 May; European Parliament 
(2002), Resolution on Egypt: the case o f Mr Saad Eddin Ibrahim, P5_TA(2002)0410, Strasbourg: 5 
September; Council o f the EU (2002b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on the trial in Egypt against Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the employees of the Ibn Khaldoun Centre and 
Hoda Association’, CFSP 11415/02, Press 225, Brussels: 30 July; European Commission (2002), Press 
Statement, ‘Commissioner Patten deplores ruling of Egyptian State Security Court against Saad Edin 
Ibrahim’, IP/02/1161, Brussels, 30 July; Council of the EU (2003a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on 
behalf of the European Union on the acquittal of Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and his associates’, CFSP 
7796/03, Press 94, Brussels: 26 March; Council of the EU (2005a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on 
behalf of the European Union on the presidential elections in Egypt’, CFSP 12084/05, Press 229, 8 
September; Council o f the EU (2005d), ‘Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on 
the Egyptian Parliamentary elections’, CFSP 15631/05, Press 355, 9 December; Council of the EU 
(2007a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the constitutional reform 
process in Egypt’, CFSP 8205/07, Press 73, Brussels: 3 April; Germany’s Presidency of the EU (2007), 
‘EU Presidency statement on the Shura Council elections in Egypt’, 22 June, 
www.eu2007.de/en/News/CFSP_Statements/June/0622ShuraRat.html.
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Centre 2003. The arrest and trial was 
considered as a signal of (among other 
things) the risks of accepting foreign 
funding, and investigating fraud in the 
1995 elections.
the alleged falsification of 
documents, which seems to have 
been central to the case for the 
prosecution. We deplore the 
continued use of State security 
courts to prosecute cases of this 
nature’.
EP Resolution
2005 First multi-candidate presidential 
elections 2005
Aid: voter education and voter 
registration projects. 




Parliamentary elections 2005 Diplomacy: EU raised issue 
through CFSP
April 2007 Referendum on Constitutional 
changes
CFSP Declaration on 
constitutional reform
June 2007 Shura Council elections Statement of the Presidency
Beyond issuing encouraging declarations, indeed, EU action did not support the 
organisation of the elections. It did not discuss the possibility of sending an Electoral 
Observation Mission to monitor the various electoral rounds of the autumn of 2005, 
ostensibly because it had not received an invitation from the Egyptian government to do
n \(L  7 1 7so -  one of the political criteria guiding the EU’s electoral observation policy. As 
an alternative, and for the first time uninvited, the European Parliament sent a small 
delegation to witness the parliamentary election rounds which, however, did not return 
for the final round as ‘there was little point in returning because of the negative 
impressions it had on 9 November’.718
EU diplomatic actions towards Mubarak and the government during this year of 
elections also reflected this strategy of caution: it insisted on the president’s agenda for 
political reform to which he had committed at the beginning of the year and during the 
election campaign, and praised the judicial supervision of the election and the 
observation missions organised by civil society groups. It also recalled that in the future
7 1 Qinternational observation missions could play a role. Solana congratulated Mubarak 
upon his re-election, but also reminded him of his ‘ambitious programme’ for political
716 Interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 1 December 2007 (phone interview), and 1 April 2008.
717 European Commission (2000a), On EU Election Assistance and Observation, COM(2000) 191 final, 
Brussels: 11 April, especially Annex III: Council Decision 9262/98 -  PESC 157 -  COHOM 6 Guidelines 
-  EU Policy on electoral observation.
718 European Parliament (2005), ‘EP delegation will not go back to Egypt for final phase of elections’, 
Press Release REF.: 20051122IPR02740, Brussels: 22 November.
7,9 Council of the EU (2005a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf o f the European Union on the 
presidential elections in Egypt/, 12084/05 (Presse 229), Brussels: 8 September.
227
reform and of the commitment to democratic principles in the Arab League’s Tunis 
Declaration of May 2004.720 The ‘encouraging’ messages were followed by ‘concern’ at 
the incidents and irregularities reported during the parliamentary elections.721
If the 2005 election year for Egypt, widely heralded as a new era of reform in the Arab 
world, produced a declaratory engagement on part of the EU, in 2007 the referendum 
approving Constitutional changes and the elections to the Shura Council (the Upper 
Chamber) attracted a weaker response. The story of the EU Declaration on 
Constitutional Reform is illustrative. The Commission Delegation in Cairo made a first 
draft of the text, viewed by some Northern member states’ embassies, which was sent to 
the German Presidency. Berlin modified the draft to include a fairly harsh condemnation 
of the constitutional amendments that were extremely likely, among other things, to 
curtail further the right to humane prison conditions, freedom from torture, as well the 
role of the judiciary in supervising the elections (hence the relevance of this declaration 
for issues relating to torture as well as to the conduct of elections).
The Egyptian government and its Representation in Brussels, having viewed the text 
redrafted by Germany, lobbied the representations to the EU of the member states and 
alerted all its embassies in the EU member state countries in an attempt to block the 
Declaration. Some member states (France, the UK, Portugal) presented amendments that 
substantially softened the tone of the condemnation. The German Presidency faced the 
choice between either endorsing a heavily watered down version of the original draft or 
issuing a Declaration on behalf of the Presidency only, without the backing of the EU.722 
The text upon which an agreement was finally reached was considered by many of the 
officials interviewed as ‘soft’: it underlines that the EU has been ‘actively’ following the 
constitutional reform process in Egypt and will continue to so on the new anti-terrorism 
law, but limited its condemnation of the referendum and ‘noted’ the lack of a public 
debate on constitutional reform. The justification used by the member states that pushed
720 Council of the EU (2005c), ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, Congratulates President 
Mubarak on his Re-election’, Brussels: 10 September, S295/05.
721 Council of the EU (2005d), ‘Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the 
Egyptian Parliamentary Elections’, 15631/05 (Presse 355), 9 December.
722 Interviews, Council of the EU, European Commission, and Egyptian Representation, Brussels: 14 
May, 15 May (1), 16 May 2007; interviews, Delegation of the European Commission, and Egyptian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo: 28 May (2), 31 May 2007.
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for a ‘soft’ declaration was the clarification with the Egyptian authorities that the EU 
expected ‘any new legislation to abide by international standards’.723
In the case of Constitutional reform, Germany preferred to seek consensus between the 
member states, but the elections to the Shura Council barely attracted any attention in 
the EU. The lack of endorsement of a statement condemning the elections on part of the 
same member states that had watered down the previous declaration on constitutional 
reform left the German head of the rotating EU Presidency to issue a statement that was 
not on behalf of the EU. The text ‘regrets’ the widespread irregularities and ‘encourages 
the Egyptian authorities to investigate these occurrences thoroughly and to ensure that 
future elections are fair and democratic’.724
In the context of such official responses, informal initiatives require mentioning. Some 
embassies of the EU member states (including the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Austria) with the Commission Delegation carried out a coordinated effort to oversee the 
electoral process and report back to their respective capitals. After the elections, these 
officials met together to ‘compare notes’ and question EU policy on the election 
rounds.725
Aid projects related to raising voter awareness have been a particularly contentious issue 
in relations between Egypt and the EU. In 2001, Said Eddin Ibrahim and his colleagues 
were imprisoned on the accusation of embezzlement and of receiving European 
Commission funds. Indeed, the Ibn Kaldun Centre had received €315.000 of MEDA 
funds for a project based on voter education. At that time, the EU issued two CFSP 
declarations and raised far more diplomatic pressure than over many other cases, but it 
was criticised for not going beyond diplomatic statements and for criticising the 
government only once it was satisfied that the funds it had given to the Centre had been 
properly accounted for.726 By 2005, however, the Commission had reactivated its aid in
723 Council of the EU (2007a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the 
constitutional reform process in Egypt’, CFSP 8205/07, Press 73, 3 April. Interviews, Council of the EU, 
Brussels: 14 May 2007.
724 Germany’s Presidency of the EU (2007), ‘Statement on the Shura Council elections in Egypt’, 22 June, 
www.eu2007.de/en/News/CFSP Statements/index.html.
725 Interviews, Delegation of the European Commission and embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 28,
29, 30 May 2007.
726 James Drummond, ‘Egypt condemned for sentencing o f activist’, Financial Times, 25 May 2001; and 
Judy Dempsey and Heba Saleh, ‘Egypt and EU take big step on free trade’, Financial Times, 26 June
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support of electoral processes, by supporting many of the local NGOs that developed a 
network to observe the conduct of elections.727 Voter registration also became a priority 
for EU aid, given that around 50% of the population does not have an identity card -  this 
is being addressed through European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument funding rather 
than EIDHR, given that it constituted an issue upon which cooperation with Egyptian 
authorities was possible.728
4. Explaining the EU response
EU action on electoral processes in Egypt shares with the case study on torture the shift 
that occurred in 2005. Mubarak’s response to US pressure with the holding of multi­
candidate presidential elections was also picked up by the EU. During the year, the EU 
produced a declaratory policy of encouragement of electoral liberalisation processes, 
recalling the President’s commitments at Tunis and during the electoral campaign. 
However, a closer look at the actions produced and the processes that led to them reveal 
some differences with the case of torture.
First of all, the Egyptian government was never condemned publicly or confidentially, 
as it was twice in 2005 with confidential demarches on torture. Secondly, informal 
diplomacy, also through the Commission, was largely absent. After the problems 
incurred with the Egyptian authorities over the case of the Ibn Kaldun Centre, the 
Commission has been cautious in its use of aid, for instance to promote voter education 
projects. In 2005 it supported a voter registration project that was carried out in 
cooperation with Egyptian government structures. By contrast, EIDHR has not been 
used to promote projects with relevance to improving standards in the conduct of 
elections.
The EU’s position on electoral standards was hostage, more than EU policy on torture, 
to divergences between the member states. If in 2005 there was sufficient agreement
2001, which raised the contradiction between the human rights clause and its lack of use on part of the EU 
for cases of this kind.
727 Interview, Delegation of the European Commission embassy of one EU member state, Cairo: 28, 30 
May 2007.
728 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 15 May 2007; interview, European Commission 
Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007.
729 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 1 April 2008.
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on producing declaratory statements encouraging respect for fundamental standards, by 
2007 this consensus had evaporated: the statement on the elections to the Shura Council 
were issued by the German presidency alone without the backing of the other EU 
member states. Similarly, the Constitutional reforms that wiped out the victories of the 
judiciary in securing their supervision of elections, ‘approved’ through a referendum, 
were met in the EU with an enfeebled declaration that had been watered down by those 
member states that were keen to prevent Cairo’s promised negative reaction.
The results of the 2005 parliamentary elections should also be taken into account in 
understanding the EU position. The clear success of the Muslim Brotherhood was not 
seen favourably in many European capitals, fearing the consequences of a rise of 
Islamist political forces in Egypt. The government’s crackdown on the opposition 
following the elections, and the EU’s reaction to it is enlightening: whereas the 
imprisonment of Ayman Nour was criticised formally and informally by EU national 
governments and by the EU,730 the imprisonment of dozens of Muslim Brotherhood 
affiliates did not raise any concern in Europe. The electoral victory in January 2006 of 
Hamas in the Palestianian Occupied Territories was overwhelmingly singled out as the 
most important factor in changing the EU position731 by and large brought to an end the 
brief season of Western pressure on electoral liberalisation in Egypt.
The EU paradigm whereby democracy and security are seen as two sides of the same 
coin, as the EMP and ENP rhetoric and policies would establish, is thus fundamentally 
contradicted when the consequences of political reform lead to the fear of a rise of 
‘fundamentalism’. Far from being ‘merged’, they are in a relationship of mutual 
contradiction. This confirms the conflict between security and normative interests that 
previous research in the field of EU relations with the Mediterranean as a whole has 
postulated.732
730 Ayman Nour’s imprisonment was also criticised informally during visits of European heads of state 
and government ministers. See Chapter 8.
731 Interviews, Council of the EU and European Commission, Brussels: 14 May, 15 May 2007 (1), 1 April 
2008, and (2), and embassies of the member states, Cairo: 29(1), 30 May 2007 (4).
732 Gillespie and Youngs (2002); Junemann (2003a); Joffe (2008), Michelle Pace (2007), ‘Norm shifting 
from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the south?’, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 659 -  675.
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On the whole, in the case of elections in Egypt, therefore, the realist interpretations 
represent the most powerful explanation for the virtual absence of any EU position prior 
to the 2005 events and to the brakes pulled during the election year. The EU did take 
some advantage of the external circumstances that offered a window of opportunity 
largely thanks to Washington’s brief period of pressure on Cairo to hold multi-candidate 
presidential elections with some diplomatic encouragement of the changes and some 
support of local NGOs to monitor the electoral processes of 2005. How to explain these 
‘push’ factors?
5. Conclusions
Human rights supporters in Cairo, non-governmental but also from within the 
government, see the EU’s position on human rights and democracy-related issues as 
‘hypocritical, naif and unfocussed’.733 Opposition parties and movements have been 
united in calling upon the EU to articulate binding reform benchmarks in approaching 
Egypt, and many doubt that EU commitment to promoting democracy is real, while 
others worry about its ‘real intentions’.734 In the member states too the EU’s self- 
portrayal as a supporter of global human rights meets the scepticism of observers:
the US and its European allies have long used the smokescreen of 
democracy and human rights to undermine regimes of which they do not 
approve [such as Belarus], while turning a blind eye to undemocratic 
practices and rights abuses in countries [including Egypt] that do their 
bidding.735
The evaluation of such external inconsistency in performance, however, requires a 
deeper analysis of the priorities of the different actors, and of the processes that led to 
EU actions.
This instrumentalist view, whereby on single issues it is possible to find a prioritisation 
on security rather than on democracy, is weakened if placed in a broader historical 
context, and does not explain the reasons for the differences in the reactions over each
733 Interview, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo: 1 June 2007.
734 Amr Hamzawy (2005), ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Democratic Reform in Egypt: 
Contemporary Policy Debates’, in Fernandez and Youngs (eds.), pp. 131-137.
735 Neil Clark, ‘You cannot be serious: The Belarus saga exposes the hollowness of the west's support for 
human rights and democracy’, The Guardian, 27 March 2006.
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case. First of all, an examination of the processes and motivations guiding the EU 
member states help us understand the nature of the ‘other’ priorities that hindered the 
development of stronger normative positions.
Chapter 7 illustrated that there was a convergence within the Council on viewing Eygpt 
as a key partner in the pursuit of other important foreign policy dossiers in the Middle 
East, in the Arab world and in Africa -  issues of particular importance to the large 
member states with a tradition of presence in the region. But the issues to be dealt with 
through partnership with Cairo varied among the member states. The strength of 
intergovemmentalism can be seen not only in terms of divisions between the member 
states but also on varied importance of types of motivations driving foreign policy. 
Whereas for Britain the key concern was Egypt’s role as a partner in a number of 
international affairs questions, Italy’s prime interests were related to economic and 
(partly) migration cooperation. France held interests in both fields, though mitigated by 
strong interests in other countries of the area. These differences were fed into the 
Council as well as in the Commission.
Although the Council’s diplomatic activity included talks with Mubarak on all the 
broader issues in which Egypt’s role was important, CFSP was rarely resorted to for 
such issues. Indeed, the member states continued to pursue bilateral relations with Cairo 
regardless of the dimensions of the EMP or ENP.737 This is counterfactually proved also 
by Cairo’s strategy of putting pressure on the individual member states as well as on EU 
institutions. Egyptian authorities saw the member states as the key actors in developing 
an EU position,738 as much as they were aware that the dialogue with the member states 
on external affairs was more important than any human rights dialogue with EU
739institutions.
Nonetheless, two key priorities stand out: the importance of partnership and of 
maintaining good relations with an important partner on numerous international and 
regional dossiers, and the overwhelming understanding that the stability of the region
736 Interviews, Council of the EU, and European Commission, Brussels, 14 May, 15 May 2007 (1).
737 Interviews, embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 29 May (3), 30 May 2007 (1).
738 Interview, Egyptian Embassy to the EU, Brussels: 16 May 2007.
739 Interview, European Commission Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (1).
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depends on the containment of Islamist political forces, especially in a key regional 
country like Egypt. Both required cooperation with Cairo.
The importance of partnership was a key inhibiting factor in pursuing action relating to 
human rights and democracy deficits. The sensitivity of EU institutions and member 
states to the reaction of Egyptian authorities to strong condemnation was taken into 
consideration in the debate on how to convey messages to the government. Troika- 
delivered messages, for instance, were seen as counterproductive, often leading to a 
preference for informal diplomacy.
In contrast with Ukraine’s Orange Revolution at the end of 2004, there has been no 
strong motivation that led member states and institutions to perceive human rights and 
democracy goals as ‘merged’ with other interests, despite the rhetoric on democracy as 
the best guarantor for stability. On the contrary, the fear of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ 
through the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, toned down the EU’s brief flirtation with 
stronger diplomacy in 2005. Nor was there any evidence to suggest that the human 
rights and democracy rhetoric would be used as a vehicle to pursue other interests, or as 
a means to appease domestic demands for human rights promotion.
But why did the EU member states on occasion pursued collective declaratory positions 
on human rights and democracy? Why was there an increase in normative CFSP 
positions after 2000, when the security ‘stakes’ grew stronger? And why did the EMP 
and ENP increasingly insist on these principles and standards? There is no evidence to 
suggest that they could act as a Trojan horse for hegemony or economic penetration (in 
fact, if anything they could be detrimental to such aims, as argued by an Egyptian 
official comparing the supposed strings attached to aid by the EU to Chinese 
investments).740
The Egyptian case illustrated the diversity of perceptions between the member states on 
the role that human rights should play, as well as the means and tools to use when 
human rights issues are eventually raised. Interviews have confirmed that the 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands have been the most active regarding human
740 Interview, Egyptian Embassy to the EU, Brussels: 16 May 2007.
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rights, and that Germany adopted high profile positions during its presidency of the EU 
in the first half of 2007. Britain too has not refrained from human rights based public 
diplomacy (CFSP was used on human rights issues in Egypt during its presidency in the 
second half of 2005, when the parliamentary and presidential elections were held in 
Egypt), as well targeting its aid projects towards human rights and democracy, but as the 
EU member state with the strongest ties to Egypt, it balanced its public condemnation 
extremely carefully.
France, Spain, Portugal and Italy were instead particularly sensitive to avoid issues they 
consider ‘internal affairs’, mistrusted the ‘lecturing style’ of the northern EU member 
states and favoured a ‘mercantilistic view based on Realpolitik’ .741 Although Spain was 
a secondary actor in Egypt, it has played an important role in developing EU policies 
towards the Mediterranean basin. But with regard to human rights and democracy, 
according to one source, ‘Spanish foreign policy is often rather lenient towards some 
regimes, and this is out of concern that Spanish policies might look too American. There 
are no democracy promotion policies against any government’.742 Italy has traditionally 
shied away from any initiative regarding human rights and democracy issues in Egypt, 
preferring to ‘follow suit rather than promote’.743 In other words, it would not block 
CFSP action on human rights and democracy, given its commitment to greater European 
cooperation in foreign affairs, but would avoid promoting an emphasis on human rights 
and democracy. Conversely, as we have seen, France has blocked EU action in the name 
of its more pressing interests of maintaining friendly relations, in other words, the 
qualitative interviews reveal different cognitive views of the ways in which relations 
with Egypt, over human rights and democracy, should be developed.
The brakes put by the member states seem to support interpretations that have the 
supranational EU institutions as driving human rights and democracy in foreign policy. 
What has been defined as ‘institutional schizophrenia’ has the Council preferring a 
pragmatic approach led by political considerations, and the Commission acting as policy 
entrepreneur seeking to combine national interests and regional cooperation, and the EP
741 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May 2007.
742 Quoted in Kimana Zulueta Fulscher (2008), ‘Democracy promotion during Zapatero’s government 
2004-2008’, FRIDE Democracy Backgrounder, Madrid: February.
743 Interview, embassy of EU member state, Cairo, 29 May 2007.
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acting as a critical watchdog to denounce violations.744 In the case of Egypt, this was 
confirmed for example by the Council initiatives that de facto have excluded the 
Commission, such as the Policy Planning Dialogue on CFSP held twice a year with 
some Southern Mediterranean states, Egypt included, to deal with international affairs 
such as the Middle East Peace Process and Sudan, initiated by the Council’s Policy 
Planning Unit to which the Commission is just invited.745
However, if the pragmatism of the Council can be generally confirmed, the roles of the 
Commission and the Parliament need further qualification.
The Commission played an influencing role, but can only secondarily be considered a 
policy shaper. The 2003 Communication on promoting human rights in the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership, strongly backed by the then Commissioner for External 
Relations Chris Patten,746 and published two months before the first proposal for the 
Neighbourhood Policy was launched (see chapter 3), did not lead to any changes in EU 
relations with Egypt, even with regard to human rights and democracy funding, which 
did not see an increase in the percentage of aid spending on human rights and 
democracy in Egypt.
It did, however, suggest a degree of ‘ideational shift’ that had occurred amongst 
Commission officials as a result of the dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the 
Barcelona Process on human rights and democracy issues and the perceived need to 
improve these types of interventions. In the case of the Commission, there is evidence of 
influence stemming from non-institutional sources, such as the UN Arab Development 
Reports and interactions with the Euro-Mediterranean NGO and research institutes’ 
networks,747 validating the hypothesis of ideational changes through epistemic 
communities. This suggests that the dense web of relations and networks created by the
744 Stefania Panebianco and Rosa Rossi (2004), ‘EU attempts to export norms of good governance to the 
Mediterranean and Western Balkan countries’, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and 
International Politics, No. 53, October, quote on p. 12.
745 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels, 14 May 2007.
746 Youngs (2006a), interview European Commission, Brussels: 9 April 2003.
747 The UNDP Reports (1 million copies of the first edition were downloaded in 2002-3) were extremely 
influential in establishing the link between lack of development and the democratic deficit. Interviews, 
European Commission, Brussels: 9 April 2003, and 15 May 2007 (3).
236
EMP has produced ‘processes of socialisation’ at the meso-level that can contribute to 
influencing the agenda, even if they have not led to fundamental policy shifts.748
Perhaps more importantly, the Commission was also struggling to define EU rhetoric on 
human rights and democracy as different to the ‘regime change’ doctrine of the Bush 
Administration, more focused on participatory dynamics and empowering local actors in 
pushing for political reform from within the countries concerned rather than exported 
from external sources,749 as the change in the language from the Common Strategy to 
the Strategic Partnership also illustrates. This suggests that some dynamics relating to 
building an ‘EU identity’750 in differentiation to the US were at work at the ‘meso-level’ 
of institutional processes.
Yet the Commission’s role as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ on human rights and democracy 
promotion was limited. Most interviewees within and outside the Commission did see it 
pushing more strongly with the ENP to ensure that human rights and democracy are 
discussed. Even in the Council there are officials who admit that the ENP and the Action 
Plan have helped the EU ‘to get one foot in the door’ on these matters.751 Thus, in the 
very recent past, the Commission has been exploiting these avenues to strengthen its 
informal diplomacy. However, in the belief that any reform path in Egypt will be long 
and difficult, and keen to maintain dialogue with Cairo, the Commission also favoured 
persuasive and gradualist tactics to public condemnation or confrontation on human 
rights and democracy issues.752
The European Parliament has also managed to raise its profile, to partly influence policy 
decisions through the use of the media and parliamentary interrogations, as well as put 
pressure on Cairo on specific human rights abuses. This role has been considered 
‘healthy’ by Commission officials: by putting the spotlight on certain problematic
748 Interview, Council of the EU, 1 April 2008.
749 Interviews with Commission officials, Brussels: 9 April 2003 and 15 May 2007 (3). It is worth 
reminding that this of change stemming from within featured also in the CFSP Strategic Partnership of 
2004 (see chapter 6).
750 Keukeleire and MacNaughton (2008), chapter 1.
751 Interviews, Council of the EU, Brussels: 14 May and 1 December 2007.
752 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 15 May 2007 (2); Interviews, European Commission 
Delegation, Cairo: 28 May 2007 (1).
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issues, the EP has forced responses from the other institutions.753 However, its role as a 
‘critical watchdog’ also requires some qualification: European Parliament involvement 
with human rights in Egypt too has been selective, even if at times vociferous and 
following an agenda that was not necessarily developed in coordination with the other 
EU institutions. Major issues relating to human rights and democracy, such as torture 
and elections, have received far less attention than other cases -  with consequences on 
perceptions of the EU in Egypt too.754 Indeed, one Egyptian official defined the 
European Parliament’s action as ‘pseudo-pressure’.755
Nonetheless, what is relevant in this context is that the EU foreign policy processes were 
not solely determined by the member states but also shaped by the positions of the other 
institutions and informed by external influences. The debates triggered by Washington’s 
stronger push for change in Egypt at the beginning of 2005, but also the epistemic 
communities revolving around the EU’s Mediterranean policies and structures both 
contributed to a reflection in European capitals and in Brussels.
In terms of agency and processes, the intergovernmental interpretations alone are 
insufficient to explain the ways in which EU policy evolved towards Egypt, despite the 
primacy of the member states’ foreign policies. This has been evident especially in 
explaining the partial change in EU policy, and has been recognised by external actors 
too. According to NGO networks:
Although the EU on several occasions in recent years has adopted a more 
open diplomatic discourse on human rights issues in the Southern 
Mediterranean region, the use of such discourse has been selective and 
unbalanced.756
If the Commission and the EP influenced policies, especially those in which they had 
formal powers, but were not instrumental in determing EU diplomatic action, why did 
such action occur? The debate within the EU regarding human rights and democracy 
principles in policies towards Egypt can help uncover these analytical gaps. The
753 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 15 May 2007 (1); Council of the EU, Brussels: 1 April 
2008; Egyptian Embassy to the EU, Brussels: 16 May 2007.
754 Interview, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo: 1 June 2007.
755 Interview, Egyptian Embassy to the EU, Brussels: 16 May 2007.
756 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2007), European Neighbourhood Policy: Human Rights 
in EU-Egypt Relations, Cairo: 26-27 January.
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different views between member states did not regard solely the importance attributed to 
human rights and democratic standards, but also the type of diplomatic tools that were 
considered most appropriate to convey messages and pursue dialogues with 
governments. Recurring themes raised by all EU and member states interviewees 
regarded the choice of issues to pursue and the means the opportunity and efficacy of, 
for instance, public condemnation statements, of sending an official delegation or a 
representation of the Troika to convey commonly shared concerns about human rights 
and democracy, which often in the case of Egypt would be declined audience. 
Conversely, cooperation rather than confrontation, informal diplomacy through non 
official delegations and by using established formats for political dialogue were seen by 
many as the best means to entertain a dialogue as well as to achieve some response.757
Secondly, if the EU member states continued to pursue strong bilateral ties with Egypt, 
on human rights and democracy issues there has been a consolidated ‘habit of 
cooperation’ and of consultation on the ground as well as in the Council, illustrated for 
example in the EU’s global policy against torture, but also in the negotiation process 
that occurred for the drafting of the CFSP Declaration on the 2007 constitutional reform 
in Egypt. This conforms both to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ as well as to a shared belief 
that the EU should, as a whole, pursue such issues collectively, also because bilateral 
action of individual countries would not be taken seriously.758 On the one hand, this 
shields those member states more concerned with human rights and democracy issues 
from retaliation, should it develop a strong position alone. On the other, it forces those 
member states that are more reluctant to promote human rights and democracy to follow 
suit when pressure is raised in Brussels to develop a position on a specific issue or to 
incorporate the principles into policies.
757 Alongside numerous interviews, these findings were also highlighted in Svensson-McCarthy (2007).
758 Interviews, embassies of EU member states, Cairo: 29 (3), 30 May 2007 (4). These findings were 
confirmed in Svensson-McCarthy (2007).
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Ch a pt e r  10
C o n c lu sio ns
1. Introduction
This thesis has focused on the gap between the EU’s self-portrait as an actor pursuing 
human rights and democracy abroad and its actual performance in foreign policy: does 
the EU include human rights and democracy objectives in its foreign policy? If so, why? 
And if not, why? The hypotheses developed to guide research regarded EU motivations 
as well as foreign policy-making processes, in an attempt to uncover the complexities of 
decision-making dynamics, and to go beyond both the rhetoric and the criticisms that are 
often levelled at the EU in European press.
These hypotheses can be summarised in five broad arguments. The first sees the EU as 
using human rights and democracy rhetoric instrumentally to justify or to conceal the 
pursuit of other objectives, which can range from establishing hegemonic power over 
third countries, to seeking legitimacy vis-a-vis domestic electorates. Alternatively, these 
principles are not translated into foreign policy action because they do not correspond to 
or because they compete with other EU foreign policy aims. Both these approaches 
challenge the genuineness of the Union’s rhetoric on promoting human rights and 
democracy.
The second sees the EU’s claim as tied to liberal views about peace and democracy; this 
approach allows for the EU pursuing human rights and democracy as a means for 
increasing security and stability for the EU and its surrounding environment. With this 
hypothesis, the search would be for the degree to which the EU conforms to this post- 
Cold War paradigm.
The third hypothesis is tied to internal rather than external aims: the EU pursues human 
rights and democracy as a consequence of intergovernmental and/or inter-institutional 
dynamics with the aim of building or maintaining consensus between member states. 
Human rights and democracy can form the backbone for a concerted CFSP or even to 
strengthen the EU’s international identity or image, feeding into more constructivist- 
based theoretical approaches.
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The fourth sees EU institutions as forces capable of shaping state preferences. The EU’s 
rhetorical commitment, through institutionalisation, would lead to further commitments 
to respond to human rights and democracy problems in third countries. Policy 
entrepreneurs, that can range from member states to epistemic communities, can act as a 
‘constituency’ persuading and shaming more reluctant member states to address human 
rights and democracy.
The fifth sees human rights and democracy as a constitutive element of the EU’s internal 
and external identity. On the basis of this hypothesis, one would expect the EU to pursue 
normative positions, even if it is recognised that this is not always the case.
This chapter will focus on drawing some conclusions from the two case studies: to what 
extent can it be claimed that human rights and democracy were included in foreign 
policy actions towards the two countries? What priorities emerged? The aim would be to 
identify sets of dynamics regarding actors, motivations, and priorities that characterise 
the EU foreign policy making process in action. The third section will identify the ways 
in which the case studies can provide some generalisations about EU foreign policy and 
the role of human rights and democracy therein. The final section will outline the ways 
in which these can challenge assumptions about the EU’s international identity, and 
relate my conclusions to literature on the subject. Are the normative power 
interpretations sustainable empirically? If not, what implications can be derived from 
empirical research that help understand the interplay between strategic foreign policy 
objectives and more ‘normative’ or immaterial principles?
2. The EU and human rights and democracy in Ukraine and Egypt
Both cases illustrated the diversity of views within the EU member states about the 
general role and importance of the two countries considered. And both cases showed 
that EU responses also need to be placed within the context of external influences. In 
both cases, the ‘regime change’ rhetoric pushed by the US was one determinant 
stimulating EU action. The ‘brakes’ to EU action on human rights and democracy also 
stemmed partly from the international context and from the relative importance that the 
EU and its member states attached to other issues and actors.
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In the case of Ukraine, the role of Russia and the relations of some member states with 
Moscow constituted an important variable in determining their action towards Kiev. In 
contrast with other findings,759 the aim of keeping Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit was not 
shared by the member states. The responses of the EU were determined by policy 
entrepreneurs and by the threat of chaos in 2004. In the case of Egypt, relations with 
Arab world, Cairo’s role in the Middle East, and political dynamics pertaining to the 
Middle Eastern countries, such as the rise through elections of Islamist parties, all 
provided important inputs into EU foreign policy choices. Hence, the understanding of 
EU foreign policy needs to be placed with this broader playing field of interaction with 
other actors, regional and international dynamics, and stimuli coming from within the 
country concerned as well as from other external actors.
It is in these dynamics, best understandable through intergovemmentalism and realism, 
that the ‘brakes’ pulled to EU action on human rights and democracy can be found. As 
we have seen, the two case studies both presented problematic and long-term issues 
relating to human rights and democracy, as well as specific episodes of abuse. With 
regard to the episodes which could have warranted an EU response, the human rights 
and democracy concerns interplayed with other interests and priorities of the EU 
member states. The most important consideration that emerged from the case studies 
was the priority of maintaining the partnership with Egypt and, in the case of Ukraine, 
with Russia, although cooperation with Kiev was increasingly seen as important with 
regard to border management and regional security issues in the context of approaching 
EU enlargement.
This priority was often at odds with engaging with the human rights and democracy 
problems that emerged in the two countries. In the case of Egypt, maintaining friendly 
relations with Cairo, as an important partner on a broad range if key international and 
regional issues, trumped the importance human rights and democracy in the foreign 
policy agenda of the EU and its member states, substantiating the realist hypothesis that 
principles and interests were in mutual opposition. The case of Ukraine can also be 
explained through realism, though with different interpretations. Here, two dynamics
759 Especially Piccone and Youngs (2006).
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were discemable. Human rights and democracy strengthened the EU’s justification for 
keeping Kiev’s demands for a prospect of accession at bay. However, once the country’s 
lack of democratic standards led to the internal crisis of the Orange Revolution, the EU 
did intervene to support a resolution of the crisis that would also be based on respect of 
those principles. Here, human rights and democracy considerations were merged into 
concerns about the stability of Eastern Europe.
These conclusions would validate the first two hypotheses developed. Yet it does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that human rights and democracy are a peripheral 
concern, if a concern at all, except for cases in which they challenged the stability of the 
Union and its proximity. In fact, paradoxically, it could be argued that they are an 
important concern, precisely because action on such issues would impinge on a wide 
range of sensitive problems for EU partners, given that they go to the heart of the 
legitimacy of the government in power in the respective countries, but also for the EU. 
Action on human rights and democracy could imply putting key interests at risk. The 
use of informal diplomacy through political dialogue, which according to officials 
represents a more constructive way of approaching sensitive issues with third countries, 
could also be an indication of the lack of transparency with which the EU treats human 
rights and democracy, as lamented by the European Parliament (see p. 168), precisely 
because of their relation with sensitive issues such as the relationship between 
sovereignty and interference, and ‘values and interests’.
The prioritisation of other concerns is just the immediate conclusion reached. As we 
have seen, especially in the case of Egypt, but also with regard to Ukraine, the 
importance of human rights and democracy in diplomacy actually increased with the rise 
in the importance of the two countries on foreign policy dossiers considered crucial 
within the EU. With regard to Egypt, it is undeniable that the fight against terrorism 
raised the security stakes for the EU in cooperating with Cairo, even if I have argued 
that the discontinuity with Barcelona’s normative agenda after September 11 has not 
been as sharp as assumed. Human rights and democracy had been the weakest feature 
EU policies towards its immediate South throughout the 1990s when the rhetoric was at 
its peak.
760 Junneman (2003b), Youngs (2006), Joffe (2008).
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Paradoxically, human rights and democracy became increasingly addressed when the 
sharpest tensions between ‘values and interests’ emerged. These illustrated conflicts 
between the need for cooperation in counter-terrorism from those same governments 
that the EU was supposedly pushing to reform, double standards and conflicts between 
internal and external consistency (as the cases of renditions showed), also leading to 
problems of credibility and legitimacy in pursuing human rights and democracy. In 
Ukraine too, Russia’s renewed policy of cultivating its sphere of influence coincided 
with the EU’s gradual extension of its Eastern reach through enlargement, posing new 
micro-security challenges on the future border, as well as potential competition with 
Moscow on influence in Eastern Europe. In both cases, therefore, there was a rationale 
pushing for greater engagement and a demand for cooperation that could lead to conflict 
with the principles.
Yet at the same time, the Union’s declaratory policy, at times dressed in tones of 
condemnation, the stronger emphasis on informal diplomacy in Egypt and the cooling 
down of relations with the President and his entourage in Ukraine, and the increased use 
of CFSP cooperation to convey messages to the two governments all witnessed greater 
activism in the 2000s than in the 1990s. This would be a paradoxical finding if the main 
obstacle to developing human rights and democracy in EU foreign policy were solely 
the existence of competing priorities. In other words, if diversity and competing 
priorities were the key drivers, why would the EU have developed its rhetoric and image 
on human rights and democracy?
Changes and stimuli from the international environment have been important 
influencing factors for the EU. The international debate triggered by Washington’s 
‘freedom’ discourse has already been mentioned as a factor that contributed to shaping 
debates within Europe. Furthermore, the Orange Revolution was not the only event that 
led to speculations of another democratisation wave after 1989-1991. In 2003 Georgia 
witnessed the ‘Rose Revolution’, in January 2005 Iraqis went to the polls for the first 
time in decades, and the following month the ‘Cedar Revolution’ in Lebanon offered a 
glimpse of change in the Middle East. Secondly, it could be argued that by the 2000s the 
EU was better ‘equipped’ to support human rights and democracy. This argument would 
certainly contribute to explaining the near-absence of aid projects relevant to the specific
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human rights and democracy problems in Ukraine and Egypt in the 1990s. The reform 
in the management of aid and the introduction of Country Report no doubt improved the 
ability of the Commission and its strengthened Delegations to pursue more targeted 
priorities through aid. Yet the tools and their legal basis were already in place by the 
1990s, even if the 2000s saw the growth of global strategies.
The most important element that has consistently been uncovered in this thesis regards 
the politics of intergovernenmentalism within the EU. Each of the responses that the EU 
produced to human rights and democracy problems in Ukraine and Egypt showed that 
the member states had different assessments of the country in question, the issue it 
raised, the role that human rights and democracy should play, the most appropriate ways 
to deal with the issue, and the potential impact that an EU response would have. 
Interviews have confirmed that, had it not been for the issue being pushed up the 
agenda, some member states would have favoured not responding to breaches of those 
principles.
In other words, differences between member states were not just about ‘casual beliefs’ 
regarding the tools to use or the most effective diplomacy; they regarded the opportunity 
of pursuing normative positions in the first place. Behind these views were different 
general assessments of the role of the country in question, but also competing cognitive 
views on the importance of human rights and democracy vis-a-vis partnership, 
cooperation, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and a sensitivity to 
cultural specificities, alongside rationalist cost-benefit analyses on the potential impact 
of EU condemnation.
So if this ‘logic of diversity’ that invests material as well as ideational concerns was 
dominant, coupled with the risks that a normative position could pose on single key 
issues on a case by case basis, why did the EU raise human rights and democracy in its 
relations with Ukraine and Egypt? However declaratory and ‘safe’ the EU’s normative 
stance, it could have chosen not to resort to such positions. Notwithstanding the concrete 
(in)action on human rights and democracy, there has been an attempt to develop 
policies, initiatives and guidelines that are relevant to this field. So the other side of the 
question also needs to be addressed: why did the EU raise human rights and democracy 
concerns. Do realism and intergovemmentalism help explain these reasons?
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At the intergovernmental level, the processes that triggered EU action still show that the 
role of the member states was important in initiating the debates about developing 
normative positions on specific episodes. Policy entrepreneurs can be found in the 
member states, and their role was more effective in setting the agenda than the European 
Parliament and the Commission. In both cases, the Presidencies were indicated by all 
interviewees as important initiators of declaratory positions on key human rights and 
democracy violations.
In the ensuing debates, the Northern EU member states were fairly consistently amongst 
those pushing for the EU to adopt stronger normative positions, and had to negotiate 
with the other member states more concerned with other priorities. The incentives for 
these states to resort to the EU to develop normative positions was the ‘politics of scale’ 
of making such position stronger vis-a-vis the country concerned. This group was 
strengthened with the accession of the new member states from Central Europe, with 
Poland often taking the lead, especially in using normative positions against Russia 
(hence their role in the Ukrainian case study). Furthermore, the possible costs of a 
collective normative position are lower: the supposed recipient of the EU’s normative 
position would be less likely to retaliate against the EU than against a single member 
state.
Britain, Germany, and France were, according to interviewees, the most powerful in 
determining the foreign policy choices of the EU. The first two, on the basis of the case 
studies examined here, did take into account human rights and democracy, but the 
balance in their favour depended on the other issues involved.
France, together with other countries like Italy, Spain (Portugal also emerged with 
regard to Egypt), were far less committed to developing normative positions on human 
rights and democracy. Interviews revealed that, alongside the search for diplomatic 
engagement with Russia, Ukraine, Egypt and the Arab world, these two countries had 
doubts about ‘the lecturing style’ of the Northern EU member states, valued the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and privileged 
cooperation also because they saw it as a vehicle to strengthen multilateralism at the 
international level. Germany’s position with regard to Ukraine changed over time. If it
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supported EU engagement with Ukraine in the early 1990s, by the end of the decade and 
in the 2000s, maintaining strong relations with Moscow emerged as the overriding 
priority. Conversely, with regard to Egypt it adopted stronger normative positions. 
Changes of government in Berlin could also be a reason for such oscillations. Britain’s 
position has revealed a favour towards strong normative positions. It was amongst those 
backing Sweden with regard to Ukraine and it did on occasion antagonise the leadership 
in Cairo with its criticisms of human rights and democracy. But Britain’s stakes and 
interests in Ukraine and Egypt and the importance of their roles with regard to Russia, 
the Middle East, the Arab world, Africa, and the US have all constituted issues that 
London deals with at a national as well European level.
This ‘logic of diversity’ regarding the role that human rights and democracy concerns 
should play in EU foreign policy also helps explain why the outcome of the process was 
‘declaratory’ and often reflecting the minimum common denominator. Nonetheless, 
once the issue was raised through ‘policy entrepreneurs’, different dynamics can be 
discerned. The rhetorical use of norms could ‘shame’ the more reluctant actors into 
following the line (a method used by the European Parliament, whose role will be 
discussed later). Domestic dynamics could also advise for caution in opposing the 
development of normative positions (Germany’s Chancellor was questioned by his 
parliament about his position towards Russia at the time of the Orange Revolution, for 
instance). Finally, a commitment towards European cooperation in foreign policy in 
general could also convince member states not to block (but water down) the 
development of normative positions. All these explanation point to a ‘habit of 
cooperation’ behind EU guiding EU responses on human rights and democracy.
Indeed, it is significant that the EU did use CFSP to coordinate its statements on human 
rights and democracy issues. In fact, in both case studies, CFSP was used to address 
human rights and democracy related problems more than it was resorted to for other 
matters. This suggests that the member states did share the view that it was appropriate 
for CFSP to deal with such issues, even when they pursued their interests in the 
countries concerned outside the EU framework. In both cases, however, this 
development became evident over time: it was roughly after 2000 that the content of
761 Interviews, Egyptian Embassy to the EU, Brussels: 16 May 2007; Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Cairo: 1 June 2007.
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CFSP became far more characterised by the presence of human rights and democracy 
related issues.
Processes and dynamics that include the other EU institutions can help shed some light. 
We have seen that the European Parliament can play the role of a ‘norm entrepreneur’. 
Even with limited powers in CFSP, the EP has used ‘strategic arguments’ to push the 
human rights and democracy agenda. It also has put pressure on the Council and the 
Commission, through parliamentary questions, to make sure that human rights and 
democracy would be part of relations developed with third countries, and has been key 
to guaranteeing that a percentage of aid would be dedicated to those aims. In other 
words, the Parliament has contributed to raising expectations from within on the EU’s 
pursuit of normative positions, and has lobbied the other institutions through its 
resolutions and human rights reports. Its influence, however, has varied according to the 
case study. In the case of Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, it played an important 
part in building an internal EU constituency in favour of intervening to solve the crisis. 
In the case of Egypt, the European Parliament’s insistence on raising particular concerns 
has worked against the human rights and democracy agenda that the Council and the 
Commission had agreed upon: political dialogue through the subcommittee established 
with the ENP.
The European Commission can play the role of a ‘policy shaper’, also thanks to its 
formal responsibilities in drafting policy proposals. Together with the European 
Parliament, we have seen that it has played a significant role in contributing to 
‘institutionalising’ the aim of including human rights and democracy in foreign policy 
considerations. Since the early 1990s, the Commission has identified the areas in which 
the institutional ‘set up’ and the policy tool box was insufficient compared to the aims 
that were rhetorically stated in declarations and in CFSP. This process of 
institutionalising and ‘mainstreaming’ human rights and democracy concerns has in turn 
raised the pressure, within the EU foreign policy making processes, to take these 
principles into account.
However, the action of the Commission, on the basis of the case studies examined here, 
differed from country to country. In a perhaps counter-intuitive conclusion, it could be 
argued that the Commission played a more important role in pushing the human rights
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and democracy agenda in relations with Egypt than with Ukraine. In Ukraine, despite its 
privileged role in drafting the first CFSP Action Plan, in managing aid towards the 
former Soviet Union, and later in drafting the ENP Action Plan, the Commission did not 
push for an EU normative position. It continued to advocate continuity of policy and the 
adequacy of the existing policy set-up, and did not lobby for a stronger human rights and 
democracy content to such policy. Even the aid dedicated to Ukraine did not reflect any 
prioritisation accorded to human rights and democracy, let alone to the problems that the 
country manifested in those fields.
Conversely, in Egypt the Commission did increasingly push for a stronger normative 
content to the policies, and pushed this line also through informal diplomacy. This was 
particularly the case once the ENP Action Plan began to be negotiated. One difference 
between the two cases was that the Commission was, in the case of Egypt, far more 
exposed to processes of socialisation brought about by the structures of the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership. There is evidence of an ideational shift within the 
Commission due to exposure to analyses developed within the policy networks 
revolving around the EMP. And with regard to the Arab world, both the Council and the 
Commission were keen to develop a response to the Bush administration’s ‘regime
I f S )
change’ doctrine. The ENP also represented a ‘policy window’ for the Commission to 
develop a stronger role in EU foreign policy.
The types of response that the EU adopted also can reveal some of the dynamics at play. 
As we have seen most of EU action on human rights and democracy was limited to the 
development of declaratory positions, often cushioned in encouraging terms, stating EU 
preoccupation on the matter and without raising the possibility of any EU action 
condemning the occurrences. In neither of the two cases were negative measures used, 
the ‘human rights’ clause was never invoked, and even positive tools were scarcely 
used.
However, it is significant that the member states would engage in a debate regarding the 
measures to adopt to address the human rights and democracy violations described in 
chapters 5, 6, 8 and 9. The main debate revolves around whether it is more productive to
762 Bicchi (2007), pp. 175-178.
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issue public statements and make a noise over certain issues (ie satisfying the EP and the 
press/public opinion) or whether it is better to act behind closed doors and exercise 
pressure carefully bearing in mind the sensitivity of the country concerned. The 
Commission, the Council and many member states prefer this latter option which 
suggests two things. Firstly, that public opinion pressure and the media is important but 
not essential. In other words, where the EU issues public statements, a correlation with 
public opinion pressure can be found. But the EU does not take initiatives solely based 
on this. Member states’ embassies do monitor the internal situation in the countries in 
which they are stationed and debate between them on means to address human rights 
and democracy problems that might emerge. Secondly, although human rights and 
democracy are not very high on the agenda, a policy guided by it can interfere in 
damaging ways with EU foreign policy agenda. In this sense, human rights and 
democracy have acquired importance and the member states are careful in handling 
them, and they often like to keep a firm hand over them.
In sum, the debates revealed different views on the opportunity of adopting a normative 
position and on the most appropriate ways to express that position. Considerations of 
potential impact, costs, and appropriateness of action all constituted part of the debate. 
The preferences that generally emerged were to ensure that the status quo in the 
receiving country would not be fundamentally challenged and to maintain engagement 
and partnership. These positions could be justified instrumentally using the human rights 
and democracy rhetoric: strategic arguments on the need to pursue longer term goals and 
on the importance of processes of ‘socialisation’ with partner countries are common 
justifications for the EU’s ‘soft’ positions on human rights and democracy.
3. EU Foreign Policy
What do the two case studies tell us about the role of human rights and democracy in 
EU foreign policy in general? Both countries are without a prospect of accession but 
within the proximity of the EU -  an area considered a priority not only of EU foreign 
policy, but also for the promotion of democracy and human rights, as the ENP and the 
ESS underlined. Both countries posed substantial challenges to the normative rhetoric 
that the EU has developed, and both entertained important relations with European 
capitals. Within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Ukraine and Egypt
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were widely seen by the Commission as crucial countries with which to make progress 
in order to have some ‘success stories’ that could be of demonstrative relevance to the
n fs i
entire neighbourhood: Ukraine was the only country in the Eastern neighbourhood
without outstanding unresolved conflicts; Egypt because of its diplomatic standing in 
the Arab world and geopolitical importance. In short, their relative strategic importance, 
their geographical proximity to the EU, their relevance in the policies that the EU 
developed towards their respective regional contexts, as well as the ways in which they 
were seen as providing an example to their neighbours of EU engagement, all make 
Ukraine and Egypt as two cases from which broader conclusions can be drawn on the 
role of human rights and democracy in EU foreign policy.
The first generalisation regarding EU foreign policy is it is still dominated by the ‘logic 
of diversity’ that makes intergovemmentalism a crucial framework to understand the 
processes at the level of the interaction between member states. Realism’s methodology 
based on an analysis of the historical context in which the EU operates also provides 
more appropriate tools to reconstruct the processes and circumstances that lead to 
cooperation in CFSP,764 the context in which the EU was operating, and the external 
influences that condition foreign policy processes. The processes that occur at the 
intergovernmental level show that different dynamics interact with each other. 
Normative positions can be debated and developed in the Council, following patterns of 
strategic argumentation, rhetorical action, and consensus-building in the search for 
unity.
The role of human rights and democracy concerns thus can vary according to the 
number of issues at stake, which in turn can reflect a commitment to cooperation in 
foreign policy, but also key national interests of some member states. In other words, the 
‘values versus interests’ dichotomy is a simplification that hides the dynamics at play. 
What is remarkable is that, despite the fact that such diversity of views on human rights 
and democracy mostly leads to declaratory positions rather than to concerted action, 
there is a shared understanding that in most cases such issues should be pursued 
collectively. In other words, the EU’s declaratory normative role can serve a self-
763 Interviews, European Commission, Brussels: 24 April 2006 (1), 15 May 2007 (1).
764 Hill and Smith (2005), Chapter 18.
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referential purpose of building consensus within the EU rather than being directed 
externally, in the sense of achieving external objectives.
Yet such commitment towards developing a collective policy has been limited to the 
‘soft’ issues, such as human rights and democracy, aspects of the political dialogue, aid, 
managing economic relations. Many of the ‘hard’ issues have continued to be dealt with 
bilaterally. Furthermore, cooperation on ‘soft’ foreign policy issues has not always 
stimulated a rationale to deepen cooperation. Especially in Egypt, twelve years of the 
Barcelona Process, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy have not altered the 
fundamentals of member states’ interests there.
Institutionalist approaches can help explain the endurance of the norms, their increasing 
‘institutionalisation’, the growing level of commitment of EU institutions towards 
‘mainstreaming’ the principles into external action, and the growing expectations from 
within the EU to act on human rights and democracy. In other words, these dynamics, 
and the role that the other institutions played therein, can be seen as having a 
‘socialisation’ effect that mitigate the intergovemmentalism dominating EU foreign 
policy. In short, rationalist frameworks have been used here to explain the decisions of 
the EU member states and institutions to establish and maintain over time human rights 
and democracy concerns in EU foreign policy.
But the dominant process has been the logic of diversity, investing cognitive as well as 
rationalist interpretations about the appropriateness of the EU’s pursuit of normative 
foreign policy positions. The fact that human rights and democracy have become part of 
the debate on EU foreign policy suggests that it is believed that the EU level is the most 
appropriate for such concerns. But rationalist arguments provided much more powerful 
explanations on EU action and inaction: even if coordination on developing EU 
normative positions can entail a socialisation or even identity-building process within 
the EU, especially at the level of EU institutions, empirical research suggests that these 
dynamics are insufficient to support a constructivist interpretation of the EU that acts 
normatively in the world.
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4. Conclusions
The case studies also generated further questions for future research. First of all, the role 
human rights and democracy play in national foreign policies, and the degree to which 
the member states try to push these issues on the EU agenda, would warrant further 
examination, exploring two-way ‘Europeanisation’ processes regarding influences from 
Brussels onto national capitals and viceversa. Research into this field would be highly 
significant to a further understanding of EU action in this field. The member states have 
developed quite diverse national approaches, also with regard to aid (indeed, the 
Commission has complained of the difficulties even just in obtaining data, let alone 
homogeneous information on national human rights and democracy programmes), and 
the playing field at the EU level revealed a range of views on what priority accord to 
normative aims as well as about the means to pursue them.
These national differences, and the ways in which they feed into European foreign 
policy-making could also include an examination of the cognitive and normative views 
of the member states. In other words, the ways in which competing ideas about EU 
foreign policy, its aims and tools to pursue them, would require further research that 
takes into account the ‘logic of diversity’ from a cognitive as well as material point of 
view.
Secondly, empirical research should focus on uncovering specific case studies. The 
proliferation of academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, for instance, 
has focused overwhelmingly on EU processes and, with few exceptions, little on 
examining the interaction between EU foreign policy and domestic dynamics in North 
African and Middle Eastern countries. Research on EU global policies for human rights 
and democracy, such as torture and election assistance too could constitute fertile 
ground for research, especially if placed in a comparative context with competing 
political factors (for example the fight against terrorism, arms’ exports, or the rise, 
through electoral competition, of governments that are ‘uncomfortable’ for EU member 
states).
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As we have seen, the academic literature that has highlighted the shortcomings of EU 
policies on human rights and democracy has pointed at the conflicting interests and at 
the limits of the EU’s rhetorical claims.765 This literature nonetheless points at a number 
of ‘distinctive’ ways in which the EU pursues its aims, including human rights and 
foreign policy, many of which can be confirmed by the empirical research carried out 
in this thesis: the EU privileges using international norms and standards to justify its 
positions, develops its web of relations by institutionalising them through agreements 
that contain such standards,767 prefers developing political dialogue and partnership with
n fiQ
third countries rather than using negative tools, and uses informal as well as formal
nf.Q
tools, such as quiet diplomacy, to pursue these principles. Indeed, the preference for 
political dialogue at the level of subcommittees (and behind closed doors) confirms a 
reluctance to use ‘megaphone diplomacy’.770 This would also conform to the desire to 
differentiate EU human rights and democracy policy from US regime change rhetoric, 
which was highlighted in interviews.
The question is whether the limits to the actual pursuit of human rights and democracy 
are sufficient to challenge the assumptions about the EU acting ‘normatively’. This 
thesis does not aim to develop alternative models to ‘normative power’ ones. However, 
its research findings do cast some empirical doubts over some of the theoretical 
assumptions of such constructs.
Beyond the inclusion of human rights and democracy in statements of principle, the 
patterns uncovered here suggest that the EU’s actual incorporation of those principles 
and their translation into foreign policy practice is far more complex than is generally 
assumed. As one official put it, ‘the EU does not have a real human rights and 
democracy policy. It has some bullet points’.771
The EU resorts to normative arguments to justify its interaction with the world. But the 
normative content needs to be undressed and divorced from self-representational
765 Olsen (2000); K. Smith (2001); K. Smith (2003).
766 K. Smith (2003).
767 K. Smith (2003). See also Ward (1998) and Cremona (1998).
768 Youngs (2001); Bicchi (2004).
769 Aliboni (2005).
770 In the words of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU Commissioner for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy, speaking at an EPC Breakfast meeting, Brussels: 11 July 2008.
771 Interview, Council of the EU, 1 April 2008.
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rhetoric. First of all, ‘normative power’ seems to be based on the false premise that 
norms are inherently devoid of power and that interests are devoid of normative content, 
implying that the legitimacy of the EU can be found in the fact that it represents a ‘force
779for good’. As E.H. Carr put it, ‘we can neither moralize power nor expel power from 
politics’.773 The prescriptive notion that the EU should do good is also full of ideological 
content. Secondly, the empirical research conducted here highlighted that spreading 
norms may be backed by more traditional justifications rooted in rationalist 
explanations. The absence of action too was often motivated by classical realist 
hypotheses.
The fact that human rights promotion might be guided by self-interest rather than by 
abstract altruism774 does not necessarily entail that the principles the EU is promoting 
are not valid or legitimate.775 However, a question that emerges is: what is normative? 
As we have seen, the logic of diversity regarded not just rationalist external foreign 
policy objectives, but also cognitive differences on the role of human rights and 
democracy in foreign policy in general. Amongst these different cognitive views, the 
importance of partnership emerged as a consistent priority. Competing dynamics on 
what normative power EU should be uncovered further, which have constituted the main 
obstacle to stronger positions on human rights and democracy. One conclusion therefore 
is that norms and power are inter-related and that the pursuit of human rights and 
democracy should not be divorced from issues regarding power, nor from other beliefs 
that can clash with human rights and democracy, such as cooperation, multilateralism, 
non interference, and partnership.
Nonetheless, the dominant ideological status of human rights and democracy norms 
have entailed that they have become increasingly part of EU foreign policy rhetoric. 
This also includes the possibility for them to be manipulated for the pursuit of 
instrumental gains. In much of the rhetoric, strategic and security arguments and idealist 
concerns are often intertwined, with the European Security Strategy, one of the most
nnc.
read and quoted EU documents, representing a good example.
772 Sjursen (2006).
773 Carr (1981), p. 95.
774 Youngs (2004).
775 Sjursen (2006).
776 See for instance the quotation on p. 78.
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The second conclusion that runs against the normative power argument is based on the 
processes that would earn the EU the adjective of normative. Empirical research carried 
out in this thesis has highlighted the ways in which the EU developed its normative 
positions in a context of interaction with the outside world. In many cases, it was largely 
external stimuli that motivated the key decisions on introducing normative content to its 
relations with third countries and that triggered coordinated responses on human rights 
and democracy issues. In other words, rather than see normative action as a reflection of 
constituent features of the EU projected on the outside world, the processes identified in 
this thesis point in the opposite direction: changes in the global environment that 
warranted an EU response. Coordination on human rights and democracy, despite the 
diversity of constituencies within the EU regarding the role they should play in foreign 
policy, provided one area that supported coordination on foreign policy. In turn, 
however, it was precisely the cognitive diversity of views between the EU member 
states and institutions that helped explain the outcome of a declaratory policy backed by 
little action.
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A n n e x e s
Box 1: EU-Ukraine European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan: ‘actions’ on 
human rights and democracy777
Strengthen the stability and effectiveness o f institutions guaranteeing democracy and the 
rule o f law
• Ensure democratic conduct of presidential (2004) and parliamentary (2006) 
elections, in accordance with OSCE standards and OSCE/ODIHR 
recommendations, including on the media
• Ensure that r legislative reforms is conducted in line with international standards
• Continue administrative reform and strengthening of local self-government, 
through appropriate legislation, in line with standards of European Charter on
______ Local Self Government________________________________________________
Further judicial and legal reform, independence o f the judiciary and strengthen its 
administrative capacity, ensure impartiality and effectiveness o f prosecution
• Ensure implementation of recent reforms of civil, criminal and administrative 
codes and codes of procedure, based on European standards
• Continue the reform of the prosecution system in accordance with the relevant 
Council of Europe Action Plan (and supported by the European Commission/ 
Council of Europe Joint Programme)
• Address reported shortcomings in the work of the law enforcement organs and 
prosecution
• Complete and implement reform of the court system to ensure independence, 
impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary
• Effective implementation of ECHR judgements
• Enhance training of judges, prosecutors and officials in judiciary, administration, 
police and prisons, in particular on human rights issues (and supported by the 
European Commission/Council of Europe Joint Programme)
• Implement actions envisaged in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on JHA matters and
______ the implementation scoreboard__________________________________________
Ensure the effectiveness o f the fight against corruption
• Join the Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) and 
implement relevant recommendations, including a revision of the Ukrainian 
national strategy for the fight against corruption
• Promote transparency and accountability of the administration, in particular 
concerning the reform of the civil service based on European standards
• Implement relevant measures as foreseen under the JHA scoreboard___________
Ensure respect o f human rights and fundamental freedoms, in line with international 
and European standards
• Promote adherence to and ensure implementation of core UN and Council of
______ Europe Conventions and related protocols_________________________________
Foster the development o f civil society.
• Ensure respect of freedom of association and involvement of the citizens in the
______ decision making process, including through civil society organisations_________
Ensure respect fo r the freedom o f the media and expression.
• Further improve and enforce the legal and administrative framework for freedom
777 European Commission (2004), EU/Ukraine Action Plan, Brussels: 9 December.
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of media, taking into account relevant Council of Europe recommendations
• Ensure effective respect of freedom of media, including journalists’ rights______
Ensure respect for rights o f persons belonging to national minorities
• Continue efforts in designing relevant legislation and effectively protecting the 
rights of persons belonging to national minorities, based on European standards
• Continue close cooperation between government authorities and representatives
______ of national minorities__________________________________________________
Prevention o f ill-treatment and torture
• Further improvement of the legal basis and practice in the sphere of detention, in 
particular pre-trial detention, in order to address effectively the problem of 
arbitrary detentions, detention conditions and ill-treatment of detainees by law 
enforcement officials, including through provision of training. Implement 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) recommendations
• Enhance the human rights training of police_______________________________
Ensure equal treatment
• Continue efforts to ensure the equality of men and women in society and
______ economic life________________________________________________________
Ensure respect o f Children *s rights
• Implement the recommendations by the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child of 2002
• Ensure full implementation of juvenile justice standards in line with relevant 
international standards
• Exchange of information on the results of the implementation of the UN and 
Hague Conventions on protecting the rights of the children in the EU and
______ Ukraine_____________________________________________________________
Ensure respect for trade unions ’ rights and core labour standards
• Continue efforts to ensure trade unions’ rights and core labour standards, based
______ on European standards and in accordance with relevant ILO conventions_______
Ensure international justice
• Enhance co-operation to promote international justice and fight impunity, 
including through further support to the International Criminal Court and the 
establishment of a consultation mechanism on ICC’s activities and functioning
• Establishing close cooperation aimed at elaboration of appropriate draft laws, 
necessary for ratification of the Rome Statute
• Signing and ratification on the agreement on privileges and immunities of the 
ICC
• Maintain co-operation within the framework of the Special Working Group on
______ the Crime of Aggression and other special groups__________________________
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Box 2: EU-Egypt European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan:
‘actions’ on human rights and democracy778
Democracy and rule of law
Enhance the effectiveness o f institutions entrusted with strengthening democracy and the 
rule o f law
• Strengthen participation in political life, including the promotion of public 
awareness and participation in elections
• Exchange experience in the field of elections and jointly develop cooperation in 
areas of shared interest; assistance on registering electors and capacity building
• Foster the role of civil society and enhance its capacity to contribute to the 
democratic and political process as well as to the economic and social progress
• Pursue and support Egypt’s efforts towards decentralization and reform of local 
administration
• Enhance political dialogue between the Egyptian and the European Parliaments
• Establish a formal and regular dialogue on Human Rights and Democracy in the 
framework of the AA
• Modernization and development of public services, promoting accountability, 
transparency and contestability
Consolidate the independent and effective administration o f justice and improve prison 
conditions.
• Strengthen, maintain and ensure the independence of the judiciary. Increase the 
capacity and efficiency of the justice administration (including prison) and 
access to justice, including capacity building of bodies entrusted with the 
implementation of the law.
• Support Egyptian government policies and programmes to improve places of
______ detention and prison conditions, especially the placement of minors____________
Human rights and fundamental freedoms
• Support Egyptian government efforts to protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in line with international conventions and to elaborate a human rights 
strategy in partnership with the NCHR
• Strengthen the culture of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Egypt and in the EU
• Support Egyptian efforts to strengthen the capacity and effectiveness of Egyptian 
public institutions and councils
• Continue the review of respective national legislations to further align their laws 
and practices with international human rights instruments to which they are party 
and taking into account relevant UN recommendations
• Examine the possibility of accession to the optional protocols to international 
human rights conventions to which Egypt is a party
• Cooperation with UN and African human rights treaty mechanisms, as well as 
with the newly established UN Human Rights Council
• Examine the possibility for the EU Member States to sign the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
• Promote dialogue on policies for physically and mentally disabled_____________
778 European Commission (2007c), European Neighbourhood Joint Action Plan, adopted at the 3rd EU- 
Egypt Association Council, Brussels: 6 March.
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• Promote a dialogue on Rome Statute of International Criminal Court
• Examine the relevant UN recommendations and the recommendations of the 
Egyptian National Council for Human Rights pertaining to security, detention 
conditions and prison staff
• Initiate a review of laws and regulations dealing with pre-trial and administrative 
detention systems
• Ensure the possibility of legal recourse against death sentences for all types of 
courts, (UN Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the 
death penalty and Arts. 4 and 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights)
• Engage in a dialogue on the death penalty.
• Co-operate to promote the achievement of the right to development in bilateral 
and multilateral fora
Rights o f women and children
• Promote the enhancement of women’s participation in political, economic and 
social life as well as their role in the political decision-making process by 
supporting the formulation and implementation of Egypt’s government policies 
and programmes
• Support Egypt’s efforts to promote gender equality and reinforce the fight 
against discrimination and gender-based violence
• Consolidate the rights of the child (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) 
and consider revising existing legislation taking into account the 
recommendations of the relevant UN Committee
• Support Egypt’s efforts to eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation 
Freedom o f association and o f expression and pluralism o f the media
• Promote the right of assembly and association (International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights)
• Assert freedom of expression and independence of the media
• Examine the possibility for developing specific legislation on the protection of 
private data
• Pursue the liberalisation process in the information sector and increase access to 
information by reviewing the legal and administrative frameworks
• Establish joint cooperation activities on media issues including capacity building 
Fight against discrimination, intolerance, racism and xenophobia
• Cooperate to combat all forms of discrimination, intolerance, racism and 
xenophobia and in particular hate or defamatory discourse based on religion, 
beliefs, race or origin.
• Strengthen the role of media in combating xenophobia and discrimination
• Promote efforts, in Egypt and the EU, towards increasing tolerance, 
understanding and respect of all religions and cultures
Fundamental social rights and core labour standards
• Develop a dialogue on fundamental social rights and core labour standards
• Development and independence of trade unions and their role in economic and 
social life
• Enhance implementation of core ILO labour standards
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Box 3: PCA Meetings with Ukraine779
EU Priorities Mention of human rights and 
democracy
1997 • Closure of Chernobyl
• Abolition of trade barriers to EU products
None
1998 • Closure of Chernobyl and nuclear safety
• Abolition of trade barriers to EU products
• Cross-border cooperation on Ukraine’s 
Western borders
• Transport and energy
• Financial system in Ukraine
• Increased cooperation in the fight against 
crime (drugs and money laundering)
Joint statement of EU-Ukraine 
summit includes the ‘importance they 
attach to the democratic and market 
economy values and to the pursuit of 
the reform process in Ukraine’, but no 
mention of specific issues
1999 • Abolition of trade barriers to EU products
• Closure of Chernobyl and nuclear safety
• Common strategy
Joint statement of EU-Ukraine 
summit mentions ‘common 
attachment [...] to Ukraine’s 
democratic development’, but no 
mention of specific issues
2000 • Reforms in trade, agriculture and energy
• Privatisation of ‘strategic’ enterprises
• Enlargement
• Illegal migration and trafficking in human 
beings
• JHA cooperation
• EU considered removing Ukraine from the 
list of non-market economies
• Closure of Chernobyl
Joint statement of EU-Ukraine 
summit mentions that the partnership 
is based on ‘principles of democracy, 
respect of human rights, the rule of 
law and market economy’
Referendum of April 2000: 
‘importance attached to democratic 
character of political reforms’
2001 • Energy: reform of the market and 
privatisation, energy transport, nuclear safety
• Trade: accession to WTO
• JHA: border management, immigration, 
judicial reform, combating organised crime.
Recognition that economic 
development is based on further 
democratic reform, the rule of law 
and the development of civil society.
Recognition of Ukraine’s European
779 Sources: ‘5 September EU-Ukraine Summit’, European Voice, 11 September 1997; EU-Ukraine 
Cooperation Council (1998a), ‘Press Release’ 9594/98 (Presse 217), Brussels, 9 June; EU-Ukraine 
Cooperation Council (1998b), ‘Joint Press Release’, Vienna, 16 October; EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council (1999a), ‘Press Release’, Luxembourg: 26 April; EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (1999b), 
‘Joint Press Communique’, 10391/99 (Presse 244), Brussels: 23 July; EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council 
(2000a), ‘Press Release’, 8741/00 (Presse 171), Brussels: 23 May; EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council 
(2000b), ‘Joint Statement’, 11241/00 (Presse 312), Paris: 15 September; EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Committee (2000), ‘Press Release’, Brussels: 18 December; EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2001a), 
‘Press Release’, 10230/01 (Presse 252), Luxemburg, 26 June; EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2001b), 
‘Joint Statement’, 11772/01 (Presse 315), Yalta: 11 September; Council of the EU (2001d), EU Action 
Plan on Justice and Home Affairs, 2003/C 77/01, Brussels: 10 December; EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council (2002a), ‘Press Release’, 7026/02 (Presse 64), Brussels: 11 March; EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council (2002b), ‘Joint Statement’, 10607/02 (Presse 195), Copenhagen: 4 July; EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council (2003a), ‘Press Release’, 7412/03 (Presse 75), Brussels: 18 March; EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council (2003b), ‘Joint Statement’, Yalta: 7 October; Council o f the EU (2004h), ‘Meeting on Justice and 
Home Affairs between the Troika of the European Union and Ukraine on 29 March 2004’, ‘Press release’, 
7515/04 (Presse 40), Brussels: 30 March; EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2004a), ‘Press Release’, 
9259/04 (Presse 151), Brussels: 18 May; EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2004b), ‘Joint Press Release’, 
The Hague, 8 July.
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• Approximation of Ukraine’s legislation
• Environmental protection: Kyoto Protocol
• Transport
Political dialogue:
• Ukraine’s participation in the European 
Conference
• Impact of enlargement
• ESDP dialogue
• Cooperation in science and technology and 
in the development of the European Global 
Navigation Satellite System
• Ukraine’s alignment on CFSP
• Regional cooperation and security, 
Transniestria and border controls between 
Ukraine and Moldova
EU Action Plan on JHA in Ukraine:
• Ratification of international instruments 
regarding illegal migration, organised crime 
and corruption
• Migration issues and border management
• Combat organised crime
International terrorism
aspirations but stress on importance 
of democratic political and economic 
development
Need to strengthen pluralist and 
independent media. Need for 
transparent and impartial 
investigations in cases of violence 
against journalists.
Encouragement for democratic and 
transparent parliamentary elections in 
2002
EU Action Plan on JHA in Ukraine:
• Develop the rule of law, access to 
justice, independence of the 
judiciary and good governance
• Increase human rights and rule of 
law awareness and transparency
2002 • Reform of the energy sector
• Trade and investment: accession to WTO
• JHA Action Plan: readmission agreement, 
border management and infrastructure, 
immigration, judicial reform, rule of law, 
organised crime
• Enlargement and visa issues
• Approximation of Ukraine’s legislation
• Environmental protection
• Transport regional and cross-border 
cooperation
• Science and Technology agreement
Political dialogue:
Free and fair elections, reform of the 
judiciary and transparent state-media 
relations
• Regional security and cooperation 
(Moldova, Belarus)
• Ukraine’s alignment on CFSP (Middle East, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
2003 • JHA: readmission agreement, organised 
crime, immigration
• Trade and investment: accession to WTO
• Approximation of Ukraine’s legislation




Democracy, rule of law and respect 
for human rights as vital to strengthen 
relations with the EU
• Wider Europe -  New Neighbourhood 
initiative
• SES with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
• Transnistria
• European Security Strategy
2004 • JHA: migration, illegal migration, JHA: strengthening the judiciary, rule
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readmission agreement, visa issues, border 
management, fight against organised crime, 
relations with Europol and Eurojust 
Enlargement
Neighbourhood Policy: development of
Action Plan
Trade and investment: accession to WTO 
and implementation of PCA 
Energy, nuclear issues, environment and 
transport
Conclusion of steel agreement 
Political dialogue:
CFSP cooperation and Ukraine’s 
participation in EU Police Mission in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM 
Regional stability and security and crisis 
management
Moldova, Iraq, non proliferation, fight 
against terrorism______________________
of law and good governance
Importance of free and fair 
presidential elections in October and 
free media
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Box 4: Euro-Mediterranean and EU-Egypt Association Council meetings and
• »i.» 780priorities







-Recognition of Middle East 
problems as obstacle to 
progress
-Work on Charter for Peace 
and Stability
-Free Trade Area by 2010 
and customs union 
-Develop joint approaches 
to illegal migration 
-Unable to reach agreement 












(June: Common Strategy on 
Mediterranean approved) 
-Accelerate AA negotiations 
-Steps towards FT A 
-Charter for Peace and 
Security abandoned 
-Enhance political relations 
-Increase Senior Officials’ 
dialogue in fields of 
terrorism and migration






-Deepen political dialogue 
on terrorism, human rights, 
good neighbourly relations,
Yes: strengthen political 
dialogue on human rights
AA with Egypt 
signed and 
approved by EP
780 The table deliberately does not include references to the Middle East Peace Process. It summarises the 
main priorities in the three chapters of the EMP. Sources: ‘6 May Euro-Mediterranean meeting’, 
European Voice, 15 May 1997; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1997), Conclusions, Malta: 15 and 16 
May; Simon Taylor, ‘Israel holds key to fate of Euro-Med talks’, European Voice, 8 April 1999; Euro- 
Mediterranean Conference (1999), ‘Chairman’s formal conclusions’, Stuttgart: 15-16 April; European 
Commission (2000c), Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, COM(2000), 497 final, Brussels: 6 
September; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2001), Presidency Conclusions, Brussels: 5-6 May; Euro- 
Mediterranean Conference (2002a), Presidency Conclusions, Valencia: 22-23 April; Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference (2002b), Valencia Action Plan, Valencia: 23 April 2002; Khaled Diab, ‘Barcelona limps on 
despite Middle East crisis’, European Voice, 25 April 2002; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2003), 
Presidency Conclusions, Naples 2-3 December; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2004), Mid-Term 
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Presidency Conclusions, Dublin, 5-6 May; Council of the EU 
(2004), EU Annual Report on Human Rights; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2005a), Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership. 10 Years After Barcelona. Achievements and Perspectives. Conclusions, 
Luxembourg: 30-31 May; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2005b), Presidency Conclusions to the tenth 
anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Barcelona: 27-28 November; European Commission 
(2005a), Five Year Work Programme, and Euro-Mediterranean, and Code of Conduct on Countering 
Terrorism, Euromed Report, Issue No. 92, 30 November 2005; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2006), 
Conclusions, Tampere: 27-28 November; Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2007), Agreed Conclusions of 




rule of law, security 
-Accelerate AA negotiation 
process
-South-south trade and 
integration
-Dialogue between cultures 
and civilisations 
-Involvement of civil 








dialogue, including on 
defence
-Develop parliamentary 
dimension of EMP 




programme in the field of 
Justice, combating drugs, 
organised crime and 
terrorism, and cooperation 
in migration issues 
launched.
-Extension of the TEMPUS 
programme
Yes: commitment to human 
rights and democracy; 
introduce national and 







(European N eighbourhood  
Strategy launched)
-ESDP cooperation, 
including in civilian crisis 
management 
-Dialogue on terrorism 
-Creation of a Euro-med 
parliamentary assembly 
-Creation of the Euro-Med - 
-Facility for Investments 
and Partnership (FEMIP) 
-Creation of Euro-Med 
Foundation for Dialogue of 
cultures
( Com m ission
Com m unication on H RD in 
the M editerranean)
Yes: ‘Cooperation in 
promoting human rights 
and democracy is crucial to 
the success of the 
Partnership.’










(S trategic Partnership  
approved)
Approval of improvement of 
working methods of EMP
Focus on political pluralism, 
regulatory reform for the 
implementation of 
international commitments, 
judicial and penal systems, 
transparency, education. 
HRD: to be addressed in 
ENP Action Plans 
HRD: sub-committee 
established in EU-Morocco 
AA. Establishment 




trade enters into 
force.
June: AA with 














Ten Year of 
the EMP 
Meeting
-Evaluation of EMP and 
recognition of need to 
identify specific and agreed 
objectives.
-Recommendation to adopt a 
Road map for trade 
liberalisation
-Dialogue in subcommittees 
on ‘justice and security’ and 
‘migration and social 
affairs’.
-5 Year work programme 
approved
-Code of Conduct on 
Countering Terrorism 
approved
-Joint Statement was not 
approved because of 
divergences over Israel- 
Palestine
-Implement Code of conduct 
in countering terrorism 
-Strengthen ESDP dialogue
From 5 Year work 
programme:
More EU support for 
political reform and HR 
principles on basis of ENP 
and commitment of 
countries involved 
Establishment of a financial 
facility to support political 
reform
Meet international 










implementing the Code of 
conduct on terrorism 
-Trade liberalisation in 
services and agriculture 
-Transport and energy 
-Women in society 
-Management of migratory 
flows










-Progress in FT A 
-Energy and Trasnport 
-Energy, climate change and 
sustainable development 
-Migration
-Launch of joint 
programme on cooperation 








R e f e r e n c e s
Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Edward A. Fogarty (2004) (eds.), Between Regionalism and 
Globalism: European Union Interregional and Transregional Trade Strategies, New 
York: Palgrave.
Aggestam, Lisbeth (2008), ‘Introduction: ethical power Europe?’, International Affairs, 
Vol. 84, No. l,pp . 1-11.
Aliboni, Roberto (2005), ‘EMP Approaches to Human Rights and Democracy’, in 
Haizam Amirah Fernandez and Richard Youngs (2005) (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, Madrid: FRIDE and the Real Instituto Elcano 
de Estudios Intemacionales y Estrategicos, pp.47-58.
Allen, David and Michael Smith (1990), ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the 
Contemporary International Arena, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 
19-38.
Alston, Philip, with Mara Bustelo and James Heenan (1999) (ed.), The EU and Human 
Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amnesty International (2003), Egypt: Time to implement the UN Committee against 
Torture recommendations, Index: MDE 12/038/2003, London: 20 November.
Amnesty International (2005), Ten years o f EUROMED: Time to end the human rights 
deficit, Brussels: 21 November.
Amnesty International (2007), Egypt -  Systematic abuses in the name o f security, 
London: Amnesty International, AI Index: MDE 12/001/2007.
Amnesty International, State o f the world’s human rights, Sections on Ukraine and on 
Egypt in the editions between 1991 and 2007, London: Amnesty International.
Andreatta, Filippo (2005), ‘Theory and the European Union’s International Relations’, 
in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (2005) (eds.), International Relations and the 
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 18-38.
An-Na’im, Abdullahi A. (2001), ‘Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional 
Perspective’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 701-732.
Arab League (2004), Tunis Declaration of 16th Arab Summit, Tunis: 23 May, 
www.saudiembassv.net/2004News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=421.
Armitage, Richard, ‘Ukraine can ill afford an unfair election’, Financial Times, 29 
October 2004.
Ashley, Richard K. (1984), ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization, 
Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 225-86.
267
Aslund, Anders (2004), ‘Ukraine’s Future and US interests’, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, Washington: US Government, 12 May.
Aslund, Anders and Michael McFaul (2006) (eds.), Revolution in Orange: The Origins 
of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.
Attina, Fulvio and Stelios Stavridis (2001) (eds.), The Barcelona Process and Euro- 
Mediterranean Issues from Stuttgart to Marseilles, Milan: Giuffre.
Baehr, Peter R. (1996), The Role o f Human Rights in Foreign Policy, London and 
Basingstoke, MacMillan.
Balfour, Rosa (2005), ‘Italy’s Policies in the Mediterranean’, in Haizam Amirah 
Fernandez and Richard Youngs (2005) (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: 
Assessing the First Decade, Madrid: FRIDE and the Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios 
Intemacionales y Estrategicos, pp. 121-130.
Balfour, Rosa and Alessandro Rotta (2005), Beyond Enlargement. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy and its Tools’, The International Spectator, Vol. XL, No. 1, pp. 
7-20.
Barbe, Esther (1998), ‘Balancing Europe’s Eastern and Southern Dimensions’, in 
Zielonka (ed.), pp. 117-29.
Bartels, Lorand (2004), ‘A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Clauses in the European 
Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 9, 
No. 3, pp. 368-395.
Batt, Judy, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triataphyllou
(2003), Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe, Chaillot Papers No. 65, 
Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
Bayoumi, Soha (2007), ‘Egyptian Views of the EU: Pragmatic, Paternalistic and 
Partnership Concerns’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 331-347.
Behrendt, Sven and Christian-Peter Hanelt (2000) (eds.), Bound to Cooperate. Europe 
and the Middle East, Giitersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers.
Berychowska, Bogumila, Przemyslaw Zurawski vel Grajewski, Grzegorz Gromakzki 
(2002), New Neighbourhood - New Association. Ukraine and the European Union at the 
beginning o f the 21st Century. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation.
Bicchi, Federica (2004), ‘L’Unione Europea e la promozione della democrazia’, in 
Federica Bicchi, Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (2004) (eds.), La Questione della 
Democrazia nel Mondo Arabo± Monza: Polimetrica pp. 143-170.
Bicchi, Federica (2007), European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean, 
New York and Basingstonke: Palgrave MacMillan.
268
Bicchi, Federica, Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (2004) (eds.), La Questione della 
Democrazia nel Mondo Arabox Monza: Polimetrica.
Bideleux, Richard and Ian Jeffries (1998), A History o f Eastern Europe. Crisis and 
Change. London: Routledge.
Bojcun, Marko (2001), ‘Russia, Ukraine and European Integration’, EU1 Working Paper 
HEC No. 2001/4, Florence: European University Institute.
Booth, Ken (1993), ‘Human wrongs and international relations’, International Affairs, 
Vol. 71, No. l,pp . 103-126.
Booth, Ken and Steve Smith (1995) (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, 
University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Bremmer, Ian and Ray Taras (1997) (eds.), New States, New Politics: Building the Post- 
Soviet Nations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler (1999), The European Union as a Global Actor, 
London: Routledge.
Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler (2006), The European Union as a Global Actor, 
2nd edition (first edition 1999), London and New York: Routledge.
Brown, Chris (1999), ‘Universal human rights: a critique’ in Dunne and Wheeler (eds.), 
pp. 103-127.
Brown, Chris (2001), ‘Ethics, interests and foreign policy’, in Margot Light and Karen 
E. Smith (2001) (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 15-32.
Brown, Nathan J. (1997), The Rule o f Law in the Arab World. Courts in Egypt and the 
Gulf, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brownlee, Jason (2002), ‘The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak’s Egypt’, Journal o f 
Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 6-14.
Bukkvoll, Tor (2001), ‘Off the Cuff Politics - Explaining Russia’s Lack of a Ukraine 
Strategy’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 8, pp. p i 141-1157.
Bulmer, Simon (1991), ‘Analysing European Political Cooperation: The Case for Two- 
tier analysis’, in Martin Holland (1991) (ed.), The Future o f Political Cooperation. 
Essays on Theory and Practice, Basingstoke and London, 
pp. 70-91.
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2006), Recommendations on the Plan of 
Action of the European Neighbourhood Policy with the Government of Egypt on 
enhancing political dialogue and reform, 
www.cihrs.org/Act file/PDF/33773200672824.pdf.
269
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2008), Limitations Imposed on the Right of 
Association in the Arab Region: Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society 
Organizations under Attack, written statement submitted to the UN Human Rights 
Council Seventh Session, 25 March.
Cameron, Fraser (1999), The Foreign and Security Policy o f the European Union. Past, 
Present and Future, Sheffield Academic Press.
Carlsnaes, Walter and Steve Smith (1994) (eds.), European Foreign Policy. The EC and 
Changing Perspectives in Europe, London: Sage.
Carlsnaes, Walter, Helene Sjursen and Brian White (eds.) (2004), Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, London: Sage.
Carr, Edward H. (1981), The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the 
study of international relations, (reprint of the 2nd edition of 1946, first edition 1939), 
reissued in 2001 with an introduction by Micheal Cox, London: Palgrave.
Chandler, David (2002), From Kosovo to Kabul, London: Pluto Press.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998), ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, 
World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 324-348.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1990), ‘Document of the 
Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE’, 
downloadable from www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/cope90e.pdf.
Cook, Steven A. (2005), ‘The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform’, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 91-102.
Cortell, Andrew P. and James W. Davis Jr. (1996), ‘How Do International Institutions 
Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms’, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 451-78.
Council of Europe (2001a), Resolution 1239 Freedom o f expression and the functioning 
o f parliamentary democracy in Ukraine, text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 
25 January.
Council of Europe (2001b), Resolution 1244 Honouring o f obligations and commitments 
by Ukraine, text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 26 April.
Council of Europe (2002), ‘Compliance with member States’ commitments, Committee 
of Ministers Declaration of 10 November 1994’, Freedom of Expression and 
Information, Experts’ report on the situation in Ukraine, CM/Monitor (2002)24 
(confidential): 19 December, declassified on 27 February 2003.
Council of Europe (2003), Resolution 1346 Honouring o f obligations and commitments 
by Ukraine, text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 29 September 2003.
Council of the EU (1994), ‘Common Position on the objectives and priorities of the 
European Union towards Ukraine’, (94/779/CFSP), Brussels: 28 November.
270
Council of the EU (1996a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the EU on behalf of the 
European Union on Ukraine’, 7319/96 (Presse 140), Brussels: 21 May.
Council of the EU (1996b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the EU on behalf of the 
European Union on the removal of nuclear warheads from Ukrainian territory’, 8076/96, 
Brussels: 12 June.
Council of the EU (1996c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on the killing of Greek tourists in Cairo’, CFSP 6717/96, Press 105, 22 April.
Council of the EU (1999), Common Strategy on Ukraine, (1999/877/CFSP), Brussels:
11 December.
Council of the EU (2000), Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region,
(2000/458/CFSP), Brussels: 19 June.
Council of the EU (2001a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU about 
working conditions for media and to remind about concerns regarding the Gongadze 
case’, CFSP Statement, 5922/01 (Presse 41), P. 24/01 Brussels, 5 February.
Council of the EU (2001b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on the sentences against Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim/Ibn Khaldoun Centre’, CFSP 
9119/01, Press 204, 28 May.
Council of the EU (2001c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on developments in Ukraine’, Press Statement, 01/086, Brussels: 27 April.
Council of the EU (2001d), EU Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs, 2003/C 77/01, 
10 December.
Council of the EU (200le), European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues, 
Brussels: 13 December.
Council of the EU (200If), Guidelines to EU policy towards third countries on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TortureGuidelines.pdf.
Council of the EU (200lg), Report from the Council to the European Council on the 
Implementation o f the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region, Press Release 
9124/01, Brussels: 23 May.
Council of the EU (200lh), Report to the European Council on the implementation o f 
the Common Strategy o f the European Union on Ukraine, 15195/01, Brussels: 11 
December.
Council of the EU (2002a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on parliamentary elections in Ukraine on 31 March 2002’, CFSP Declaration, 
7815/02 (Presse 93), Brussels: 10 April.
271
Council of the EU (2002b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on the trial in Egypt against Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the employees of the Ibn 
Khaldoun Centre and Hoda Association’, CFSP 11415/02, Press 225. Brussels: 30 July.
Council of the EU (2002c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on the Implementation of the EU Guidelines on Efforts to Prevent and Eradicate 
Torture’, 15493/02 (Press 398) P 188/02, Brussels: 11 December.
Council of the EU (2002d), ‘Council Decision concerning the Agreements between the 
European Union and Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, 
Turkey and Ukraine on the participation of these states to the European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 2003/663/CFSP, Brussels: 10 December.
Council of the EU (2003a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on the acquittal of Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and his associates’, CFSP 7796/03, 
Press 94, Brussels: 26 March.
Council of the EU (2003b), A Secure Europe in a Better World -  the European Security 
Strategy, Brussels: 12 December.
Council of the EU (2003c), EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/GuidelinesChildren.pdf.
Council of the EU (2004a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on 
Ukraine’, 22 November (document number not available),
www.eu2004.nl/default.asp7CMS ITEM=B2C459EC419347E59AA019D53CAE787E 
X 1X60623X25.
Council of the EU (2004b), ‘Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on 
the presidential elections of 31 October 2004 in Ukraine’, 1 November.
Council of the EU (2004c), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on forthcoming elections and media freedom in Ukraine’, CFSP Declaration No. 
12696/04 (Presse 272), Brussels: 29 September.
Council of the EU (2004d), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on proposals for constitutional change in Ukraine’, 5614/1/04 (Presse 32), 
Brussels: 29 January 2004.
Council of the EU (2004e), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on media freedom and democratic standards’, CFSP Declaration No. 7186/04 
(Presse 74), Brussels: 18 March.
Council of the EU (2004f), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union regarding the Gongadze case in Ukraine’, 12452/04 (Presse 267), Brussels, 16 
September.




Council of the EU (2004h), ‘Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs between the Troika 
of the European Union and Ukraine on 29 March 2004’, ‘Press release’, 7515/04 (Presse 
40), Brussels: 30 March.
Council of the EU (2005a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on the presidential elections in Egypt’, 12084/05 (Presse 229), Brussels: 8 
September.
Council of the EU (2005b), ‘EU Presidency condemns bombings in Egypt’, 23 July, 
http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=QpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage 
&c=Page&cid=l 115146994806&a=KArticle&aid=l 119528783164&date=2005-07-23.
Council of the EU (2005c), ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, 
Congratulates President Mubarak on his Re-election’, S295/05, Brussels: 10 September.
Council of the EU (2005d), ‘Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on the Egyptian Parliamentary Elections’, 15631/05 (Presse 355), 9 December.
Council of the EU (2006e), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on measures by the Egyptian authorities against civil society activists’, CFSP 
9364/06, Press 143, Brussels: 15 May.
Council of the EU (2006f), ‘Declaration of the Presidency on the ferry disaster in the 
Red Sea’, CFSP Statement. 3 February.
Council of the EU (2006g), ‘EU Presidency statement on the train collision in Egypt’, 
Press release 303/2006, 21 August.
Council of the EU (2006h), ‘Second Meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council’, 
Luxemburg 13 June.
Council of the EU (2007a), ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union on the constitutional reform process in Egypt’, CFSP 8205/07, Press 73, Brussels: 
3 April.
Council of the EU (2007b), ‘Third Meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council’, 
Luxembourg 27 February.
Council of the EU (2007c), Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection o f the Rights o f 
the Child, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/16031.07.pdf.
Council of the EU, EU Annual Report on Human Rights, editions between 1998 and 
2007.
Council of the EU, General Affairs and External Relations (2004a), Press Release, 
14724/04 (Presse 325), Brussels, 22-23 November.
Council of the EU, General Affairs and External Relations (2004b), Conclusions, 
Luxemburg: 14 June.
273
Council of the EU, General Affairs and External Relations Council (2004c),
Conclusions, Luxemburg: 11 October.
Council of the EU, General Affairs Council (1998), Council Declaration on the Death 
Penalty, Brussels: 25 May.
Council on Rights, Democracy and Development (1991), Resolution o f the council and 
o f the member states meeting in the council on human rights, democracy and 
development, 28 November.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 975/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements 
for the implementation of development cooperation operations which contribute to the 
general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to 
tha of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, OJ L 120/1.
Council Regulation (EC) NO. 976/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements 
for the implementation of Community operations, other than those of development 
cooperation, which, within the framework of Community cooperation policy, contribute 
to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law 
and to tha of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries, OJ 
LI 20/8.
Cox, Adrian and Jenny Chapman (1999), The European Community External 
Cooperation Programmes. Policies, Management and Distribution, London: Overseas 
Development Institute.
Crawford, Beverly (2004), ‘Why the Euro-Med Partnership? Explaining the EU’s 
Strategies in the Mediterranean Region’, in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty
(2004) (eds.), Between Regionalism and Globalism: European Union Interregional and 
Transregional Trade Strategies, New York: Palgrave., pp. 93-117.
Crawford, Gordon (1996), Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance 
Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study o f the Policies o f Four Northern 
Donors, Leeds, Centre for Democratisation, University of Leeds.
Crawford, Gordon (1998), ‘Human Rights and Democracy in EU Development Co­
operation: Towards Fair and Equal Treatment’, in Marjorie Lister (1998b) (ed.), 
European Union Development Policy, Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, pp. 131- 
178.
Crawford, Gordon (2001), ‘Evaluating EU promotion of human rights, democracy and 
good governance: towards a participatory approach’, DSA European Development 
Policy Study Group, Discussion Paper No. 20, February.
Cremona, Marise (1998), ‘The European Union as an International Actor: The Issues of 
Flexibility and Linkage’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 67-94.
Dalacoura, Katerina (2003), Engagement or coercion? Weighing Western human rights 
policies towards Turkey, Iran and Egypt, London: The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs.
274
Dalacoura, Katerina (2005), ‘US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 
September 2001’, International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5, pp. 963-979.
Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrott (1997) (eds.), Democratic Changes and 
Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Declaration by the Heads of Mission of the European Union on the presidential election 
process in Ukraine, Kiev: 27 October 2004,
www.eu2004.nl/default.asp7CMS TCP=tcpPrint EU2004&CMS ITEM=AEA. 
Accessed 3 November 2004.
Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, ‘Foreign 
Direct Investments from the European Union to Ukraine’, 
www. delukr. cec. eu .int/site/pag 32099.htm.
Deutsch, Karl (et al.) (1957), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Diamond, Larry (2002), ‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’, Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 
13, No. 2, pp. 21-35.
Donnelly, Jack (1986), ‘International human rights: a regime analysis’, International 
Organization, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 599-642.
Donnelly, Jack (1994), ‘Post-Cold War Reflections on the Study of International Human 
Rights.’ Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 8 (published annually), pp. 97-117.
Donnelly, Jack (1999), ‘The Social Construction of International Human Rights’, in 
Dunne, Tim and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.) (1999), Human Rights in Global Politics, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 71-102.
Donnelly, Jack (2000), ‘An Overview’, in David P. Forsythe (2000) (ed.), Human Rights 
and Comparative Foreign Policy, Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University 
Press, pp. 310-34.
Doran, Micheal (1999) Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian power politics and the 
Palestine Question, New York : Oxford University Press.
Dosenrode, S0ren and Anders Stubkjaer (2002), The European Union and the Middle 
East, London, New York: Sheffield Academic Press.
Duchene, F rancis (1972), ‘Europe’s Role in world Peace, in Mayne, Richard J. (1972) 
(ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London: Fontana.
, pp. 32-47.
Duchene, Fran£ois (1973), ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of 
Interdependence’, in Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (1973) (eds.), A Nation 
Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community, Basingstoke: 
MacMillan, pp. 1-21.
275
Duffield, John (1994), ‘Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of 
Regional Security Regimes’, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 369- 
88 .
Dunne, Michele (2006), ‘Evaluating Egyptian Reform’, Carnegie Papers, No. 66, 
January.
Dunne, Tim and Nicholas J. Wheeler (1999) (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Ebeid, Hanaa (2004), ‘The Partnership in Southern Eyes: Reflections on the Discourse 
in the Egyptian Press’, EuroMeSCo paper, No. 37, October.
Economist Intelligence Unit (2005), Country Report: Egypt, London: September.
ECORYS-NEI Macro & Sector Policies (2005), Mid-term evaluation o f the MED A I I  
programme. Final report, Rotterdam: 18 July.
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Human Rights Watch (2007), ‘Human 
Rights Council Membership Requires Steps to Address Violations’, Briefing Paper, 
May, hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/egypt0507.
Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (2004), Torture in Egypt...an unchecked 
phenomenon, www.eohr.org/report/2004/re3.htm.
Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (2005a), The 2005 presidential election: a 
critical analysis, Cairo: 10 September, www.eohr.org/report/2005/re0910.shtml.
Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (2005b), “Future Parliament”? Not Yet! 
EOHR Report on Parliamentary Elections 2005 Results, Cairo: 14 December, 
www.eohr.org/report/2005/re 1214.shtml.
Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (2007), Torture in Egypt, culprits without 
punishment, Report, Cairo: 8 August, www.eohr.org/report/2007/re0808.shtml.
Elgstrom, Ole (2000), ‘Lome and Post-Lome: Asymmetric Negotiations and the Impact 
of Norms’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 175-95.
Elgstrom, Ole and Michael Smith (2006), ‘Introduction’, Ole Elgstrom and Michael 
Smith (2006) (eds.), The European Union’s Roles in International Politics. Concepts 
and Analysis, London: Routledge, pp. 1-10.
Elgstrom, Ole and Michael Smith (2006) (eds.), The European Union’s Roles in 
International Politics. Concepts and Analysis, London: Routledge.
Emerson, Michael (2005) (ed.), Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, 
Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
of the other part (2004), Official Journal L 304 , 30 September.
276
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995), Barcelona Declaration, Barcelona: 27-28 
November.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1997), Conclusions, Malta: 15 and 16 May.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1999), ‘Chairman’s formal conclusions’, Stuttgart: 15- 
16 April.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2001), Presidency Conclusions, Brussels: 5-6 May.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2002a), Presidency Conclusions, Valencia: 22-23 
April.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2002b), Valencia Action Plan, Valencia: 23 April.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2003), Presidency Conclusions, Naples 2-3 December.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2004), Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Presidency Conclusions, Dublin, 5-6 May.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2005a), Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 10 Years 
After Barcelona: Achievements and Perspectives. Conclusions, Luxembourg: 30-31 
May.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2005b), Presidency Conclusions to the tenth 
anniversary o f the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Barcelona: 27-28 November.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2006), Conclusions, Tampere: 27-28 November.
Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2007), Agreed Conclusions o f the 9th Euro- 
Mediterranean Meeting o f the Ministers o f Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 5-6 November.
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2007), European Neighbourhood Policy: 
Human Rights in EU-Egypt Relations, Cairo: 26-27 January.
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (2002), Egypt Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & 
National Indicative Programme 2002-2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/extemal relations/egypt/csp/02 06 en.pdf.
EuroMeSCO (2005), Barcelona Plus. Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community o f 
Democratic States, Lisbon: EuroMeSCO Secretariat.
European Commission (1991), On Human Rights, Democracy and Development, 
Brussels: November, SEC(91) 61 final.
European Commission (1995a), On the inclusion o f respect fo r democratic principles 
and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries, COM(95) 
216 final, Brussels: 23 May.
277
European Commission (1995b), The External Dimension o f the EU ’s Human Rights 
Policy: from Rome to Maastricht and Beyond, Brussels: 22 November, COM (95) 567 
final.
European Commission (1996), Action Plan for Ukraine, COM/96/0593/FINAL, 
Brussels: 20 November.
European Commission (2000a), On EU Election Assistance and Observation, 
COM(2000) 191 final, Brussels: 11 April.
European Commission (2000b), On the Implementation o f Measures Intended to 
Promote Observance o f Human Rights and Democratic Principles in External Relations 
for 1996-1999, COM(2000) 726 final, Brussels: 14 November.
European Commission (2000c), Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, COM(2000),
497 final, Brussels: 6 September.
European Commission (2001a), Annual Report o f the Meda programme 2000, Brussels, 
No document number available, retrievable from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/reports/meda 2000 en.pdf.
European Commission (2001b), Commission Staff Working Document, European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Programming Document, 2002-2004, 
Brussels: 20 December.
European Commission (2001c), Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the 
implementation o f the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000, 
SEC(2001) 801, Brussels: 22 May.
European Commission (200Id), Egypt. Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National 
Indicative Programme 2002-2004, Brussels: no date available, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/extemal relations/egypt/csp/02 06 en.pdf.
European Commission (200le), The European Union's Role in Promoting Human 
Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, COM(2001) 252 final, Brussels: 8 May.
European Commission (200If), Ukraine. Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006. National 
Indicative Programme 2002-2003, Brussels: 27 December.
European Commission (2002), Press Statement, ‘Commissioner Patten deplores ruling 
of Egyptian State Security Court against Saad Edin Ibrahim’, IP/02/1161, Brussels, 30 
July.
European Commission (2003a), ‘Commission Services Working Document to prepare 
the Euro-Mediterranean mid-term meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs’, Crete, 26-27 
May.
European Commission (2003b), Commission Staff Working Document, European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, Programming Update 2004, Brussels: 1 
December.
278
European Commission (2003c), European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 
Programming Update 2004, 1 December.
European Commission (2003e), ‘National Indicative Programme: Ukraine, adopted on 4 
August’, Annex 3,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/ukraine/csp/ip03 04 08.pdf.
European Commission (2003f), Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and 
Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners. Strategic Guidelines, COM(2003) 294 
final, Brussels: 21 May.
European Commission (2003g), Wider Europe -  Neighbourhood: A New Framework for  
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels:
11 March.
European Commission (2004a), Delegation to Ukraine, ‘Press Release’, Kyiv 19 March.
European Commission (2004b), EU/Ukraine Action Plan, Brussels: 9 December.
European Commission (2004c), European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR), Programming for 2005 and 2006, Bmssels: 6 December 2004.
European Commission (2004d), European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, 
COM(2004) 373 final, Bmssels: 12 May.
European Commission (2004e), The Implementation o f the Commission Communication 
on the EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, 
SEC(2004) 1041, Bmssels: 30 July.
European Commission (2005a) Euromed Report, Issue No. 92, 30 November.
European Commission (2005b), Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to :
“European Neighbourhood Policy” Country Report Egypt COM(2005) 72 final, 
SEC(2005) 287/3 Bmssels, 2 March.
European Commission (2005c), DG Trade, ‘Ukraine’, 5 July, http://trade- 
info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/iulv/tradedoc 113459.pdf, accessed 14 February 2006.
European Commission (2005d), Tenth Anniversary o f the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership: A work programme to meet the challenges o f the next five years. 
Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, Document 
number not available,
http://ec.europa.eu/extemal relations/euromed/barcelona 10/docs/10th comm en.pdf.
European Commission (2007a), Egypt. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Bmssels 4 
January.
European Commission (2007b), The European Union: furthering human rights and 
democracy across the globe, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities.
279
European Commission (2007c), European Neighbourhood Joint Action Plan, adopted at 
the 3rd EU-Egypt Association Council, Brussels: 6 March.
European Council (1991), Declaration on Human Rights, Luxemburg: 28-29 June 1991.
European Council (1993), Council Conclusions, Copenhagen: 21-22 June.
European Council (1997), Council Conclusions, Annex to Annex HI: application of 
Conditionality with a view to developing a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with 
the Countries of the Region’, Luxemburg: 29-30 April.
European Council (2001a), Common Strategy o f the European Union on Ukraine. The 
Swedish Presidency Work Plan, Final Version, (no date or document number available), 
http://eu2001 se/static/pdf/eng/ukraineplanorgdf.pdf.
European Council (2001b), EU Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs in Ukraine 
(2003/ c 77/01) Brussels: 10 December.
European Council (2001c), Presidency Conclusions, Goteborg: 15-16 June.
European Council (2004a), ‘Declaration on Ukraine’ Annex I, Presidency Conclusions: 
Brussels: 17 December.
European Council (2004b), Council Conclusions, Brussels: 5 November.
European Council (2004c), Final Report on a EU Strategic Partnership with the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, Brussels: 17-18 June.
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (2004), Programming for 2005 
and 2006, Brussels: 6 December,
w ww .europa.eu. int/comm/europeaid/proi ects/eidhr/pdf/eidhr-pro grammin g-2005- 
2006 en.pdf.
European Parliament (2001a), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common 
Security and Defence Policy, Report on the Common Strategy o f the European Union on 
Ukraine, Rapporteur Paavo Vayrynen, C5-0208/2000-2000/2116(COS)), Final A5- 
0083/2001, Brussels: 28 February.
European Parliament (2001b), Report on the Commission Communication on relations 
between the EU and the Mediterranean region: reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, 
Brussels, 22 January.
European Parliament (2002), Resolution on Egypt: the case o f Mr Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 
P5_TA(2002)0410, Strasbourg: 5 September.
European Parliament (2003), Resolution on human rights violations in Egypt, 
P5_TA(2003)0192, Strasbourg: 10 April.
European Parliament (2005), ‘EP delegation will not go back to Egypt for final phase of 
elections’, Press Release REF.: 20051122IPR02740, Brussels: 22 November.
280
European Parliament (2006), Resolution on on Egypt: Violence against Sudanese 
refugees, P6_TA(2006)0031, Strasbourg: 19 January.
European Parliament (2008), Resolution on the situation in Egypt, P6_TA(2008) 0023, 
Strasbourg: 17 January.
European Parliament, Annual Report on human rights in the world and European 
Union's human rights policy, editions between 1995 and 2007.
European Political Cooperation (1991), Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial 
Meeting concerning the Guidelines on the Recognition o f New States in Eastern Europe 
and in the Soviet Union, Brussels and The Hague: 16 December.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Committee (2000), Press Release, Brussels, 18 December.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Committee (2003), ‘Joint Report on the Implementation of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Ukraine’ 
europa.int.eu/comm./external_relations/Ukraine/intro/pcarep2.pdf.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (1998a), ‘Press Release’ 9594/98 (Presse 217), 
Brussels, 9 June.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (1998b), ‘Joint Press Release’, Vienna, 16 October .
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (1999a), ‘Press Release’ Luxembourg, 26 April.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (1999b), ‘Joint Press Communique’, 10391/99 (Presse 
244), Brussels, 23 July.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2000a), ‘Press Release’, 8741/00 (Presse 171), 
Brussels, 23 May.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2000b), ‘Joint Statement’, 11241/00 (Presse 312), 
Paris, 15 September.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2001a), ‘Press Release’, 10230/01 (Presse 252), 
Luxemburg, 26 June.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2001b), ‘Joint Statement’, 11772/01 (Presse 315), 
Yalta: 11 September.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2002a), ‘Press Release’, 7026/02 (Presse 64), 
Brussels: 11 March.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2002b), ‘Joint Statemen’t, 10607/02 (Presse 195), 
Copenhagen: 4 July.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2003a), ‘Press Release’, 7412/03 (Presse 75), 
Brussels: 18 March.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2003b), ‘Joint Statement’, Yalta: 7 October.
281
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2004a), Tress Release’, 9259/04 (Presse 151), 
Brussels: 18 May.
EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2004b), ‘Joint Press Release’, The Hague, 8 July.
EU-Ukraine Summit (2000), ‘Joint Statement by the President of the European Council 
Jacques Chirac assisted by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the EU Javier Solana, The President of the Commission Romano Prodi, and 
the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma’, Paris: 15 September.
EU-Ukraine Summit (2002), ‘Joint Statement’, 10607/02 (Presse 195), Copenhagen: 4 
July.
EU-Ukraine Summit (2003), ‘Press Release’, IP703/1343, Brussels: 6 October.
Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (1993) (eds.), Double- 
Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkely and Los 
Angeles.
Fehl, Caroline (2004), ‘Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ 
for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches’, European Journal o f International 
Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 357-394.
Feliu, Laura (2001), ‘Human Rights and the Barcelona Process’, in Fulvio Attina and 
Stelios Stavridis (eds.), The Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Issues from  
Stuttgart to Marseilles, Milan: Giuffre, pp. 67-92.
Feliu, Laura (2003). ‘A Two Level Game: Spain and the Promotion of Democracy and 
Human Rights in Marocco’, in Annette Jiinemann (2003b) (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean 
Relations after September 11. International, Regional, Domestic Dynamics, London: 
Frank Cass, pp. 90-111.
Fernandez, Haizam Amirah and Richard Youngs (2005) (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, Madrid: FRIDE and the Real Instituto Elcano 
de Estudios Intemacionales y Estrategicos.
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), ‘International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change’, International Organization. Special issue: Exploration and 
Contestation in the Study o f World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 887-917.
Forsythe, David P. (2000) (ed.), Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy,
Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press.
Forsythe, David P. and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer (2000), ‘US foreign policy and Enlarging 
the Democratic Community’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 988-1010.
Fouwles, Martine (1997) ‘The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and Human Rights’, in the Netherlands Quarterly o f Human Rights, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 
291-324.
282
Freedom House and UN Watch (2007), Evaluation o f2007 -  2010 UN Human Rights 
Council Candidates, Joint Analysis 7 May, www.unwatch.org.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World, chapters on Ukraine and on Egypt in the 
editions from 1991 to 2007.
Freedom House, Nations In Transit, chapters on Ukraine in the editions from 1997 to 
2007.
G8 (2004), Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region o f the 
Broader Middle East and North Africa, Sea Island, Georgia: 9 June, 
http://g8usa.gov/d 060904c.htm.
Gause, Gregory, m  (2005), ‘Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.
84, No. 5, pp.77-86.
Gerges, Fawaz A. (2000), ‘The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt? Cost and 
Prospects’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 592-612.
Germany’s Presidency of the EU (2007), Statement on the Shura Council elections in 
Egypt 22 June 2007, www.eu2007.de/en/News/CFSP Statements/index.html.
Giddens, Anthony (1984), The Constitution o f Society: Outline o f the Theory of 
Structuration, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gillespie, Richard (1997a), ‘Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med Partnership 
Initiative’, in Richard Gillespie (1997b) (ed.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
Political and Economic Perspectives, London: Frank Cass, pp. 33-48.
Gillespie, Richard (1997b) (ed.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and 
Economic Perspectives, London: Frank Cass.
Gillespie, Richard (2003), ‘Reshaping the Agenda? The Internal Politics of the 
Barcelona Process in the Aftermath of September 11’, in Junemann, Annette (2003b) 
(ed.), Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11. International, Regional, 
Domestic Dynamics, London: Frank Cass, pp. 21-36.
Gillespie, Richard and Richard Youngs (2002), ‘Themes in European Democracy 
Promotion’, European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case o f North Africa. 
Special Issue o f Democratization, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
Ginsberg, Roy H. (1989), Foreign Policy Actions o f the European Community: The 
Politics o f Scale, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Ginsberg, Roy H. (1999), ‘Conceptualizing the European Union as an International 
Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap’, Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 429-54.
Ginsberg, Roy H. (2001), The European Union in international politics: baptism by fire, 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
283
Glasser, Brad (2001), ‘Foreign Aid and Reform: The Diverging Paths of Egypt and 
Jordan in the 1990s’, EU1 Working Papers, RSC No. 2001/20.
Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane (1993a), ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy. An 
Analytical Framework’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993b) (eds.), 
Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, pp. 3-30.
Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane (1993b) (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy. 
Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Gomez, Ricardo (1998), ‘The EU’s Mediterranean policy. Common foreign policy by 
the back door?’, in Sjursen, Helen and John Peterson (1998) (eds.), A Common Foreign 
Policy for Europe? Competing Visions o f the CFSP, London: Routledge, pp. 133-51.
Gordon, Philip H. (1997-8), ‘Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International 
Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 74-100.
Grabbe, Heather (2000), ‘The sharp edges of Europe: extending Schengen eastwards, 
International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, July, pp. 519-536.
Grunert, Angela (2004), ‘Loss of Guiding Values and Support: September 11 and the 
Isolation of Human Rights Organizations in Egypt’, in Annette Junemann (2003b) (ed.), 
Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11. International, Regional, Domestic 
Dynamics, London: Frank Cass, pp. 133-152.
Guazzone, Laura and Daniela Pioppi (2004), ‘Introduzione alia questione della 
democrazia nel mondo arabo’, in Bicchi, Federica, Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi 
(2004) (eds.), La Questione della Democrazia nel Mondo Arabo± Monza: Polimetrica, 
pp. 19-41.
Haas, Ernst and Edward Thomas Rowe (1973), ‘Regional Organizations in the United 
Nations: Is There Extemalization?’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 
3-54.
Haas, Peter M. (1989), ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and 
Mediterranean Pollution Control’, International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 377- 
403.
Hamzawy, Amr (2005), ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Democratic Reform in 
Egypt: Contemporary Policy Debates’, in Haizam Amirah Femandezand Richard 
Youngs (2005) (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First 
Decade, Madrid: FRIDE and the Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y 
Estrategicos, pp. 131-137.
Herranz, Anna (2003) ‘Relaciones UE-Ucraina 1991-2003: Una politica de reaction’, 
Working Papers No. 52, Barcelona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
Hill, Christopher (1993) ‘The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing 
Europe’s International Role, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 
305-328.
284
Hill, Christopher (1996) (ed.), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London: 
Routledge.
Hill, Christopher and Michael Smith (2005) (eds.), International Relations and the 
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hill, Dilys (1989) (ed.), Human Rights and Foreign Policy. Principles and Practices, 
Basingstoke and London, MacMillan.
Hillal Dessouki, Ali E. (1991), ‘The Primacy of Economics: the Foreign Policy of 
Egypt’, in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, and Bahgat Korany (1991) (eds.), The Foreign 
Policies o f Arab States, Boulder, Oxford, San Francisco, Westview Press, pp. 156-185.
Hillal Dessouki, Ali E. and Bahgat Korany (1991) (eds.), The Foreign Policies o f Arab 
States, Boulder, Oxford, San Francisco, Westview Press.
Hillion, Christopher (1998), ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the 
European Union and the New Independent States of the Ex-Soviet Union’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 , pp. 399-420.
Hillion, Christopher (2000), ‘Institutional aspects of the partnership between the 
European Union and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union: Case 
studies of Russia and Ukraine’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 5 pp. 1211- 
1235.
Hinnebusch, Raymond (2002), ‘The Foreign Policy of Egypt’, in Raymond Hinnebusch 
and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policy o f Middle East States, Boulder 
and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 91-114.
Hinnebusch, Raymond and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (2002) (eds.), The Foreign Policy 
of Middle East States, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
Hoffman, Stanley (2000), ‘Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?’, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 189-198.
Holland, Martin (1991) (ed.), The Future o f Political Cooperation. Essays on Theory 
and Practice, Basingstoke and London.
Hollis, Rosemary (1997), ‘Europe and the Middle East: power by stealth?’,
International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, pp. 15-29.
Hollis, Rosemary (1999), ‘Capitalizing on diplomacy’, in Phebe Marr (1999) (ed.), 
Egypt at the crossroads : domestic stability and regional role, Washington, DC : 
National Defense University Press, pp. 129-152.
Hollis, Rosemary (2000), ‘Barcelona’s First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Security 
Relations?’, in Sven Behrendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt (2000) (eds.), Bound to 
Cooperate. Europe and the Middle East, Giitersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 
pp. 107-130.
285
Human Rights Watch, World Report, chapters on Ukraine and Egypt in the editions 
between 1991 and 2007.
Ikenberry, G. John (2001), After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the 
Rebuilding o f Order after Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
International Election Observation Mission (2004a), ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings 
and Conclusions, Presidential Election, Ukraine -  31 October 2004’, Kiev: 1 November.
International Election Observation Mission (2004b), ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings 
and Conclusions, Presidential Election (Second Round), Ukraine -  21 November 2004’, 
Kiev: 22 November.
International Election Observation Mission (2004c), ‘Presidential Election (Repeat 
Second Round), Ukraine, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 26 
December 2004’, Kiev: 27 December.
International Federation for Human Rights (2005), The Death Penalty in Egypt, Report 
of International Fact Finding Mission, No. 415/2005, April.
International Federation of Human Rights, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 
World Organization Against Torutre, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, Egyptian 
Organisation for Human Rights, Cairo Institute for Human Rights (2007), EU-Egypt 
Association Council: Action Plan’s Human Rights Section Falls Short ofNGO  
Expectations, Press Release, Brussels and Cairo: 7 March, 
www.cihrs.org/print press en aspx?per id=197.
ISA Consult, European Institute, Sussex University, and GJW Europe [ISA] (1997), 
Evaluation o f the PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme 1992-1997. Final Report, 
Brighton and Hamburg.
Jawad, A. Haiifaa (1992), Euro-Arab Relations: A Study in Collective Diplomacy, 
Reading: Ithaca Press.
Joffe, George (1999), ‘The Future of the Middle East and Egypt’, in Phebe Marr, (1999) 
(ed.), Egypt at the crossroads : domestic stability and regional role, Washington, DC : 
National Defense University Press, pp. 171-191.
Joffe, George (2008), ‘The European Union, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in the 
Maghreb’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 46. No. 1, pp. 147-171.
J0rgensen, Knud Erik (1998), ‘The European Union’s Performance in World Politics: 
How Should we Measure Success?’, in Jan Zielonka (1998) (ed.), Paradoxes o f 
European Foreign Policy, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 87-101.
J0rgensen, Knud Erik (2004) ‘European Foreign Policy: Conceptualising the Domain’, 
in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (1994) (eds.), European Foreign Policy. The EC 
and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London: Sage, pp. 32-56.
J0rgensen, Knud Erik (2006), ‘Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Values, Images 
and Principles in Foreign Policy’, in Sonia Lucarelli, and Ian Manners (2006) (eds.),
286
Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, pp. 42- 
58.
Jiinemann, Annette (2003a), ‘Security Builiding in the Mediterranean after September 
11*, in Jiinemann, Annette (2003b) (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean Relations after 
September 11. International, Regional, Domestic Dynamics, London: Frank Cass, pp. 1- 
20.
Jiinemann, Annette (2003b) (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11. 
International, Regional, Domestic Dynamics, London: Frank Cass.
Karatnychky, Adrian (2005), ‘Ukraine’s Orange Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, 
No. 2, pp. 35-52.
Karawan, Ibrahim A. (2002), ‘Identity and Foreign Policy. The Case of Egypt’, in 
Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (2002) (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the 
Middle East, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, pp. 155-168.
Karkutli, Nadim and Dirk Biitzler (1999), Evaluation o f the MEDA Democracy 
Programme 1996-1998. Final Report, Brussels: April.
Kelley, Judith (2006), ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms 
through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 44. No 1, pp. 29-55.
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye (1989, first edition 1977), Power and 
Interdependence, Glenview, Dl.: Scott, Foresman.
Keohane, Robert O., Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.) (1993), After the Cold 
War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Cambridge, 
MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Keukeleire, Stephan (2002), ‘Reconceptualizing (European) Foreign Policy: Structural 
Foreign Policy’, paper presented at the 1st Pan-European Conference on European Union 
Politics, Bordeaux: 26-28 September, www.wmin.ac.uk/csd/rw/TMP 1005915395.htm.
Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughton (2008), The Foreign Policy o f the 
European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Kienle, Eberhard (1998a), ‘Destabiliazation through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean 
Relations after the Barcelona Declaration’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.l- 
20.
Kienle, Eberhard (1998b), ‘More than a Response to Islamism: the Political 
Deliberalisation of Egypt in the 1990s’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 219- 
235.
Kienle, Eberhard (2001), A Grand Delusion. Democracy and Economic Reform in 
Egypt, London and New York: I.B. Tauris.
287
Klotz, Audie (1995), ‘Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and U.S. 
sanctions against South Africa’, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 451- 
478.
Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (2004), ‘Explaining Government Preferences for 
Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy’, International 
Organization, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 137-174.
Kohnstamm, Max and Wolfgang Hager (1973) (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign 
Policy Problems before the European Community, Basingstoke: MacMillan.
Korany, Bahgat (2006), ‘Egypt’s Overdue Reform: A Prototype of the Middle East to 
Come?’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 83-89.
Krasner, Steven D. (1982), ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables,’ International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 185-205.
Krenzler, Horst-Gunter and Henning C. Schneider (1997), ‘The Question of 
Consistency’, in Regelsberger, Elfriede, Philippe de Schouteete and Wolfgang Wessels 
(1997) (eds.), Foreign Policy o f the European Union: from EPC to CFSP and Beyond, 
Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 133-151.
Kubicek, Paul (2001), ‘The Limits of Electoral Democracy in Ukraine’,
Democratization, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 117-139.
Kuchma, Leonid, ‘Those responsible for journalist’s death should be brought to justice’, 
Letters to the editor, Financial Times, 27 February 2001.
Kuzio, Taras (1998) (ed.), Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics o f Post-Soviet 
Transformation, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp.
Kuzio, Taras (1999), ‘Slawophiles versus Westemizers: Foreign Policy Orientations in 
Ukraine’, in Kurt R.Spillman, Andreas Wenger and Derek Muller (1999) (eds.),
Between Russia and the West: Foreign and Security Policy o f Independent Ukraine, 
Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 53-74.
Kuzio, Taras (2003), ‘EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?’, Occasional Papers 
No. 47, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, November.
Kuzio, Taras, Jennifer D.P. Moroney, and Mikhail Molchanov (2002), Ukrainian 
foreign and security policy: theoretical and comparative perspectives, Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger.
Langhor, Vickie (2004), ‘Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics. Egypt and 
Liberalizing Arab Regimes’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 181-204.
Larsen, Henrik (2004), ‘Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy’ in 
Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (2004b) (eds.), Rethinking European Union foreign 
policy, Manchester : Manchester University Press, pp. 62-80.
288
Legro, Jeffrey and Andrew Moravcsik (1999), ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’
International Security. Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 5-55.
Lewis, Ann (2002) (ed.), The EU and Ukraine, London : Kogan Page.
Light, Margot (2001), ‘Exporting Democracy’, in Light, Margot and Karen E. Smith 
(2001) (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
75-92.
Light, Margot and Karen E. Smith (2001) (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Lindh, Anna (2001), ‘Statement by Anna Lindh in Kiev’, Press Release, 13 February 
2001, eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news_reas.asp?iInformationID=l 1869.
Lister, Marjorie (1998a), ‘Europe’s New Development Policy’, in Lister, Marjorie 
(1998b) (ed.), European Union Development Policy, Basingstoke and London: 
MacMillan, pp. 17-38.
Lister, Marjorie (1998b) (ed.), European Union Development Policy, Basingstoke and 
London: MacMillan.
Lucarelli, Sonia (2000), Europe and the Breakup o f Yugoslavia, The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International.
Lucarelli, Sonia (2002), Peace and Democracy: The Rediscovered Link. The EU, NATO 
and the European System o f Liberal-Democratic Security Communities, Final Report, 
NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Individual Research Fellowships 2000-2002 
Programme.
Lucarelli, Sonia and Ian Manners (2006) (eds.), Values and Principles in European 
Union Foreign Policy, London: Routledge.
Lynch, Dov (2003), ‘The new Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU’, in Judy Batt,
Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triataphyllou (2003), 
Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe, Chaillot Papers No. 65, Paris:
EU Institute for Security Studies, pp. 34-59.
Makram-Ebeid, Mona (2001), ‘Egypt’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections’, Middle East 
Policy, Vol. Vin, No. 2, pp. 32-44.
Manners, Ian (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal o f 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235-58.
Manners, Ian (2006), ‘The Constitutive nature of values, images and principles in the 
European Union’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (2006) (eds.), Values and 
Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, pp. 19-41.
Manners, Ian and Richard Whitman (1998), ‘Towards Identifying the International 
Identity of the European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU’s Network of 
Relations’, Journal o f European Integration, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 231-49.
289
Manners, Ian and Richard Whitman (2003), ‘The “difference engine”: constructing and 
representing the international identity of the European Union’, Journal o f European 
Public Policy, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 380-404.
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1998), ‘The Institutional Dynamics of 
International Political Orders’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 943-969.
Marr, Phebe (1999) (ed.), Egypt at the crossroads: domestic stability and regional role, 
Washington, DC : National Defense University Press.
Martin, Lisa and Beth Simmons (1998) ‘Theories and Empirical Studies of International 
Institutions’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 729-757.
Maull, Hans (1990), ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, in Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 91-106.
Mayne, Richard J. (1972) (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, 
London: Fontana.
McFaul, Michael (2007), ‘Ukraine Imports Democracy. External Influences on the 
Orange Revolution’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 45-83.
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994), ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, 
International Security, Vol. XIX, No. 3, pp. 459-89.
Merlinger, Michael, Cas Mudde, and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2001), ‘The Right and the 
Righteous? European Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sactions against Austria’, 
Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1: pp. 59-77.
Miller, Vaughne (2004), ‘The Human Rights Clause in the EU’s External Agreements’, 
House o f Commons Research Paper, 04/33, London: 16 April.
Milward, Alan S. (2000), The European Rescue of the Nation State, (first edition 1992) 
New York: Routledge.
Missiroli, Antonio (2001a), ‘European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 177-196.
Missiroli, Antonio (2001b) (ed.), ‘Coherence for European Security Policy: Debates -  
Cases -  Assessments, Occasional Pgpers, No. 27, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 
Western European Union, May.
Monar, Jorg (1998), ‘Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Mediterranean 
Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 1998, pp. 39-60.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1999), The Choice for Europe, London: UCL Press.
Moravcsik, Andrew (2000), ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe’, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 217-52.
290
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1985) (6th edition), Politics among Nations. The Struggle for  
Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A Knopf.
Morse, Edward L. (1970), ‘The Transformation of Foreign Policies. Modernization, 
Interdependence, and Extemalization’, World Politics, Vol. XXII, No. 3, pp. 371-92. 
Motyl, Alexander and Bohdan Krawchenko (1997), ‘Ukraine: from empire to 
statehood’, in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (1997) (eds.), New States, New Politics: 
Building the Post-Soviet Nations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 235-275.
MWH, ECDPM, ODI Consortium (2003), Evaluation o f the European Commission's 
Country Strategy for Ukraine, Final Report, La Hulpe: June.
Napoletano, Pasqualina, ‘Helping Europe’s southern neighbours take a leap forward’, 
European Voice, 12 May 2005.
Napoli, Daniela (1995), ‘The European Union’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights’, in 
Nanette A. Neuwahl and Allan Rosas (1995) (eds.), The European Union and Human 
Rights, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 297-311.
Nemyria, Hryrhoriy (2005), ‘The Orange Revolution: Explaining the Unexpected’, in 
Emerson, Michael (2005) (ed.), Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, 
Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, pp. 53-62.
Neuwahl, Nanette A. (1995), ‘The Treaty on European Union: A Step Forward in the 
Protection of Human Rights?’, in Nanette A. Neuwahl and Allan Rosas (1995) (eds.), 
The European Union and Human Rights, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 1- 
22.
Neuwahl, Nanette A. and Allan Rosas (1995) (eds.), The European Union and Human 
Rights, The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Nuttall, Simon J. (2000), European Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Official Journal (2005), ‘Reglement (CE) No. 1236/2005 du Conseil du 27 juin 2005 
concemant le commerce de certains biens susceptibles d'etre utilises en vue d'infliger la 
peine Capitale, la torture ou d’autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou 
degradants’, L2000, Brussels: 30 July.
0hrgaard, Jakob C. (2004), ‘International relations or European integration: is the CFSP 
sui generisT, in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (2004b) (eds.), Rethinking 
European Union foreign policy, Manchester : Manchester University Press, pp. 26-44.
Olsen, Gorm Rye (1998), ‘Bureaucratic Interests and European Aid to Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, in Marjorie Lister (1998b) (ed.), European Union Development Policy, 
Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, pp. 64-96.
Olsen, Gorm Rye (2000), ‘Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of 
“Europe”: Limits to International Idealism’, Democratization, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 142- 
167.
291
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2000), Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, ‘Ukraine Presidential Elections’, 31 and 14 November 
1999, Final Report, Warsaw: 7 March.
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2001), Representative of Freedom 
of the Media, ‘Statement to the Permanent Council’, 8 February.
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2001), Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, ‘Press release’, 21 September.
Pace, Michelle (2007), ‘Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm 
entrepreneur in the south?’, Cambridge Review o f International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4, 
pp. 659-675.
Panebianco, Stefania and Rosa Rossi (2004), ‘EU attempts to export norms of good 
governance to the Mediterranean and Western Balkan countries’, Jean Monnet Working 
Papers in Comparative and International Politics, JMWP No. 53, October.
Pargeter, Alison (2001) ‘Italy and the Western Mediterranean’, ESRC 'One Europe or 
Several?' Programme Working Paper 26/01.
Participation of non-state Actors in EC Development Policy, http://europa.eu.int/eur- 
Iex/en/com/cnc/2002/com2002:0598en01 .pdf.
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States, and Ukraine, OJ L 49/3, 19 February 1998.
Pascual, Carlos, and Steven Pifer (2002). ‘Ukraine’s Bid for a Decisive Place in 
History’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 175-192.
Patten, Chris (2001), Speech to the European Parliament Plenary on the Vayrynen 
Report on the Common Strategy, SPECH/01/121, Strasbourg: 14 March.
Pavliuk, Oleksandr (1997), ‘Ukrainian-Polish Relations: A Pillar of Regional Stability?’ 
in Monika Wohlfeld (1997) (ed.), The Effects o f Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Chaillot Paper No. 26, Paris, Western European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, pp. 29-42.
Pavliuk, Oleksandr (2002), ‘An Unfulfilling Partnership: Ukraine and the West, 1991- 
2001’, European Security, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring, pp. 81-101.
Persson, Goran (2001), ‘Speech by Prime Minister Goran Persson to the European 
Parliament’, (document number not available), Strasbourg: 3 July.
Persson, Goran and Romano Prodi, ‘Ukraine’s Progress Should be Top Priority for All 
Europe’ in International Herald Tribune, 23 May 2001.
Peterson, John (1995), ‘Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework 
for analysis’, Journal o f European Public Policy Vol. 2, No. 1: pp. 69-93.
292
Peterson, John and Elizabeth Bomberg (1999), Decision-making in the European Union, 
New York, St. Martin's Press.
Philippart, Eric (2003), ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A Critical Evaluation of 
an Ambitious Scheme’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 201-220.
Piccone, Ted and Richard Youngs (2006), Strategies for Democratic Change: Assessing 
the Global Response, Madrid: FRIDE and Democracy Coalition Project, chapter on 
Ukraine, pp. 97-121.
Pijpers, Alfred E. (1991), ‘European Political Cooperation and the Realist Paradigm’, in 
Martin Holland (1991) (ed.), The Future o f Political Cooperation. Essays on Theory and 
Practice, Basingstoke and London, pp. 8-35.
Pijpers, Alfred, Elfriede Regelsberger, Wolfgang Wessels and Geoffrey Edwards (1988) 
(eds.), European Political Cooperation in the 1980s. A Common Foreign policy for  
Western Europe?, Dordrecht: Marinus Nijhoff.
Pioppi, Daniela (2004), ‘L’Egitto de\V intifah: quale liberalizzazione?’ in Federica 
Bicchi, Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (2004) (eds.), La Questione della 
Democrazia nel Mondo Arabox Monza: Polimetrica, pp. 271-289.
Powell, Colin L. (2001), ‘Remarks with Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed 
Maher’, Washington DC: 26 September,
http://www.state.gov/secretarv/former/powell/remarks/2001/5066.htm.
President of Ukraine (1998), Decree by the President of Ukraine, Strategy of Ukraine’s 
integration into the European Union, Decree 615/98, 11 June.
Prizel, Dya (1997), ‘Ukraine between proto-democracy and "soft" authoritarianism’, in 
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (1997) (eds.), Democratic Changes and 
Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 330-365.
Prodi, Romano (2000), Speech at the National Academy of Science, SPEECH/00/429, 
Kiev: 10 November.
Protsyk, Oleh (2003), ‘Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their 
responses to EU enlargement’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, 
pp. 427-442.
Puglisi, Rosaria (2003), ‘The Rise of the Ukrainian Oligarchs’, Democratization, Vol.
10, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 99-123.
Putnam, Robert D. (1993), ‘Appendix: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of 
Two-Level Games’, in Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam 
(eds.) Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. 
Berkely and Los Angeles.
293
Raik, Kristi (2006), ‘Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the 
EU’s Policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood’, CEPS Working Paper No. 237, 
February.
Regelsberger, Elfriede, Philippe de Schouteete and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) (1997), 
Foreign Policy o f the European Union: from EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder, CO.: 
Lynne Rienner.
Rice, Condoleezza (2005), Secretary of US State Department, Remarks at the American 
University in Cairo, Cairo: 20 June, www.state. gov/secretarv/rm/2005/48328.htm.
Richardson, Jeremy (2001a) ‘Policy-making in the EU. Interests, ideas and garbage cans 
of primeval soup’, in Jeremy Richardson (2001b) (ed.), European Union. Power and 
policy-making, London and New York, Routledge, pp. 23-26.
Richardson, Jeremy (2001b) (ed.), European Union. Power and policy-making, London 
and New York, Routledge.
Riedel, Eibe and Martin Will (1999), ‘Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of 
the EC’, in Philip Alston, with Mara Bustelo and James Heenan (1999) (ed.), The EU 
and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 723-754.
Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink (1999), ‘The socialization of international human 
rights norms into domestic practices: introduction’ in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, 
and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) (eds.), The power o f human rights: international norms and 
domestic change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-38.
Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) (eds.), The power o f 
human rights : international norms and domestic change, Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1996), ‘Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International 
Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union’, Journal 
o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 53-80.
Romeo, Isabel (1998), ‘The European Union and North Africa: Keeping the 
Mediterranean “Safe” for Europe’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 21-38.
Rosamond, Ben (2000), Theories o f European Integration, Basingstoke and London: 
MacMillan.
Ruggie, John Gerard (1998), ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo- 
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’, International Organization. 
Special issue: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 
4, pp. 855-85.
Said Aly, Abdel Moneim and Robert H. Pelletreau (2001), ‘U.S.-Egyptian Relations’, 
Middle East Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 2, June, pp. 45-58.
Scheipers, Sibylle and Daniela Sicurelli (2007), ‘Normative Power Europe: A Credible 
Utopia?’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 435-457.
294
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2001), ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical 
Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International 
Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 47-80.
Schmitter, Philippe C. (1969), ‘Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International 
Integration.’ International Organization Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 161-66.
Schumacher, Tobias (2001), ‘The Mediterranean as a New Foreign Policy Challenge? 
Sweden and the Barcelona Process’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 81-102.
Secretary General/High Representative (2000), Common Strategies Report, Brussels: 21 
December, reprinted in Antonio Missiroli (2001b) (ed.), ‘Coherence for European 
Security Policy: Debates -  Cases -  Assessments, Occasional Pgpers, No. 27, Paris: 
Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, May, Annex E.
Selim El-Sayed, Mohammed (1997), ‘Egypt and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: 
Strategic Choice or Adaptive Mechanism?’, in Richard Gillespie (1997b) (ed.), The 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and Economic Perspectives, London: Frank 
Cass, pp. 64-90.
Sherr, James (1998), ‘Ukrainian Security Policy: The Relationship between Domestic 
and External Factors’, in Taras Kuzio (1998) (ed.), Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics o f 
Post-Soviet Transformation, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, pp. 245-277.
Sherr, James (1999), ‘After Yugoslavia: Whither Ukraine?’, in Kurt R.Spillman,
Andreas Wenger and Derek Muller (1999) (eds.), Between Russia and the West: Foreign 
and Security Policy o f Independent Ukraine, Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 123-144.
Sikkink, Kathryn (1993), ‘The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the 
United States and Western Europe’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993b) 
(eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, pp. 139-170.
Singerman, Diane (2002), ‘The Politics of Emergency Rule in Egypt’, Current History, 
January, pp. 29-35.
Sjostedt, Gunnar (1977), The External Role o f the European Community, Westmead, 
Famborough: Saxon House.
Sjursen, Helen and John Peterson (1998) (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? 
Competing Visions o f the CFSP, London: Routledge.
Sjursen, Helene (2006), ‘What kind of power?’, Journal o f European Public Policy,
Vol. 13, No. 2, 169-181.
Smith, Hazel (2002), European Union Foreign Policy: what it is and what it does, 
London: Pluto.
295
Smith, Karen E. (1998a), ‘The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy’, in Jan 
Zielonka (1998b) (ed.), Paradoxes o f European Foreign Policy, The Hague, London, 
Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 67-85.
Smith, Karen E. (1998b), ‘The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations 
with Third Countries: How Effective?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
pp. 253-274.
Smith, Karen E. (1999), The Making ofEU Foreign Policy. The Case o f Eastern 
Europe, London: MacMillan Press, 1999.
Smith, Karen E. (2000), ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or a 
Cause for Concern?’, The International Spectator, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 11-28.
Smith, Karen E. (2001), ‘The EU, human rights and relations with third countries: 
“foreign policy” with an ethical dimension?’ in Margot Light and Karen E. Smith (2001) 
(eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185-203.
Smith, Karen E. (2003), European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 
Cambridge: Polity.
Smith, Steve (1995), ‘The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Geneology of International 
Relations Theory’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (1995) (eds.), International Relations 
Theory Today, University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 
1-37.
Smolansky, Oleh M. (2004), ‘Ukraine and Russia: An Evolving Marriage of 
Inconvenience’, Orbis, Vol. 48 No. 1, pp. 117-134.
Soetendorp, Ben (1994), ‘The Evolution of the EC/EU as a Single Foreign Policy 
Actor’, in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (1994) (eds.), European Foreign Policy.
The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London: Sage, pp. 103-119.
Soetendorp, Ben (1999) Foreign Policy in the European Union, London and New York: 
Longman.
Solana, Javier, ‘Europe’s role in the spread of democracy’, Financial Times, 14 March 
2005.
Solchanyk, Roman (2001). Ukraine and Russia. The Post-Soviet Transition. Lanham, 
Maryland: Roman and Littlefield.
Sprensen, George (1993) (ed.), Political Conditionality, London: Frank Cass.
Spencer, Claire (2001), ‘The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the 
Mediterranean’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 31-51.
Spillman, Kurt R., Andreas Wenger and Derek Muller (1999) (eds.), Between Russia 
and the West: Foreign and Security Policy o f Independent Ukraine, Bern: Peter Lang.
296
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (2002), Theories o f International Cooperation and the Primacy 
of Anarchy: Explaining U.S. International Monetary Policy-Making after Bretton 
Woods, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Subtelny, Orest (2000), Ukraine. A History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Sushko, Oleksandr and Olena Prystayko (2006), ‘Western Influence’, in Anders Aslund 
and Michael McFaul (2006) (eds.), Revolution in Orange: The Origins o f Ukraine’s 
Democratic Breakthrough, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, pp. 125-144.
Svensson-McCarthy, Anna-Lena (2007), The implementation o f the EU guidelines on 
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Directorate 
General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate for Interparliamentary 
Delegations and Policy Department, Policy Department External Relations, Brussels, 
European Parliament: March.
Szymanski, Marcela and Michael E. Smith (2005), ‘Coherence and Conditionality in 
European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU-Mexico Global Agreement’, Journal o f 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 171-92.
Telhami, Shibley and Michael Barnett (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press.
Telo, Mario (2006), Europe: a Civilian Power? European Union, Global 
Governance, World Order, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Tonra, Ben (2003), ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility 
of a Cognitive Approach’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No 4, pp. 731- 
56.
Tonra, Ben and Thomas Christiansen (2004a), ‘The study of foreign policy: between 
international relations and European Studies’, in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen 
(2004b) (eds.), Rethinking European Union foreign policy, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, pp. 1-9.
Tonra, Ben and Thomas Christiansen (2004b) (eds.), Rethinking European Union 
foreign policy, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Twitchett, Kenneth J. (1976) (ed), Europe and the World: The External Relations o f the 
Common Market, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
UK Presidency of the EU (2005), ‘EU Presidency statement on the outcome of the trial 
of Mr Ayman Nour in Egypt’, 27 December 2005,
http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=QpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage 
&c=Page&cid=l 107293561746&a=KArticle&aid=l 134650253515&date=2005-12-27.
United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] (2002), Arab Human Development 
Report, New York.
297
US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, chapters on Ukraine and Egypt in the editions 
between 1993 and 2007.
van Ham, Peter (1994), ‘Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for 
Western Policy’, Chaillot Paper 13, Paris: Western European Union Institute for 
Security Studies.
Vincent, Raymond J. (1989), ‘Human Rights in Foreign Policy’, in Dilys Hill (1989) 
(ed.), Human Rights and Foreign Policy. Principles and Practices, Basingstoke and 
London: MacMillan, pp. 54-99.
Wallace, Helen (2000), ‘Analysing and Explaining Policies’, in Helen Wallace and 
William Wallace (2000) (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 65-81.
Wallace, Helen and William Wallace (2000) (eds.), Policy-Making in the European 
Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ward, Angela (1998), ‘Frameworks for Cooperation between the European Union and 
Third States: a Viable Matrix for Uniform Human Rights Standards?’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 505-536.
Warleigh, Alex (2006), ‘Learning from Europe? EU Studies and the Re-Thinking of 
“International Relations’” , European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1, 
pp. 31-51.
Weiler, Joseph H. and Wolfgang Wessels (1988), ‘EPC and the Challenge of Theory’ in 
Alfred Pijpers, Elfriede Regelsberger, Wolfgang Wessels and Geoffrey Edwards (1988) 
(eds.), European Political Cooperation in the 1980s. A Common Foreign policy for  
Western Europe?, Dordrecht: Marinus Nijhoff, pp. 229-258.
Wendt, Alexander (1992), ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics’ , International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391-425.
Wendt, Alexander (1994), ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’ 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 384-396.
White, Brian (2001), Understanding European Foreign Policy, Houndsmill, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave
White, Stephen, Ian McAllister, Margot Light and John Lowenhardt (2002), ‘A 
European or Slavic Choice? Foreign Policy and Public Attitudes in Post-Soviet Europe’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2, Spring, pp. 181-202.
White, Stephen, Margot Light, John Lowenhardt (2000), ‘A Wider Europe: The View 
from Moscow and Kyiv’, International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 77-88.
Whitman, Richard (1998), From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International 
Identity o f the European Union, Basingstoke: MacMillan.
298
Wilson, Andrew (2005), Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, New Haven, Conn., and 
London: Yale University Press.
Wise, Charles R. and Trevor L. Brown (1998), ‘The Consolidation of Democracy in 
Ukraine’, Democratization, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 116-137.
Wohlfeld, Monika (1997) (ed.), The Effects o f Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Chaillot Paper No. 26, Paris, Western European Union 
Institute for Security Studies.
Wolczuk, Kataryna (2001), ‘Ukraine: Tormented Constitution-Making’, in Jan Zielonka
(2001) (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Institutional Engineering, 
Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 243-268.
Wolczuk, Roman (2002), ‘Ukraine. Poland’s Failing Project’, in Ann Lewis (2002)
(ed.), The EU and Ukraine, London : Kogan Page, pp. 171-179.
Wood, Pia Christina (2002), ‘French Foreign Policy and Tunisia: Do Human Rights 
Matter?’, in Middle East Policy, Vol. IX, No. 2, June, pp. 92-110.
Woods, Ngaire (1996a), ‘The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations’, in 
Ngaire Woods (ed.), Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford: OUP, pp. 
9-31.
Woods Ngaire (1996b) (ed.), Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford: 
OUP.
Youngs, Richard (1998), ‘The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: The Need for 
Prioritization’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-24.
Youngs, Richard (2001), Democracy Promotion: The Case o f European Union Strategy. 
Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 167, October.
Youngs, Richard (2004), ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s 
External Identity’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 415-435.
Youngs, Richard (2005), Ten Years of the Barcelona Process: A Model for Supporting 
Arab Reform?’, FRIDE Working Paper No. 2.
Youngs, Richard (2006a), Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow o f September 11, 
Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Youngs, Richard (2006b) (ed.), Survey o f European Democracy Promotion Policies 
2000-2006, Madrid: FRIDE.
Zaborowski, Marcin (2004), ‘From America’s protege to constructive European. Polish 
security policy in the twenty-first century’, Occasional Papers No. 56, Paris: EU 
Institute for Security Studies, December.
Zanger, Sabine C. (2000), ‘Good Governance and European Aid. The Impact of Political 
Conditionality’, European Union Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 293-317.
299
Zielonka, Jan (1998a), Explaining Euro-Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in 
International Politics, Basingstoke, MacMillan.
Zielonka, Jan (1998b) (ed.), Paradoxes o f European Foreign Policy, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International.
Zielonka, Jan (2001) (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Institutional 
Engineering, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zlenko, Anatol (2001), ‘Ukraine and the EU: It Takes Two to Tango’, in Ann Lewis
(2002) (ed.), The EU and Ukraine, London : Kogan Page, pp. 21-25.
Zulueta Fiilscher, Kimana (2008), ‘Democracy promotion during Zapatero’s 
government, 2004-2008’, Democracy Backgrounder, No. 13, Madrid: FRIDE.
300
